| dc.contributor | 經濟系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 江品慧 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chiang, Piin‐Hueih | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Boyarchenko, Svetlana | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2019-08 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 20-Jun-2020 14:10:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 20-Jun-2020 14:10:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 20-Jun-2020 14:10:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130104 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | An industry consisting of a large number of small price taking firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks is considered. At the moment of entry, a firm takes on debt. We show that in a competitive equilibrium, some firms exit and pay out their debt while others choose to default. The outcome depends on the realization of firm‐specific shocks. The paper demonstrates that if the firms self‐select between exit with debt repayment and default, then the default region is disconnected from the exit region. The methodological contribution of the paper is the analytical characterization of the long‐run equilibrium for two scenarios of the initial distribution of productivity shocks. We consider two public policy mechanisms—contract enforcement and creditor protection. Our policy recommendation is that regulators need to reduce the contract enforcement if they want to decrease the long‐run default rate. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1855837 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.21, No.4, pp.650-686 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | endogenous default ; endogenous exit ; heterogeneous firms ; industryequilibrium | |
| dc.title (題名) | Industry equilibrium with random exit or default | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1111/jpet.12381 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12381 | |
