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題名 中央與地方租稅整合與最適地方公共財提供—扣抵稅額的運用
Tax Integration between the Central and Local Governments and the Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods—An Application of Tax Credits作者 郭佳柔
Kuo, Chia-Jou貢獻者 陳國樑
郭佳柔
Kuo, Chia-Jou關鍵詞 租稅競爭
財政自主
稅額扣抵
租稅整合日期 2020 上傳時間 1-Dec-2020 15:01:40 (UTC+8) 摘要 無論市場型態為完全競爭亦或不完全競爭，在租稅競爭下，地方政府間為了競爭資本而導致地方資本稅率低於最適水準，由地方政府透過地方稅收融通之公共財因而無法足量提供。當地方政府不願自主開徵地方稅或地方稅率過低時，地方政府無法對其財政收支負責，地方財政自主與財政努力受到影響。為解決地方租稅競爭所帶來之不效率以及增進地方財政自主，中央政府可透過稅額扣抵的制度整合納稅義務人之總租稅負擔並將資本流動之誘因消除，使地方政府自主將地方資本稅率訂在最適水準，地方公共財亦呈現足量提供，此時地方財政自主亦因地方稅率之提高而提升。 參考文獻 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relation (1993), RTS 1991: State Revenue Capacity and Effort, Washington, D. C.: ACIR.Akin, J. (1973), “Fiscal Capacity and the Estimation Method of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,” National Tax Journal, 26(2), 275–291.Atkinson, A. B. and N. H. Stern (1974), “Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods,” Review of Economic Studies, 41, 119–128.Beck, J. H. (1983), “Tax Competition, Uniform Assessment and the Benefit Principle,” Journal of Urban Economics, 3(2), 127–146.Bucovetsky, S. (1991), “Asymmetric Tax Competition,” Journal of Urban Economics, 30, 167–181.Brueckner, J. K. and L. A. Saavedra (2001), “Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-Tax Competition?” National Tax Journal, 54(2), 203–229.Fisher, R. C. (1996), State and Local Public Finance, Chicago: Richard D Irwin.Gordon, R. H. (2007), “Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?” International Taxation, 396–417.Keen, M. and M. Marchand (1997), “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 33–53.Lai, Y. B. (2006), “Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Rent-Shifting Incentives,” Taipei Economic Inquiry, 42, 1–24.Manvel, A. D. (1971), “Differences in Fiscal Capacity and Effort: Their Significance for a Federal Revenue Sharing System,” National Tax Journal, 24(2), 193–204.Oates, W. E. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.Oates, W. E. (1999), “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1120–1149.Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, Paris: OECD.Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416–424.Wildasin, D. E. (1988), “Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 35(2), 229–240.Wilson, J. D. (1991), “Tax Competition with Interregional Differences in Factor Endowments,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 21(3), 423–451.Wilson, J. D. (1986), “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3), 296–315.Wilson, J. D. (1999), “Theories of Tax Competition,” National Tax Journal, 52, 269–304.Zodrow, G. R. and P. Mieszkowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356–370. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
106255009資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255009 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 陳國樑 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 郭佳柔 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Kuo, Chia-Jou en_US dc.creator (作者) 郭佳柔 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Kuo, Chia-Jou en_US dc.date (日期) 2020 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Dec-2020 15:01:40 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Dec-2020 15:01:40 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Dec-2020 15:01:40 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106255009 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/132896 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106255009 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 無論市場型態為完全競爭亦或不完全競爭，在租稅競爭下，地方政府間為了競爭資本而導致地方資本稅率低於最適水準，由地方政府透過地方稅收融通之公共財因而無法足量提供。當地方政府不願自主開徵地方稅或地方稅率過低時，地方政府無法對其財政收支負責，地方財政自主與財政努力受到影響。為解決地方租稅競爭所帶來之不效率以及增進地方財政自主，中央政府可透過稅額扣抵的制度整合納稅義務人之總租稅負擔並將資本流動之誘因消除，使地方政府自主將地方資本稅率訂在最適水準，地方公共財亦呈現足量提供，此時地方財政自主亦因地方稅率之提高而提升。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 11.1 研究背景 11.2 研究動機 41.3 研究架構 6第二章 文獻回顧 92.1 財政努力與財政自主 92.2 租稅競爭文獻 10第三章 完全競爭市場下之租稅競爭模型 133.1 基本假設 143.2 基本模型 163.3 Case 1：加入中央政府後，中央政府針對全國資本課稅 173.4 Case 2：中央政府和地方政府皆針對資本課稅，中央政府提供公共財所需部分資金 193.5 Case 3：中央政府和地方政府皆針對資本課稅，中央政府設有扣抵比率 並設定扣抵稅額上限之制度 213.6 小結 24第四章 不完全競爭下之租稅競爭模型 254.1 Lai (2006) 的租稅競爭模型 254.2 Case 4：地方政府不課徵資本稅，改由中央政府針對全國資本課徵資本稅 284.3 Case 5：加入中央政府後，地方政府以及中央政府皆針對資本課稅，中央政府提供部分公共財所需資金 304.4 Case 6：加入中央政府後，地方政府以及中央政府皆課徵資本稅，並在一定額度內允許稅額扣抵 334.5 小結 36第五章 結論 38參考文獻 41 zh_TW dc.format.extent 765482 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255009 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅競爭 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財政自主 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 稅額扣抵 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅整合 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 中央與地方租稅整合與最適地方公共財提供—扣抵稅額的運用 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Tax Integration between the Central and Local Governments and the Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods—An Application of Tax Credits en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relation (1993), RTS 1991: State Revenue Capacity and Effort, Washington, D. C.: ACIR.Akin, J. (1973), “Fiscal Capacity and the Estimation Method of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,” National Tax Journal, 26(2), 275–291.Atkinson, A. B. and N. H. Stern (1974), “Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods,” Review of Economic Studies, 41, 119–128.Beck, J. H. (1983), “Tax Competition, Uniform Assessment and the Benefit Principle,” Journal of Urban Economics, 3(2), 127–146.Bucovetsky, S. (1991), “Asymmetric Tax Competition,” Journal of Urban Economics, 30, 167–181.Brueckner, J. K. and L. A. Saavedra (2001), “Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-Tax Competition?” National Tax Journal, 54(2), 203–229.Fisher, R. C. (1996), State and Local Public Finance, Chicago: Richard D Irwin.Gordon, R. H. (2007), “Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?” International Taxation, 396–417.Keen, M. and M. Marchand (1997), “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 33–53.Lai, Y. B. (2006), “Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Rent-Shifting Incentives,” Taipei Economic Inquiry, 42, 1–24.Manvel, A. D. (1971), “Differences in Fiscal Capacity and Effort: Their Significance for a Federal Revenue Sharing System,” National Tax Journal, 24(2), 193–204.Oates, W. E. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.Oates, W. E. (1999), “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1120–1149.Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, Paris: OECD.Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416–424.Wildasin, D. E. (1988), “Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 35(2), 229–240.Wilson, J. D. (1991), “Tax Competition with Interregional Differences in Factor Endowments,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 21(3), 423–451.Wilson, J. D. (1986), “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3), 296–315.Wilson, J. D. (1999), “Theories of Tax Competition,” National Tax Journal, 52, 269–304.Zodrow, G. R. and P. Mieszkowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356–370. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202001792 en_US
