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題名 移動性資本對公共政策之影響
The Impact of Mobile Capital on Public Policy作者 趙珮涵
Chao, Pei-Han貢獻者 賴育邦
Lai, Yu-Bong
趙珮涵
Chao, Pei-Han關鍵詞 租稅競爭
環境政策
外溢效果
資本稅
租稅天堂
租稅查緝
tax competition
environmental policy
spillover effect
capital tax
tax haven
tax enforcement日期 2020 上傳時間 3-Aug-2020 18:13:04 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文採用兩地區多階段模型，探討政府以不同公共政策競爭移動性資本時，對社會福利之影響。在兩地區政府先後訂定合作之租稅與環境政策時，均衡資本稅率及污染排放配俄水準均具效率。而當兩地區政府先合作訂定環境政策，再分別訂定資本稅率時，各地區政府合作訂定之污染排放標準具效率，但當分權決定資本稅率時，各地區為吸引資本移入，訂定之均衡資本稅率低於最適水準，公共財提供不足。當兩地區政府共同決定租稅歧視政策後，再分別訂定各地區之資本稅率時，各地區政府為提高聯合社會福利，將極大化租稅歧視程度，提供移動資本租稅優惠，降低移動資本之有效稅率。而租稅歧視程度擴大亦使均衡資本稅率高於傳統租稅競爭文獻，說明租稅天堂的存在可能對社會福利提升有正面影響，並緩解租稅競爭導致向下沉淪情形。此外，在兩地區政府先合作訂定資本稅率，而租稅查緝程度則由各地區自行訂定下，兩地區政府為極大化聯合福利水準，會將資本稅率訂在最高的水準，剝奪固定資本之資本報酬。但各地區政府對移動資本之均衡租稅查緝程度過於寬鬆，導致最適公共財提供水準不足。
The dissertation is based on a setting with a sequential game between two symmetric jurisdictions. I intend to discuss the impact of the jurisdictions competing for mobile capital on social welfare with different public policies. I find that when jurisdictions cooperate in both the tax and the environmental policies, the two policies are set efficiently. In the case that governments choose non-cooperative capital tax rates after deciding coordinated environmental policy, the coordinated environmental standards will be set at the optimal level. However, the governments would set the capital tax rate suboptimally low in order to compete for mobile capital, leading the public goods underprovided.In the case that governments coordinate the tax discrimination policy first and then choose the capital tax rates non-cooperatively, the government will set the tax preferences given to mobile capital firms at the highest level, and hence lower the effective tax rate of mobile capital. The finding that the government would be lenient to multinational firms could suggest that the equilibrium capital tax rate is higher than the result derived from traditional tax competition literature. The result implies the existence of tax havens can enhance global welfare, and mitigate the race to the bottom in public goods provision due to tax competition.When the tax enforcement level in different jurisdictions is set respectively, even though the governments cooperate in the tax policy, the public goods provision is still below the optimal level. Although coordination in tax policy leads to a high capital tax rate, which deprives the net return from immobile capital, the governments will loosen the tax enforcement requirement on the mobile capital in order to discriminate mobile capital from immobile capital.參考文獻 Akai, N, Ogawa, H and Ogawa, Y (2011), "Endogenous choice on tax instruments in a tax competition model: Unit tax versus ad valorem tax", International Tax and Public Finance, 18, 495-506.Barrett, S (1994), "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements", Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 878-894.Barrett, S (1999), "The credibility of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements. In: Fredriksson, P. (Ed.)", Trade, Global Policy and the Environment. World Bank Discussion Paper ,402, 161-172.Baumann, F, Buchwald, A, Friehe, T, Hottenrott, H and Weche, J (2017), "Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting", Applied Economic Letters, 24, 902-905.Baumann, F and Friehe, T (2013), "Profit shifting despite symmetric tax rates? A note on the role of tax enforcement", International Economic Journal, 27, 97-108.Becker, J and Fuest, C (2010), "Tax enforcement and tax havens under formula apportionment", International Tax and Public Finance, 17, 217-235.Botteon, M and Carraro, C (1997), "Burden-sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations with asymmetric countries", In: Carraro, C. (Ed.), International environmental negotiations, strategic policy issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 26-55.\\ref Bucovetsky, S and Haufler, A (2008), "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?", Journal of International Economics, 74, 188-201.Carraro, C, Siniscalco, D (1993), "Strategies for the international protection of the environment", Journal of Public Economics, 52, 309-328.Clausing, K (2003), "Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrafirm trade prices", Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2207-2223.Chu, H (2014), "Tax enforcement policy and the provision of the public goods with the presence of tax havens", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 61, 304-321.Egger, P, Eggert, W, Keuschnigg C and Winner, H (2010), "Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership", European Economic Review, 54, 96-107.Haufler, A and Runkel, M (2012), "Firms’ financial choices and thin capitalization rules under corporate tax competition", European Economic Review, 56, 1087-1103.Hines, JR and Rice, EM (1994), "Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American business", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 149-182.Hoel, M (1992), "International environmental conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions", Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 141-159.Hoel, M and Schneider, K (1997), "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement", Environmental and Resources Economics, 9, 153-170.Hong, Q and Smart, M (2010), "In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment", European Economic Review, 54, 82-95.Janeba, E, and Peters, W (1999), "Tax evasion, tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination: The case of interest taxation in Europe", The Economic Journal, 109, 93–101.Johannesen, N (2010), "Imperfect tax competition for profits, asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens", Journal of International Economics, 81, 253-264.Keen, M (2001), "Preferential regimes can make tax competition less harmful", National Tax Journal, 54, 757-762.List, JA and Mason, CF (2001), "Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 42, 277-296.