| dc.contributor | 國貿系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 潘振宇 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Pan, Chen‐Yu | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2020-03 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 25-May-2021 14:11:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 25-May-2021 14:11:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 25-May-2021 14:11:10 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135128 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. Party leaders have both office- and policy-motivations. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one-sidedly biased district profile, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district profile. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1434591 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.22, No.5, pp.1183-1212 | |
| dc.title (題名) | Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1111/jpet.12433 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12433 | |
