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題名 Can Government Industrial Policy Enhance Corporate Bidding? the Evidence of China
作者 陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn‐Ru
翁嘉祥
Chia-HsiangWeng
XiaoquanJiang
貢獻者 財管系; 會計系
關鍵詞 Industrial policy;Mergers and acquisitions;Merger synergies;State-owned enterprises
日期 2020-04
上傳時間 26-May-2020 13:42:48 (UTC+8)
摘要 We adopt the policy of “Opinion on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions” (OCMA) issued by the State Council of China in 2010 as an exogenous experiment to examine the corporate bidding decisions and the post-merger performance. While the policy encourages more corporate bidding decisions, the policy-driven mergers are not appreciated by the market investors at the time of announcements. The policy-driven M&As, on average, do not increase firm performance unless those acquirers possess a high pre-merger value of internal financial sufficiency or market power. The additional analysis shows that the insignificant positive effect of the policy-driven M&As is because the value created by the non-SOE acquirers is offset by the value decreased by the SOE acquirers. The value creation in non-SOE acquirers remains consistent at different levels of financial strength and market power. Differently, policy-driven M&As decrease (increase) value for SOE acquirers with a medial and low (high) pre-merger level of financial strength or market power.
關聯 Pacific Basin Finance Journal, Vol.60, 101288
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101288
dc.contributor 財管系; 會計系-
dc.creator (作者) 陳嬿如-
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Yenn‐Ru-
dc.creator (作者) 翁嘉祥-
dc.creator (作者) Chia-HsiangWeng-
dc.creator (作者) XiaoquanJiang-
dc.date (日期) 2020-04-
dc.date.accessioned 26-May-2020 13:42:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 26-May-2020 13:42:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 26-May-2020 13:42:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129868-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) We adopt the policy of “Opinion on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions” (OCMA) issued by the State Council of China in 2010 as an exogenous experiment to examine the corporate bidding decisions and the post-merger performance. While the policy encourages more corporate bidding decisions, the policy-driven mergers are not appreciated by the market investors at the time of announcements. The policy-driven M&As, on average, do not increase firm performance unless those acquirers possess a high pre-merger value of internal financial sufficiency or market power. The additional analysis shows that the insignificant positive effect of the policy-driven M&As is because the value created by the non-SOE acquirers is offset by the value decreased by the SOE acquirers. The value creation in non-SOE acquirers remains consistent at different levels of financial strength and market power. Differently, policy-driven M&As decrease (increase) value for SOE acquirers with a medial and low (high) pre-merger level of financial strength or market power.-
dc.format.extent 725820 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Pacific Basin Finance Journal, Vol.60, 101288-
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Industrial policy;Mergers and acquisitions;Merger synergies;State-owned enterprises-
dc.title (題名) Can Government Industrial Policy Enhance Corporate Bidding? the Evidence of China-
dc.type (資料類型) article-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101288-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101288-