\\ref Lockwood, B (2004), "Competition in unit vs. ad valorem taxes", International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 763-772.Marceau, N, Mongrain, S and Wilson, JD (2010), "Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital", Journal of International Economics, 80, 249-259.Mintz, J and Smart, M (2004), "Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: Theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada", Journal of Public Economics, 88,1149–1168.Oates, W and Schwab, R (1988), "Economic competition among Jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?", Journal of Public Economics, 35, 333-354.OECD (2013), "Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting", Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf.Ogawa, H and Wildasin, D (2009), "Think locally, act locally: Spillovers, spillbacks, and efficient decentralized policymaking", American Economic Review, 99, 1206-1217.WEF (2019), "The Global Risks Report 2019", World Economic Forum, Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2019.Peralta, S, Wauthy, X and Ypersele, T (2006), "Should countries control international profit shifting?", Journal of International Economics, 68, 24-37.Slemrod, J, and Wilson, JD (2009), "Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens", Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1261-1270.Wildasin, D (1989), "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy", Journal of Urban Economics, 25, 193-212.Wilson, JD (1986), "A theory of interregional tax competition", Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 296-315.Wilson, JD (1999), "Theories of tax competition", National Tax Journal, 52, 269-304.Zodrow, G and Mieszkowski, P (1986), "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of public goods", Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356-70. 描述 博士
國立政治大學
財政學系
101255501資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101255501 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 賴育邦 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lai, Yu-Bong en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 趙珮涵 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chao, Pei-Han en_US dc.creator (作者) 趙珮涵 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chao, Pei-Han en_US dc.date (日期) 2020 en_US dc.date.accessioned 3-Aug-2020 18:13:04 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 3-Aug-2020 18:13:04 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-Aug-2020 18:13:04 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0101255501 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131186 - dc.description (描述) 博士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 101255501 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文採用兩地區多階段模型，探討政府以不同公共政策競爭移動性資本時，對社會福利之影響。在兩地區政府先後訂定合作之租稅與環境政策時，均衡資本稅率及污染排放配俄水準均具效率。而當兩地區政府先合作訂定環境政策，再分別訂定資本稅率時，各地區政府合作訂定之污染排放標準具效率，但當分權決定資本稅率時，各地區為吸引資本移入，訂定之均衡資本稅率低於最適水準，公共財提供不足。當兩地區政府共同決定租稅歧視政策後，再分別訂定各地區之資本稅率時，各地區政府為提高聯合社會福利，將極大化租稅歧視程度，提供移動資本租稅優惠，降低移動資本之有效稅率。而租稅歧視程度擴大亦使均衡資本稅率高於傳統租稅競爭文獻，說明租稅天堂的存在可能對社會福利提升有正面影響，並緩解租稅競爭導致向下沉淪情形。此外，在兩地區政府先合作訂定資本稅率，而租稅查緝程度則由各地區自行訂定下，兩地區政府為極大化聯合福利水準，會將資本稅率訂在最高的水準，剝奪固定資本之資本報酬。但各地區政府對移動資本之均衡租稅查緝程度過於寬鬆，導致最適公共財提供水準不足。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The dissertation is based on a setting with a sequential game between two symmetric jurisdictions. I intend to discuss the impact of the jurisdictions competing for mobile capital on social welfare with different public policies. I find that when jurisdictions cooperate in both the tax and the environmental policies, the two policies are set efficiently. In the case that governments choose non-cooperative capital tax rates after deciding coordinated environmental policy, the coordinated environmental standards will be set at the optimal level. However, the governments would set the capital tax rate suboptimally low in order to compete for mobile capital, leading the public goods underprovided.In the case that governments coordinate the tax discrimination policy first and then choose the capital tax rates non-cooperatively, the government will set the tax preferences given to mobile capital firms at the highest level, and hence lower the effective tax rate of mobile capital. The finding that the government would be lenient to multinational firms could suggest that the equilibrium capital tax rate is higher than the result derived from traditional tax competition literature. The result implies the existence of tax havens can enhance global welfare, and mitigate the race to the bottom in public goods provision due to tax competition.When the tax enforcement level in different jurisdictions is set respectively, even though the governments cooperate in the tax policy, the public goods provision is still below the optimal level. Although coordination in tax policy leads to a high capital tax rate, which deprives the net return from immobile capital, the governments will loosen the tax enforcement requirement on the mobile capital in order to discriminate mobile capital from immobile capital. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1 前言 11.1 研究動機與目的 11.2 研究方法 21.3 本文架構 32 跨界污染的次佳租稅及環境政策 42.1 緒論 42.2 模型設定 82.3 資本稅率合作情況 142.4 資本稅率不合作情況 202.5 本章結論 273 跨區資本的最適租稅政策 303.1 緒論 303.2 模型設定 333.3 租稅競爭下之資本稅率 383.4 最適租稅差異及經濟分析 423.5 本章結論 474 當租稅查緝程度為內生之次佳租稅政策 504.1 緒論 504.2 模型設定 534.3 租稅競爭下之資本稅率 584.4 最適租稅差異及經濟分析 614.5 本章結論 665. 