| dc.contributor.advisor | 蔡致遠 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 白仲彥 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Pai, Chung-Yen | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 白仲彥 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Pai, Chung-Yen | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2020 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 3-Aug-2020 17:25:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 3-Aug-2020 17:25:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 3-Aug-2020 17:25:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0107351036 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130917 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國際經營與貿易學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 107351036 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 中文摘要 iAbstract iiContents iiiList of Tables vList of Figures vi1 Introduction 12 Institutional Background 32.1 The Target of Clearance Rates in Taiwan 33 Data and Sample 93.1 Data 93.2 Sample and Variables 114 Results 134.1 Discontinuities around the Targeted Clearance Rate 134.2 Effect of Local Incentives 204.3 Robustness Check 245 Conclusion 35Appendix A Available Policy Plans and Performance Reports 36Appendix B McCrary’s Test for ClearanceRate/Floor 37Appendix C McCrary’s Test for ClearanceRate/CityFloor 38Bibliography 39 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 889603 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107351036 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 績效考核 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 破案率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 選舉 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 誘因設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 代理人問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Performance Evaluation | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Clearance Rate | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Election | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Incentive Design | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Principal-Agent Problem | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 政治壓力對犯罪報告的扭曲效果: 以臺灣政府的誘因結構設計為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The Distortion Effects of Political Pressure on Crime Reporting: Evidence from Government`s Incentive Design in Taiwan | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | John A. Eterno, Arvind Verma, and Eli B. Silverman. Police manipulations of crime reporting: Insiders’ revelations. Justice Quarterly, 2016. ISSN 17459109. doi: 10.1080/07418825.2014.980838.Raymond Fisman and Yongxiang Wang. The distortionary effects of incentives in government: Evidence from China’s “death ceiling” program. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2017. ISSN 19457790. doi: 10.1257/app.20160008.Bengt Holmstrom. Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979. ISSN 0361915X. doi: 10.2307/3003320.Judy Luce Mann. Suburban law expert sees various figure juggling acts. Washington Star, 1971.Justin McCrary. Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test. Journal of Econometrics, 2008. ISSN 03044076. doi: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005.Rong-Yuan Huang, Jun-Yuan Wang, Yan-Yi Jhang, Yi-Wun Cheng, Li-Qiu Xie. 地方政府施政績效評估機制之研究. Development Research and Evaluation Commission, 2012.H Laurence Ross, Donald T Campbell, and Gene V Glass. Determining the social effects of a legal reform: The british “breathalyser” crackdown of 1967. American Behavioral Scientist, 13(4):493–509, 1970.David Seidman and Michael Couzens. Getting the Crime Rate Down: Political Pressure and Crime Reporting. Law & Society Review, 1974. ISSN 00239216. doi: 10.2307/3053084. | zh_TW |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6814/NCCU202000951 | en_US |
