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題名 Silent promotion of agendas: campaign contributions and ideological polarization
作者 潘振宇
Pan, Chen-Yu
Konishi, Hideo
貢獻者 國貿系
關鍵詞 Electoral competition ; Probabilistic voting ; Campaign contributions ; Interest groups ; Impressionable voters ; Polarization
日期 2020-01
上傳時間 2021-01-28
摘要 We set up a two-party electoral competition model in a two-dimensional policy space with campaign contributions by an interest group that wants to promote a certain agenda. Assuming that voters are influenced by campaign spending for/against candidates, we analyze incentive-compatible contracts between the interest group and the candidates on agenda policy positions and campaign contributions. The interest group asks the candidates to commit to a level of agenda promotion in exchange for campaign contributions, letting them compete over the other (ideological) dimension only. It is shown that as the agenda is pushed further by the interest group, ideological policy polarization and campaign contributions surge.
關聯 Public Choice, No.182, pp.93–117
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00670-y
dc.contributor 國貿系
dc.creator (作者) 潘振宇
dc.creator (作者) Pan, Chen-Yu
dc.creator (作者) Konishi, Hideo
dc.date (日期) 2020-01
dc.date.accessioned 2021-01-28-
dc.date.available 2021-01-28-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2021-01-28-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/133826-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) We set up a two-party electoral competition model in a two-dimensional policy space with campaign contributions by an interest group that wants to promote a certain agenda. Assuming that voters are influenced by campaign spending for/against candidates, we analyze incentive-compatible contracts between the interest group and the candidates on agenda policy positions and campaign contributions. The interest group asks the candidates to commit to a level of agenda promotion in exchange for campaign contributions, letting them compete over the other (ideological) dimension only. It is shown that as the agenda is pushed further by the interest group, ideological policy polarization and campaign contributions surge.
dc.format.extent 2606988 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Public Choice, No.182, pp.93–117
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Electoral competition ; Probabilistic voting ; Campaign contributions ; Interest groups ; Impressionable voters ; Polarization
dc.title (題名) Silent promotion of agendas: campaign contributions and ideological polarization
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00670-y
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00670-y