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題名 企業網絡連結與租稅規避
Network connections among firms and tax avoidance作者 林子傑
Lin, Tzu-Chieh貢獻者 何怡澄<br>郭振雄
林子傑
Lin, Tzu-Chieh關鍵詞 社會網絡分析
董事會連結
租稅規避
social network analysis
board interlocks
tax avoidance日期 2019 上傳時間 7-Aug-2019 16:50:25 (UTC+8) 摘要 社會網絡是資訊流通的渠道,公司管理階層能藉由其自身之社會網絡接觸到各種能應用於公司的資訊。社會學學習理論指出個體會模仿社會網絡中其他個體之行為,進而造成公司觀念及策略的擴散。本研究探討企業網絡關係與租稅規避的關係,欲檢驗避稅策略是否會隨社會網絡連結而由低稅率公司向外擴散,本文於主要分析中以董事會連結(board interlocks)當作企業網絡關係的代理變數。除在主要迴歸分析研究探討與低稅率公司連結的各種特性外,並於額外分析部分再引入網絡中心度概念及企業策略特性加以分析。本研究以2002年至2016年的臺灣上市櫃公司(排除TDR、KY股與金融業)為研究樣本,使用一般最小平方法進行迴歸分析。結果發現,公司自身如存在與低稅率公司的連結或是位在整個社會董事會連結網絡的中心皆有助於增加其避稅程度。
Information diffuses through social networks. Social learning theory discussed in sociology indicates that one would imitate other individuals` actions, and therefore leads to diffusion of concepts and strategies. This study discusses the relation between firms` network connections and tax avoidance and hopes to examine whether tax avoidance strategies transfer from low-tax firms to other firms through network connections. In this study, I primarily use board interlocks to measure network connections. Besides considering different attributes of the board interlocks, this study also takes the concept of network centrality and firms’ business strategies into consideration for additional analysis.This study focuses on listed Taiwanese companies from 2002 to 2016, using ordinary least square (OLS) regression method to test the hypotheses. The empirical results show that if the firm itself has connections with low-tax firms or has a higher level of degree of centrality, it will avoid more taxes.參考文獻 陳明進與蔡麗雯, (2006), 財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究,管理學報,23(6),739-763。郭振雄、何怡澄、徐書凡與彭火樹,(2017),企業策略、企業社會責任報告與租稅規避之關聯性,中華會計學刊,12卷特刊,367-421。楊子江、司徒達賢與黃俊英,(1988),策略性組織關聯與事業風險及財務報酬關係之研究─企業董監事連結策略的應用,管理評論,7卷,131-151。Borgatti, S. P., & Foster, P. C. (2003). The network paradigm in organizational research: A review and typology. Journal of management, 29(6), 991-1013.Borgatti, S., & Rob Cross. (2003). A Relational View of Information Seeking and Learning in Social Networks. Management Science, 49(4), 432-445.Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. (2002). Ucinet 6 for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.Boyd, B. (1990). Corporate Linkages and Organizational Environment: A Test of the Resource Dependence Model. Strategic Management Journal, 11(6), 419-430.Brown, J. L. (2011). The spread of aggressive corporate tax reporting: A detailed examination of the corporate-owned life insurance shelter. The Accounting Review, 86(1), 23-57.Brown, J. L., & Drake, K. D. (2014). Network ties among low-tax firms. The Accounting Review, 89(2), 483-510.Cai, Ye, Dan S. Dhaliwal, Yongtae Kim, and Carrie Pan. (2014). Board Interlocks and the Diffusion of Disclosure Policy. Review of Accounting Studies, 19(3), 1086-1119.Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?. Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41-61.Cheng, Shijun & Felix, Robert & Zhao, Yijiang. (2019). Board interlock networks and informed short sales. Journal of Banking & Finance, 98(C), 198-211.Cook, K., & Omer, T. (2013). The Cost of Independence: Evidence from Firms` Decisions to Dismiss Auditors as Tax-Service Providers. Available at SSRN, 1549705.David F. Larcker, Eric C. So, Charles C.Y. Wang, Boardroom centrality and firm performance. (2013). Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(2–3), 225-250.Davis, G. F., & Greve, H. R. (1997). Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 1980s. American journal of sociology, 103(1), 1-37.Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. (2006). Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 145-179.Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. (2009). Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(3), 537-546.Dyreng, S. D., Hoopes, J. L., & Wilde, J. H. (2016). Public pressure and corporate tax behavior. Journal of Accounting Research, 54(1), 147-186.Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review , 83 (1), 61–82.Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1995). Size and book to market factors in earnings and returns. The journal of finance, 50(1), 131-155.Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78,1360-1380.Granovetter, M. (2005). The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (1): 33–50.Gulati, R., & Gargiulo, M. (1999). Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come From? American Journal of Sociology, 104(5), 1439-1493.Gulati, R., & Higgins, M. (2003). Which Ties Matter When? The Contingent Effects of Interorganizational Partnerships on IPO Success. Strategic Management Journal, 24(2), 127-144.Gulati, R., & Westphal, J. (1999). Cooperative or Controlling? The Effects of CEO-Board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint Ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(3), 473-506.Hanlon, M., & Slemrod, J. (2009). What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 126-141.Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics , 50 (2-3), 127–178.Hansen, M. T. (1999). The search-transfer problem: The role of weak ties in sharing knowledge across organization subunits. Administrative science quarterly, 44(1), 82-111.Haunschild, P. (1994). How Much is That Company Worth?: Interorganizational Relationships, Uncertainty, and Acquisition Premiums. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), 391-411.Haunschild, P. R. (1993). Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity. Administrative science quarterly, 564-592.Higgins, D., T. C. Omer, and J. D. Phillips. 2015. “The influence of a firm’s business strategy on its tax aggressiveness.” Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (2): 374-702.Hines, J., & Rice, E. (1994). Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(1), 149-182.Kang, E. (2008), Director interlocks and spillover effects of reputational penalties from financial reporting fraud, Academy of Management Journal, 51(3), 537-555.Kim, J. B., Li, Y., & Zhang, L. (2011). Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(3), 639-662.Lamb, N. H., & Roundy, P. (2016). The “ties that bind” board interlocks research: a systematic review. Management Research Review, 39(11), 1516-1542.Larcker, D. F., So, E. C., & Wang, C. C. (2013). Boardroom centrality and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(2-3), 225-250.Lo, A. W. Y., Wong, R. M. K., & Firth, M. (2010). Tax, financial reporting, and tunneling incentives for income shifting: An empirical analysis of the transfer pricing behavior of Chinese-listed companies. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 32(2), 1-26.Manzon, G.B. and Plesko, G.A. (2002) The Relation between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income. Tax Law Review, 55, 176-195.McGuire, S. T., Omer, T. C., & Wang, D. (2012). Tax avoidance: Does tax-specific industry expertise make a difference?. The Accounting Review, 87(3), 975-1003.Miles, R. E., and C. C. Snow. (1978). Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.Miles, R. E., and C. C. Snow. (2003). Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Minnick, K. & Noga, T., (2010). Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(5), 703-718.Okhmatovskiy, I., & David, R. (2012). Setting Your Own Standards: Internal Corporate Governance Codes as a Response to Institutional Pressure. Organization Science, 23(1), 155-176.Podolny, J. (2001). Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Market. American Journal of Sociology, 107(1), 33-60.Pombo, C. & Gutierrez, Luis H. (2011). Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups, Journal of Economics and Business, 63(4), 251-277.Powers, K., Robinson, J. R., & Stomberg, B. (2016). How do CEO incentives affect corporate tax planning and financial reporting of income taxes?. Review of Accounting Studies, 21(2), 672-710.Rindfleisch, A., & Moorman, C. (2001). The acquisition and utilization of information in new product alliances: A strength-of-ties perspective. Journal of marketing, 65(2), 1-18.Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of innovations (5th ed.). New York: Free Press.Sanchez, L. P. C., & Barroso-Castro, C. (2015). It is useful to consider the interlocks according to the type of board member (executive or non-executive) who posseses them? Their effect on firm performance. Revista Europea de Direccion y Economia de la Empresa, 24(3), 130-137.Sean T. McGuire, Dechun Wang, and Ryan J. Wilson (2014). Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review, 89(4), 1487-1516.Zaheer, A., Gozubuyuk, R., & Milanov, H. (2010). It`s the connections: The network perspective in interorganizational research. Academy of management perspectives, 24(1), 62-77. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
106255002資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255002 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 何怡澄<br>郭振雄 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林子傑 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Tzu-Chieh en_US dc.creator (作者) 林子傑 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lin, Tzu-Chieh en_US dc.date (日期) 2019 en_US dc.date.accessioned 7-Aug-2019 16:50:25 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 7-Aug-2019 16:50:25 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Aug-2019 16:50:25 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106255002 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124948 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106255002 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 社會網絡是資訊流通的渠道,公司管理階層能藉由其自身之社會網絡接觸到各種能應用於公司的資訊。