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題名 敵意併購後目標公司財務績效與企業價值探討
Does the target firm have better post-acquisition operating performance through the hostile takeover?作者 林芸竹
Lin, Yun-Tsu貢獻者 戚務君
Chi, Wu-Chun
林芸竹
Lin, Yun-Tsu關鍵詞 被併購公司
併購後財務績效
敵意併購
Target firm
Post-acquisition operating performance
Hostile takeover日期 2021 上傳時間 1-Jul-2021 16:37:29 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究於台灣敵意併購氛圍興起同時，透過探討被敵意併購公司併購後財務績效與公司價值變化，瞭解敵意併購對被併購公司影響為何；於此同時，亦針對所有樣本，檢視併購政策對於被併購公司的影響。本研究將提供敵意併購於資本市場現況，以利未來併購法律條文修改與企業擬定併購策略參考。根據過去文獻，Manne（1965）提出公司控制權市場概念，說明因公司管理階層效率不彰導致的股價下跌，將觸發外部人士透過大量低價購買股票，以取得公司經營權的接管機制。外部人士將透過更換管理階層，振興經營不善的公司，以改善財務績效。而為確認台灣資本市場是否受前述理論影響，亦為有效篩出政策實施效果，而採用差異中之差異法（DID）作為研究方法，並針對假說一（政策為是否施行併購），以及假說二（政策為是否為敵意併購），各自建立實證模型。由實證結果可知，併購確能改善被併購公司財務績效，但未能改善其企業價值，因此實證結果部分支持假說一；被敵意併購公司相較於被善意併購與未併購公司，於併購後財務績效確能獲得改善，惟未能改善企業價值，因此實證結果部分支持假說二。綜上所述，敵意併購確能改善被併購公司併購後之財務績效，主管機關可於制定併購法律時，參考放寬敵意併購限制，讓公司控制權市場更加活絡，以提升台灣資本市場資源分配效率。
When hostile takeovers emerged from the Taiwanese capital market, we investigate the changes in the target firms` financial performance and enterprise value after the hostile takeovers. In the meanwhile, we are also interested in how M&A policy influences the target firms in the same way. This study would be the reference for lawmakers and enterprises to make the next decision.In previous literature, Manne (1965) proposes the theory of the corporate-control market. The control of the corporate is regarded as an asset. When the stock price declines because of the inefficiency of the management, it will trigger outside to take over the corporate control through purchasing the stock with significant volume. Once the outsider acquired the corporate control, the outsider would replace the origin management with a more efficient one.To confirm whether the theory of the corporate-control market work on the Taiwanese capital market and filter information that would bother pure policy implementation effect analysis, the difference-in-difference (DID) design would be adopted as the research method. According to the different hypotheses, the empirical model would be built separately, containing the H1 (M&A as the treatment) and H2 (Hostile Attitude as the treatment).The empirical results suggest the M&A policy could improve the target firms` financial performance but fail to improve its enterprise value. Therefore, the empirical results are partially consistent with the first hypothesis. In addition, compared to target firms of friendly takeovers and firms that do not be acquired, hostile takeovers could improve the target firms` financial performance but fail to enhance their enterprise value. The empirical results are partially consistent with the second hypothesis.In summary, hostile takeovers do improve the financial performance of target firms after M&A. The authority could induce more hostile-takeover-oriented concepts when amending the M&A laws to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation in Taiwan`s capital market.參考文獻 中華經濟與金融協會與台灣併購與私募股權協會，2016，企業併購的第一堂課，台北：中華經濟與金融協會。王藏偉，2005，公開收購有價證券之制度及運作淺析，證券暨期貨月刊，第二十三卷，第七期：4-11。王志誠、李書孝、彭惠筠、黃文昭、李宗哲、許苑，2020，企業併購法實戰手則，台北：新學林。翁鶯娟、張紹基，2017，併購與策略聯盟在公司理財文獻之回顧與展望：亞洲市場之研究，台大管理論叢，第二十七卷，第三期：163-214。黃日燦，2012，黃日燦看併購—台灣企業脫胎換骨的賽局，新北市：經濟日報。楊岳平，2011，公司治理與公司社會責任：企業併購下股東、債權人、員工、投資人之保護，台北：元照。Ahmed, Y., & Elshandidy, T. 2020. Effect of leverage deviation on choices and outcomes of public versus non-public acquisitions. International Journal of Finance & Economics (線上刊登)Aktas, N., Croci, E., & Simsir, S. A. 2016. Corporate governance and takeover outcomes. Corporate Governance: An International Review 24 (3): 242-252.Baradwaj, B. G., Fraser, D. R., & Furtado, E. P. H. 1990. Hostile bank takeover offers: analysis and implications. Journal of Banking and Finance 14 (6): 1229-1242.Cain, M. D., McKeon, S. B., & Solomon, S. D. 2017. Do takeover laws matter? evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers. Journal of Financial Economics 124 (3): 418-437.Cui, H., & Leung, S. C. 2020. The long-run performance of acquiring firms in mergers and acquisitions: does managerial ability matter? Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 16 (1): 100-185.Dang, M., Henry, D., Yin, X., & Vo, T. A. 2018. Target corporate governance, acquirers` location choices, and partial acquisitions. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 50 (7): 82-104.Demirtas, G., & Simsir, S. A. 2016. The effect of ceo departure on target firms’ post-takeover performance: evidence from not-delisting target firms. Finance Research Letters 16 (8): 55-65.Dissanaike, G., Drobetz, W., Momtaz, P. P., & Rocholl, J. 2021. The economics of law enforcement: quasi-experimental evidence from corporate takeover law. Journal of Corporate Finance 67 (1).Chang, E. C., Lin, T., & Ma, X. 2019. Does short-selling threat discipline managers in mergers and acquisitions decisions? Journal of Accounting and Economics 68 (1).Fu, F., Lin, L., & Officer, M.S. 2013. Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation: Are they good deals? Jouranl of Financial Economics 109 (1): 24-39.Gillan, S. L. 2006. Recent developments in corporate governance: an overview. Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (3): 381-402.Goergen, M., & Renneboog, L. 2004. Shareholder wealth effects of european domestic and cross-border takeover bids. European Financial Management 10(1): 9-45.Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G., & Rubak, R. S. 1992. Does corporate performance improve after mergers? Jouranl of Financial Economics 31 (2): 135-175.Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. E. 1997. Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: evidence from evaluating a job training programme. Review of Economic Studies 64 (4): 605-654.Hossain, M. S. 2021. Merger & acquisitions (m&as) as an important strategic vehicle in business: thematic areas, research avenues & possible suggestions. Journal of economics and business (線上刊登)Lennox, C., Wang, Z., & Wu, X. 2018. Earnings management, audit adjustments, and the financing of corporate acquisitions: evidence from china. Journal of Accounting and Economics 65 (1): 21-40.Liu, T., & Mulherin, J. H. 2018. How has takeover competition changed over time? Journal of Corporate Finance 49 (7): 104-119.Martin, K. J., & Mcconnell, J. J. 1991. Corporate performance, corporate takeovers, and management turnover. The Journal of Finance 46 (2): 671–687.Manne, H. G. 1965. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 73 (2): 110-120.Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. 1988. Corporate Takeovers: Causes andConsequences. CHI: University of Chicago Press.Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. 1989. Alternative mechanisms for corporate control. The American Economic Review 79 (4): 842–852.Powell, R. G. 1997. Modelling takeover likelihood. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 24 (7) & (8): 1009-1030.Renneboog, L., & Vansteenkiste, C. 2019. Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (33): 650-699.Schwert, G. W. 2000. Hostility in takeovers: in the eyes of the beholder? The Journal of Finance 55 (6): 2599–2640.Sokolyk, T. 2011. The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (3): 612-627.Spiegel, M., & Tookes, H. 2013. Dynamic competition, valuation, and merger activity. The Journal of Finance 68 (1): 125–172.Thomas, H. M. 1997. Discussion of modelling takeover likelihood. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 24 (7) & (8): 1031-1035.Tunyi, A. A., Ntim, C. G., & Danbolt, J. 2019. Decoupling management inefficiency: myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood. International Review of Financial Analysis 62 (2): 1-20.Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., & Wruck, K. H. 1988. Stock prices and top management changes. Jouranl of Financial Economics 20 (19): 461-492. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
107353113資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353113 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 戚務君 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Chi, Wu-Chun en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林芸竹 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Yun-Tsu en_US dc.creator (作者) 林芸竹 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lin, Yun-Tsu en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2021 16:37:29 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2021 16:37:29 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2021 16:37:29 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107353113 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135909 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 107353113 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究於台灣敵意併購氛圍興起同時，透過探討被敵意併購公司併購後財務績效與公司價值變化，瞭解敵意併購對被併購公司影響為何；於此同時，亦針對所有樣本，檢視併購政策對於被併購公司的影響。