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題名 利潤分配談判、阻礙式專利與社會福利 : Schumpeter成長模型的分析
Profit-division bargaining, blocking patents, and social welfare in a Schumpeterian growth model作者 陳逸倫
Chen, I-Lun貢獻者 賴景昌
Lai, Ching-Chong
陳逸倫
Chen, I-Lun關鍵詞 研發
阻礙式專利
利潤分配
談判
福利
R&D
Blocking patents
Profit-division
Bargain
Social welfare日期 2019 上傳時間 7-Aug-2019 16:48:57 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文在品質提升的R&D內生成長模型的基礎下，建構了具有阻礙式專利(blocking patents)的及利潤分配(profit-division rule)特性的模型，並引進一般化Nash談判(generalized Nash bargain)的函數形式，讓研發廠商擁有各自的談判力量，來解決研發廠商之間的利益衝突。政府有兩種政策工具，專利權的保護及研發勞動成本的補貼，在此架構下探討以上的參數對經濟成長及社會福利的影響。我們發現隨著新一代研發廠商的談判力量、專利權的保護程度及政府提供的補貼比例愈大時，愈能夠帶動經濟成長; 反之，隨著新一代研發廠商的談判力量、專利權的保護程度及政府提供的補貼比例愈小時，經濟成長會隨之下降。在社會福利方面，我們列出經濟體所有存在的外部性，並分析如何透過專利權的保護及研發勞動的補貼來矯正外部性;其中，發現次佳政策下的最適專利權保護政策及勞動補貼政策為兩個非獨立的政府政策工具。最後，也發現最佳政策與次佳政策求解出的最適補貼相同，經濟成長率等內生變數的均衡值也皆相同，因此次佳政策求解出的補貼足以矯正經濟體存在的外部性，將經濟體帶回到Pareto最適的狀態。
This thesis develops a quality-ladder growth model with blocking patents and the profit-division rule. Our model introduces generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine the distribution of profits between current and former inventors. In our model, each of these two innovators owns its bargaining power. Also, the government has two policy instruments to improve social welfare: patents breadth and R&D subsidies. The main focus of this thesis is to study whether the relative bargaining power between current and former inventors, patents breadth, and R&D subsidies are powerful to affect economic growth and social welfare.Some main findings emerge from the analysis. First, in association with increases in the bargaining power, the extent of patents protection, and the subsidy rate on R&D production, the economy`s growth rate will rise in response, and vice versa. This study also deals with the welfare analysis, and our analysis focuses on whether the government`s R&D subsidy policy is effective to correct the externalities associated with R&D production. Second, both policy instruments of patent protection and R&D subsidies are mutually dependent when the government seeks for the second-best optimum. Finally, we find that the optimal subsidy rate on R&D production at the second-best optimum are equal to that at the first-best optimum, and all relevant endogenous variables are the same under both the second-best regime and the first-best regime. Accordingly, the optimum subsidy polity on R&D production in second best optimum can eliminate all distortions within the model, and bring the economy back to the Pareto optimum equilibrium.參考文獻 一、中文部份賴景昌(2018)，內生成長理論，政大經研所上課講義。賴景昌(2015)，內生成長理論：品質提升模型，逢甲經研所上課講義 。賴景昌(2013)，R&D 內生成長理論，逢甲經研所上課講義。賴景昌(2005)，工資談判理論(Union Bargaining Theory)，輔大經研所上課講義。賴景昌(1993)，國際金融理論：基礎篇，台北：茂昌。二、英文部份Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (1992). A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica, 60 (2), 323-351.Booth, A. L. (1995). The economics of the trade union. Cambridge (Eng.): Cambridge University Press.Cozzi, G. (2007). The Arrow effect under competitive R&D. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics, 7 (1), 1-18.Cozzi, G., Giordani, P. E., & Zamparelli, L. (2007). The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models. Journal of Economic Theory, 136 (1), 788-797.Chu, A. C. (2009). Effects of blocking patents on R&D: A quantitative DGE analysis. Journal of Economic Growth, 14 (1), 55-78.Chu, A. C. (2011). The welfare cost of one-size-fits-all patent protection. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (6), 876-890.Chu, A. C., & Furukawa, Y. (2011). On the optimal mix of patent instruments. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (11), 1964-1975.Chu, A. C., & Pan, S. (2013). The escape-infringement effect of blocking patents on innovation and economic growth. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17 (4), 955-969.Furukawa, Y. (2007). The protection of intellectual property rights and endogenous growth: Is stronger always better?. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31 (11), 3644-3670.Futagami, K., & Iwaisako, T. (2007). Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model. Journal of Economic Theory, 132 (1), 306-33Gilbert, R., & Shapiro, C. (1990). Optimal patent length and breadth. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1), 106-112.Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991). Quality ladders in the theory of growth. The review of economic studies, 58 (1), 43-61.Green, J. R., & Scotchmer, S. (1995). On the division of profit in sequential innovation. The RAND Journal of Economics, 26 (1), 20-33.Goh, A. T., & Olivier, J. (2002). Optimal patent protection in a two-sector economy. International Economic Review, 43 (4), 1191-1214.Judd, K. L. (1985). On the performance of patents. Econometrica, 53 (3), 567-585.Klemperer, P. (1990). How broad should the scope of patent protection be?. