| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wang, Jue-Shyan | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 蔡宜樺 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Tsai, Yi-Hua | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 蔡宜樺 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Tsai, Yi-Hua | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2020 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 3-Aug-2020 18:15:44 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 3-Aug-2020 18:15:44 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 3-Aug-2020 18:15:44 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0107255025 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131200 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 107255025 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在台灣的選舉，各政黨參選人為了爭取機會，讓自己能夠在競爭激烈的選舉當中脫穎而出，如何贏得勝利就取決於他們所選取的策略，競選的過程中有正面攻擊與負面攻擊兩種策略，至於選擇採取何種策略就看參選人評估自己的效益後再做決定。本文使用三種賽局模型分析在一場政治選舉中，當參選人競選能力不同時，面臨各種情況下，會如何做出選擇。根據各情況所求得的均衡結果，我們可以得到不論在哪種競選賽局，參選人都是根據正面與負面效益的強度做決定，正面效益較強時採取正面攻擊，負面效益較強則採取負面攻擊，至於當兩者效益相當時，會選擇採取正面與負面攻擊的混合策略，由結果可以看到，參選人採用的攻擊策略與決策先後順序、各型態出現的機率大小等皆無關。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In Taiwan, every candidate from each political party wants to win the leadership of government in a highly competitive election. However, the outcome depends on the strategy they choose. There are two kinds of strategies in the election process, “positive” and “negative” activity. The candidates will take the final decision after evaluate their own benefits. Considering the different campaign ability of each candidate, this paper uses three types of game model to analyze how the candidates make choices under all circumstances in a political election. According to the equilibrium results, we concluded that the candidates make a decision on the basis of the degree of positive and negative benefits. They would take positive actions when the positive benefit is stronger, otherwise they take negative actions. When the benefits of positive and negative actions are equal, they choose mixed strategies. Moreover, the attack strategies adopted by the candidates have nothing to do with the sequence of the decision and the probability of each strategic type. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言 1第二章 兩參選人同時決策的競選賽局 5第三章 兩參選人先後決策的競選賽局 20第四章 兩參選人在資訊不對稱下的競選賽局 25第五章 結論 30參考文獻 31 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 1284243 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255025 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 競選策略 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 正面攻擊 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 負面攻擊 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Nash均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 子賽局完全均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 序列均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | campaign strategy | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | positive activity | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | negative activity | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Nash equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | subgame perfect equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | sequential equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 正面與負面攻擊策略的競選賽局 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The Game of Positive and Negative Campaigning in Political Elections | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 一、 中文文獻陳銘薰、李祥銘，2009，〈競選廣告可信度對候選人品牌權益及選民投票意願之影響-以正負面競選廣告為例〉，《商管科技季刊》，10(1): 29-60。張芝瑜、蘇佩萱，2016，〈2014年雙北市長候選人競選形象別之研究〉，《藝術論文集刊》，26: 27-68。張卿卿，2000，〈美國政治競選廣告效果研究的回顧〉，《廣告學研究》，14: 1-29。鈕則勳，2012，〈2009年縣市長選舉候選人文宣功能分析〉，《中國廣告學刊》，17: 41-66。二、 英文文獻Ansolabehere, Stephen, Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon, and Nicholas Valentino. 1994. “Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate? ” The American Political Science Review 88(4): 829-838.Garramone, Gina M. 1984. “Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads.” Journalism Quarterly 61(2): 250-259.Harrington, Joseph E., and Gregory D. Hess. 1996. “A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning.” Games and Economic Behavior 17(2): 209-229.Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. 1984. “Democratic Elections and Democratic Government.” World Affairs 147(2): 61-69.Polborn, Mattias K., and David T. Yi. 2006. “Informative Positive and Negative Campaigning.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1(4): 351-371.Roese, Neal J., and Gerald N. Sande. 1993. “Backlash Effects in Attack Politics.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 23(8): 632-653.Skaperdas, Stergios, and Bernard Grofman. 1995. “Modeling Negative Campaigning.” American Political Science Review 89(1): 49-61. | zh_TW |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6814/NCCU202000985 | en_US |
