| dc.contributor | 財管系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 湛可南 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chan, Konan | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chen, Hung-Kun | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hu, Shing-Yang | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Liu, Yu-Jane | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2018-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 20-Feb-2020 14:31:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 20-Feb-2020 14:31:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 20-Feb-2020 14:31:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/128725 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Our paper documents that companies may use corporate resources as attempts to protect personal incentives of insiders. When insiders pledge their shareholdings as collaterals for a personal loan, they are subject to margin calls as the stock prices may fall below the desired level. We argue that insiders may tend to protect their pledged shares to maintain their control right. Among plausible ways to support price, repurchases seem to be more effective to relieve the potential threat of margin calls on their share pledge. Our results also show that investors will perceive insiders’ incentive and hence discount the potential benefits of repurchase programs. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1676567 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.52, pp.96-117 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | share pledges ; repurchases ; controlling shareholders | |
| dc.title (題名) | Share Pledgpes and Margin Call Pressure | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.08.003 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.08.003 | |
