| dc.contributor | 選舉研究 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 王智賢 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wang, Jue-shyan | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 嚴馥妤 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Yan, Fu-yu | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 林玫吟 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lin, Mei-yin | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2019-11 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 19-Nov-2020 11:43:39 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 19-Nov-2020 11:43:39 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 19-Nov-2020 11:43:39 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/132727 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在臺灣的選舉中，政黨候選人時常在競選過程中發生禮讓參選的現象。本文以賽局模型分析參選人在政黨屬性較接近的其他政黨決定參選時，是否採取禮讓參選的決策。在參選人不知道屬性較接近的其他政黨參選人實力強弱的情況下，我們發現屬性較接近的其他政黨參選人強者型態的比例愈大、給予參選人較多的禮讓好處時，參選人較容易啟動禮讓參選的機制。 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In Taiwan, a phenomenon commonly occurs that the candidates of a political party yield to other candidates in election campaigns. This paper establishes a model of game theory in which candidates can decide whether to make a concession in an election when the candidates of another party with similar attributes are running for election. In the case of candidates who do not know the capability of other party candidates, it is easier for candidates to start the concession mechanism when the proportion of a strong type among the other candidates is large and when the candidates from another party concede more benefits. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 2058770 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 選舉研究, 26(2), 1-22 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 禮讓參選 ; 政黨整合 ; 序列均衡 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | concession election ; party integration ; sequential equilibrium | - |
| dc.title (題名) | 禮讓參選的賽局分析 | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Game-Theoretic Analysis of Making a Concession Decision in an Election | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6612/tjes.201911_26(2).0001 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.6612/tjes.201911_26(2).0001 | - |
