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題名 以比較法觀點論私部門吹哨者保護與通報機制之建構
Whistleblower Protection and Internal Reporting Mechanisms in Private Sectors: A Comparative Law Perspective作者 陳芊妤
Chen, Chien-Yu貢獻者 劉連煜
Liu, Len-Yu
陳芊妤
Chen, Chien-Yu關鍵詞 吹哨者保護
反報復保障措施
內部通報機制
吹哨誘因
檢舉獎金制度
企業舞弊
公司治理
Whistleblower Protection
Anti-Retaliation Provisions
Internal Reporting Mechanisms
Whistleblowing Incentives
Whistleblower Bounty Program
Corporate Fraud
Corporate Governance日期 2021 上傳時間 1-Feb-2021 14:11:41 (UTC+8) 摘要 企業舞弊事件頻繁發生反映出公司治理缺失與內部控制失靈等嚴重問題，透過吹哨者揭發不法既普遍作為偵測潛在舞弊行為之方式，應得有效遏止與減輕其造成的危害。一般而言，吹哨制度須涵蓋企業內部通報機制與吹哨者保護，因通報途徑若不受吹哨者信賴或缺乏保障措施，於揭弊風險過高而誘因不足時，將難以促進通報機制之利用，且當企業無視通報案件或阻撓員工對外吹哨，亦無從發揮示警效果。我國目前尚未通過揭弊者保護法而停留在草案階段，企業內部人揭弊不僅未獲正面肯定更可能遭追究責任，又受限於既有規範的不足，其處境艱難卻無法獲得充分有效救濟，顯見吹哨者保護之立法已是刻不容緩。關於吹哨者保護制度之具體內涵，本文係以吹哨者身分保密、禁止報復、匿名通報與吹哨行為責任減免等層面，分析美國、英國與澳洲吹哨者保護法制之規範重點與實際運作狀況，釐清如何提供積極保障以降低吹哨風險。另為在吹哨者保護與企業利益間取得平衡，探討通報範圍、通報程序優先性與應具備的各項要件，而為鼓勵吹哨則進一步思考於證券不法事件引入美國檢舉獎金制度之必要性。現行法未強制所有類型之企業建立內部通報機制，將來如僅以公開發行公司作為規範對象，其架構設計應考量如何落實吹哨者保護並切合監管需求。對此議題，本文擬就受理單位之獨立性、保密義務與通報案件處理流程為基礎進行討論，並借鏡國外法制經驗提出完善內部通報機制之要素，期能確保通報機制運作效率，進而強化公司治理及形塑提倡揭弊之環境。
As the prevalence of fraud in companies reflects the failure of corporate governance and internal control, whistleblowing could be regarded as an effective way to detect malfeasance, to prevent or mitigate damages arising from the violation. Generally, internal reporting mechanisms and protection provisions are both essential for a whistleblower policy, in order to gain the trust of potential whistleblowers and decrease the fear of retaliation. If the risks of whistleblowing outweigh the benefits, it will be difficult to stimulate the use of reporting systems and function as an early warning system without strong incentives, especially when the concerns have been ignored or impeded by employers.Given the continuing lack of effective and comprehensive whistleblower protection laws in Taiwan, it revealed the urgent need of legislation that whistleblowers should have access to legal remedies and immunity from liability. This paper focuses on the confidentiality of the whistleblower`s identity, anti-retaliation protection, anonymous whistleblowing, and the exemption from liability, while primarily analyzing elements of whistleblowing laws enacted in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, to minimize the risks of whistleblowing. In addition, the scope of protected disclosures, reporting procedures and the requirements should be examined from a perspective of striking the balance between the competing interests of whistleblowers and corporates. Providing financial incentives to whistleblowers who report cases of possible securities law violations, such as the bounty program established by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, might also be taken into consideration for the purpose of encouraging employees to speak up.Despite the fact that establishing internal reporting mechanisms has not been a legal obligation for most businesses under the current regime, such mechanisms enable staff to speak up about unethical or illegal conduct, fostering a corporate culture of trust and responsiveness; these are necessarily applicable to public companies. This paper intends to explore the issue based on the independent receivers, confidentiality, and the procedure for dealing with concerns. 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REV. 217 (2008).39.Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Intelligence Design: An Analysis of the SEC`s New Office of Market Intelligence and Its Goal of Using Big Data to Improve Securities Enforcement, 82 U. Cin. L. Rev. 415 (2018).40.Thomas C.R. Reynolds, Securing Protections for Whistleblowers of Securities Fraud in the United States and the European Union, 13 Chi.-Kent J. Int`l & Comp. L. 201, (2013).41.Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC`s New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1235 (2014).42.Stephane Rousseau, Whistleblowing: An Instrument Serving Compliance, 50 R.J.T. n.s. 571 (2016).43.Sonia A. Steinway, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” but What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC`s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209 (2014).44.Stubben, Stephen and Welch, Kyle, Evidence on the Use and Efficacy of Internal Whistleblowing Systems, Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 58 (2) (February 29, 2020).45.Lucy Vickers, Whistling in the Wind? The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, 20 Legal Stud. 428 (2000).46.Andrew Walker, Why shouldn’t we protect internal whistleblowers? Exploring justifications for the Asadi decision, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1761 (2015).47.Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer and a Critique, Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law Vol. XII (2007).三、政府機關資料1.ASIC, Regulatory Guide 270 Whistleblower policies (2019).2.Financial Conduct Authority, Whistleblowing in deposit-takers, PRA-designated investment firms and insurers, Policy Statement PS15/24 (2015).3.Ontario Securities Commission, OSC Policy 15-601-Whistleblower Program (2018).4.OSHA, Whistleblower Investigations Manual (Jan. 28, 2016).5.Parliament of Australia, Final Report: Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2014).6.Parliament of Australia, Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2018, Revised Explanatory Memorandum (2019).7.SEC, 2019 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program (Nov. 15, 2019).8.SEC, Form TCR - Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9.SEC, Issuing Release No. 34-64545, File No. S7-33-10, 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249, Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Aug. 12, 2011).10.SEC, Final Rule, Release No. 34-89963 (2020).11.Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2020 (Nov. 2, 2020).四、法院判決1.American International Group, Inc. v. Greenberg, C.A. No. 769-VCS, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).2.Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013).3.Berman v. Neo @Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2nd Cir. 2015).4.Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. 2014).5.Cellucci v. O`Leary, No. 19-CV-2752 (VEC), 2020 WL 977986 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2020).6.Chesterton Global Ltd v. Nurmohamed [2017] EWCA Civ 979.7.Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 837 (1984).8.Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 200 L. Ed. 2d 15 (2018).9.Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429 (2014).10.Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc., 520 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2008)11.Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., U.S. Dep`t of Labor, 717 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2013).12.Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2014).13.Parkins v. Sodexho Ltd [2002] IRLR 109.14.Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).15.Street v. Derbyshire Unemployed Workers` Centre [2004] IRLR 687.16.Thomas v. Tyco Int`l Mgmt. Co., LLC, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2017).五、網路及其他資料1.ACFE, Report to Nations-2020 Global Study on Occupational Fraud and Abuse.2.BaFin, Wirecard AG: General Administrative Act on the prohibition on establishing and increasing of net short positions, at:https://www.bafin.de/dok/12081206.3.Emily Flitter, The Price of Wells Fargo’s Fake Account Scandal Grows by $3 Billion, The New York Times, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/business/wells-fargo-settlement.html.4.EQS Integrity Line: The innovative whistleblower system, at: https://www.eqs.com/compliance-solutions/integrity-line/.5.EUR-Lex, Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law.6.Financial Times, Wirecard: the timeline, at: https://www.ft.com/content/284fb1ad-ddc0-45df-a075-0709b36868db.7.Investigative Journalism Manual, Becoming an investigate journalist, at: https://www.investigative-manual.org/en/chapters/who-is-that-investigative-journalist/1-how-to-define-investigative-journalism/.8.ISO 37001 Anti-bribery management systems, at: https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/store/en/PUB100396.pdf.9.Matt Egan, SEC: GE could face punishment over staggering insurance losses, CNN