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題名 Supply chain investment and de-escalation of capacity competition
作者 謝凱宇
Hsieh, Kai-Yu
楊曙榮
Yang, Shu-Jung
貢獻者 企管系
關鍵詞 Operations strategy, capacity competition, supply chain investment, game theory, regression analysis
日期 2021-02
上傳時間 25-May-2020 15:48:50 (UTC+8)
摘要 Research on capacity competition has examined the conditions under which early mover’s capacity investment might preempt, or instead escalate, latecomers’ capacity investment. In contrast, this paper investigates the role of early mover’s supply chain investment in de-escalating subsequent capacity competition, in a setting where competing firms enter a new location to establish new production sites. Supply chain investment refers to investment in developing and integrating with supply chain partners in the location where a production site resides. We build a two-stage model where an early mover and a latecomer first make their investment decisions sequentially, and next choose either their output level (Cournot competition) or pricing (Bertrand competition) simultaneously. Predictions derived from the analytical model is then tested using data on a set of leading IT manufacturers. Both analytical and empirical results suggest that latecomer’s capacity investment increases correspondingly with early mover’s capacity investment, but decreases with early mover’s supply chain investment.
關聯 International Journal of Production Research, Vol.59, No.3, pp.942-958
資料類型 期刊論文
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1711989
dc.contributor 企管系-
dc.creator (作者) 謝凱宇-
dc.creator (作者) Hsieh, Kai-Yu-
dc.creator (作者) 楊曙榮-
dc.creator (作者) Yang, Shu-Jung-
dc.date (日期) 2021-02-
dc.date.accessioned 25-May-2020 15:48:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 25-May-2020 15:48:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 25-May-2020 15:48:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129815-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Research on capacity competition has examined the conditions under which early mover’s capacity investment might preempt, or instead escalate, latecomers’ capacity investment. In contrast, this paper investigates the role of early mover’s supply chain investment in de-escalating subsequent capacity competition, in a setting where competing firms enter a new location to establish new production sites. Supply chain investment refers to investment in developing and integrating with supply chain partners in the location where a production site resides. We build a two-stage model where an early mover and a latecomer first make their investment decisions sequentially, and next choose either their output level (Cournot competition) or pricing (Bertrand competition) simultaneously. Predictions derived from the analytical model is then tested using data on a set of leading IT manufacturers. Both analytical and empirical results suggest that latecomer’s capacity investment increases correspondingly with early mover’s capacity investment, but decreases with early mover’s supply chain investment.-
dc.format.extent 157 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) International Journal of Production Research, Vol.59, No.3, pp.942-958-
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Operations strategy, capacity competition, supply chain investment, game theory, regression analysis-
dc.title (題名) Supply chain investment and de-escalation of capacity competition-
dc.type (資料類型) 期刊論文-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1080/00207543.2020.1711989-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1711989-