學術產出-Theses
Article View/Open
Publication Export
-
題名 公司投資層級與實質盈餘管理
Pyramidal Layers and Real Earnings Management作者 蔡佩柔
Tsai, Pei-Rou貢獻者 翁嘉祥
Weng, Chia-Hsiang
蔡佩柔
Tsai, Pei-Rou關鍵詞 金字塔結構
公司投資層級
實質盈餘管理
應計基礎盈餘管理
租稅天堂
Pyramidal layers
Pyramidal structure
Real earnings management
Accrual-based earnings management
Tax haven日期 2021 上傳時間 1-Jul-2021 17:13:09 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文探討公司金字塔結構的投資層級多寡與實質盈餘管理行為的關聯性。由於投資鏈越長的公司意味著更大的資訊不對稱性與代理問題，為數眾多的投資層使外部投資者較難了解公司如何在金字塔結構內運作，且最終控制者與底層公司間的資訊傳遞會消耗更多的時間和成本。本研究以2009年至2019年間台灣上市上櫃公司為研究對象，實證結果可知，投資階層的數量多寡會影響公司從事實質盈餘管理之行為，投資層數較高的公司較少從事實質盈餘管理，可能由於公司可以選擇成本更低的方式進行盈餘管理以達成目標，因此較少選擇使用實質盈餘管理。然而投資層數較高的公司其應計基礎盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理間之替代效果較強，也就是說高投資層數的公司越可能經由應計基礎盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理間的轉換達成最終之管理目的。整體而言，本文發現金字塔結構下投資層數較高的公司，其所屬集團之租稅天堂比率越高時母公司愈容易從事實質盈餘管理之行為。
This study investigates the relationship between the company`s pyramidal structure and the real earnings management behavior. Since longer investment chains imply greater information asymmetry and agency problems, the large number of investment layers makes it more difficult for outside investors to understand how the company operates within the pyramid structure, and the transfer of information between the ultimate controller and the bottom company consumes more time and costs. Using a sample of publicly traded non-financial firms of Taiwan from 2009 to 2019, we find that the span of corporate pyramids which is measured by the number of ownership layers affects the behavior of companies engaging in real earnings management. Companies with higher investment layers are less likely to engage in real earnings management, probably because they can choose a less costly way to manage earnings to achieve their goals. However, the substitution effect between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management is stronger for companies with higher number of investment layers, which means that companies with higher number of investment layers are more likely to achieve their objectives by switching between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Overall, this paper finds that the higher the number of investment layers under the corporate pyramid and the higher the tax haven ratio, the more likely the parent company is to engage in real earnings management.參考文獻 中文文獻江家瑜、簡凌慧與薛敏正 (2014)。公司特質對應計與實質盈餘管理選擇的影響。中華會計學刊，10(1)，頁1-32。黃勝華、鄧安琪 (2018)。資產減損會計處理準則對盈餘管理選擇之影響。台灣管理學刊，18(1)，頁45-64。英文文獻Aalbers, M. B. (2018). Financial geography I: Geographies of tax. Progress in Human Geography, 42(6), 916-927.Alstadsæter, A., Johannesen, N., and Zucman, G. (2018). Who owns the wealth in tax havens? Macro evidence and implications for global inequality. Journal of Public Economics, 162, 89-100.Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting review, 443-465.Bebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R., and Triantis, G. (2000). Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights. In Concentrated corporate ownership (pp. 295-318): University of Chicago Press.Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., and Welker, M. (2003). The world price of earnings opacity. The accounting review, 78(3), 641-678.Carlson, S. J., and Bathala, C. T. (1997). Ownership differences and firms` income smoothing behavior. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 24(2), 179-196.Chan, A. L.-C., and Hsu, A. W.-H. (2013). Corporate pyramids, conservatism and cost of debt: Evidence from Taiwan. The International Journal of Accounting, 48(3), 390-413.Chen, K.-P., and Chu, C. C. (2005). Internal control versus external manipulation: A model of corporate income tax evasion. rand Journal of Economics, 151-164.Chi, W., Lisic, L. L., and Pevzner, M. (2011). Is enhanced audit quality associated with greater real earnings management? Accounting horizons, 25(2), 315-335.Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., and Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771.Cohen, D. A., Dey, A., and Lys, T. Z. (2008). Real and accrual‐based earnings management in the pre‐and post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley periods. The accounting review, 83(3), 757-787.Cohen, D. A., and Zarowin, P. (2010). Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of accounting and economics, 50(1), 2-19.Crocker, K. J., and Slemrod, J. (2005). Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10), 1593-1610.DeAngelo, L. E. (1986). Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders. Accounting review, 400-420.Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings management. Accounting review, 193-225.Demsetz, H., and Villalonga, B. (2001). Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of corporate finance, 7(3), 209-233.Durnev, A., Li, T., and Magnan, M. (2017). Beyond tax avoidance: Offshore firms’ institutional environment and financial reporting quality. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 44(5-6), 646-696.Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., and Maydew, E. L. (2012). Where do firms manage earnings? Review of Accounting Studies, 17(3), 649-687.Erickson, M., Hanlon, M., and Maydew, E. L. (2004). How much will firms pay for earnings that do not exist? Evidence of taxes paid on allegedly fraudulent earnings. The accounting review, 79(2), 387-408.Ewert, R., and Wagenhofer, A. (2005). Economic effects of tightening accounting standards to restrict earnings management. The accounting review, 80(4), 1101-1124.Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of political economy, 88(2), 288-307.Gordon, E. A., and Henry, E. (2005). Related party transactions and earnings management. Available at SSRN 612234.Gul, F. A., Hsu, A. W.-H., and Liu, S. H.-T. (2018). Parent-subsidiary investment layers and audit fees. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 33(4), 555-579.Gunny, K. A. (2010). The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), 855-888.Gupta, M., Pevzner, M., and Seethamraju, C. (2010). The implications of absorption cost accounting and production decisions for future firm performance and valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), 889-922.Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of accounting and economics, 7(1-3), 85-107.Hong, Q., and Smart, M. (2010). In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment. European economic review, 54(1), 82-95.Hsu, A. W.-H., and Liu, S. H.-T. (2016). Organizational structure, agency costs, and accrual quality. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 12(1), 35-60.Hsu, A. W.-H., and Liu, S. H.-T. (2018). Parent-subsidiary investment layers and the value of corporate cash holdings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 51(3), 651-681.Hsu, A. W.-H., and Liu, S. H.-T. (2018). Tax Avoidance and Pyramidal Layers. Tai Da Guan Li Lun Cong, 28(1), 1.Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The journal of finance, 48(3), 831-880.Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.Jian, M., and Wong, T. J. (2010). Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(1), 70-105.Jo, H., and Kim, Y. (2007). Disclosure frequency and earnings management. Journal of financial economics, 84(2), 561-590.Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of accounting research, 29(2), 193-228.Kim, B. H., Lisic, L. L., and Pevzner, M. (2010). Debt covenant slack and real earnings management. Kertas kerja yang dipublikasikan melalui SSRN.Kim, J. B., Chung, R., and Firth, M. (2003). Auditor conservatism, asymmetric monitoring, and earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(2), 323-359.Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of accounting and economics, 33(3), 375-400.La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517.Leuz, C., Nanda, D., and Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison. Journal of financial economics, 69(3), 505-527.Liang, S., Qi, X., Xin, F., and Zhan, J. (2020). Pyramidal Ownership Structure and Firms’ Audit Fees. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 1-31.Palan, R., and Wigan, D. (2014). Herding cats and taming tax havens: The US strategy of ‘not in my backyard’. Global policy, 5(3), 334-343.Pincus, M., and Rajgopal, S. (2002). The interaction between accrual management and hedging: Evidence from oil and gas firms. The accounting review, 77(1), 127-160.Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of accounting and economics, 42(3), 335-370.Rugman, A. M., and Verbeke, A. (2004). A perspective on regional and global strategies of multinational enterprises. Journal of international business studies, 35(1), 3-18.Schipper, K. (1989). Earnings management. Accounting horizons, 3(4), 91.Visvanathan, G. (2008). Corporate governance and real earnings management. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 12(1), 9.Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting review, 112-134.Wolfenzon, D. (1999). A theory of pyramidal ownership. Unpublished working paper. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.Zang, A. Y. (2012). Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. The accounting review, 87(2), 675-703. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
108353103資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353103 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 翁嘉祥 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Weng, Chia-Hsiang en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蔡佩柔 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Tsai, Pei-Rou en_US dc.creator (作者) 蔡佩柔 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Tsai, Pei-Rou en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2021 17:13:09 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2021 17:13:09 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2021 17:13:09 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108353103 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135922 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108353103 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文探討公司金字塔結構的投資層級多寡與實質盈餘管理行為的關聯性。