| dc.contributor.advisor | 林靖庭 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 徐婧雯 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Xu, Jing-Wen | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 徐婧雯 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Xu, Jing-Wen | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2020 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 3-Aug-2020 17:39:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 3-Aug-2020 17:39:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 3-Aug-2020 17:39:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0107352047 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130999 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 金融學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 107352047 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 自20世紀初以來有許多投資人和金融機構呼籲公司放棄提供盈餘指導，原因主要是盈餘指導會導致盈餘管理進而誤導大眾，吸引到更多短期投資者和內幕交易。然而，仍有許多公司提供盈餘指導，理由是盈餘指導可以降低信息不對稱，降低股價波動度，使分析師有更充足的資訊分析公司。本研究以美國上市公司爲例，探究公司停止季度盈餘指導的原因。本研究發現，機構投資者持股比例低的公司，更有可能放棄季度盈餘指導，體現出機構對公司的監督作用，進而使公司持續披露盈餘指導資訊。本文進一步探究持股機構之異質性，公司之集中機構投資人中，有長期、獨立投資機構持股之公司傾向持續提供季度盈餘指導，有短期或灰色投資者持股之公司傾向停止提供季度盈餘指導。指導停止者具有以下特徵，如公司的報酬較差、有會計損失的季度較多、股價波動度大、分析師數量少和公司規模小。因此機構投資者持股小、公司業績差、預測難度大是公司放棄盈餘指導的主要因素。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Since the early 20th century, many investors and financial institutions have called on companies to abandon earnings guidance. The main reason is that earnings guidance will lead to earnings management, furthering misleads investors, attracting more short-term investors and causing insider trading. From the supporting point of view, earnings guidance can reduce information asymmetry, reduce stock price volatility and enable analysts to know more about the company and better to analyze.This study uses US listed companies as a sample to explore the factors that companies stop quarterly earnings guidance. We found that companies with low institutional shareholding proportion are more likely to give up quarterly earnings guidance, which reflects the supervision role of the institution over the company and enables the company to continuously disclose earnings guidance information. We further explore the heterogeneity of institutional shareholders. Among the concentrated institutional investors of companies, companies with long-term, independent institutions are more likely to maintain quarterly earnings guidance, and companies with short-term or grey institutions are more likely to stop quarterly earnings guidance. The guidance stoppers have the characteristics of poor buy-and-hold return, more quarterly accounting losses, high volatility of stock price, few analysts and small company size. Therefore, small institutional ownership, poor performance and difficult forecast are the main reasons for companies to abandon earnings guidance. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1第二章 理論基礎與假設發展 6第三章 樣本選取 9第四章 變數定義 16第一節 機構持股 16第二節 公司業績 18第三節 盈餘預測的難度 18第四節 控制變數 19第五章 實證結果分析 21第一節 敘述性統計分析 21第二節 機構持股與各類機構投資人是否影響盈餘指導停止 22第三節 公司業績與是否影響盈餘指導停止 28第四節 預測難度是否影響盈餘指導停止 29第六章 研究結論 32參考文獻 40 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 804647 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107352047 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 盈餘指導 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 機構投資者 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 監督效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Earning guidance | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Institutional investors | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Monitor effect | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 公司停止季度盈餘指導之探究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The analysis of firms that stop providing quarterly earnings guidance | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Brochet, Francois, and David Kiron.,2011. “Google and Earnings Guidance.”, Harvard Business School.Bushee, Brian J., and Christopher F. Noe. 2000. “Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility.” Journal of Accounting Research 38(1):171-202.CFA Institute. 2008. “Short-termism survey: Practices and preferences of investment professionals”. Available at https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/research/survey-reports/short-termism-surveyChen, Shuping, Dawn Matsumoto, and Shiva Rajgopal. 2011. “Is Silence Golden? An Empirical Analysis of Firms That Stop Giving Quarterly Earnings Guidance.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 51(1):134-150.Chen, Xia, Jarrad Harford, and Kai Li. 2007. “Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?” Journal of Financial Economics 86(2):279-305.Houston, Joel F., Baruch Lev, and Jennifer Wu Tucker. 2010. “To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance*: Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance.” Contemporary Accounting Research 27(1):143-185.Hsieh, P., T. Koller, and D. R. Rajan. 2006. The misguided practice of earnings guidance. The McKinsey Quarterly. Available at http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_misguided_practice_of_earnings_guidance_1759.Janjigian, V. 2003. In defense of earnings guidance. Forbes.com. February 20. Available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/02/20/cz_vj_0220soapbox.htmlJensen, M., Murphy, K., Wruck, E., 2004. Remuneration: where we’ve been, how we got to here, what are the problems, and how to fix them. Working paper, Harvard Business School.U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 2007. Commission on the regulation of U.S. capital markets in the 21st century: Report and recommendations. Available at http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0703capmarketscomm.htm.Verrecchia, R. E. (2001). Essays on disclosure. Journal of accounting and economics, 32(1-3), 97-180. | zh_TW |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6814/NCCU202000742 | en_US |