Business, at: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/06/business/ge-investigation-wells-notice-insurance/index.html.10.OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015), at: https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf.11.OECD, Guidelines on whistleblower protection for companies in Greece, (2018), at: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Guidelines-Whistleblower-Protection-Companies-in-Greece-ENG.pdf.12.OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), at: http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.13.Ryan Browne, It was once Germany’s fintech star. Now, a missing $2 billion puts Wirecard’s future in doubt, at: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/19/wirecards-future-is-in-doubt-as-accounting-scandal-deepens.html.14.SEC Charges Hedge Fund Adviser With Conducting Conflicted Transactions and Retaliating Against Whistleblower, at: https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-118.15.SEC, Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers in Confidentiality Agreements, at: https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-54.html.16.The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012).17.The UK Corporate Governance Code (2018).18.Transparency International, Internal whistleblowing mechanisms topic guide. (2017), at: https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Whistleblowing-Topic-Guide.pdf.19.United States Department of Labor, statutes enforced by Occupational Safety and Health Administration, at: https://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
法律學系
106651006資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106651006 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 劉連煜 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Liu, Len-Yu en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳芊妤 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, Chien-Yu en_US dc.creator (作者) 陳芊妤 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chen, Chien-Yu en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Feb-2021 14:11:41 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Feb-2021 14:11:41 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Feb-2021 14:11:41 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106651006 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/133898 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 法律學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106651006 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 企業舞弊事件頻繁發生反映出公司治理缺失與內部控制失靈等嚴重問題，透過吹哨者揭發不法既普遍作為偵測潛在舞弊行為之方式，應得有效遏止與減輕其造成的危害。一般而言，吹哨制度須涵蓋企業內部通報機制與吹哨者保護，因通報途徑若不受吹哨者信賴或缺乏保障措施，於揭弊風險過高而誘因不足時，將難以促進通報機制之利用，且當企業無視通報案件或阻撓員工對外吹哨，亦無從發揮示警效果。我國目前尚未通過揭弊者保護法而停留在草案階段，企業內部人揭弊不僅未獲正面肯定更可能遭追究責任，又受限於既有規範的不足，其處境艱難卻無法獲得充分有效救濟，顯見吹哨者保護之立法已是刻不容緩。關於吹哨者保護制度之具體內涵，本文係以吹哨者身分保密、禁止報復、匿名通報與吹哨行為責任減免等層面，分析美國、英國與澳洲吹哨者保護法制之規範重點與實際運作狀況，釐清如何提供積極保障以降低吹哨風險。另為在吹哨者保護與企業利益間取得平衡，探討通報範圍、通報程序優先性與應具備的各項要件，而為鼓勵吹哨則進一步思考於證券不法事件引入美國檢舉獎金制度之必要性。現行法未強制所有類型之企業建立內部通報機制，將來如僅以公開發行公司作為規範對象，其架構設計應考量如何落實吹哨者保護並切合監管需求。對此議題，本文擬就受理單位之獨立性、保密義務與通報案件處理流程為基礎進行討論，並借鏡國外法制經驗提出完善內部通報機制之要素，期能確保通報機制運作效率，進而強化公司治理及形塑提倡揭弊之環境。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) As the prevalence of fraud in companies reflects the failure of corporate governance and internal control, whistleblowing could be regarded as an effective way to detect malfeasance, to prevent or mitigate damages arising from the violation. Generally, internal reporting mechanisms and protection provisions are both essential for a whistleblower policy, in order to gain the trust of potential whistleblowers and decrease the fear of retaliation. If the risks of whistleblowing outweigh the benefits, it will be difficult to stimulate the use of reporting systems and function as an early warning system without strong incentives, especially when the concerns have been ignored or impeded by employers.Given the continuing lack of effective and comprehensive whistleblower protection laws in Taiwan, it revealed the urgent need of legislation that whistleblowers should have access to legal remedies and immunity from liability. This paper focuses on the confidentiality of the whistleblower`s