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題名 CEO股權與薪酬對目標公司採取反併購措施與績效之關聯性
Are CEO Compensation and Ownership Associated with Antitakeover Defenses?作者 施榮甫
Shih, Rong-Fu貢獻者 翁嘉祥
Weng, CHia-Hsiang
施榮甫
Shih, Rong-Fu關鍵詞 CEO薪酬與股權
管理防禦
反併購措施
目標公司
CEO compensation and ownership
Entrenchment
Antitakeover measures
Target companies日期 2021 上傳時間 1-Jul-2021 16:54:39 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究透過SDC資料庫蒐集美國上市的目標公司於1990-2014年間發生的併購事件為樣本，將目標公司分類為有採取反併購措施及沒有採取反併購措施，於Execucomp中搜尋目標公司CEO的薪酬資料與持股比例，再從Compustat蒐集目標公司的財務資訊，最後使用CRSP的事件研究法蒐集目標公司在併購宣告前後之不同期間持有股票的異常報酬。本研究實證結果發現:目標公司CEO薪資報酬與股權報酬佔總薪酬比例較高時，面對主併公司併購時，較不願採取反併購措施，獎金佔總報酬高的CEO則傾向進行反併購措施，但結果並不顯著。有持股的CEO較不願意進行反併購措施，而持股的比例並無顯著影響CEO是否進行反併購措施。反併購措施在2日與30日及180日對於目標公司之併購績效有顯著的正面影響，雖於60日與90日有正面影響，但效果並不顯著，顯示反併購措施在短期及長期效果較大。
In this study, the SDC database was used to collect a sample of M&A events of U.S.-listed target companies from 1990-2014, the target companies were categorized into those with and without anti-merger measures, searched the compensation information and shareholding ratio of CEOs of target companies in Execucomp, collected financial information of target companies from Compustat.Finally, used CRSP`s event study method to collect the abnormal returns of the target company`s stock holdings between the pre- and post-merger announcement periods. The empirical results of this study revealed that: CEOs with a higher ratio of salary to total compensation are more reluctant to take antitakeover measures in the face of a merger with the acquiring company, while those with a higher ratio of bonus to total compensation tend to take antitakeover measures, but the results are not significant. CEOs with shareholdings are less likely to engage in antitakeover measures, and the percentage of shareholdings do not significantly affect whether CEOs engaged in antitakeover measures. Antitakeover measures have a significant positive effect on the performance of target companies at 2 days, 30 days and 180 days, but not at 60 days and 90 days, indicating that antitakeover measures have a greater effect in the short and long term.參考文獻 中文部分王淑芬與黃昭華(2010), 白衣武士、敵意併購與股東利益, 臺大管理論叢,第21卷第1期:113-136英文部分Antounian,C.,Dah,M.A. and Harakeh,M.(2021), Excessive managerial entrenchment, corporate governance, and firm performance, Research in International Business and Finance,56,101-392Agrawal,A. and Knoeber,C.R.(1998), Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover, Journal of Financial Economics,47(2),219-239Bebchuk,L.A. and Fried,J.M.(2003), Executive Compensation as an Agency Proble, Journal of Economic Perspectives,17(3),71-92Bebchuk,L.A. and Fried,J.M.(2004), Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits, Nber Working Paper Serirs ,10742Bebchuk,L., Alma Cohen,A.and Ferrell,A.(2009), What Matters in Corporate Governance, The Review of Financial Studies ,22(2),783- 827Hermalin,B.E. and Weisbach,M.S.(1991), The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, Financial Management , Winter, 1991, 20(4),101-112Borokhovich,K.A.,Brunarski,K.R. and Parrino,R.(1997),CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments.The Journal of Finance,52(4),1495-1517Carroll ,C., Griffith,J.M. and Rudolph,P.M.(1999), Hostile-vs.-White-Knight Bidders, Managerial and Decision Economics ,20(3), 163-171Chang,X. and Zhang,H.F.(2015), Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Value: A Dynamic Perspective, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,50(5),1083-1103Chen,H.,Hexter,J.L. and Hu,M.Y.(1993), Management Ownership and Corporate Value, Managerial and Decision Economics ,14(4),335-346Coombs,J.E. and Gilley,K.M.(1990), Stakeholder Management As a PredictorOf CEO Compensation: Main Effects And Interactions With Financial Performance, Strategic Management Journal,26,827-840DeAngelo1,H. and Rice1,E.M.(1983),Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth, Journal of Financial Economics ,11(1-4),329-359Dittmar ,A. and J Mahrt-Smith,J.