| dc.contributor | 資管系 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 杜雨儒 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Tu, Tony Yu-Ju | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Piramuthu, Selwyn | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2020-02 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-May-2020 15:10:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-May-2020 15:10:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-May-2020 15:10:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129965 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Relay attacks generally occur between two entities that communicate with each other through wireless means. When a relay attack between a honest prover and a honest verifier occurs, an adversary tricks the prover and verifier into believing that they are indeed communicating with each other. Such attacks are rather difficult to identify and prevent since a passive adversary does not modify any of the communicated messages between prover and verifier. RFID/NFC-based applications are particularly vulnerable to such attacks. We provide an overview of RFID-based relay attacks and evaluate various streams of research that have attempted to address these attacks. Specifically, we consider distance-bounding techniques and the use of artificial or natural ambient conditions, with specific emphasis on the latter. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 785660 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Decision Support Systems, pp.113194 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | RFID ; Relay attack ; Cryptography ; Ambient conditions | - |
| dc.title (題名) | On Addressing RFID/NFC-based Relay Attacks: An Overview | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.dss.2019.113194 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2019.113194 | - |
