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題名 企業揭露品質與經理人能力之關聯：以強制管理階層盈餘預測修正為例
Corporate Disclosure Quality and Managerial Ability: Evidence from Mandatory Management Earnings Forecasts Revisions
作者 黃郁茜
Huang, Yu-Chien
貢獻者 潘健民
黃郁茜
Huang, Yu-Chien
關鍵詞 管理階層盈餘預測
強制盈餘預測修正
揭露品質
經理人能力
Management earnings forecasts
Mandatory earnings forecasts revisions
Disclosure quality
Managerial ability
日期 2020
上傳時間 1-Jul-2020 13:33:45 (UTC+8)
摘要 東京證券交易所鼓勵企業發布盈餘預測，日本金融商品交易法也強制企業在預見重大變動時修正先前所發布之盈餘預測。本研究以2005年至2019年之東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，旨在探討於強制性盈餘預測修正的環境之中，企業揭露品質與經理人能力之關聯。\n本研究採用盈餘預測修正次數多寡和是否於最後一刻修正盈餘預測（會計年度結束後至發布下一年度盈餘預測之間）作為衡量企業揭露品質的指標。實證結果發現，經理人能力越佳，越有可能多次修正盈餘預測，同時也越有可能在最後一刻修正盈餘預測。
Listing firms in Japan are strongly encouraged by the Tokyo Stock Exchange to provide next year’s management earnings forecasts. Once forecasts are issued, firms are required by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act to immediately revise previous issued forecasts when they foresee any significant changes in earnings. Using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2019, I investigate the association between disclosure quality and managerial ability where the management earnings forecasts revisions are mandatory.\nI use two measures as proxies for the firm’s disclosure quality: (1) how often a firm revises its previous earnings forecasts; and (2) whether a firm issues last minute revisions between the end of fiscal year and the announcement of its earnings forecasts for the next fiscal year. The results show that firms with higher managerial ability are more likely to provide frequent revisions to their earnings forecasts, and are also more likely to revise earnings forecasts at the last minute.
參考文獻 Aier, J. K., J. Comprix, M. T. Gunlock, and D. Lee. 2005. The financial expertise of CFOs and accounting restatements. Accounting Horizons 19 (3): 123-135.\nAjinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (3): 343-376.\nBaginski, S. P., J. M. Hassell, and M. D. Kimbrough. 2002. The effect of legal environment on voluntary disclosure: Evidence from management earnings forecasts issued in U.S. and Canadian markets. The Accounting Review 77 (1): 25-50.\nBaik, B., D. B. Farber, and S. S. Lee. 2011. CEO ability and management earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (5): 1645-1668.\nBamber, L. S., and Y. S. Cheon. 1998. Discretionary management earnings forecast disclosures: Antecedents and outcomes associated with forecast venue and forecast specificity. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2): 167-190.\nBamber, L. S., J. X. Jiang, and I. Y. Wang. 2010. What`s my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. The Accounting Review 85 (4): 1131-1162.\nBarth, M. E. 2003. Discussion of ‘‘compensation policy and discretionary disclosure’’. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34 (1-3): 311-318.\nBertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208.\nBotosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review 72 (3): 323-349.\nBrown, S., S. A. Hillegeist, and K. Lo. 2004. Management forecasts and litigation risk. Working Paper, Goizueta Business School, Emory University.\nBushee, B. J., and C. F. Noe. 2000. Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (Supplement): 171-202.\nCarmeli, A., and A. Tishler. 2004. Resources, capabilities, and the performance of industrial firms: A multivariate analysis. Managerial and Decision Economics 25 (6-7): 299-315.\nCarter, M. E., F. Franco, and I. Tuna. 2010. Premium pay for executive talent: An empirical analysis. Working paper, Boston College.\nChemmanur, T. J., I. Paeglis, and K. Simonyan. 2009. Management quality, financial and investment policies, and asymmetric information. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44 (5): 1045-1079.\nChen, S. 2004. Why do managers fail to meet their own forecasts? Working paper, University of Texas.\nCheng, E. C. M., and S. Courtenay. 2006. Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting 41 (3): 262-289.\nCho, M., Y. D. Hah, and O. Kim. 2011. Optimistic bias in management forecasts by Japanese firms to avoid forecasting losses. The International Journal of Accounting 46 (1): 79-101.\nCollins, D. W., and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11 (2-3): 143-181.\nColler, M., and T. L. Yohn. 1997. Management forecasts and information asymmetry: An examination of bid-ask spreads. Journal of Accounting Research 35 (2): 181-191.\nDemerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229-1248.\nDemerjian, P. R., B. Lev, M. F. Lewis, and S. E. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. The Accounting Review 88 (2): 463-498.\nDiamond, D. W., and R. E. Verrecchia. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1325-1359.\nEng L. L., and Y. T. Mak. 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22 (4): 325-345.\nFee, C. E., and C. J. Hadlock. 2003. Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for managerial talent. The Review of Financial Studies 16 (4): 1315-1357.\nFrancis, J. R., I. K. Khurana, and R. Pereira. 2005. Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of capital around the world. The Accounting Review 80 (4): 1125-1162.\nFrancis, J., A., H. Huang, S. Rajgopal, and A. Y. Zang. 2008. CEO reputation and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 109-147.\nFrost, C. A. 1996. Characteristics and information value of corporate disclosures of forward-looking information in global equity markets. Working paper, Washington University.