| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳文傑 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wu, Wen-Chieh | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 李義善 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Lee, Yi-Shan | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 李義善 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lee, Yi-Shan | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2019 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 7-Aug-2019 17:20:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 7-Aug-2019 17:20:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 7-Aug-2019 17:20:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G1062660091 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125106 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程(IMES) | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 106266009 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本研究使用美國職棒大聯盟資料，旨在探究運動市場裡的勞動經濟學。即使目前已有諸多研究探討美國職棒大聯盟裡的勞動市場，本論文之研究方法有別於過往文獻。隨者美國職棒大聯盟的歷史發展所延伸出的制度變化提供研究者充分的資源運用。本研究採用實證研究之方式探討MLB的球員表現與薪資之間的均衡並納入球員不同階段的身分。過往諸多文獻皆指出球員傾向於在合約年表現會特別突出，此及合約效果並於簽訂合約後表現將下滑，此即為怠惰與拿喬。有別於過往研究，在納入球員身分因素考量後本研究估計球員過往的表現是如何影響未來下一階段身分的薪資並同樣檢視美國職棒大聯盟的投手是否如打者一樣存在者合約要果。本研究主要發現: 當球團在與選手簽訂契約時依照球員過去表現的時間具有不同參考價值且愈趨近於合約年之表現其參考價值愈高;此外本研究發現球員的身分限制使得薪資具有僵固性，因而無法達成勞動市場的薪資與表現的均衡。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This thesis conducts research using Major League Baseball (MLB) data. Though so far numerous researches have been using MLB data to discover the sports labor economics theoretically and empirically, these researches have been conducted on different points. With the long history of the MLB, institutions have changed as time changes, and thus offering the researcher abundant sources to conduct different researches.This thesis uses empirical research to explore the relationship between performance and wage considering different athlete statuses. The past empirical literature’s main finding is athletes tend to perform better in the contract year and to reveal the shirk effect in line with the terms of the contract.Unlike the methodology of previous literature and findings, this thesis estimates how the past pitcher ERA (Earned Run Average) affects their wage in the future and examines the contract effect.The main findings are when a sports team is making a decision to sign a new contract, it should value the performance more as it approaches the contract year, that is the different time value of reference. The empirical research gives the reason why the contract effect always exists by considering the performance of time reference value and the present institution makes it hard to reach performance and wage equilibrium. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | TABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract I1. Introduction 11.1 Background 11.2 Historical evolution in MLB institution 41.3 Methodology 51.4 Research Limitations 61.5 Framework 72.Literature review 83.Models and Estimation 123.1.1 Panel Data and Fixed-Effects Regression Model 144.Data Source and Sample 154.1 Variables and expected signs 154.1.1 Dependent variable (WAGE) 154.1.2 Explanatory variables and dummy variables for outcome variable wage 164.1.3 Dependent variable (perf) 184.1.4 Explanatory variables and Dummy variables for outcome variable perf 195.Empirical results 236.Conclusion and suggestions 287.References 30 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 638206 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1062660091 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 合約效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 拿喬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 理性預期 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 時間參考價值 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Contract effect | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Shirk | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Rational expectation | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Time value of reference | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 合約表現與薪資差異-以美國職棒大聯盟投手為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Contract effect, athlete performance and wage difference using MLB pitcher | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Rottenberg, Simmon (1956). "The Baseball Players` Labor Market". Journal of Political Economy Vol.64, No.3,242-258.O`Neill, Heather M. and Hummel, Matthew J (2011). "Do Major League Baseball Hitters Come Up Big in Their Contract Year?". Business and Economics Faculty Publications.8.O`Neill, Heather M.(2013). Do Major League Baseball Hitters Engage in Opportunistic Behavior?.International Atlantic Economic Society 2013Sloane J. Peter(2006). Rottenberg and the Economics of Sport after 50 Years: An Evaluation. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2175Stankiewicz, Katie (2009). "Length of Contracts and the Effect on the Performance of MLB Players,"The Park Place Economist: Vol. 17Charles R. Link1 and Martin Yosifov1 (2012). Contract Length and Salaries Compensating Wage Differentials in Major League Baseball.Journal of Sports Economics 13(1) 3-19Turner Chad and Jahn Hakes (2007). Pay, productivity and aging in Major League Baseball MPRA Paper No. 4326Scully W. Gereald (1974). Pay and performance in Major League Baseball.The American Economic Review, Volume 64, Issue 6, 915-930.Stiroh J. Kevin (2007). PLAYING FOR KEEPS: PAY AND PERFORMANCE IN THE NBAEconomic Inquiry November 27, 2006 Vol. 45, No. 1, 145–161Solow L. John and Anthony Charles Krautmann (2009). The Dynamics of Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball Long-Term Contracts Journal of Sports economics 10(1)Tao Yu-Li (2014). Three essays on Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball.Leeds, Sakata and Allmen (2012). Determinants of Attendance at Nippon Professional Baseball Games. Journal of sports economics. doi.org/10.1177/1527002510394294Findlay A. Hilary A. Rachell Corbat. The rights of athletics, Coaches and Participant in Sport (2000) | zh_TW |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6814/NCCU201900334 | en_US |