本研究將提供敵意併購於資本市場現況，以利未來併購法律條文修改與企業擬定併購策略參考。根據過去文獻，Manne（1965）提出公司控制權市場概念，說明因公司管理階層效率不彰導致的股價下跌，將觸發外部人士透過大量低價購買股票，以取得公司經營權的接管機制。外部人士將透過更換管理階層，振興經營不善的公司，以改善財務績效。而為確認台灣資本市場是否受前述理論影響，亦為有效篩出政策實施效果，而採用差異中之差異法（DID）作為研究方法，並針對假說一（政策為是否施行併購），以及假說二（政策為是否為敵意併購），各自建立實證模型。由實證結果可知，併購確能改善被併購公司財務績效，但未能改善其企業價值，因此實證結果部分支持假說一；被敵意併購公司相較於被善意併購與未併購公司，於併購後財務績效確能獲得改善，惟未能改善企業價值，因此實證結果部分支持假說二。綜上所述，敵意併購確能改善被併購公司併購後之財務績效，主管機關可於制定併購法律時，參考放寬敵意併購限制，讓公司控制權市場更加活絡，以提升台灣資本市場資源分配效率。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) When hostile takeovers emerged from the Taiwanese capital market, we investigate the changes in the target firms` financial performance and enterprise value after the hostile takeovers. In the meanwhile, we are also interested in how M&A policy influences the target firms in the same way. This study would be the reference for lawmakers and enterprises to make the next decision.In previous literature, Manne (1965) proposes the theory of the corporate-control market. The control of the corporate is regarded as an asset. When the stock price declines because of the inefficiency of the management, it will trigger outside to take over the corporate control through purchasing the stock with significant volume. Once the outsider acquired the corporate control, the outsider would replace the origin management with a more efficient one.To confirm whether the theory of the corporate-control market work on the Taiwanese capital market and filter information that would bother pure policy implementation effect analysis, the difference-in-difference (DID) design would be adopted as the research method. According to the different hypotheses, the empirical model would be built separately, containing the H1 (M&A as the treatment) and H2 (Hostile Attitude as the treatment).The empirical results suggest the M&A policy could improve the target firms` financial performance but fail to improve its enterprise value. Therefore, the empirical results are partially consistent with the first hypothesis. In addition, compared to target firms of friendly takeovers and firms that do not be acquired, hostile takeovers could improve the target firms` financial performance but fail to enhance their enterprise value. The empirical results are partially consistent with the second hypothesis.In summary, hostile takeovers do improve the financial performance of target firms after M&A. The authority could induce more hostile-takeover-oriented concepts when amending the M&A laws to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation in Taiwan`s capital market. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 謝辭 i中文摘要 iiAbstract iii目 錄 iv表目錄 v圖目錄 vi方程式目錄 vi第壹章 緒論 7第一節 研究背景與目的 7第二節 研究問題 9第三節 論文結構圖 10第貳章 文獻探討與研究假說建立 11第一節 併購與企業績效關聯文獻回顧 11第二節 敵意併購與企業績效關聯文獻回顧 13第參章 研究方法 16第一節 實證模型建立 16第二節 變數定義及衡量 18第肆章 實證結果分析 20第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 20第二節 敘述性統計分析 27第三節 實證結果分析 43第伍章 結論與建議 46第一節 結論與建議 46第二節 研究限制 47參考文獻 48附錄一、敘述性統計表─全部樣本(分期別) 51附錄二、敘述性統計表─併購類型(分期別) 52附錄三、敘述性統計表─假說一(分期別) 55附錄四、敘述性統計表─假說二(分期別) 57 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1341865 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353113 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 被併購公司 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購後財務績效 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 敵意併購 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Target firm en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Post-acquisition operating performance en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Hostile takeover en_US dc.title (題名) 敵意併購後目標公司財務績效與企業價值探討 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Does the target firm have better post-acquisition operating performance through the hostile takeover? en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中華經濟與金融協會與台灣併購與私募股權協會，2016，企業併購的第一堂課，台北：中華經濟與金融協會。王藏偉，2005，公開收購有價證券之制度及運作淺析，證券暨期貨月刊，第二十三卷，第七期：4-11。王志誠、李書孝、彭惠筠、黃文昭、李宗哲、許苑，2020，企業併購法實戰手則，台北：新學林。翁鶯娟、張紹基，2017，併購與策略聯盟在公司理財文獻之回顧與展望：亞洲市場之研究，台大管理論叢，第二十七卷，第三期：163-214。黃日燦，2012，黃日燦看併購—台灣企業脫胎換骨的賽局，新北市：經濟日報。楊岳平，2011，公司治理與公司社會責任：企業併購下股東、債權人、員工、投資人之保護，台北：元照。