\nFrost, C. A. 1997. Disclosure policy choices of UK firms receiving modified audit reports. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23 (2): 163-187.\nGe, W., D. Matsumoto, and J. L. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the effect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (4): 1141-1179.\nHambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review 9 (2): 193-206.\nHealy, P. M., A. P. Hutton, and K. G. Palepu. 1999. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research 16 (3): 485-520.\nHerrmann, D., T. Inoue, and W. B. Thomas. 2003. The sale of assets to manage earnings in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (1): 89-108.\nHiggins, H. N. 2013. Do stock-for-stock merger acquirers manage earnings? Evidence from Japan. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 32 (1): 44-70.\nHossain, M., M. H. B. Perera, and A. R. Rahman. 1995. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies. Journal of international Financial Management and Accounting 6 (1): 69-87.\nHribar, P, and H. Yang. 2016. CEO overconfidence and management forecasting. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (1): 204-227.\nJohn, K., and L. W. Senbet. 1998. Corporate governance and board effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance 22 (4): 371-403.\nKaramanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (3): 453-486.\nKasznik, R., and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review 70 (1): 113-134.\nKato, K., D. J. Skinner, and M. Kunimura. 2009. Management forecasts in Japan: An empirical study of forecasts. The Accounting Review 84 (5): 1575-1606.\nKoch, A. S. 2002. Financial distress and the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Working paper, Carnegie Mellon University.\nKwak, B., B. T. Ro, and I. Suk. 2012. The composition of top management with general counsel and voluntary information disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54 (1): 19-41.\nLang, M., and R. Lundholm. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 31 (2): 246-271.\nMeek, G. K., C. B. Roberts, and S. J. Gray. 1995. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., U.K. and continental European multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies 26 (3): 555-572.\nMilbourn, T. T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2) 233-262.\nNagar V., D. Nanda, and P. Wysocki. 2003. Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34 (1-3): 283-309.\nNagata, K., and P. Nguyen. 2017. Ownership structure and disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts revisions in Japan. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 36 (6): 451-467.\nOta, K. 2010. The value relevance of management forecasts and their impact on analysts’ forecasts: Empirical evidence from Japan. Abacus 46 (1): 28-59.\nPan, C. K. 2016. Classification shifting through extraordinary items: Evidence from Japan. Waseda Commercial Review 446: 357-387.\nPan, C. K. 2019. Association between earnings management and management earnings forecasts: Evidence from mandatory revisions. Journal of Contemporary Accounting 20 (1): 67-90.\nRajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and V. Zamora. 2006. CEOs` outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. The Journal of Finance 61 (4): 1813-1844.\nRogers, J. L., and P. C. Stocken. 2005. Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting Review 80 (4): 1233-1260.\nSkinner, D. J. 1997. Earnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23 (3): 249-282.\nSmith, Jr. C. W., and R. L. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (3): 263-292.\nSwitzer, L. N., and J. F. Bourdon. 2011. Management quality and operating performance: Evidence for Canadian IPOs. International Journal of Business 16 (2): 133-149.\nTrueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (1): 53-71.\nVerrecchia, R. E. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5: 179-194.\nWallace, R. S. O., and K. Naser. 1995. Firm-specific determinants of the comprehensiveness of mandatory disclosure in the corporate annual reports of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 14 (4):311-368.\nWang, I. Y. 2007. Private earnings guidance and its implications for disclosure regulation. The Accounting Review 82 (5): 1299-1332.\nWang, M., and K. Hussainey. 2013. Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by corporate governance and their value relevance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 32 (3): 26-49.\nXiao, J. Z., H. Yang, and C. W. Chow. 2004. The determinants and characteristics of voluntary internet-based disclosures by listed Chinese companies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (3): 191-225.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
107353006
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353006
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 潘健民zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃郁茜zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang, Yu-Chienen_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃郁茜zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Yu-Chienen_US
