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題名 間接網路外部性對租稅歸宿之影響
The Effect of Indirect Network Externality on Tax Incidence作者 陳品心
Chen, Pin-Hsin貢獻者 陳國樑
陳品心
Chen, Pin-Hsin關鍵詞 間接網路外部性
雙邊市場
租稅歸宿
租稅轉嫁
Indirect Network Externality
Two-sided Market
Tax Incidence
Tax Shifting日期 2020 上傳時間 1-Jul-2020 13:55:12 (UTC+8) 摘要 根據Katz and Shapiro（1985）的定義，間接網路外部性指一個產品的消費者效用會隨著另一個產品消費者人數的增加而提高。本文拓展Armstrong（2006）邊際成本固定、服務兩個市場1、2的獨佔平台生產者模型，討論若對平台市場1課利潤稅或從價稅（銷售稅），間接網路外部性如何影響租稅轉嫁。結果發現：不論利潤稅或從價稅，首先，平台會藉由調降市場1稅後均衡價格、增加市場2稅後均衡價格，以將租稅旁轉至市場2的方式賺取更多利潤。其次，市場2承受的租稅負擔隨市場1稅後均衡人數越多而越多，並且除了兩市場人數增加的情況無法確定外之外，均有超額轉嫁的可能。最後，在從價稅發現，當市場1彈性小，平台需要調降越多市場1價格以刺激市場1需求，市場1稅後人數因此增加，使平台越能夠拉抬市場2價格，此與過去彈性理論指出彈性越小者會承擔越多租稅的結果不一致。
According to Katz and Shapiro (1985), indirect network externality means the number of consumers of one product being an increasing function of the number of consumers of another product. This paper utilizes the model in Armstrong (2006) to discuss tax shifting when a constant marginal cost monopolistic platform producer serves two markets in the existence of indirect network effect. The results show that either market 1 is taxed by profits or by an ad valorem tax (sales tax), the price of market 1 reduces and the price of market 2 increases. By shifting the tax to market 2, the platform earns more profits when market 1 is taxed. The tax burden of market 2 depends on the after-tax number of consumers in market 1. A larger number of consumers in market 1 after taxation, results in more tax burden been shifted to market 2. In most cases, there exists excessive tax-shifting except when both markets have more consumers after taxation. Finally, with an ad valorem tax, if the demand elasticity of market 1 is small, the platform needs to downward adjusting market 1’s price more so that to increase the demand in market 1. A lower price in market 1 results in more consumers in market 1, and the platform gets easier to raise the price of market 2; this is at odds to the previous result that a smaller elasticity implies more tax burden.參考文獻 Armstrong, M.（2006）, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37, 668–691.Barzel, Y.（1976）, “An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation,” Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1177–1197.Besley, T. J. and, H. S. Rosen（1999）, “Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical Analysis,” National Tax Journal, 52, 157–178.Bishop, R. L.（1968）, “The Effects of Specific and Ad Valorem Taxes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 198–218.Bloch, F. and D. Demange（2016）, “Taxation and Privacy Protection on Internet Platforms,” Journal of Political Economic Theory, 20(1), 52–66.Fullerton, D. and G. E. Metcalf（2002）, “Tax Incidence,” NBER Working Papers, No. 8829.Harberger, A. C.（1962）, “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax,” Journal of Political Economy, 70, 215–240.Katz, M. L. and C. Shapiro（1985）, “Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,” American Economic Review, 75, 424–440.Kind, H. J., M. Koethenbuergery, and G. Schjelderup（2010）, “Tax Responses in Platform Industries,” Oxford Economic Papers, 62, 764–783.Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole（2003）, “Platform Competition in Two‐Sided Markets,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 990–1029.Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole（2006）, “Two-Sided Markets a Progress Report,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37, 645–667.Rosen, H. S. and T. Gayer（2014）, Public Finance, Shoppenhangers Road: McGraw-Hill Education.Spoerer, M.（2008）, “The Laspeyres-Paradox: Tax Overshifting in Nineteenth Century Prussia,” Cliometrica, 2, 173–193.工商時報（2020），「法國暫緩開徵數位稅 暫時避免引爆貿易戰」，上網日期109年4月18日，檢自：https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20200121005046-260410?chdtv。工商時報（2018），「從中美電商排行結構 看世界零售趨勢」，上網日期109年4月19日，檢自：https://gd.taiwantrade.com/news/357。鉅亨網（2019），「亞馬遜積極拓展歐洲市場 將於英、法增設逾4000職位」，上網日期109年4月19日，檢自：https://news.cnyes.com/news/id/4350380。經濟部駐法國代表處經濟組（2019），「亞馬遜（AMAZON）針對法國數位服務稅提高法國網站抽成」，上網日期109年1月14日，檢自：https://info.taiwantrade.com/biznews/%E4%BA%9E%E9%A6%AC%E9%81%9C-amazon-針對法國數位服務稅提高法國網站抽成-1847673.html。謝章升（2018），「3種拿到FB廣告發票方法的優劣比較」，上網日期109年4月19日，檢自：https://www.tutortristar.com/?p=3050。 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
107255002資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255002 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 陳國樑 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳品心 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, Pin-Hsin en_US dc.creator (作者) 陳品心 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chen, Pin-Hsin en_US dc.date (日期) 2020 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2020 13:55:12 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2020 13:55:12 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2020 13:55:12 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107255002 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130614 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 107255002 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 根據Katz and Shapiro（1985）的定義，間接網路外部性指一個產品的消費者效用會隨著另一個產品消費者人數的增加而提高。