| dc.contributor.advisor | 鄭光明 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Cheng, Kuang-Ming | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 林怡仲 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Lin, Yi-Chung | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 林怡仲 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lin, Yi-Chung | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2020 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 1-Jul-2020 13:48:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 1-Jul-2020 13:48:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 1-Jul-2020 13:48:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0107154002 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130580 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 哲學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 107154002 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 隱私是我們日常生活中出現頻率頗高，卻也是最難精確捕捉的概念之一。有哲學家主張隱私至關重要、不容侵犯，如：Ferdinard David Schoeman主張隱私即定義自我的核心事物 (Schoeman, 1984)；然亦有哲學家認為隱私僅是文化產物，如：Richard A. Wasserstrom認為隱私與「必須私下從事的事務」相關，並且之所以「必須私下從事」並非理性的產物，是我們所處文化下的隱私規約所決定 (Wasserstrom, 1978)。另外，即便同屬支持隱私具重要價值的哲學家，各持理據亦不同。James Rachels認為隱私即我們對自身訊息的控制，唯有保障隱私不受他人侵犯，我們方得以建立親疏有別的人際關係 (Rachels, 1975)。而Jeffrey Reiman認為我們的社會有一套與隱私相關的規約，該規約告訴我們哪些事項屬於自身事務。透過該隱私規約的運作方能使得我們逐漸掌握自我的範圍，形成自我 (Reiman, 1984)。本文將以評判Wasserstrom及Schoeman的歧見為切口，繼以兩者中勝出的理論 (筆者主張Wasserstrom的理論勝出)，檢視Rachels、Deigh及Reiman三者作為隱私傳統上的哲學探討的經典理論，並試圖釐清隱私此一錯綜複雜的概念。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Frequently referred to in our daily life, privacy as a significant value is actually one of the most far-fetched and elusive concepts in contemporary philosophical disputes. Some philosophers argue that privacy is so substantial that it is inviolable in any circumstanses. For example, Ferdinard David Schoeman argues that privacy is the core of a person which define one’s self (Schoeman, 1984). Some others argue that privacy is irrational and merely a product of our culture. For example, Richard A. Wasserstrom argues that privacy is related to things which need to be performed in private and the reason why people should do those things in private is a product of irrationality which is determined by their own culture (Wasserstrom, 1978). On top of that, despite their consensus that privacy is cherishable, philosophers may offer different grounds on which privacy’s value is founded. James Rachels believes that privacy is control over information about ourselves—only by keeping people’s privacy inviolated can we establish multiple personal relationships (Rachels, 1975). However, Jeffrey Reiman suggests that our culture has a set of conventions related to privacy which determines what kind of things belong to the personal domain. Following the privacy convention, we can grasp the concept of the self (Reiman, 1984).This paper focuses primarily on the debates between Wasserstrom and Schoeman, and I will side with Wasserstrom and indicate several problems in Schoeman’s arguments. Further, on the basis of Wasserstrom’s privacy theory, I will look into the privacy theories laid out by Rachels, Deigh, and Reiman, all of which hold a prominent place in the philosophical debates over privacy, as an attempt to better capture the complex concept of privacy. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 導論 9第二章 Wasserstrom與Schoeman論隱私 12第一節 Wasserstrom論隱私 12第二節 Schoeman論隱私 17第三章 究竟Wasserstrom和Schoeman誰較為言之成理？ 25第一節 描述義隱私、規範義隱私與三種規約： 26第二節 「強干擾」vs.「弱干擾」及「獨處權利」vs.「行動自由」 33第四章 為何「隱蔽狀態」是「隱私」的必要條件？ 四個思想實驗 43第一節 Q星人論證 43第二節 「隱蔽」的概念分析 51第三節 自我放棄隱私論證 57第四節 泰山論證 63第五節 魯賓遜論證 67第五章 規約、自由與兩種隱私 82第一節 「免干擾規約」vs.「隱私規約」 82第二節 獨處、隱私與自由 87第六章 隱私訊息控制說與價目表說 91第一節 Rachels的「隱私訊息控制─人際關係說」 91第二節 Rachels的問題1：「強意義的控制」與「弱意義的控制」的混淆 96第三節 Rachels的問題2：忽略「規範義的隱私」 100第四節 價目表說 (Price List Theory) 105第五節 Rachels為何無法提出好的隱私理論？ 109第七章 Deigh和Reiman的理論有甚麼錯？ 110第一節 再論Deigh的描述義隱私與規範義隱私 110第二節 Deigh的理論有甚麼錯？ 113第三節 Reiman的理論有甚麼錯？ 115第八章 結論 122參考文獻 131 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 2083953 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107154002 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 隱私文化規約說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 描述義隱私 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 規範義隱私 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 隱私訊息控制─人際關係說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 價目表說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 隱私自我生成說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | privacy conventionalism | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | descriptive sense of privacy | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | normative sense of privacy | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | control-relationship definition of privacy | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | price list theory | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | personhood view of privacy | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 規約、自我與兩種隱私：隱私的哲學探究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Conventions, Personhood and Two Senses of Privacy: A Philosophical Study on Privacy | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 鄭光明，林怡仲 (2018)，隱私、規約、獨處與自由：瓦瑟史東與修曼論隱私。台灣哲學學會2018年學術研討會。林怡仲 (2019)，Deigh與Thomson的描述義隱私。台灣哲學學會2019年學術研討會。Benn, Stanly I. (1971). Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 223-244). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Bloustein, Edward. (1964). Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity. New York University Law Review, 39: 962-1007. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 156-202). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Deigh, John. (2008). Privacy. In Laurence Thomas (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Social Philosophy (pp. 131-145). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.Fried, Charles. (1968). Privacy. Yale Law Journal, 77: 475-493.Gerstein, R. (1970). Privacy and Self-Incrimination. Ethics, 80, 2: 87-101.Kalven, Harry Jr. (1966). Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? Law and Contemporary Problems, 31: 326-341.Parent, W. (1983). Privacy, Morality, and the Law. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12, 4: 269-288.Prosser, William. (1960). Privacy. California Law Review, 48: 383-423.Rachels, James. (1975). Why Privacy Is Important. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 4: 323-333. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 290-299). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Reiman, Jeffrey. (1976). Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 300-316). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Schoeman, Ferdinard David. (1984). Privacy and Intimate Information. In Ferdinard David Schoeman (ed.). Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 403-418). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1975). The Right to Privacy. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 4, 4: 295-314. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 272-289). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Warren, Samuel and Louis Brandeis. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review, 4: 193-220. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 75-103). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Wasserstrom, Richard A. (1978). Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions. Reprinted in Ferdinard David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 317-332). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. | zh_TW |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6814/NCCU202000499 | en_US |