dc.date (日期) 2020en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2020 13:33:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2020 13:33:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2020 13:33:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107353006en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=149438-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 107353006zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 東京證券交易所鼓勵企業發布盈餘預測，日本金融商品交易法也強制企業在預見重大變動時修正先前所發布之盈餘預測。本研究以2005年至2019年之東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，旨在探討於強制性盈餘預測修正的環境之中，企業揭露品質與經理人能力之關聯。\n本研究採用盈餘預測修正次數多寡和是否於最後一刻修正盈餘預測（會計年度結束後至發布下一年度盈餘預測之間）作為衡量企業揭露品質的指標。實證結果發現，經理人能力越佳，越有可能多次修正盈餘預測，同時也越有可能在最後一刻修正盈餘預測。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Listing firms in Japan are strongly encouraged by the Tokyo Stock Exchange to provide next year’s management earnings forecasts. Once forecasts are issued, firms are required by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act to immediately revise previous issued forecasts when they foresee any significant changes in earnings. Using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2019, I investigate the association between disclosure quality and managerial ability where the management earnings forecasts revisions are mandatory.\nI use two measures as proxies for the firm’s disclosure quality: (1) how often a firm revises its previous earnings forecasts; and (2) whether a firm issues last minute revisions between the end of fiscal year and the announcement of its earnings forecasts for the next fiscal year. The results show that firms with higher managerial ability are more likely to provide frequent revisions to their earnings forecasts, and are also more likely to revise earnings forecasts at the last minute.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、緒論 1\n第一節 研究動機與目的 1\n第二節 研究架構 5\n貳、文獻探討與研究假說 6\n第一節 盈餘預測揭露品質 6\n第二節 經理人能力 12\n第三節 研究假說 16\n參、研究方法 18\n第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 18\n第二節 變數定義與衡量 21\n肆、實證結果與分析 35\n第一節 敘述性統計 35\n第二節 相關係數檢定 38\n第三節 企業揭露品質與經理人能力之實證結果 41\n伍、追加測試 46\n陸、結論 48\n參考文獻 50zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353006en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 管理階層盈餘預測zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 強制盈餘預測修正zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 揭露品質zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經理人能力zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Management earnings forecastsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Mandatory earnings forecasts revisionsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Disclosure qualityen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Managerial abilityen_US
dc.title (題名) 企業揭露品質與經理人能力之關聯：以強制管理階層盈餘預測修正為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Corporate Disclosure Quality and Managerial Ability: Evidence from Mandatory Management Earnings Forecasts Revisionsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aier, J. K., J. Comprix, M. T. Gunlock, and D. Lee. 2005. The financial expertise of CFOs and accounting restatements. Accounting Horizons 19 (3): 123-135.\nAjinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (3): 343-376.\nBaginski, S. P., J. M. Hassell, and M. D. Kimbrough. 2002. The effect of legal environment on voluntary disclosure: Evidence from management earnings forecasts issued in U.S. and Canadian markets. The Accounting Review 77 (1): 25-50.\nBaik, B., D. B. Farber, and S. S. Lee. 2011. CEO ability and management earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (5): 1645-1668.\nBamber, L. S., and Y. S. Cheon. 1998. Discretionary management earnings forecast disclosures: Antecedents and outcomes associated with forecast venue and forecast specificity. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2): 167-190.\nBamber, L. S., J. X. Jiang, and I. Y. Wang. 2010. What`s my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. The Accounting Review 85 (4): 1131-1162.\nBarth, M. E. 2003. Discussion of ‘‘compensation policy and discretionary disclosure’’. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34 (1-3): 311-318.\nBertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208.\nBotosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review 72 (3): 323-349.\nBrown, S., S. A. Hillegeist, and K. Lo. 2004. Management forecasts and litigation risk. Working Paper, Goizueta Business School, Emory University.\nBushee, B. J., and C. F. Noe. 2000. Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (Supplement): 171-202.\nCarmeli, A., and A. Tishler. 2004. Resources, capabilities, and the performance of industrial firms: A multivariate analysis. Managerial and Decision Economics 25 (6-7): 299-315.\nCarter, M. E., F. Franco, and I. Tuna. 2010. Premium pay for executive talent: An empirical analysis. Working paper, Boston College.\nChemmanur, T. J., I. Paeglis, and K. Simonyan. 2009. Management quality, financial and investment policies, and asymmetric information. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44 (5): 1045-1079.\nChen, S. 2004. Why do managers fail to meet their own forecasts? Working paper, University of Texas.\nCheng, E. C. M., and S. Courtenay. 2006. Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting 41 (3): 262-289.\nCho, M., Y. D. Hah, and O. Kim. 2011. Optimistic bias in management forecasts by Japanese firms to avoid forecasting losses. The International Journal of Accounting 46 (1): 79-101.\nCollins, D. W., and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11 (2-3): 143-181.\nColler, M., and T. L. Yohn. 1997. Management forecasts and information asymmetry: An examination of bid-ask spreads. Journal of Accounting Research 35 (2): 181-191.\nDemerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229-1248.\nDemerjian, P. R., B. Lev, M. F. Lewis, and S. E. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. The Accounting Review 88 (2): 463-498.\nDiamond, D. W., and R. E. Verrecchia. