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題名 考慮租稅逃漏下從量關稅與從價關稅福利之比較
The Welfare Comparison of Specific Tariff and Ad Valorem Tariff in the Presence of Tax Evasion作者 黃聖文
Huang, Sheng-Wen貢獻者 翁堃嵐
黃聖文
Huang, Sheng-Wen關鍵詞 租稅逃漏
關稅逃漏
從量關稅
從價關稅
福利比較
Tax Evasion
Tariff Evasion
Specific Tariff
Ad Valorem Tariff
Welfare Comparison日期 2020 上傳時間 3-八月-2020 18:14:41 (UTC+8) 摘要 從量與從價稅兩種稅制之比較一直都是被廣泛討論的租稅議題，然而從量關稅與從價關稅福利比較之文獻卻相對較少。本文即在出口國廠商可以透過作帳來隱匿價格的情況下進行從量關稅與從價關稅福利之比較。由於在從價關稅下廠商有誘因透過作帳來隱匿價格，然而在從量關稅制度下廠商則沒有誘因，此一性質將會造成二種關稅政策福利效果的差異。從進口國社會福利水準的觀點來看，除了傳統的經濟效果外，相對從量關稅制度，從價關稅制度會提供廠商隱匿價格的誘因進而降低本國政府的關稅收入，導致從價稅制並不一定優於從量稅制，換言之，傳統從價稅優於從量稅之論點不必然會成立。
The comparison of the specific and ad valorem tax has been a widely discussed issue of taxation. However, there is little literature about the welfare comparison of specific and ad valorem tariff. This paper compares the specific tariff and the ad valorem tariff welfare when exporters can conceal the real price through doing fake accounting. Under the ad valorem tariff, exporters have incentives to conceal prices through accounting. On the contrary, exporters have no incentive under the specific tariff. This property brings differences in the welfare comparison of the two tariff systems. From the import country point of view, in addition to the traditional economic effects, the ad valorem tariff will provide exporters incentive to conceal prices and thereby reduce the domestic tariff revenue. As a result, the ad valorem tax system is not necessarily better than the specific tax system. In other words, the traditional proposition that the ad valorem tax is superior to the specific tax is not necessarily true.參考文獻 Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3-4), 323-338.Anderson, S. P., De Palma, A., & Kreider, B. (2001). The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition. Journal of Public Economics, 81(2), 231-251.Arias, R. J. (2005). A note on indirect tax evasión. Link at: http://www. aaep. org. ar/anales/works/works2005/arias. pdf.Boadway, R., Marchand, M., & Pestieau, P. (1994). Towards a theory of the direct-indirect tax mix. Journal of Public Economics, 55(1), 71-88.Fisman, R., & Wei, S. J. (2004). Tax rates and tax evasion: evidence from “missing imports” in China. Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 471-496.Fisman, R., Moustakerski, P., & Wei, S. J. (2008). Outsourcing tariff evasion: A new explanation for entrepôt trade. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 587-592.Huang, C. C., Ueng, K. G., & Hu, J. L. (2017). Non-equivalence of Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation in the Competitive Market with Tax Evasion. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 41-51.Javorcik, B. S., & Narciso, G. (2008). Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs. Journal of International Economics, 76(2), 208-222.Marrelli, M. (1984). On indirect tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 25(1-2), 181-196.Mishra, P., Subramanian, A., & Topalova, P. (2008). Tariffs, enforcement, and customs evasion: Evidence from India. Journal of Public Economics, 92(10-11), 1907-1925.Rijkers, B., Baghdadi, L., & Raballand, G. (2017). Political connections and tariff evasion evidence from Tunisia. The World Bank Economic Review, 31(2), 459-482.Skeath, S. E., & Trandel, G. A. (1994). A Pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments. Journal of Public Economics, 53(1), 53-71.Suits, D. B., & Musgrave, R. A. (1953). Ad valorem and unit taxes compared. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 67(4), 598-604.Ueng, K. G., Huang, C. C., & Hu, J. L. (2017). Specific Versus Ad Valorem Taxation With Tax Evasion In Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 107-119.Wicksell, K. (1896). Taxation in the monopoly case. Readings in the Economics of Taxation, 156-77.Virmani, A. (1989). Indirect tax evasion and production efficiency. Journal of Public Economics, 39(2), 223-237. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
107255016資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255016 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 翁堃嵐 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) 黃聖文 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Huang, Sheng-Wen en_US dc.creator (作者) 黃聖文 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Huang, Sheng-Wen en_US dc.date (日期) 2020 en_US dc.date.accessioned 3-八月-2020 18:14:41 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 3-八月-2020 18:14:41 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-八月-2020 18:14:41 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0107255016 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131194 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 107255016 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 從量與從價稅兩種稅制之比較一直都是被廣泛討論的租稅議題，然而從量關稅與從價關稅福利比較之文獻卻相對較少。