identity, anti-retaliation protection, anonymous whistleblowing, and the exemption from liability, while primarily analyzing elements of whistleblowing laws enacted in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, to minimize the risks of whistleblowing. In addition, the scope of protected disclosures, reporting procedures and the requirements should be examined from a perspective of striking the balance between the competing interests of whistleblowers and corporates. Providing financial incentives to whistleblowers who report cases of possible securities law violations, such as the bounty program established by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, might also be taken into consideration for the purpose of encouraging employees to speak up.Despite the fact that establishing internal reporting mechanisms has not been a legal obligation for most businesses under the current regime, such mechanisms enable staff to speak up about unethical or illegal conduct, fostering a corporate culture of trust and responsiveness; these are necessarily applicable to public companies. This paper intends to explore the issue based on the independent receivers, confidentiality, and the procedure for dealing with concerns. In conclusion, operational efficiency of such mechanisms would be improved owing to the critical factors of reporting systems learned from international experiences, and consequently enhance corporate governance through a supportive environment for whistleblowers. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究範圍與方法 4第一項 研究範圍 4第二項 研究方法 5第三節 研究架構 6第二章 吹哨制度概述 8第一節 吹哨者之定義與保障範圍 8第二節 建構吹哨制度之重要性 9第三節 吹哨制度與公司治理之落實 12第一項 公司治理之內涵 12第二項 吹哨制度於公司治理之作用 13第三章 私部門之揭弊機制與吹哨者保護制度 16第一節 企業內部通報機制 16第一項 內部通報機制之建立 16第二項 是否允許匿名吹哨 19第三項 建立內部通報機制之必要性 20第四項 內部通報機制之實際運作情形 21第二節 律師與會計師作為吹哨主體之適當性 23第一項 資本市場守門員之角色 23第二項 律師作為企業不法行為之吹哨者 24第三項 會計師作為企業不法行為之吹哨者 27第四項 守門員通報義務之法制建構 29第三節 董事監察人作為吹哨主體 31第四節 提升吹哨誘因 33第一項 經濟上誘因 34第二項 非經濟上誘因 36第五節 吹哨者保護制度 38第一項 吹哨者可能構成之法律責任 38第一款 刑事責任 38第二款 民事責任 40第二項 匿名吹哨與吹哨者身分保密 41第三項 保護吹哨者不因通報行為而受報復 43第一款 報復行為 43第二款 保障對象 44第三款 保障措施 45第四項 吹哨行為之責任減免 47第五項 吹哨者涉入違法行為之刑事責任與民事責任能否減免 48第四章 國外吹哨者保護法制 52第一節 美國吹哨者保護法制 52第一項 沙賓法案（Sarbanes-Oxley Act） 52第一款 審計委員會應負責建立企業內部通報機制 53第二款 保護吹哨者免受報復 53第三款 對吹哨者採取報復行為之刑事責任 57第四款 保障措施之實效性 58第五款 專業人士之通報義務 59第二項 華爾街改革法案（Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010） 62第一款 以SEC檢舉獎金制度建立吹哨者獎勵措施 62第二款 對吹哨者之保護 71第三款 外部通報以SEC吹哨者辦公室為專責單位 81第四款 向監管機構通報之程序與後續調查 82第三項 小結 82第二節 英國吹哨者保護法制 85第一項 英國吹哨者法制沿革 85第二項 公益揭露法（Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998） 86第一款 保障對象 86第二款 吹哨行為 86第三款 吹哨程序 87第四款 保障措施與相關救濟 90第三項 企業與監管改革法案（Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013） 91第一款 新增公共利益（public interest）要件 92第二款 刪除須基於善意之要件 92第三款 新增雇主之連帶責任 93第四項 英國公司治理守則以及監管機構發布之規則 93第三節 澳洲私部門吹哨者保護法制 95第一項 法制概述與立法背景 95第二項 吹哨者保護規範 96第一款 澳洲公司法於2019年修正前之規定 96第二款 證券交易所上市規則要求建立內部通報制度與保障措施 97第三款 2019年新修正公司法之吹哨者保護制度 98第四款 澳洲法2019年吹哨新制與修法前規範之差異 105第五款 ASIC法規指引（Regulatory Guide 270） 107第四節 美國、英國與澳洲之私部門吹哨者保護法制比較 109第五章 我國現行法制之探討 112第一節 現行法與吹哨制度相關之規範 112第一項 誘因制度 112第一款 提供檢舉獎金 112第二款 現行法提供之誘因不足 114第二項 對吹哨者之保障 115第一款 受保護之要件 116第二款 保障措施 118第三款 舉證責任 120第四款 現行法規範不足之檢討 120第二節 企業建立內部通報機制之相關規範 124第一項 勞動基準法要求訂立之工作規則 124第二項 公司治理實務守則之規定 124第三項 企業內部控制制度 127第六章 揭弊者保護法草案架構與評析 131第一節 草案架構與規範內容 132第一項 立法目的與主管機關 132第二項 受保護之要件 133第三項 對揭弊者免受報復行為侵害之保障 135第四項 揭弊者法律責任減免規定 138第五項 揭弊者人身安全保護 139第六項 揭弊者之身分保密 139第七項 揭弊者權益維持原則及喪失保護之例外情事 140第八項 揭弊之獎金由各目的事業主管機關另為規範 140第二節 揭弊者保護法草案規定之評析 142第一項 受保護之要件過於嚴格 142第二項 揭弊程序之優先性與運作問題 145第三項 匿名揭弊不應排除受理 147第四項 報復行為定義過於狹隘且保障措施不足 148第五項 未提供積極誘因 150第七章 結論與建議 152參考文獻 158 zh_TW dc.format.extent 4376145 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106651006 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 吹哨者保護 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 反報復保障措施 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 內部通報機制 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 吹哨誘因 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 檢舉獎金制度 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 企業舞弊 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Whistleblower Protection en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Anti-Retaliation Provisions en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Internal Reporting Mechanisms en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Whistleblowing Incentives en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Whistleblower Bounty Program en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Fraud en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Governance en_US dc.title (題名) 以比較法觀點論私部門吹哨者保護與通報機制之建構 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Whistleblower Protection and Internal Reporting Mechanisms in Private Sectors: A Comparative Law Perspective en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文資料一、專書1.