Ahmed, Y., & Elshandidy, T. 2020. Effect of leverage deviation on choices and outcomes of public versus non-public acquisitions. International Journal of Finance & Economics (線上刊登)Aktas, N., Croci, E., & Simsir, S. A. 2016. Corporate governance and takeover outcomes. Corporate Governance: An International Review 24 (3): 242-252.Baradwaj, B. G., Fraser, D. R., & Furtado, E. P. H. 1990. Hostile bank takeover offers: analysis and implications. Journal of Banking and Finance 14 (6): 1229-1242.Cain, M. D., McKeon, S. B., & Solomon, S. D. 2017. Do takeover laws matter? evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers. Journal of Financial Economics 124 (3): 418-437.Cui, H., & Leung, S. C. 2020. The long-run performance of acquiring firms in mergers and acquisitions: does managerial ability matter? Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 16 (1): 100-185.Dang, M., Henry, D., Yin, X., & Vo, T. A. 2018. Target corporate governance, acquirers` location choices, and partial acquisitions. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 50 (7): 82-104.Demirtas, G., & Simsir, S. A. 2016. The effect of ceo departure on target firms’ post-takeover performance: evidence from not-delisting target firms. Finance Research Letters 16 (8): 55-65.Dissanaike, G., Drobetz, W., Momtaz, P. P., & Rocholl, J. 2021. The economics of law enforcement: quasi-experimental evidence from corporate takeover law. Journal of Corporate Finance 67 (1).Chang, E. C., Lin, T., & Ma, X. 2019. Does short-selling threat discipline managers in mergers and acquisitions decisions? Journal of Accounting and Economics 68 (1).Fu, F., Lin, L., & Officer, M.S. 2013. Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation: Are they good deals? Jouranl of Financial Economics 109 (1): 24-39.Gillan, S. L. 2006. Recent developments in corporate governance: an overview. Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (3): 381-402.Goergen, M., & Renneboog, L. 2004. Shareholder wealth effects of european domestic and cross-border takeover bids. European Financial Management 10(1): 9-45.Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G., & Rubak, R. S. 1992. Does corporate performance improve after mergers? Jouranl of Financial Economics 31 (2): 135-175.Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. E. 1997. Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: evidence from evaluating a job training programme. Review of Economic Studies 64 (4): 605-654.Hossain, M. S. 2021. Merger & acquisitions (m&as) as an important strategic vehicle in business: thematic areas, research avenues & possible suggestions. Journal of economics and business (線上刊登)Lennox, C., Wang, Z., & Wu, X. 2018. Earnings management, audit adjustments, and the financing of corporate acquisitions: evidence from china. Journal of Accounting and Economics 65 (1): 21-40.Liu, T., & Mulherin, J. H. 2018. How has takeover competition changed over time? Journal of Corporate Finance 49 (7): 104-119.Martin, K. J., & Mcconnell, J. J. 1991. Corporate performance, corporate takeovers, and management turnover. The Journal of Finance 46 (2): 671–687.Manne, H. G. 1965. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 73 (2): 110-120.Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. 1988. Corporate Takeovers: Causes andConsequences. CHI: University of Chicago Press.Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. 1989. Alternative mechanisms for corporate control. The American Economic Review 79 (4): 842–852.Powell, R. G. 1997. Modelling takeover likelihood. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 24 (7) & (8): 1009-1030.Renneboog, L., & Vansteenkiste, C. 2019. Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (33): 650-699.Schwert, G. W. 2000. Hostility in takeovers: in the eyes of the beholder? The Journal of Finance 55 (6): 2599–2640.Sokolyk, T. 2011. The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (3): 612-627.Spiegel, M., & Tookes, H. 2013. Dynamic competition, valuation, and merger activity. The Journal of Finance 68 (1): 125–172.Thomas, H. M. 1997. Discussion of modelling takeover likelihood. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 24 (7) & (8): 1031-1035.Tunyi, A. A., Ntim, C. G., & Danbolt, J. 2019. Decoupling management inefficiency: myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood. International Review of Financial Analysis 62 (2): 1-20.Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., & Wruck, K. H. 1988. Stock prices and top management changes. Jouranl of Financial Economics 20 (19): 461-492. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100492 en_US
