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題名 薪酬揭露人數與盈餘管理之關聯性
作者 黃宣蓉
Huang, Hsuan-Jung
貢獻者 梁嘉紋
黃宣蓉
Huang, Hsuan-Jung
關鍵詞 薪酬揭露
盈餘管理
價值攸關性
Compensation disclosure
Earnings management
Value relevance
日期 2019
上傳時間 5-Feb-2020 17:06:05 (UTC+8)
摘要 國際高階管理階層薪酬規範趨勢逐步從資訊揭露、薪酬與績效結合到股東薪酬話語權的規範，而為了使股東參與能發揮實質監督功能，個別揭露現已被視為一良好的做法。然而，個別揭露規範在我國頗具爭議，主管機關折衷以彙總搭配級距揭露方式於年報揭露公司之薪酬資訊，在我國採取實質認定揭露對象下，揭露人數多寡勢必會影響資訊內涵。本研究透過經理人資訊揭露動機與盈餘管理，以及資訊揭露與企業價值之關聯，分別探討薪酬揭露人數是否與盈餘管理具關聯性，以及是否具有價值攸關性。實證結果顯示薪酬揭露人數與盈餘管理具關聯性，當揭露人數越多，向上應計基礎盈餘管理程度越低；而實質盈餘管理方面，當揭露人數越多，向下實質盈餘管理程度會越高。在價值攸關性方面，實證發現外部投資者以資訊觀點為重，揭露越少人數越能直接辨識解讀薪酬資訊，資訊揭露程度越高因而使公司價值提升。本研究實證結果對我國彙總搭配級距式薪酬揭露之影響以及揭露對象規範之研究提供不同思考方向及初步證據。
Executive compensation disclosure on an individual basis has been regarded as a better disclosure practice of executive pay. However, authorities in Taiwan compromised to a disclosure of individual executive’s pay in brackets and a lump-sum total for the executive group as a whole. Under such pay disclosure practice, it is unclear whether including more executives in the executive group when reporting executive compensation is informative to the outsiders. This study explores whether the number of executives whose compensation is disclosed to the public is associated with earnings management and whether it is value relevant. The empirical results suggest that the number of executives whose compensation is included in the compensation tables disclosed to the public is negatively associated with upward discretionary accruals and positively associated with downward earnings management. Empirical evidence also shows that the number of executives with compensation is included in reporting lump-sum total of executive pay is negatively associated with firm value, indicating that external investors consider including more executives in reporting total executive pay to be less informative.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
106353001
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353001
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃宣蓉zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang, Hsuan-Jungen_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃宣蓉zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Hsuan-Jungen_US
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned 5-Feb-2020 17:06:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 5-Feb-2020 17:06:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Feb-2020 17:06:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106353001en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/128556-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106353001zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 國際高階管理階層薪酬規範趨勢逐步從資訊揭露、薪酬與績效結合到股東薪酬話語權的規範，而為了使股東參與能發揮實質監督功能，個別揭露現已被視為一良好的做法。然而，個別揭露規範在我國頗具爭議，主管機關折衷以彙總搭配級距揭露方式於年報揭露公司之薪酬資訊，在我國採取實質認定揭露對象下，揭露人數多寡勢必會影響資訊內涵。本研究透過經理人資訊揭露動機與盈餘管理，以及資訊揭露與企業價值之關聯，分別探討薪酬揭露人數是否與盈餘管理具關聯性，以及是否具有價值攸關性。實證結果顯示薪酬揭露人數與盈餘管理具關聯性，當揭露人數越多，向上應計基礎盈餘管理程度越低；而實質盈餘管理方面，當揭露人數越多，向下實質盈餘管理程度會越高。在價值攸關性方面，實證發現外部投資者以資訊觀點為重，揭露越少人數越能直接辨識解讀薪酬資訊，資訊揭露程度越高因而使公司價值提升。本研究實證結果對我國彙總搭配級距式薪酬揭露之影響以及揭露對象規範之研究提供不同思考方向及初步證據。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Executive compensation disclosure on an individual basis has been regarded as a better disclosure practice of executive pay. However, authorities in Taiwan compromised to a disclosure of individual executive’s pay in brackets and a lump-sum total for the executive group as a whole. Under such pay disclosure practice, it is unclear whether including more executives in the executive group when reporting executive compensation is informative to the outsiders. This study explores whether the number of executives whose compensation is disclosed to the public is associated with earnings management and whether it is value relevant. The empirical results suggest that the number of executives whose compensation is included in the compensation tables disclosed to the public is negatively associated with upward discretionary accruals and positively associated with downward earnings management. Empirical evidence also shows that the number of executives with compensation is included in reporting lump-sum total of executive pay is negatively associated with firm value, indicating that external investors consider including more executives in reporting total executive pay to be less informative.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄
壹、 緒論 1
一、 研究動機 1
二、 研究問題 5
貳、 文獻探討與假說發展 6
一、 薪酬資訊揭露 6
二、 薪酬之揭露人數與盈餘管理之關聯 8
三、 薪酬之揭露人數之價值攸關性 9
參、 研究方法 10
一、 樣本選取與資料來源 10
二、 變數衡量與實證模型 11
(一) 高階經理人薪酬之揭露人數與盈餘管理之關聯性 11
(二) 高階經理人薪酬之揭露人數之價值攸關性 17
肆、 實證結果 18
一、 敘述統計 18
二、 迴歸結果分析 27
(一) 檢測H1：高階經理人薪酬之揭露人數與盈餘管理 27
(二) 檢測H2：高階經理人薪酬之揭露人數與價值攸關性 33
三、 額外分析 34
四、 敏感性分析 37
五、 延伸議題 38
伍、 結論與建議 40
陸、 參考文獻 41
附錄一、我國薪酬揭露規範 48
我國高階管理階層薪酬揭露法規沿革 48		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1711508 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353001en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬揭露zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 盈餘管理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 價值攸關性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Compensation disclosureen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Earnings managementen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Value relevanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 薪酬揭露人數與盈餘管理之關聯性zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) CSR@天下電子報，2018.6.21，同樣是CEO，年薪250萬和2億的差別在哪裡。
公視新聞網，2009.6.12，超級肥貓 大眾銀總經理年薪近億。
月旦會計網，2018.5.17，新版公司治理藍圖。
江家瑜、簡凌慧與薛敏正，2014，公司特質對應計與實質盈餘管理選擇的影響，中華會計學刊，第10期(1月)：頁1-32。
自由時報，2018.7.16，高鐵增2資深副總爆「肥貓」爭議 吳宏謀：將進一步了解。
林仁光，2006，董事會功能性分工之法制課題－經營權功能之強化與內部監控機制之設計，臺大法學論叢：35卷1期。
金融監督管理委員會，2018，新版公司治理藍圖(2018-2020)。
陳振遠、張智堯、王蘭芬與李文智，2004，應用 Ohlson 會計評價模型探究公司治理之價值攸關性—以台灣上市公司電子業為例，臺大管理論叢，第15卷，第2期：頁123-142。
經理人月刊，2010.1.12，稱他們「肥貓」，公平嗎。
廖益均，2014，董事及高管薪酬揭露概況─如何透過級距資料獲得額外訊息，貨幣觀測與信用評等，108期：頁35-43。
廖益興與陳昭蓉，2014，銀行進入公司董事會、代理問題與資訊不對稱之關聯性研究，人文及社會科學集刊，第26卷第4期：頁583-619。
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dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202000005en_US