朱德芳，證券交易法下資訊不實案件董監事民事責任之免責抗辯事由，財經法新課題與新趨勢（二），2015年12月。2.劉連煜，現代公司法，新學林，2020年9月，15版。3.劉連煜、杜怡靜、林郁馨、陳肇鴻，選任獨立董事與公司治理，元照，2013年7月。二、期刊1.王文宇，法學、經濟學與組織(下)—兼論契約型與公司型共同基金組織，月旦法學雜誌，182期，2010年7月，頁9-10。2.王志誠，金融機構公司治理實務守則之特性及發展—以金融機構負責人之兼任職務為中心，財稅研究，48卷4期，2019年7月，頁90。3.余雪明，臺灣新公司法與獨立董事（上），萬國法律，123期，2002年7月，頁63。4.李智仁、陳一銘，建構金融機構內部人通報機制之芻議，存款保險資訊季刊，21卷3期，2008年9月，頁140-141。5.李聖傑，「新」揭弊者保護法之簡介—公私部門合併，月旦會計實務研究，16期，2019年4月，頁27。6.李曜崇，從比較法觀點探討我國律師擔當守門員角色之法律布局，法學新論，5期，2008年12月，頁123。7.林仁光，公司治理之理論與實踐—經營者支配或股東支配之衝突與調整，臺大法學論叢，33卷3期，2003年，頁209-211。8.林志潔，貪污犯罪檢舉人之保護與獎勵—以廣義的貪污共犯為核心，月旦法學雜誌，203期，2012年4月，頁147-149。9.林良榮，日本公益通報者保護法之立法政策與行政實務—兼論法院裁判案例與通報制度之改革，月旦法學雜誌，290期，2019年6月，頁162。10.林良榮，吹哨者之勞工保護與企業法遵義務—「一例一休」之權利保障與雇主勞動條件明示義務，月旦法學雜誌，273期，2018年1月，頁182。11.林良榮，勞基法第二八條積欠工資申請墊償之「雇主」與「勞工」概念—最高行政法院一○四年度判字第四七二號判決評釋，月旦裁判時報，42期，2015年12月，頁7-8。12.林郁馨，從美國證券集體訴訟談證券詐欺訴訟的填補損害及嚇阻功能，月旦財經法雜誌，14期，2008年9月，頁183。13.林鈺雄，誹謗罪之實體要件與訴訟證明－兼評大法官釋字第五○九號解釋，國立臺灣大學法學論叢，32卷2期，頁97。14.法務部廉政署，2019年聯合國反貪腐公約專題學術研討會實錄論文集，2019年10月，頁81-82。15.邵慶平，金融管制與私人執行—國際金融危機後管制發展的反省，國立中正大學法學集刊，40期，2013年7月，頁104-106。16.邵慶平，財報不實民事責任法制中公司作為責任主體之反思，月旦法學雜誌，290期，2019年7月，頁128。17.姜世明，釋明程序中之證據方法提出—評最高法院九十八年度台抗字第九二八號民事裁定，月旦法學雜誌，182期，2010年7月，頁275-277。18.袁義昕，美國律師作為資本市場守門員之研究，法學叢刊，210期，2008年4月，頁165。19.馬秀如、朱家德，「揭弊者保護」草案之評析，月旦會計實務研究，16期，2019年4月，頁51。20.張心悌，台灣財報不實吹哨者免責抗辯之判決分析，月旦會計實務研究，10期，2018年，頁56。21.莊永丞，公司治理下會計師、律師之吹哨者角色—以美國聯邦法制為中心，月旦會計實務研究，16期，2019年4月，頁44。22.郭大維，沉默未必是金—吹哨者法制之建構與企業不法行為之防範，台灣法學雜誌，216期，2013年1月，頁51。23.郭大維，從公司治理之角度論我國獨立董事及審計委員會之法制化，輔仁法學，31期，2006年6月，頁284。24.陳文智，會計師之吹哨義務與責任—兼論英、美兩國相關規範，法學新論，6期，2009年1月，頁13。25.陳瑞仁，吹哨者保護法法制（二），月旦刑事法評論，8期，2018年3月，頁126。26.惲純良，商譽損失作為背信罪之財產損害？—評臺灣高等法院102年度金上重更（一）字第8號判決，月旦刑事法評論，11期，2018年12月，頁136。27.黃銘傑，吹哨者保護之國際潮流與規範理念，月旦會計實務研究，16期，2019年4月，頁19。28.黃銘傑，從吹哨者及其保護機制的建置看法遵強化與風險控管趨勢，會計研究月刊，391期，2018年6月，頁83。29.黃銘傑，管窺力霸風暴中所暴露之公司治理與金融監理問題，月旦財經法雜誌，8期，2007年3月，頁19。30.楊戊龍、李淑如，行政院民國108年版揭弊者保護法草案評析，文官制度季刊，11卷3期，2019年7月，頁35。31.詹德恩，金融機構執行檢舉人保護制度之困境，月旦會計實務研究，11期，2018年11月，頁107-108。32.蔡昌憲，省思公司治理下之內部監督機制—以獨立資訊管道的強化為核心，政大法學評論，141期，2015年6月，頁261。33.蔡昌憲，從內控制度及風險管理之國際規範趨勢論我國的公司治理法制：兼論董事監督義務之法律移植，臺大法學論叢，41卷4期，2012年12月，頁1845-1849。34.蔡昌憲，從公司法第一條修正談公司治理之內外部機制—兼論企業社會責任的推動模式，成大法學，36期，2018年12月，頁117-118。三、研究報告與學位論文1.林志潔、林良榮、張天一、薛景文、陳俊元，法務部廉政署102年度「私部門公益通報者保護法立法研究」委託案期末報告，2014年。2.武永生、馮震宇、曾宛如、范姜真媺，律師於先進國家資本市場扮演之角色及與其他專家權責之劃分，行政院金融監督管理委員會委外研究計畫，2006年2月。3.陳一銘，內部人通報機制之建構與公司治理—以勞工通報為中心，國立臺北大學法律系碩士論文，2007年。4.陳恩儀、楊峻昌，證券事件「吹哨者」及其民事責任研究，證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心委託專案研究，2018年10月。5.黃銘傑，組織內部不法資訊揭露法制之研究，行政院研究發展考核委員會委託研究報告，2005年8月。四、網路資料1.中央通訊社網站，網址：https://www.cna.com.tw/news/asoc/202010300264.aspx。2.司法改革進度追蹤資訊平台，網址：https://judicialreform.gov.tw/Resolutions/Form/?fn=62&sn=2-2&oid=13#progress_check_j。3.法務部廉政署，揭弊者保護法草案（109年第2版），網址：https://www.aac.moj.gov.tw/6398/6540/837481/Lpsimplelist。4.金管會銀行局網站，網址：https://www.banking.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=60&parentpath=0,4&mcustomize=FscSearch_BankType.jsp&type=F。5.財團法人中華民國會計研究發展基金會審計準則公報第72號「查核財務報表對法令遵循之考量」，網址： http://dss.ardf.org.tw/ardf/au72.pdf。6.章忠信，美國新訂營業秘密保護法案強化民事救濟手段，著作權筆記，網址：http://www.copyrightnote.org/ArticleContent.aspx?ID=8&aid=2774。7.勞動部108年11月19日勞動關2字第 1080128698號函，勞動契約認定指導原則，網址：https://www.mol.gov.tw/announcement/2099/42678/。8.新光產物保險股份有限公司檢舉作業要點，網址：https://www.skinsurance.com.tw/SKI/Doc.aspx?uID=12&sID=1322&ST。9.資誠聯合會計師事務所，2018年臺灣經濟犯罪與舞弊調查，網址：https://www.pwc.tw/zh/publications/topic-report/assets/2018-taiwan-economic-crime-and-fraud-survey.pdf。10.臺灣產物保險股份有限公司檢舉不法案件處理制度，網址：https://www.tfmi.com.tw/investor_CG.aspx。11.臺灣證券交易所，英國證券市場相關制度，網址：https://www.twse.com.tw/staticFiles/product/publication/0003000194.pdf。12.