(2007), Corporate governance and the value of cashholdings, Journal of Financial Economics,83(3),599-634Frydman,C. and Jenter,D.(2010), CEO Compensation, Annual Review of Financial Economics , 2010, 2 ,75-102Gompers,P.,Ishii,J. and Metrick,A.(2003), Corporate Governance And Equity Price, Quarterly Journal of Economics,118,55-107.Jarrell,G.A. and Poulsen,A.B.(1987), Shark repellents and stock prices: The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980, Journal of Financial Economics19(1),127-168Jensen,M.C. and Meckling,W.H.(1976),Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics,3(4), 305-360Jensen,M.C. and Ruback,R.S. (1983), The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence ,Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4),5-50Jensen,M.C. and Murphy,K.J.(1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy,98(2),225- 264Kadyrzhanova,D. and Rhodes-Kropf,M.(2011), Concentrating on Governance, The Journal of Finance,66(5),1649-1685Klock,M.S., Mansi,S.A., and Maxwel,W.F.(2005), Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,40(4),693-719Knoeber,CR.(1986), Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, The American Economic Review, 76(1), 155- 167Mahoney, J.M., Sundaramurthy,C.and Mahoney,J.T.(1996), The differential impact on stockholder wealth of various antitakeover provisions, Managerial and Decesion Economics,17,531-549Mahoney,J.M.,Sundaramurthy,C. and Mahoney,J.T.(1997), The Effects of Corporate Antitakeover Provisions on Long-Term Investment: Empirical Evidence, Managerial and Decision Economics ,18(5),349-365Manne,H.G.(1965), Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy ,73(2),110- 120McConnell,J.J. and Servaes,H.(1990), Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics,27(2),595-612Mehran,H.(1995), Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics,38(2),163-184Schoenberg,R. and Thorton(2006), The Impact of Bid Defences in Hostile Acquisitions, European Management Journal,24(2-3),142-150Smith, Jr.C.W and Watts,R.L(1992), The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies, Journal of Financtal Economics 32,263-192Stein,J.C.(1988), Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopi, Journal of Political Economy ,96(1) ,61-80Stulz,M.(1988), Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics,20,25-54Straska,M. and Waller,G.(2010), Do antitakeover provisions harm shareholders, Journal of Corporate Finance,16(4),487-497Straska,M. and Waller,H.G.(2014), Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 49(4),933-956Sundaramurthy,C.(1996), Corporate Governance Within The Context of Antitakeover Provisions, Strategic Management Journal, 17, 377-394Tallman,S. and Li,J.(1996), Effects of International Diversity and Product Diversity on the Performance of Multinational Firms, The Academy of Management Journal , 39(1),179-196Tosi,H.L.,Werner,S.,Katz,J.P. and Gomez-Mejia,L.R.(2000), How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies, Journal of Management,26(2),301-339 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
108353021資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353021 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 翁嘉祥 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Weng, CHia-Hsiang en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 施榮甫 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Shih, Rong-Fu en_US dc.creator (作者) 施榮甫 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Shih, Rong-Fu en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2021 16:54:39 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2021 16:54:39 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2021 16:54:39 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108353021 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135914 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108353021 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究透過SDC資料庫蒐集美國上市的目標公司於1990-2014年間發生的併購事件為樣本，將目標公司分類為有採取反併購措施及沒有採取反併購措施，於Execucomp中搜尋目標公司CEO的薪酬資料與持股比例，再從Compustat蒐集目標公司的財務資訊，最後使用CRSP的事件研究法蒐集目標公司在併購宣告前後之不同期間持有股票的異常報酬。