社會學學習理論指出個體會模仿社會網絡中其他個體之行為,進而造成公司觀念及策略的擴散。本研究探討企業網絡關係與租稅規避的關係,欲檢驗避稅策略是否會隨社會網絡連結而由低稅率公司向外擴散,本文於主要分析中以董事會連結(board interlocks)當作企業網絡關係的代理變數。除在主要迴歸分析研究探討與低稅率公司連結的各種特性外,並於額外分析部分再引入網絡中心度概念及企業策略特性加以分析。本研究以2002年至2016年的臺灣上市櫃公司(排除TDR、KY股與金融業)為研究樣本,使用一般最小平方法進行迴歸分析。結果發現,公司自身如存在與低稅率公司的連結或是位在整個社會董事會連結網絡的中心皆有助於增加其避稅程度。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Information diffuses through social networks. Social learning theory discussed in sociology indicates that one would imitate other individuals` actions, and therefore leads to diffusion of concepts and strategies. This study discusses the relation between firms` network connections and tax avoidance and hopes to examine whether tax avoidance strategies transfer from low-tax firms to other firms through network connections. In this study, I primarily use board interlocks to measure network connections. Besides considering different attributes of the board interlocks, this study also takes the concept of network centrality and firms’ business strategies into consideration for additional analysis.This study focuses on listed Taiwanese companies from 2002 to 2016, using ordinary least square (OLS) regression method to test the hypotheses. The empirical results show that if the firm itself has connections with low-tax firms or has a higher level of degree of centrality, it will avoid more taxes. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景及動機 1第二節 研究流程 3第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立 4第一節 租稅規避 5第二節 董事會連結 6第三節 假說建立 8第參章 研究方法 11第一節 資料來源與樣本篩選 11第二節 董事會連結變數?明 12第三節 租稅規避指標 13第四節 研究模型 14第五節 控制變數 18第肆章 實證結果 23第一節 敘述統計 23第二節 實證結果分析 31第三節 額外分析 41第伍章 結論及研究限制 55第一節 結論 55第二節 研究限制 56參考文獻 58 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1023723 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255002 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 社會網絡分析 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事會連結 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅規避 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) social network analysis en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) board interlocks en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) tax avoidance en_US dc.title (題名) 企業網絡連結與租稅規避 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Network connections among firms and tax avoidance en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 陳明進與蔡麗雯, (2006), 財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究,管理學報,23(6),739-763。郭振雄、何怡澄、徐書凡與彭火樹,(2017),企業策略、企業社會責任報告與租稅規避之關聯性,中華會計學刊,12卷特刊,367-421。楊子江、司徒達賢與黃俊英,(1988),策略性組織關聯與事業風險及財務報酬關係之研究─企業董監事連結策略的應用,管理評論,7卷,131-151。Borgatti, S. P., & Foster, P. C. (2003). The network paradigm in organizational research: A review and typology. Journal of management, 29(6), 991-1013.Borgatti, S., & Rob Cross. (2003). A Relational View of Information Seeking and Learning in Social Networks. Management Science, 49(4), 432-445.Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. (2002). Ucinet 6 for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.Boyd, B. (1990). Corporate Linkages and Organizational Environment: A Test of the Resource Dependence Model. Strategic Management Journal, 11(6), 419-430.Brown, J. L. (2011). The spread of aggressive corporate tax reporting: A detailed examination of the corporate-owned life insurance shelter. The Accounting Review, 86(1), 23-57.Brown, J. L., & Drake, K. D. (2014). Network ties among low-tax firms. The Accounting Review, 89(2), 483-510.Cai, Ye, Dan S. Dhaliwal, Yongtae Kim, and Carrie Pan. (2014). Board Interlocks and the Diffusion of Disclosure Policy. Review of Accounting Studies, 19(3), 1086-1119.Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?. Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41-61.Cheng, Shijun & Felix, Robert & Zhao, Yijiang. (2019). Board interlock networks and informed short sales. Journal of Banking & Finance, 98(C), 198-211.Cook, K., & Omer, T. (2013). The Cost of Independence: Evidence from Firms` Decisions to Dismiss Auditors as Tax-Service Providers. Available at SSRN, 1549705.David F. Larcker, Eric C. So, Charles C.Y. Wang, Boardroom centrality and firm performance. (2013). Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(2–3), 225-250.Davis, G. F., & Greve, H. R. (1997). Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 1980s. American journal of sociology, 103(1), 1-37.Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. (2006). Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 145-179.Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. (2009). Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(3), 537-546.Dyreng, S. D., Hoopes, J. L., & Wilde, J. H. (2016). Public pressure and corporate tax behavior. Journal of Accounting Research, 54(1), 147-186.Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review , 83 (1), 61–82.Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1995). Size and book to market factors in earnings and returns. The journal of finance, 50(1), 131-155.Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78,1360-1380.Granovetter, M. (2005). The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (1): 33–50.Gulati, R., & Gargiulo, M. (1999). Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come From? American Journal of Sociology, 104(5), 1439-1493.Gulati, R., & Higgins, M. (2003). Which Ties Matter When? The Contingent Effects of Interorganizational Partnerships on IPO Success. Strategic Management Journal, 24(2), 127-144.Gulati, R., & Westphal, J. (1999). Cooperative or Controlling? The Effects of CEO-Board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint Ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(3), 473-506.Hanlon, M., & Slemrod, J. (2009). What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 126-141.Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics , 50 (2-3), 127–178.Hansen, M. T. (1999). The search-transfer problem: The role of weak ties in sharing knowledge across organization subunits. Administrative science quarterly, 44(1), 82-111.Haunschild, P. (1994). How Much is That Company Worth?: Interorganizational Relationships, Uncertainty, and Acquisition Premiums. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), 391-411.Haunschild, P. R. (1993). Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity. Administrative science quarterly, 564-592.Higgins, D., T. C. Omer, and J. D. Phillips. 2015. “The influence of a firm’s business strategy on its tax aggressiveness.” Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (2): 374-702.Hines, J., & Rice, E. (1994). Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(1), 149-182.Kang, E. (2008), Director interlocks and spillover effects of reputational penalties from financial reporting fraud, Academy of Management Journal, 51(3), 537-555.Kim, J. B., Li, Y., & Zhang, L. (2011). Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(3), 639-662.Lamb, N. H., & Roundy, P. (2016). The “ties that bind” board interlocks research: a systematic review. Management Research Review, 39(11), 1516-1542.Larcker, D. F., So, E. C., & Wang, C. C. (2013). Boardroom centrality and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(2-3), 225-250.Lo, A. W. Y., Wong, R. M. K., & Firth, M. (2010). Tax, financial reporting, and tunneling incentives for income shifting: An empirical analysis of the transfer pricing behavior of Chinese-listed companies. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 32(2), 1-26.Manzon, G.B. and Plesko, G.A. (2002) The Relation between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income. Tax Law Review, 55, 176-195.McGuire, S. T., Omer, T. C., & Wang, D. (2012). Tax avoidance: Does tax-specific industry expertise make a difference?. The Accounting Review, 87(3), 975-1003.Miles, R. E., and C. C. Snow. (1978). Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.Miles, R. E., and C. C. Snow. (2003). Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Minnick, K. & Noga, T., (2010). Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(5), 703-718.Okhmatovskiy, I., & David, R. (2012). Setting Your Own Standards: Internal Corporate Governance Codes as a Response to Institutional Pressure. Organization Science, 23(1), 155-176.Podolny, J. (2001). Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Market. American Journal of Sociology, 107(1), 33-60.Pombo, C. & Gutierrez, Luis H. (2011). Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups, Journal of Economics and Business, 63(4), 251-277.Powers, K., Robinson, J. R., & Stomberg, B. (2016). How do CEO incentives affect corporate tax planning and financial reporting of income taxes?. Review of Accounting Studies, 21(2), 672-710.Rindfleisch, A., & Moorman, C. (2001). The acquisition and utilization of information in new product alliances: A strength-of-ties perspective. Journal of marketing, 65(2), 1-18.Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of innovations (5th ed.). New York: Free Press.Sanchez, L. P. C., & Barroso-Castro, C. (2015). It is useful to consider the interlocks according to the type of board member (executive or non-executive) who posseses them? Their effect on firm performance. Revista Europea de Direccion y Economia de la Empresa, 24(3), 130-137.Sean T. McGuire, Dechun Wang, and Ryan J. Wilson (2014). Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review, 89(4), 1487-1516.Zaheer, A., Gozubuyuk, R., & Milanov, H. (2010). It`s the connections: The network perspective in interorganizational research. Academy of management perspectives, 24(1), 62-77. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900339 en_US