總統府司法改革國是會議第五分組第三次會議，檢討反貪腐法制，網址：https://www.moj.gov.tw/dl-25935-51c431bcdfc14a4dbe1cca025d8da110.html。13.證券交易所「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」問答集，網址：https://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/20170315/000000005ab785eb015acfdf7c8e000e_2017%E4%B8%8A%E5%B8%82%E4%B8%8A%E6%AB%83%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8%E6%B2%BB%E7%90%86%E5%AF%A6%E5%8B%99%E5%AE%88%E5%89%87QA-FINAL.pdf。英文資料一、書籍Janet Austin, To Reward or Not to Reward: A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of the Reasons Why Securities Regulators Have Adopted or Rejected Policies to Pay Whistleblowers, in Corporate Whistleblowing Regulation 65 (Lombard S., Brand V., Austin J. eds., 2020).二、期刊論文1.Janet Austin, Sulette Lombard, The Impact of Whistleblowing Awards Programs on Corporate Governance, 36 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 63 (2019).2.Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizing the Whistleblower`s Dilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2215 (2017).3.Evan J. Ballan, Protecting whistleblowing (and not just whistleblowers), 116 Mich. L. Rev. 475 (2017).4.Stanley J. Brown, Barbara M. Roth, Supreme Court Extends SOX Whistleblower Protection to Contractor Employees, 2014 Bus. L. Today 1 (2014).5.Jeffrey V. Butler, Danila Serra, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Motivating Whistleblowers, Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(2) (2020).6.Carliss N. Chatman, Myth of the Attorney Whistleblower, 72 SMU L. Rev. 669 (2019).7.Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004).8.John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding Enron: It`s about the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002).9.John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301 (2004).10.Olivia Dixon, Honesty without Fear - Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protections in Corporate Codes of Conduct, 40 Melb. U. L. Rev. 168 (2016).11.Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213 (2010).12.Frederick A. Elliston, Anonymity and Whistleblowing, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 1(3),167 (1982).13.David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012).14.Joshua Ernst, The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provision: Throwing Fuel on the Fire for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1313 (2012).15.James Gobert, Maurice Punch, Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, 63 Mod. L. Rev. 25 (2000).16.John A. Gray, The Scope of Whistleblower Protection in the State of Maryland: A Comprehensive Statute Is Needed, 33 U. Balt. L. Rev. 225 (2004).17.Heidi L. Hansberry, In Spite of Its Good Intentions, the Dodd–Frank Act Has Created an FCPA Monster, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195 (2012).18.Harold Hassink, Meinderd de Vries, Laury Bollen, A Content Analysis of Whistleblowing Policies of Leading European Companies, 75 Journal of Business Ethics 25 (2007).19.Alex Howard, Gold star for internal compliance: Why a broader protection of Dodd-Frank whistleblowers is beneficial, 9 U. P.R. Bus. L.J. 53 (2017).20.Iwasaki, Masaki, Effects of External Whistleblower Rewards on Internal Reporting, Harvard John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series No. 76 (May 26, 2018).21.Iwasaki, Masaki, Relative Impacts of Monetary and Non-Monetary Factors on Whistleblowing Intention: The Case of Securities Fraud, 22 J. Bus. L. 591 (2020).22.Caroline E. Keen, Clarifying What Is “Clear”: Reconsidering Whistleblower Protections Under Dodd-Frank, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 215 (2015).23.Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2. J.L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986).24.Paul Latimer, AJ Brown, Whistleblower Laws: International Best Practice, 31 UNSW LJ 766 (2008).25.Suzanne Le Mire and Christine Parker, Lawyers as Whistleblowers: The Need for a Gatekeeper of Justice Whistleblowing Obligation/Exception, New Directions for Law in Australia: Essays in Contemporary Law Reform, edited by RON LEVY et al., ANU Press, Australia (2017).26.Samuel C. Leifer, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-Frank Act, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2014).27.David Lewis, Ten Years of Public Interest Disclosure Legislation in the UK: Are Whistleblowers Adequately Protected?, J Bus Ethics 82, 497 (2008).28.Lombard, S & Brand, Corporate whistleblowing: Public lessons for private disclosure, Australian Business Law Review, vol. 42 (2014).29.Jenny Mendelsohn, Calling the Boss or Calling the Press: A Comparison of British and American Responses to Internal and External Whistleblowing, 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 723 (2009).30.Miceli, M.P., Near, J.P., Dworkin, T.M., A Word to the Wise: How Managers and Policy-Makers Can Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing, J Bus Ethics 86, 379 (2009).31.Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley`s Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 5 BYU L. Rev. 1107 (2006).32.Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65 (2007).33.Near, Janet P., and Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing, J Bus Ethics 4 (1985).34.Julie Rose O`Sullivan, Private Justice and FCPA Enforcement: Should the SEC Whistleblower Program Include a Qui Tam Provision, 53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 67 (2016).35.Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary: When Attorneys Act as Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL Ethics 1027 (2015).36.Parmerlee, Marcia A., et al., Correlates of Whistle-Blowers’ Perceptions of Organizational Retaliation, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1 (1982).37.Janine Pascoe, Michelle Welsh, Whistleblowing, Ethics and Corporate Culture: Theory and Practice in Australia, 40 Comm. L. World Rev. 144 (2011).38.A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217 (2008).39.Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Intelligence Design: An Analysis of the SEC`s New Office of Market Intelligence and Its Goal of Using Big Data to Improve Securities Enforcement, 82 U. Cin. L. Rev. 415 (2018).40.Thomas C.R. Reynolds, Securing Protections for Whistleblowers of Securities Fraud in the United States and the European Union, 13 Chi.-Kent J. Int`l & Comp. L. 201, (2013).41.Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC`s New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1235 (2014).42.Stephane Rousseau, Whistleblowing: An Instrument Serving Compliance, 50 R.J.T. n.s. 571 (2016).43.Sonia A. Steinway, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” but What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC`s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209 (2014).44.Stubben, Stephen and Welch, Kyle, Evidence on the Use and Efficacy of Internal Whistleblowing Systems, Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 58 (2) (February 29, 2020).45.Lucy Vickers, Whistling in the Wind? The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, 20 Legal Stud. 428 (2000).46.Andrew Walker, Why shouldn’t we protect internal whistleblowers? Exploring justifications for the Asadi decision, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1761 (2015).47.Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer and a Critique, Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law Vol. XII (2007).三、政府機關資料1.ASIC, Regulatory Guide 270 Whistleblower policies (2019).2.Financial Conduct Authority, Whistleblowing in deposit-takers, PRA-designated investment firms and insurers, Policy Statement PS15/24 (2015).3.Ontario Securities Commission, OSC Policy 15-601-Whistleblower Program (2018).4.OSHA, Whistleblower Investigations Manual (Jan. 28, 2016).5.Parliament of Australia, Final Report: Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2014).6.Parliament of Australia, Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2018, Revised Explanatory Memorandum (2019).7.SEC, 2019 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program (Nov. 15, 2019).8.SEC, Form TCR - Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9.SEC, Issuing Release No. 34-64545, File No. S7-33-10, 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249, Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Aug. 12, 2011).10.SEC, Final Rule, Release No. 34-89963 (2020).11.Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2020 (Nov. 2, 2020).四、法院判決1.American International Group, Inc. v. Greenberg, C.A. No. 769-VCS, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).2.Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013).3.Berman v. Neo @Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2nd Cir. 2015).4.Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. 2014).5.Cellucci v. O`Leary, No. 19-CV-2752 (VEC), 2020 WL 977986 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2020).6.Chesterton Global Ltd v. Nurmohamed [2017] EWCA Civ 979.7.Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 837 (1984).8.Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 200 L. Ed. 2d 15 (2018).9.Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429 (2014).10.Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc., 520 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2008)11.Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., U.S. Dep`t of Labor, 717 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2013).12.Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2014).13.Parkins v. Sodexho Ltd [2002] IRLR 109.14.Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).15.Street v. Derbyshire Unemployed Workers` Centre [2004] IRLR 687.16.Thomas v. Tyco Int`l Mgmt. Co., LLC, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2017).五、網路及其他資料1.ACFE, Report to Nations-2020 Global Study on Occupational Fraud and Abuse.2.BaFin, Wirecard AG: General Administrative Act on the prohibition on establishing and increasing of net short positions, at:https://www.bafin.de/dok/12081206.3.Emily Flitter, The Price of Wells Fargo’s Fake Account Scandal Grows by $3 Billion, The New York Times, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/business/wells-fargo-settlement.html.4.EQS Integrity Line: The innovative whistleblower system, at: https://www.eqs.com/compliance-solutions/integrity-line/.5.EUR-Lex, Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law.6.Financial Times, Wirecard: the timeline, at: https://www.ft.com/content/284fb1ad-ddc0-45df-a075-0709b36868db.7.Investigative Journalism Manual, Becoming an investigate journalist, at: https://www.investigative-manual.org/en/chapters/who-is-that-investigative-journalist/1-how-to-define-investigative-journalism/.8.ISO 37001 Anti-bribery management systems, at: https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/store/en/PUB100396.pdf.9.Matt Egan, SEC: GE could face punishment over staggering insurance losses, CNN Business, at: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/06/business/ge-investigation-wells-notice-insurance/index.html.10.OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015), at: https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf.11.OECD, Guidelines on whistleblower protection for companies in Greece, (2018), at: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Guidelines-Whistleblower-Protection-Companies-in-Greece-ENG.pdf.12.OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), at: http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.13.Ryan Browne, It was once Germany’s fintech star. Now, a missing $2 billion puts Wirecard’s future in doubt, at: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/19/wirecards-future-is-in-doubt-as-accounting-scandal-deepens.html.14.SEC Charges Hedge Fund Adviser With Conducting Conflicted Transactions and Retaliating Against Whistleblower, at: https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-118.15.SEC, Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers in Confidentiality Agreements, at: https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-54.html.16.The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012).17.The UK Corporate Governance Code (2018).18.Transparency International, Internal whistleblowing mechanisms topic guide. (2017), at: https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Whistleblowing-Topic-Guide.pdf.19.United States Department of Labor, statutes enforced by Occupational Safety and Health Administration, at: https://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100110 en_US