結論、政策意涵與未來研究方向 685.1 結論 685.2 政策意涵與未來研究方向 69參考文獻 72 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1363440 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101255501 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅競爭 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 環境政策 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 外溢效果 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資本稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅天堂 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅查緝 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) tax competition en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) environmental policy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) spillover effect en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) capital tax en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) tax haven en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) tax enforcement en_US dc.title (題名) 移動性資本對公共政策之影響 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Impact of Mobile Capital on Public Policy en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Akai, N, Ogawa, H and Ogawa, Y (2011), "Endogenous choice on tax instruments in a tax competition model: Unit tax versus ad valorem tax", International Tax and Public Finance, 18, 495-506.Barrett, S (1994), "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements", Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 878-894.Barrett, S (1999), "The credibility of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements. In: Fredriksson, P. (Ed.)", Trade, Global Policy and the Environment. World Bank Discussion Paper ,402, 161-172.Baumann, F, Buchwald, A, Friehe, T, Hottenrott, H and Weche, J (2017), "Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting", Applied Economic Letters, 24, 902-905.Baumann, F and Friehe, T (2013), "Profit shifting despite symmetric tax rates? A note on the role of tax enforcement", International Economic Journal, 27, 97-108.Becker, J and Fuest, C (2010), "Tax enforcement and tax havens under formula apportionment", International Tax and Public Finance, 17, 217-235.Botteon, M and Carraro, C (1997), "Burden-sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations with asymmetric countries", In: Carraro, C. (Ed.), International environmental negotiations, strategic policy issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 26-55.\\ref Bucovetsky, S and Haufler, A (2008), "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?", Journal of International Economics, 74, 188-201.Carraro, C, Siniscalco, D (1993), "Strategies for the international protection of the environment", Journal of Public Economics, 52, 309-328.Clausing, K (2003), "Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrafirm trade prices", Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2207-2223.Chu, H (2014), "Tax enforcement policy and the provision of the public goods with the presence of tax havens", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 61, 304-321.Egger, P, Eggert, W, Keuschnigg C and Winner, H (2010), "Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership", European Economic Review, 54, 96-107.Haufler, A and Runkel, M (2012), "Firms’ financial choices and thin capitalization rules under corporate tax competition", European Economic Review, 56, 1087-1103.Hines, JR and Rice, EM (1994), "Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American business", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 149-182.Hoel, M (1992), "International environmental conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions", Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 141-159.Hoel, M and Schneider, K (1997), "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement", Environmental and Resources Economics, 9, 153-170.Hong, Q and Smart, M (2010), "In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment", European Economic Review, 54, 82-95.Janeba, E, and Peters, W (1999), "Tax evasion, tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination: The case of interest taxation in Europe", The Economic Journal, 109, 93–101.Johannesen, N (2010), "Imperfect tax competition for profits, asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens", Journal of International Economics, 81, 253-264.Keen, M (2001), "Preferential regimes can make tax competition less harmful", National Tax Journal, 54, 757-762.List, JA and Mason, CF (2001), "Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 42, 277-296.\\ref Lockwood, B (2004), "Competition in unit vs. ad valorem taxes", International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 763-772.Marceau, N, Mongrain, S and Wilson, JD (2010), "Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital", Journal of International Economics, 80, 249-259.Mintz, J and Smart, M (2004), "Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: Theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada", Journal of Public Economics, 88,1149–1168.Oates, W and Schwab, R (1988), "Economic competition among Jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?", Journal of Public Economics, 35, 333-354.OECD (2013), "Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting", Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf.Ogawa, H and Wildasin, D (2009), "Think locally, act locally: Spillovers, spillbacks, and efficient decentralized policymaking", American Economic Review, 99, 1206-1217.WEF (2019), "The Global Risks Report 2019", World Economic Forum, Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2019.Peralta, S, Wauthy, X and Ypersele, T (2006), "Should countries control international profit shifting?", Journal of International Economics, 68, 24-37.Slemrod, J, and Wilson, JD (2009), "Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens", Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1261-1270.Wildasin, D (1989), "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy", Journal of Urban Economics, 25, 193-212.Wilson, JD (1986), "A theory of interregional tax competition", Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 296-315.Wilson, JD (1999), "Theories of tax competition", National Tax Journal, 52, 269-304.Zodrow, G and Mieszkowski, P (1986), "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of public goods", Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356-70. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202001031 en_US