本文拓展Armstrong（2006）邊際成本固定、服務兩個市場1、2的獨佔平台生產者模型，討論若對平台市場1課利潤稅或從價稅（銷售稅），間接網路外部性如何影響租稅轉嫁。結果發現：不論利潤稅或從價稅，首先，平台會藉由調降市場1稅後均衡價格、增加市場2稅後均衡價格，以將租稅旁轉至市場2的方式賺取更多利潤。其次，市場2承受的租稅負擔隨市場1稅後均衡人數越多而越多，並且除了兩市場人數增加的情況無法確定外之外，均有超額轉嫁的可能。最後，在從價稅發現，當市場1彈性小，平台需要調降越多市場1價格以刺激市場1需求，市場1稅後人數因此增加，使平台越能夠拉抬市場2價格，此與過去彈性理論指出彈性越小者會承擔越多租稅的結果不一致。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) According to Katz and Shapiro (1985), indirect network externality means the number of consumers of one product being an increasing function of the number of consumers of another product. This paper utilizes the model in Armstrong (2006) to discuss tax shifting when a constant marginal cost monopolistic platform producer serves two markets in the existence of indirect network effect. The results show that either market 1 is taxed by profits or by an ad valorem tax (sales tax), the price of market 1 reduces and the price of market 2 increases. By shifting the tax to market 2, the platform earns more profits when market 1 is taxed. The tax burden of market 2 depends on the after-tax number of consumers in market 1. A larger number of consumers in market 1 after taxation, results in more tax burden been shifted to market 2. In most cases, there exists excessive tax-shifting except when both markets have more consumers after taxation. Finally, with an ad valorem tax, if the demand elasticity of market 1 is small, the platform needs to downward adjusting market 1’s price more so that to increase the demand in market 1. A lower price in market 1 results in more consumers in market 1, and the platform gets easier to raise the price of market 2; this is at odds to the previous result that a smaller elasticity implies more tax burden. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景 1第二節 研究動機 6第三節 研究架構 7第二章 文獻回顧 8第一節 傳統租稅轉嫁理論 8第二節 雙邊市場（間接網路外部性）租稅歸宿分析11第三章 模型與理論分析 14第一節 基本模型 14第二節 課稅模型 16一、利潤稅租稅轉嫁分析 16二、利潤稅租稅轉嫁分析小結 21三、從價稅租稅轉嫁分析 22四、從價稅租稅轉嫁分析小結 26五、轉嫁幅度 27第四章 結論 29參考文獻 33附錄一 利潤稅租稅轉嫁證明 35附錄二 從價稅租稅轉嫁證明 39 zh_TW dc.format.extent 2214277 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255002 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 間接網路外部性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 雙邊市場 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅歸宿 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅轉嫁 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Indirect Network Externality en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Two-sided Market en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax Incidence en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax Shifting en_US dc.title (題名) 間接網路外部性對租稅歸宿之影響 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Effect of Indirect Network Externality on Tax Incidence en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Armstrong, M.（2006）, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37, 668–691.Barzel, Y.（1976）, “An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation,” Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1177–1197.Besley, T. J. and, H. S. Rosen（1999）, “Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical Analysis,” National Tax Journal, 52, 157–178.Bishop, R. L.（1968）, “The Effects of Specific and Ad Valorem Taxes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 198–218.Bloch, F. and D. Demange（2016）, “Taxation and Privacy Protection on Internet Platforms,” Journal of Political Economic Theory, 20(1), 52–66.Fullerton, D. and G. E. Metcalf（2002）, “Tax Incidence,” NBER Working Papers, No. 8829.Harberger, A. C.（1962）, “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax,” Journal of Political Economy, 70, 215–240.Katz, M. L. and C. Shapiro（1985）, “Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,” American Economic Review, 75, 424–440.Kind, H. J., M. Koethenbuergery, and G. Schjelderup（2010）, “Tax Responses in Platform Industries,” Oxford Economic Papers, 62, 764–783.Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole（2003）, “Platform Competition in Two‐Sided Markets,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 990–1029.Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole（2006）, “Two-Sided Markets a Progress Report,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37, 645–667.Rosen, H. S. and T. Gayer（2014）, Public Finance, Shoppenhangers Road: McGraw-Hill Education.Spoerer, M.（2008）, “The Laspeyres-Paradox: Tax Overshifting in Nineteenth Century Prussia,” Cliometrica, 2, 173–193.工商時報（2020），「法國暫緩開徵數位稅 暫時避免引爆貿易戰」，上網日期109年4月18日，檢自：https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20200121005046-260410?chdtv。工商時報（2018），「從中美電商排行結構 看世界零售趨勢」，上網日期109年4月19日，檢自：https://gd.taiwantrade.com/news/357。鉅亨網（2019），「亞馬遜積極拓展歐洲市場 將於英、法增設逾4000職位」，上網日期109年4月19日，檢自：https://news.cnyes.com/news/id/4350380。經濟部駐法國代表處經濟組（2019），「亞馬遜（AMAZON）針對法國數位服務稅提高法國網站抽成」，上網日期109年1月14日，檢自：https://info.taiwantrade.com/biznews/%E4%BA%9E%E9%A6%AC%E9%81%9C-amazon-針對法國數位服務稅提高法國網站抽成-1847673.html。謝章升（2018），「3種拿到FB廣告發票方法的優劣比較」，上網日期109年4月19日，檢自：https://www.tutortristar.com/?p=3050。 zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202000607 en_US
