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題名 法人說明會與聯貸案之關聯—以台灣為例
Conference Calls and Syndicated Loan — Evidence from Taiwan作者 呂冠廷
Lu, Kuan-Ting貢獻者 詹凌菁
呂冠廷
Lu, Kuan-Ting關鍵詞 法人說明會
聯貸案
自願性揭露
資訊不對稱
借款風險
Conference call
Syndicated loan
Credit risk
Information asymmetry日期 2020 上傳時間 3-Aug-2020 17:30:21 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究探討法人說明會與銀行聯貸案之間的關聯性。法人說明會作為公司的一種自願性揭露工具，若公司資訊揭露的程度越高，應能夠降低在聯貸案中銀行團對於該借款公司的信貸風險，並提供公司提供較低的利率。因此，本研究期望有召開法說會的借款人及法說會的次數，與聯貸案中借款人取得較有利條款間能發現正向關聯，例如：較低的貸款利率，較長的還款期間，較高的借款金額，較少抵押品等。本研究利用臺灣2002年至2016年間的上市公司的聯貸案資料與公開資訊觀測站舉辦法說會的資料組成樣本。研究結果顯示，舉行法說會的公司獲得了較低的銀行借款利息，更高的貸款金額，並且需要抵押品的可能性也較小，但沒有顯著證據表明法說會對貸款期限有整體的重大影響。此外，法說會的次數和法說會的定期性也可為借款人獲得更好的貸款條件帶來顯著的影響。外國銀行對於資訊不對稱的風險高於本國銀行，本研究的額外測試也發現外國銀行較偏好參與有召開法說會的借款人的聯貸案。
This study investigates whether information in conference call disclosures helps banks evaluate credit risk and provide lower spreads to borrowers. We expect a positive association between the number of times of conference call held and better loan terms. The sample consists of Taiwan listed companies’ that borrow from the syndicated loan market during the period 2002 to 2016. The result shows that firms holding conference call obtain favorable bank loan spreads, larger loan amounts, and are less likely to have collateral. In addition, the frequency of conference call and regularity of conference call can also beneficial to borrowers in terms of price term. However, there is no evidence showing that conference call has an overall significant impact on loan maturities. Besides, in additional analyses, I further find foreign banks tend to be involved in syndicated loan which borrowers holding conference call.參考文獻 Asquith, P., R. Gertner & D. Scharfstein. (1994). Anatomy of financial distress: An examination of junk-bond issuers. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3), 625-658.Barry, C. B., & S. J. Brown. (1985). Differential information and security market equilibrium. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20(4), 407-422.Bassemir, M., Z. Novotny-Farkas, & J. Pachta, (2013). The Effect of Conference Calls on Analysts` Forecasts – German Evidence, European Accounting Review, 22(1), 151-183.Benston, G., & C. Smith. (1976). A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 31(2), 215-231.Bharath, S. T., J. Sunder, & S. V. Sunder. (2008). Accounting quality and debt contracting. The Accounting Review, 83(1), 1-28.Bolton, P., & Scharfstein, D. S. (1996). Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors. Journal of Political Economy, 104(1), 1-25.Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review, 323-349.Botosan, C. A., & M. A. Plumlee. (2002). A re‐examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 21-40.Bowen, R. M., A. K. Davis, & D. A. Matsumoto. (2002). Do Conference Calls Affect Analysts` Forecasts? The Accounting Review, 77(2), 285-316.Brown, S., Hillegeist, S. A. and Lo, K. 2004. Conference calls and information asymmetry, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, 343–366Chin, C-L., P. Lee, P-W. Wang, G. Kleinman. (2007). Does Innovation Matter to Conference Calls? IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 54(4), 699-715Diamond, D. (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of Economic Studies, 51(3), 393-414.Fama, E. (1985). What`s Different about Banks? Journal of Monetary Economics, 15(1), 29-36.Frankel, R., M. Johnson, & D.J. Skinner. (1999). An empirical examination of conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 133-150.Gilson, S. C., K. John, & L. H. Lang. (1990). Troubled debt restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 315-353.Graham, J. R., S. Li, & J. Qiu. (2008). Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Economics, 89(1), 44-61.Hollander, S., M. Pronk, & E. Roelofsen. (2010), Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices during Conference Calls. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(3), 531-563.Kim, J. B., J. S. Tsui, & H. Y. Cheong. (2011). The voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and loan contracting around the world. Review of Accounting Studies, 16(4), 779-811.Kimbrough, M. D. and H. Louis. Voluntary Disclosure to Influence Investor Reactions to Merger Announcements: An Examination of Conference Calls. The Accounting Review, 86(2), 637-667Lee, S. W. & D. J. Mullineaux. (2004). Monitoring, financial distress, and the structure of commercial lending syndicates. Financial Management, 107-130.Leftwich, R. (1983). Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from Private Lending Agreements. Accounting Review, 58(1), 23-42.Lin, C., Y. Ma, P. Malatesta & Y. Xuan. (2012). Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 1-22.Matsumoto, D., M. Pronk, and E. Roelofsen. (2011). What Makes Conference Calls Useful? The Information Content of Managers` Presentations and Analysts` Discussion Sessions. The Accounting Review 86(4), 1383-1414.Mazumdar, S. C., & P. Sengupta. (2005). Disclosure and the loan spread on private debt. Financial Analysts Journal, 61(3), 83-95.Mian, A. (2006). Distance constraints: The limits of foreign lending in poor economies. The Journal of Finance, 61(3), 1465-1505.Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting Review, 459-474.Siougle, G., S. I. Spyrou, & A. E. Tsekrekos. Conference Calls Around Merger and Acquisition Announcements: Do They Reduce Information Asymmetry? UK Evidence. (2013). Research in International Business and Finance 30, 148-172Tasker, S. C. (1998). Bridging the Information Gap: Quarterly Conference Calls as a Medium for Voluntary Disclosure. Review of Accounting Studies 3, 137-167Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 179-194 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
107353108資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353108 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 詹凌菁 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 呂冠廷 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lu, Kuan-Ting en_US dc.creator (作者) 呂冠廷 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lu, Kuan-Ting en_US dc.date (日期) 2020 en_US dc.date.accessioned 3-Aug-2020 17:30:21 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 3-Aug-2020 17:30:21 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-Aug-2020 17:30:21 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107353108 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130950 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 107353108 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究探討法人說明會與銀行聯貸案之間的關聯性。法人說明會作為公司的一種自願性揭露工具，若公司資訊揭露的程度越高，應能夠降低在聯貸案中銀行團對於該借款公司的信貸風險，並提供公司提供較低的利率。因此，本研究期望有召開法說會的借款人及法說會的次數，與聯貸案中借款人取得較有利條款間能發現正向關聯，例如：較低的貸款利率，較長的還款期間，較高的借款金額，較少抵押品等。本研究利用臺灣2002年至2016年間的上市公司的聯貸案資料與公開資訊觀測站舉辦法說會的資料組成樣本。研究結果顯示，舉行法說會的公司獲得了較低的銀行借款利息，更高的貸款金額，並且需要抵押品的可能性也較小，但沒有顯著證據表明法說會對貸款期限有整體的重大影響。此外，法說會的次數和法說會的定期性也可為借款人獲得更好的貸款條件帶來顯著的影響。外國銀行對於資訊不對稱的風險高於本國銀行，本研究的額外測試也發現外國銀行較偏好參與有召開法說會的借款人的聯貸案。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study investigates whether information in conference call disclosures helps banks evaluate credit risk and provide lower spreads to borrowers. We expect a positive association between the number of times of conference call held and better loan terms. The sample consists of Taiwan listed companies’ that borrow from the syndicated loan market during the period 2002 to 2016. The result shows that firms holding conference call obtain favorable bank loan spreads, larger loan amounts, and are less likely to have collateral. In addition, the frequency of conference call and regularity of conference call can also beneficial to borrowers in terms of price term. However, there is no evidence showing that conference call has an overall significant impact on loan maturities. Besides, in additional analyses, I further find foreign banks tend to be involved in syndicated loan which borrowers holding conference call. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction 12. Literature review and hypothesis development 32.1. Conference calls background and related literature 32.2. Disclosure and loan contracting related literature 42.3. Hypothesis development 53. Research design 73.1. Data collection 73.2. Variable description 73.2.1. Dependent variable 73.2.2. Independent variable 83.3. Research method 103.3.1. Sample selection 103.3.2. Model Construction 164. Empirical findings 184.1. Summary statistics and correlation analysis 184.2. Main analysis 224.2.1. Conference calls and loan terms and borrowers’ characteristics 224.2.2. The effect of conference calls on loan spread 244.2.3. The effect of conference calls on non-price terms ofloan contracts 254.3. Additional analyses 304.3.1. Test of match samples 304.3.2. Test of lender participation in syndicated loan structure 344.3.3. Analyses of difference of effects compared by research and development expense 394.3.4. Analyses of difference of effects compared by borrowers with regular conference calls and irregular conference calls 465. Conclusion 49References 51 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1977269 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353108 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 法人說明會 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯貸案 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自願性揭露 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊不對稱 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 借款風險 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Conference call en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Syndicated loan en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Credit risk en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Information asymmetry en_US dc.title (題名) 法人說明會與聯貸案之關聯—以台灣為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Conference Calls and Syndicated Loan — Evidence from Taiwan en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Asquith, P., R. Gertner & D. Scharfstein. (1994). Anatomy of financial distress: An examination of junk-bond issuers. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3), 625-658.Barry, C. B., & S. J. Brown. (1985). Differential information and security market equilibrium. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20(4), 407-422.Bassemir, M., Z. Novotny-Farkas, & J. Pachta, (2013). The Effect of Conference Calls on Analysts` Forecasts – German Evidence, European Accounting Review, 22(1), 151-183.Benston, G., & C. Smith. (1976). A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 31(2), 215-231.Bharath, S. T., J. Sunder, & S. V. Sunder. (2008). Accounting quality and debt contracting. The Accounting Review, 83(1), 1-28.Bolton, P., & Scharfstein, D. S. (1996). Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors. Journal of Political Economy, 104(1), 1-25.Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review, 323-349.Botosan, C. A., & M. A. Plumlee. (2002). A re‐examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 21-40.Bowen, R. M., A. K. Davis, & D. A. Matsumoto. (2002). Do Conference Calls Affect Analysts` Forecasts? The Accounting Review, 77(2), 285-316.Brown, S., Hillegeist, S. A. and Lo, K. 2004. Conference calls and information asymmetry, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, 343–366Chin, C-L., P. Lee, P-W. Wang, G. Kleinman. (2007). Does Innovation Matter to Conference Calls? IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 54(4), 699-715Diamond, D. (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of Economic Studies, 51(3), 393-414.Fama, E. (1985). What`s Different about Banks? Journal of Monetary Economics, 15(1), 29-36.Frankel, R., M. Johnson, & D.J. Skinner. (1999). An empirical examination of conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 133-150.Gilson, S. C., K. John, & L. H. Lang. (1990). Troubled debt restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 315-353.Graham, J. R., S. Li, & J. Qiu. (2008). Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Economics, 89(1), 44-61.Hollander, S., M. Pronk, & E. Roelofsen. (2010), Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices during Conference Calls. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(3), 531-563.Kim, J. B., J. S. Tsui, & H. Y. Cheong. (2011). The voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and loan contracting around the world. Review of Accounting Studies, 16(4), 779-811.Kimbrough, M. D. and H. Louis. Voluntary Disclosure to Influence Investor Reactions to Merger Announcements: An Examination of Conference Calls. The Accounting Review, 86(2), 637-667Lee, S. W. & D. J. Mullineaux. (2004). Monitoring, financial distress, and the structure of commercial lending syndicates. Financial Management, 107-130.Leftwich, R. (1983). Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from Private Lending Agreements. Accounting Review, 58(1), 23-42.Lin, C., Y. Ma, P. Malatesta & Y. Xuan. (2012). Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 1-22.Matsumoto, D., M. Pronk, and E. Roelofsen. (2011). What Makes Conference Calls Useful? The Information Content of Managers` Presentations and Analysts` Discussion Sessions. The Accounting Review 86(4), 1383-1414.Mazumdar, S. C., & P. Sengupta. (2005). Disclosure and the loan spread on private debt. Financial Analysts Journal, 61(3), 83-95.Mian, A. (2006). Distance constraints: The limits of foreign lending in poor economies. The Journal of Finance, 61(3), 1465-1505.Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting Review, 459-474.Siougle, G., S. I. Spyrou, & A. E. Tsekrekos. Conference Calls Around Merger and Acquisition Announcements: Do They Reduce Information Asymmetry? UK Evidence. (2013). Research in International Business and Finance 30, 148-172Tasker, S. C. (1998). Bridging the Information Gap: Quarterly Conference Calls as a Medium for Voluntary Disclosure. Review of Accounting Studies 3, 137-167Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 179-194 zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202000982 en_US