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1325-1359.\nEng L. L., and Y. T. Mak. 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22 (4): 325-345.\nFee, C. E., and C. J. Hadlock. 2003. Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for managerial talent. The Review of Financial Studies 16 (4): 1315-1357.\nFrancis, J. R., I. K. Khurana, and R. Pereira. 2005. Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of capital around the world. The Accounting Review 80 (4): 1125-1162.\nFrancis, J., A., H. Huang, S. Rajgopal, and A. Y. Zang. 2008. CEO reputation and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 109-147.\nFrost, C. A. 1996. Characteristics and information value of corporate disclosures of forward-looking information in global equity markets. Working paper, Washington University.\nFrost, C. A. 1997. Disclosure policy choices of UK firms receiving modified audit reports. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23 (2): 163-187.\nGe, W., D. Matsumoto, and J. L. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the effect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (4): 1141-1179.\nHambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review 9 (2): 193-206.\nHealy, P. M., A. P. Hutton, and K. G. Palepu. 1999. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research 16 (3): 485-520.\nHerrmann, D., T. Inoue, and W. B. Thomas. 2003. The sale of assets to manage earnings in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (1): 89-108.\nHiggins, H. N. 2013. Do stock-for-stock merger acquirers manage earnings? Evidence from Japan. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 32 (1): 44-70.\nHossain, M., M. H. B. Perera, and A. R. Rahman. 1995. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies. Journal of international Financial Management and Accounting 6 (1): 69-87.\nHribar, P, and H. Yang. 2016. CEO overconfidence and management forecasting. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (1): 204-227.\nJohn, K., and L. W. Senbet. 1998. Corporate governance and board effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance 22 (4): 371-403.\nKaramanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (3): 453-486.\nKasznik, R., and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review 70 (1): 113-134.\nKato, K., D. J. Skinner, and M. Kunimura. 2009. Management forecasts in Japan: An empirical study of forecasts. The Accounting Review 84 (5): 1575-1606.\nKoch, A. S. 2002. Financial distress and the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Working paper, Carnegie Mellon University.\nKwak, B., B. T. Ro, and I. Suk. 2012. The composition of top management with general counsel and voluntary information disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54 (1): 19-41.\nLang, M., and R. Lundholm. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 31 (2): 246-271.\nMeek, G. K., C. B. Roberts, and S. J. Gray. 1995. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., U.K. and continental European multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies 26 (3): 555-572.\nMilbourn, T. T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2) 233-262.\nNagar V., D. Nanda, and P. Wysocki. 2003. Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34 (1-3): 283-309.\nNagata, K., and P. Nguyen. 2017. Ownership structure and disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts revisions in Japan. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 36 (6): 451-467.\nOta, K. 2010. The value relevance of management forecasts and their impact on analysts’ forecasts: Empirical evidence from Japan. Abacus 46 (1): 28-59.\nPan, C. K. 2016. Classification shifting through extraordinary items: Evidence from Japan. Waseda Commercial Review 446: 357-387.\nPan, C. K. 2019. Association between earnings management and management earnings forecasts: Evidence from mandatory revisions. Journal of Contemporary Accounting 20 (1): 67-90.\nRajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and V. Zamora. 2006. CEOs` outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. The Journal of Finance 61 (4): 1813-1844.\nRogers, J. L., and P. C. Stocken. 2005. Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting Review 80 (4): 1233-1260.\nSkinner, D. J. 1997. Earnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23 (3): 249-282.\nSmith, Jr. C. W., and R. L. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (3): 263-292.\nSwitzer, L. N., and J. F. Bourdon. 2011. Management quality and operating performance: Evidence for Canadian IPOs. International Journal of Business 16 (2): 133-149.\nTrueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (1): 53-71.\nVerrecchia, R. E. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5: 179-194.\nWallace, R. S. O., and K. Naser. 1995. Firm-specific determinants of the comprehensiveness of mandatory disclosure in the corporate annual reports of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 14 (4):311-368.\nWang, I. Y. 2007. Private earnings guidance and its implications for disclosure regulation. The Accounting Review 82 (5): 1299-1332.\nWang, M., and K. Hussainey. 2013. Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by corporate governance and their value relevance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 32 (3): 26-49.\nXiao, J. Z., H. Yang, and C. W. Chow. 2004. The determinants and characteristics of voluntary internet-based disclosures by listed Chinese companies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (3): 191-225.zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202000561en_US