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題名 Supply Chain Finance and Impacts of Consumers` Sustainability Awareness
作者 何靜嫺
Ho, Shirley J.
Sung, Hao-Chang
貢獻者 經濟系
關鍵詞 Supply Chain Finance ; Bank Credit ; Moral Hazard ; Default Risk ; Corporate Social Responsibility
日期 2019-04
上傳時間 20-Jun-2020 14:11:10 (UTC+8)
摘要 Several new methods have been proposed for supply chain finance (SCF) with bank credits, but none of them mentions how to solve the borrowers’ moral hazard problems in SCF. This paper examines the moral hazard problem in supply chain financing with procurement contract (or purchase order). We show that since supply chain is an up-down directed structure, when financing with the procurement contract, the supplier`s effort monitoring task can be rendered to the procurement contract, which can secure the supplier`s optimal effort and capital choices in production. Hence, compared to separate lending, the supplier`s credit rationing problem can be mitigated, and most importantly, banks’ under-estimation on the supplier`s default risk and the over-estimation on the retailer`s default risk will both decrease. We further show that the retailer`s corporate social responsibility expenditure can increase consumers’ brand recognition, thus when facing demand shocks arising from consumer`s unexpected concerns, the retailer can better stabilize the firm value.
關聯 North American Journal of Economics and Finance
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2019.04.005
dc.contributor 經濟系
dc.creator (作者) 何靜嫺
dc.creator (作者) Ho, Shirley J.
dc.creator (作者) Sung, Hao-Chang
dc.date (日期) 2019-04
dc.date.accessioned 20-Jun-2020 14:11:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 20-Jun-2020 14:11:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 20-Jun-2020 14:11:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130106-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Several new methods have been proposed for supply chain finance (SCF) with bank credits, but none of them mentions how to solve the borrowers’ moral hazard problems in SCF. This paper examines the moral hazard problem in supply chain financing with procurement contract (or purchase order). We show that since supply chain is an up-down directed structure, when financing with the procurement contract, the supplier`s effort monitoring task can be rendered to the procurement contract, which can secure the supplier`s optimal effort and capital choices in production. Hence, compared to separate lending, the supplier`s credit rationing problem can be mitigated, and most importantly, banks’ under-estimation on the supplier`s default risk and the over-estimation on the retailer`s default risk will both decrease. We further show that the retailer`s corporate social responsibility expenditure can increase consumers’ brand recognition, thus when facing demand shocks arising from consumer`s unexpected concerns, the retailer can better stabilize the firm value.
dc.format.extent 201944 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) North American Journal of Economics and Finance
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Supply Chain Finance ; Bank Credit ; Moral Hazard ; Default Risk ; Corporate Social Responsibility
dc.title (題名) Supply Chain Finance and Impacts of Consumers` Sustainability Awareness
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.najef.2019.04.005
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2019.04.005