本文即在出口國廠商可以透過作帳來隱匿價格的情況下進行從量關稅與從價關稅福利之比較。由於在從價關稅下廠商有誘因透過作帳來隱匿價格，然而在從量關稅制度下廠商則沒有誘因，此一性質將會造成二種關稅政策福利效果的差異。從進口國社會福利水準的觀點來看，除了傳統的經濟效果外，相對從量關稅制度，從價關稅制度會提供廠商隱匿價格的誘因進而降低本國政府的關稅收入，導致從價稅制並不一定優於從量稅制，換言之，傳統從價稅優於從量稅之論點不必然會成立。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The comparison of the specific and ad valorem tax has been a widely discussed issue of taxation. However, there is little literature about the welfare comparison of specific and ad valorem tariff. This paper compares the specific tariff and the ad valorem tariff welfare when exporters can conceal the real price through doing fake accounting. Under the ad valorem tariff, exporters have incentives to conceal prices through accounting. On the contrary, exporters have no incentive under the specific tariff. This property brings differences in the welfare comparison of the two tariff systems. From the import country point of view, in addition to the traditional economic effects, the ad valorem tariff will provide exporters incentive to conceal prices and thereby reduce the domestic tariff revenue. As a result, the ad valorem tax system is not necessarily better than the specific tax system. In other words, the traditional proposition that the ad valorem tax is superior to the specific tax is not necessarily true. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 11.1研究動機 11.2研究架構 2第二章 文獻回顧 32.1逃漏稅之相關文獻 32.2從量稅與從價稅比較之文獻 42.3關稅之相關文獻 5第三章 基本模型 63.1從量稅模型 63.2從價稅模型 83.3兩種稅制下的社會福利比較 9第四章 逃漏稅模型 114.1從量稅模型 114.2有逃漏稅行為之從價稅模型 124.3兩種稅制下的社會福利比較 14第五章 結論 17參考文獻 18附錄 20 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1001223 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255016 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅逃漏 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 關稅逃漏 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 從量關稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 從價關稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 福利比較 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax Evasion en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tariff Evasion en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Specific Tariff en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ad Valorem Tariff en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Welfare Comparison en_US dc.title (題名) 考慮租稅逃漏下從量關稅與從價關稅福利之比較 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Welfare Comparison of Specific Tariff and Ad Valorem Tariff in the Presence of Tax Evasion en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3-4), 323-338.Anderson, S. P., De Palma, A., & Kreider, B. (2001). The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition. Journal of Public Economics, 81(2), 231-251.Arias, R. J. (2005). A note on indirect tax evasión. Link at: http://www. aaep. org. ar/anales/works/works2005/arias. pdf.Boadway, R., Marchand, M., & Pestieau, P. (1994). Towards a theory of the direct-indirect tax mix. Journal of Public Economics, 55(1), 71-88.Fisman, R., & Wei, S. J. (2004). Tax rates and tax evasion: evidence from “missing imports” in China. Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 471-496.Fisman, R., Moustakerski, P., & Wei, S. J. (2008). Outsourcing tariff evasion: A new explanation for entrepôt trade. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 587-592.Huang, C. C., Ueng, K. G., & Hu, J. L. (2017). Non-equivalence of Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation in the Competitive Market with Tax Evasion. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 41-51.Javorcik, B. S., & Narciso, G. (2008). Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs. Journal of International Economics, 76(2), 208-222.Marrelli, M. (1984). On indirect tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 25(1-2), 181-196.Mishra, P., Subramanian, A., & Topalova, P. (2008). Tariffs, enforcement, and customs evasion: Evidence from India. Journal of Public Economics, 92(10-11), 1907-1925.Rijkers, B., Baghdadi, L., & Raballand, G. (2017). Political connections and tariff evasion evidence from Tunisia. The World Bank Economic Review, 31(2), 459-482.Skeath, S. E., & Trandel, G. A. (1994). A Pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments. Journal of Public Economics, 53(1), 53-71.Suits, D. B., & Musgrave, R. A. (1953). Ad valorem and unit taxes compared. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 67(4), 598-604.Ueng, K. G., Huang, C. C., & Hu, J. L. (2017). Specific Versus Ad Valorem Taxation With Tax Evasion In Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 107-119.Wicksell, K. (1896). Taxation in the monopoly case. Readings in the Economics of Taxation, 156-77.Virmani, A. (1989). Indirect tax evasion and production efficiency. Journal of Public Economics, 39(2), 223-237. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202000846 en_US