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1), 113-130.Li, C. W. (2001). On the policy implications of endogenous technological progress. The Economic Journal, 111 (471), C164-C179.Lai, C. C., & Liao, C. H. (2012). Optimal nonlinear income taxation with productive government expenditure. International Review of Economics & Finance, 22 (1), 66-77.Mundell, R. A. (1962). The appropriate use of monetary and fiscal policy under fixed exchange rates. IMF Staff Papers, 9 (1), 70-79.O`donoghue, T., & Zweimüller, J. (2004). Patents in a model of endogenous growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (1), 81-123.Scotchmer, S. (1996). Protecting early innovators: should second-generation products be patentable?. The Rand Journal of Economics, 27 (2), 322-331.Segerstrom, P. S. (1998). Endogenous growth without scale effects. The American Economic Review, 88 (5), 1290-1310.Shapiro, C. (2001). Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting. In A. Jaffe, J. Lerner, & S. Stern (Eds.), Innovation policy and the economy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Tinbergen, J. (1956). Economic policy: principles and design. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Yang, Y. (2018). On the optimality of IPR protection with blocking patents. Review of Economic Dynamics, 27 (1), 205-230. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
106258032資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106258032 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 賴景昌 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lai, Ching-Chong en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳逸倫 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, I-Lun en_US dc.creator (作者) 陳逸倫 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chen, I-Lun en_US dc.date (日期) 2019 en_US dc.date.accessioned 7-Aug-2019 16:48:57 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 7-Aug-2019 16:48:57 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Aug-2019 16:48:57 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106258032 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124939 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 經濟學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106258032 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文在品質提升的R&D內生成長模型的基礎下，建構了具有阻礙式專利(blocking patents)的及利潤分配(profit-division rule)特性的模型，並引進一般化Nash談判(generalized Nash bargain)的函數形式，讓研發廠商擁有各自的談判力量，來解決研發廠商之間的利益衝突。政府有兩種政策工具，專利權的保護及研發勞動成本的補貼，在此架構下探討以上的參數對經濟成長及社會福利的影響。我們發現隨著新一代研發廠商的談判力量、專利權的保護程度及政府提供的補貼比例愈大時，愈能夠帶動經濟成長; 反之，隨著新一代研發廠商的談判力量、專利權的保護程度及政府提供的補貼比例愈小時，經濟成長會隨之下降。在社會福利方面，我們列出經濟體所有存在的外部性，並分析如何透過專利權的保護及研發勞動的補貼來矯正外部性;其中，發現次佳政策下的最適專利權保護政策及勞動補貼政策為兩個非獨立的政府政策工具。最後，也發現最佳政策與次佳政策求解出的最適補貼相同，經濟成長率等內生變數的均衡值也皆相同，因此次佳政策求解出的補貼足以矯正經濟體存在的外部性，將經濟體帶回到Pareto最適的狀態。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis develops a quality-ladder growth model with blocking patents and the profit-division rule. Our model introduces generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine the distribution of profits between current and former inventors. In our model, each of these two innovators owns its bargaining power. Also, the government has two policy instruments to improve social welfare: patents breadth and R&D subsidies. The main focus of this thesis is to study whether the relative bargaining power between current and former inventors, patents breadth, and R&D subsidies are powerful to affect economic growth and social welfare.Some main findings emerge from the analysis. First, in association with increases in the bargaining power, the extent of patents protection, and the subsidy rate on R&D production, the economy`s growth rate will rise in response, and vice versa. This study also deals with the welfare analysis, and our analysis focuses on whether the government`s R&D subsidy policy is effective to correct the externalities associated with R&D production. Second, both policy instruments of patent protection and R&D subsidies are mutually dependent when the government seeks for the second-best optimum. Finally, we find that the optimal subsidy rate on R&D production at the second-best optimum are equal to that at the first-best optimum, and all relevant endogenous variables are the same under both the second-best regime and the first-best regime. Accordingly, the optimum subsidy polity on R&D production in second best optimum can eliminate all distortions within the model, and bring the economy back to the Pareto optimum equilibrium. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機 1第二節 文獻回顧 3第三節 本文架構 4第二章 理論模型 5第一節 各部門之決策行為 5第二節 競爭均衡 18第三章 福利分析 26第一節 次佳政策(Second-best optimum) 26第二節 最佳政策(First-best optimum) 33第四章 結論 37本文附錄 39附錄A 39附錄B 39附錄C 41附錄D 42參考文獻 45 zh_TW dc.format.extent 690504 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106258032 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 研發 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 阻礙式專利 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 利潤分配 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 談判 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 福利 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) R&D en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Blocking patents en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Profit-division en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Bargain en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Social welfare en_US dc.title (題名) 利潤分配談判、阻礙式專利與社會福利 : Schumpeter成長模型的分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Profit-division bargaining, blocking patents, and social welfare in a Schumpeterian growth model en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文部份賴景昌(2018)，內生成長理論，政大經研所上課講義。賴景昌(2015)，內生成長理論：品質提升模型，逢甲經研所上課講義 。賴景昌(2013)，R&D 內生成長理論，逢甲經研所上課講義。賴景昌(2005)，工資談判理論(Union Bargaining Theory)，輔大經研所上課講義。賴景昌(1993)，國際金融理論：基礎篇，台北：茂昌。二、英文部份Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (1992). A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica, 60 (2), 323-351.Booth, A. L. (1995). The economics of the trade union. Cambridge (Eng.): Cambridge University Press.Cozzi, G. (2007). The Arrow effect under competitive R&D. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics, 7 (1), 1-18.Cozzi, G., Giordani, P. E., & Zamparelli, L. (2007). The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models. Journal of Economic Theory, 136 (1), 788-797.Chu, A. C. (2009). Effects of blocking patents on R&D: A quantitative DGE analysis. Journal of Economic Growth, 14 (1), 55-78.Chu, A. C. (2011). The welfare cost of one-size-fits-all patent protection. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (6), 876-890.Chu, A. C., & Furukawa, Y. (2011). On the optimal mix of patent instruments. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (11), 1964-1975.Chu, A. C., & Pan, S. (2013). The escape-infringement effect of blocking patents on innovation and economic growth. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17 (4), 955-969.Furukawa, Y. (2007). The protection of intellectual property rights and endogenous growth: Is stronger always better?. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31 (11), 3644-3670.Futagami, K., & Iwaisako, T. (2007). Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model. Journal of Economic Theory, 132 (1), 306-33Gilbert, R., & Shapiro, C. (1990). Optimal patent length and breadth. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1), 106-112.Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991). Quality ladders in the theory of growth. The review of economic studies, 58 (1), 43-61.Green, J. R., & Scotchmer, S. (1995). On the division of profit in sequential innovation. The RAND Journal of Economics, 26 (1), 20-33.Goh, A. T., & Olivier, J. (2002). Optimal patent protection in a two-sector economy. International Economic Review, 43 (4), 1191-1214.Judd, K. L. (1985). On the performance of patents. Econometrica, 53 (3), 567-585.Klemperer, P. (1990). How broad should the scope of patent protection be?. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1), 113-130.Li, C. W. (2001). On the policy implications of endogenous technological progress. The Economic Journal, 111 (471), C164-C179.Lai, C. C., & Liao, C. H. (2012). Optimal nonlinear income taxation with productive government expenditure. International Review of Economics & Finance, 22 (1), 66-77.Mundell, R. A. (1962). The appropriate use of monetary and fiscal policy under fixed exchange rates. IMF Staff Papers, 9 (1), 70-79.O`donoghue, T., & Zweimüller, J. (2004). Patents in a model of endogenous growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (1), 81-123.Scotchmer, S. (1996). Protecting early innovators: should second-generation products be patentable?. The Rand Journal of Economics, 27 (2), 322-331.Segerstrom, P. S. (1998). Endogenous growth without scale effects. The American Economic Review, 88 (5), 1290-1310.Shapiro, C. (2001). Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting. In A. Jaffe, J. Lerner, & S. Stern (Eds.), Innovation policy and the economy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Tinbergen, J. (1956). Economic policy: principles and design. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Yang, Y. (2018). On the optimality of IPR protection with blocking patents. Review of Economic Dynamics, 27 (1), 205-230. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900373 en_US