本研究實證結果發現:目標公司CEO薪資報酬與股權報酬佔總薪酬比例較高時，面對主併公司併購時，較不願採取反併購措施，獎金佔總報酬高的CEO則傾向進行反併購措施，但結果並不顯著。有持股的CEO較不願意進行反併購措施，而持股的比例並無顯著影響CEO是否進行反併購措施。反併購措施在2日與30日及180日對於目標公司之併購績效有顯著的正面影響，雖於60日與90日有正面影響，但效果並不顯著，顯示反併購措施在短期及長期效果較大。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) In this study, the SDC database was used to collect a sample of M&A events of U.S.-listed target companies from 1990-2014, the target companies were categorized into those with and without anti-merger measures, searched the compensation information and shareholding ratio of CEOs of target companies in Execucomp, collected financial information of target companies from Compustat.Finally, used CRSP`s event study method to collect the abnormal returns of the target company`s stock holdings between the pre- and post-merger announcement periods. The empirical results of this study revealed that: CEOs with a higher ratio of salary to total compensation are more reluctant to take antitakeover measures in the face of a merger with the acquiring company, while those with a higher ratio of bonus to total compensation tend to take antitakeover measures, but the results are not significant. CEOs with shareholdings are less likely to engage in antitakeover measures, and the percentage of shareholdings do not significantly affect whether CEOs engaged in antitakeover measures. Antitakeover measures have a significant positive effect on the performance of target companies at 2 days, 30 days and 180 days, but not at 60 days and 90 days, indicating that antitakeover measures have a greater effect in the short and long term. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、緒論 1貳、文獻探討 4第一節、代理理論 4第二節、反併購措施與績效之關聯性 5第三節、CEO薪酬與反併購措施之關聯性 6第四節、CEO股權與績效之關聯性 8第五節、假說發展 9參、研究方法 11第一節、應變數 11第二節、自變數 12第三節、控制變數 12第四節、實證模型建立 14第五節、資料來源及樣本選取 16肆、實證結果與分析 17第一節、敘述性統計 17第二節、相關係數 19第三節、迴歸實證結果 21伍、研究結論與研究限制 28第一節、研究結論 28第二節、研究限制與未來研究建議 29參考文獻 30 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1839835 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353021 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO薪酬與股權 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 管理防禦 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 反併購措施 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 目標公司 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO compensation and ownership en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Entrenchment en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Antitakeover measures en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Target companies en_US dc.title (題名) CEO股權與薪酬對目標公司採取反併購措施與績效之關聯性 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Are CEO Compensation and Ownership Associated with Antitakeover Defenses? en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分王淑芬與黃昭華(2010), 白衣武士、敵意併購與股東利益, 臺大管理論叢,第21卷第1期:113-136英文部分Antounian,C.,Dah,M.A. and Harakeh,M.(2021), Excessive managerial entrenchment, corporate governance, and firm performance, Research in International Business and Finance,56,101-392Agrawal,A. and Knoeber,C.R.(1998), Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover, Journal of Financial Economics,47(2),219-239Bebchuk,L.A. and Fried,J.M.(2003), Executive Compensation as an Agency Proble, Journal of Economic Perspectives,17(3),71-92Bebchuk,L.A. and Fried,J.M.(2004), Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits, Nber Working Paper Serirs ,10742Bebchuk,L., Alma Cohen,A.and Ferrell,A.(2009), What Matters in Corporate Governance, The Review of Financial Studies ,22(2),783- 827Hermalin,B.E. and Weisbach,M.S.(1991), The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, Financial Management , Winter, 1991, 20(4),101-112Borokhovich,K.A.,Brunarski,K.R. and Parrino,R.