由於投資鏈越長的公司意味著更大的資訊不對稱性與代理問題，為數眾多的投資層使外部投資者較難了解公司如何在金字塔結構內運作，且最終控制者與底層公司間的資訊傳遞會消耗更多的時間和成本。本研究以2009年至2019年間台灣上市上櫃公司為研究對象，實證結果可知，投資階層的數量多寡會影響公司從事實質盈餘管理之行為，投資層數較高的公司較少從事實質盈餘管理，可能由於公司可以選擇成本更低的方式進行盈餘管理以達成目標，因此較少選擇使用實質盈餘管理。然而投資層數較高的公司其應計基礎盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理間之替代效果較強，也就是說高投資層數的公司越可能經由應計基礎盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理間的轉換達成最終之管理目的。整體而言，本文發現金字塔結構下投資層數較高的公司，其所屬集團之租稅天堂比率越高時母公司愈容易從事實質盈餘管理之行為。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study investigates the relationship between the company`s pyramidal structure and the real earnings management behavior. Since longer investment chains imply greater information asymmetry and agency problems, the large number of investment layers makes it more difficult for outside investors to understand how the company operates within the pyramid structure, and the transfer of information between the ultimate controller and the bottom company consumes more time and costs. Using a sample of publicly traded non-financial firms of Taiwan from 2009 to 2019, we find that the span of corporate pyramids which is measured by the number of ownership layers affects the behavior of companies engaging in real earnings management. Companies with higher investment layers are less likely to engage in real earnings management, probably because they can choose a less costly way to manage earnings to achieve their goals. However, the substitution effect between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management is stronger for companies with higher number of investment layers, which means that companies with higher number of investment layers are more likely to achieve their objectives by switching between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Overall, this paper finds that the higher the number of investment layers under the corporate pyramid and the higher the tax haven ratio, the more likely the parent company is to engage in real earnings management. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 5第一節 公司投資層級 5第二節 盈餘管理 8第三節 假說發展 10第三章 研究方法 14第一節 應變數 14第二節 自變數 16第三節 控制變數 18第四節 實證模型建立 19第五節 資料來源及樣本選取 21第四章 實證結果與分析 23第一節 敘述性統計 23第二節 相關係數 25第三節 迴歸實證結果 27第四節 額外測試 31第五章 結論與建議 34第一節 研究結論 34第二節 研究限制與未來研究建議 35參考文獻 36 zh_TW dc.format.extent 855487 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353103 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 金字塔結構 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司投資層級 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 實質盈餘管理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 應計基礎盈餘管理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅天堂 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Pyramidal layers en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Pyramidal structure en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Real earnings management en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Accrual-based earnings management en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax haven en_US dc.title (題名) 公司投資層級與實質盈餘管理 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Pyramidal Layers and Real Earnings Management en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文文獻江家瑜、簡凌慧與薛敏正 (2014)。公司特質對應計與實質盈餘管理選擇的影響。中華會計學刊，10(1)，頁1-32。黃勝華、鄧安琪 (2018)。資產減損會計處理準則對盈餘管理選擇之影響。台灣管理學刊，18(1)，頁45-64。英文文獻Aalbers, M. B. (2018). Financial geography I: Geographies of tax. Progress in Human Geography, 42(6), 916-927.Alstadsæter, A., Johannesen, N., and Zucman, G. (2018). Who owns the wealth in tax havens? Macro evidence and implications for global inequality. Journal of Public Economics, 162, 89-100.Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting review, 443-465.Bebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R., and Triantis, G. (2000). Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights. In Concentrated corporate ownership (pp. 295-318): University of Chicago Press.Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., and Welker, M. (2003). The world price of earnings opacity. The accounting review, 78(3), 641-678.Carlson, S. J., and Bathala, C. T. (1997). Ownership differences and firms` income smoothing behavior. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 24(2), 179-196.Chan, A. L.-C., and Hsu, A. W.-H. (2013). Corporate pyramids, conservatism and cost of debt: Evidence from Taiwan. The International Journal of Accounting, 48(3), 390-413.Chen, K.-P., and Chu, C. C. (2005). Internal control versus external manipulation: A model of corporate income tax evasion. rand Journal of Economics, 151-164.Chi, W., Lisic, L. L., and Pevzner, M. (2011). Is enhanced audit quality associated with greater real earnings management? Accounting horizons, 25(2), 315-335.Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., and Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771.Cohen, D. A., Dey, A., and Lys, T. Z. (2008). Real and accrual‐based earnings management in the pre‐and post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley periods. The accounting review, 83(3), 757-787.Cohen, D. A., and Zarowin, P. (2010). Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of accounting and economics, 50(1), 2-19.Crocker, K. J., and Slemrod, J. (2005). Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10), 1593-1610.DeAngelo, L. E. (1986). Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders. Accounting review, 400-420.Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings management. Accounting review, 193-225.Demsetz, H., and Villalonga, B. (2001). Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of corporate finance, 7(3), 209-233.Durnev, A., Li, T., and Magnan, M. (2017). Beyond tax avoidance: Offshore firms’ institutional environment and financial reporting quality. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 44(5-6), 646-696.Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., and Maydew, E. L. (2012). Where do firms manage earnings? Review of Accounting Studies, 17(3), 649-687.Erickson, M., Hanlon, M., and Maydew, E. L. (2004). How much will firms pay for earnings that do not exist? Evidence of taxes paid on allegedly fraudulent earnings. The accounting review, 79(2), 387-408.Ewert, R., and Wagenhofer, A. (2005). Economic effects of tightening accounting standards to restrict earnings management. The accounting review, 80(4), 1101-1124.Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of political economy, 88(2), 288-307.Gordon, E. A., and Henry, E. (2005). Related party transactions and earnings management. Available at SSRN 612234.Gul, F. A., Hsu, A. W.-H., and Liu, S. H.-T. (2018). Parent-subsidiary investment layers and audit fees. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 33(4), 555-579.Gunny, K. A. (2010). The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), 855-888.Gupta, M., Pevzner, M., and Seethamraju, C. (2010). The implications of absorption cost accounting and production decisions for future firm performance and valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), 889-922.Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of accounting and economics, 7(1-3), 85-107.Hong, Q., and Smart, M. (2010). In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment. European economic review, 54(1), 82-95.Hsu, A. W.-H., and Liu, S. H.-T. (2016). Organizational structure, agency costs, and accrual quality. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 12(1), 35-60.Hsu, A. W.-H., and Liu, S. H.-T. (2018). Parent-subsidiary investment layers and the value of corporate cash holdings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 51(3), 651-681.Hsu, A. W.-H., and Liu, S. H.-T. (2018). Tax Avoidance and Pyramidal Layers. Tai Da Guan Li Lun Cong, 28(1), 1.Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The journal of finance, 48(3), 831-880.Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.Jian, M., and Wong, T. J. (2010). Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(1), 70-105.Jo, H., and Kim, Y. (2007). Disclosure frequency and earnings management. Journal of financial economics, 84(2), 561-590.Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of accounting research, 29(2), 193-228.Kim, B. H., Lisic, L. L., and Pevzner, M. (2010). Debt covenant slack and real earnings management. Kertas kerja yang dipublikasikan melalui SSRN.Kim, J. B., Chung, R., and Firth, M. (2003). Auditor conservatism, asymmetric monitoring, and earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(2), 323-359.Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of accounting and economics, 33(3), 375-400.La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517.Leuz, C., Nanda, D., and Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison. Journal of financial economics, 69(3), 505-527.Liang, S., Qi, X., Xin, F., and Zhan, J. (2020). Pyramidal Ownership Structure and Firms’ Audit Fees. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 1-31.Palan, R., and Wigan, D. (2014). Herding cats and taming tax havens: The US strategy of ‘not in my backyard’. Global policy, 5(3), 334-343.Pincus, M., and Rajgopal, S. (2002). The interaction between accrual management and hedging: Evidence from oil and gas firms. The accounting review, 77(1), 127-160.Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of accounting and economics, 42(3), 335-370.Rugman, A. M., and Verbeke, A. (2004). A perspective on regional and global strategies of multinational enterprises. Journal of international business studies, 35(1), 3-18.Schipper, K. (1989). Earnings management. Accounting horizons, 3(4), 91.Visvanathan, G. (2008). Corporate governance and real earnings management. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 12(1), 9.Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting review, 112-134.Wolfenzon, D. (1999). A theory of pyramidal ownership. Unpublished working paper. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.Zang, A. Y. (2012). Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. The accounting review, 87(2), 675-703. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100616 en_US