(1997),CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments.The Journal of Finance,52(4),1495-1517Carroll ,C., Griffith,J.M. and Rudolph,P.M.(1999), Hostile-vs.-White-Knight Bidders, Managerial and Decision Economics ,20(3), 163-171Chang,X. and Zhang,H.F.(2015), Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Value: A Dynamic Perspective, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,50(5),1083-1103Chen,H.,Hexter,J.L. and Hu,M.Y.(1993), Management Ownership and Corporate Value, Managerial and Decision Economics ,14(4),335-346Coombs,J.E. and Gilley,K.M.(1990), Stakeholder Management As a PredictorOf CEO Compensation: Main Effects And Interactions With Financial Performance, Strategic Management Journal,26,827-840DeAngelo1,H. and Rice1,E.M.(1983),Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth, Journal of Financial Economics ,11(1-4),329-359Dittmar ,A. and J Mahrt-Smith,J.(2007), Corporate governance and the value of cashholdings, Journal of Financial Economics,83(3),599-634Frydman,C. and Jenter,D.(2010), CEO Compensation, Annual Review of Financial Economics , 2010, 2 ,75-102Gompers,P.,Ishii,J. and Metrick,A.(2003), Corporate Governance And Equity Price, Quarterly Journal of Economics,118,55-107.Jarrell,G.A. and Poulsen,A.B.(1987), Shark repellents and stock prices: The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980, Journal of Financial Economics19(1),127-168Jensen,M.C. and Meckling,W.H.(1976),Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics,3(4), 305-360Jensen,M.C. and Ruback,R.S. (1983), The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence ,Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4),5-50Jensen,M.C. and Murphy,K.J.(1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy,98(2),225- 264Kadyrzhanova,D. and Rhodes-Kropf,M.(2011), Concentrating on Governance, The Journal of Finance,66(5),1649-1685Klock,M.S., Mansi,S.A., and Maxwel,W.F.(2005), Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,40(4),693-719Knoeber,CR.(1986), Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, The American Economic Review, 76(1), 155- 167Mahoney, J.M., Sundaramurthy,C.and Mahoney,J.T.(1996), The differential impact on stockholder wealth of various antitakeover provisions, Managerial and Decesion Economics,17,531-549Mahoney,J.M.,Sundaramurthy,C. and Mahoney,J.T.(1997), The Effects of Corporate Antitakeover Provisions on Long-Term Investment: Empirical Evidence, Managerial and Decision Economics ,18(5),349-365Manne,H.G.(1965), Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy ,73(2),110- 120McConnell,J.J. and Servaes,H.(1990), Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics,27(2),595-612Mehran,H.(1995), Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics,38(2),163-184Schoenberg,R. and Thorton(2006), The Impact of Bid Defences in Hostile Acquisitions, European Management Journal,24(2-3),142-150Smith, Jr.C.W and Watts,R.L(1992), The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies, Journal of Financtal Economics 32,263-192Stein,J.C.(1988), Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopi, Journal of Political Economy ,96(1) ,61-80Stulz,M.(1988), Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics,20,25-54Straska,M. and Waller,G.(2010), Do antitakeover provisions harm shareholders, Journal of Corporate Finance,16(4),487-497Straska,M. and Waller,H.G.(2014), Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 49(4),933-956Sundaramurthy,C.(1996), Corporate Governance Within The Context of Antitakeover Provisions, Strategic Management Journal, 17, 377-394Tallman,S. and Li,J.(1996), Effects of International Diversity and Product Diversity on the Performance of Multinational Firms, The Academy of Management Journal , 39(1),179-196Tosi,H.L.,Werner,S.,Katz,J.P. and Gomez-Mejia,L.R.(2000), How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies, Journal of Management,26(2),301-339 zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100607 en_US
