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題名 經理人股權獎酬對企業風險之影響
The Impact of Executive Stock Ownership on Enterprise Risk作者 鐘元斌
Chung, Yuan-Bin貢獻者 翁嘉祥
Weng, Chia-Hsiang
鐘元斌
Chung, Yuan-Bin關鍵詞 經理人股權獎酬
企業風險
系統性風險
產業創新條例
Executive Stock Option
Enterprise Risk
Systematic Risk
Innovation Act日期 2021 上傳時間 1-Jul-2021 17:19:02 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究以2008年至2019年上市櫃員工認股權發行資料做為樣本，分析認股權憑證發行對企業風險之影響。過去文獻有風險偏好及趨避之衝突觀點，實證結果發現，認股權證有助於解決代理問題，發行權證數量越高，將鼓勵經理人選擇系統性風險(Beta值)較高之決策，但經理人具有風險規避的本質，應同時消除非系統性風險，在以PSM模型消除權證特性影響後，其結果仍維持一致。此外，亦加入經理人持股變數，以衡量整體財富對風險之影響，實證結果顯示，經理人持股越高之公司，在發行員工認股權後，總體風險呈現下降趨勢，顯示經理人對於公司之投資決策更保守，反映尾端風險可能對財富造成侵蝕，呈現經理人風險趨避狀態。本研究同時發現，產業創新條例19-1條提供租稅誘因，鼓勵企業採用股權獎酬工具，課稅時間點延緩至實際出售，且可採出售價格與取得價格孰低做為課稅依據，但緩課具有500萬額度上限，獎酬金額超過500萬額度仍需回歸正常課稅，使其實值效力降低，進而導致該租稅誘因無法對經理人的風險偏好及決策行為造成影響。
This study is to investigate the effect of executive incentives on company risk by using employee stock options issued by Taiwan-listed companies from 2008 to 2019. As a result of our study, the stock option is a helpful tool to solve agency problems. If the company issued more options, company profit would be in line with the managers. These will encourage managers to choose strategies that have higher systematic risk (Beta). However, since managers are risk aversion in nature, managers tend to maintain or lower total risk, meanwhile, they tend to eliminate unsystematic risk. The result holds the same when we use PSM Model to eliminate the effect of stock option character. Besides, we also add the manager holding effect in our empirical model, in order to evaluate total wealth impact on enterprise risk. Mangers would be afraid of downside risk, which results in risk aversion behaviors.Innovation Act Art.19-1 provides tax incentives to encourage the company to adopt more employee compensation plans. We also take tax benefits provided by Industry Innovation Act Art.19-1 into consideration, in order to evaluate its impact on company risk. Based on the empirical results, tax incentives can’t change managers’ risk tendency and decision behavior. The main reason is it has 5,000 thousand limitations. The stock option which value exceeds the limit would be taxed in normal, which weakens its real impacts.參考文獻 中文部分陳雪如、黃邵彥、邱安安、劉俊麟等人(2011), 員工分紅費用化對薪酬制度影響之研究。中華管理評論國際學報，14(4)，1-25經濟部工業局(2019)。「產業創新條例」第19條之1實施檢討報告，未出版。資誠會計事務所(2009)。股份基礎給付議題 產學面對面。資誠通訊, 226, 40-43英文部分Agrawl, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996), Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, The Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377-397Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 605-617Armstrong C. S., & Vashishtha R. (2012), Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value, Journal of Financial Economics, 104, 70-88Babenko, I., & Tserlukevich, Y. (2009) Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options, The Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1791-1825Baker, T., Collins, D., & Reitenga, A. (2003), Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 18(4), 557-582Black, B. S., Kim, W., & Jang, H. (2006), Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value? Evidence From Korea, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 22(2), 366-413Bryan, S., Lee-Seok, H., & Steven B. L. (1999), CEO Stock Option Awards: An Empirical Analysis and Synthesis of the Economic Determinants, SSRN Electronic JournalChen., Y. R., & Ma, Y. (2011), Revisiting the risk-taking effect of executive stock options on firm performance. Journal of Business Research, 64, 650-648Core, J., & Guay, W. (2002), Estimating the value of stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 40, 613-630Defusco, R. A., Johnson, R. R., & Zorn, T. (1990), The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, The Journal of Finance, 45(2), 617-627Devers, C. E., Mcnamara, G., & Wiseman M. R. (2008), Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk, Organization Science, 19(4), 548-566Destuch, Y., Keil, T., & Laamanen,T. (2010) A Dual Agency View of Board Compensation: The Joint Effects of Outside Director and CEO Stock Options on Firm Risk, Strategic Management Journal, 32, 212-227Dong, Z., Wang, C., & Xie F. (2010), Do executive options induce excessive risk taking, Journal of Banking & Finance, 34, 2518-2529Firth, M., Peter, M.Y.F., & Oliver, M. R. (2007). How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China’s listed firms, Journal of Business Research, 60, 776-785Garvey, G. (1997) Marketable Incentive Contracts and Capital Structure Relevance, The Journal of Finance, 52(1), 353-378Gaver, J., & Gaver, K. M. (1993) Additional evidence of the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 125-160Harvey H., & John, J. (2003), The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: The Data, SSRN Electronic JournalHenderson, V. (2005). The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation, incentive and opportunity of executive stock options, Quantitative Finance, 5(1), 35-47Huddart, S. (1998), Tax Planning and the Exercise of Employee Stock Options, Contemporary Accounting Research, 15(2), 203-216James, S. A., Rebel, A. C., & James. W. L. (2000), Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, The Journal of Finance, 56(1), 81-106Jenson, M., & Mecking W. H. (1976), Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360Khan, R., Dharwadkar, R., & Brandes, P. (2005). Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination, Journal of Business Research, 58, 1078-1088Litner, J. (1965), The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 47(1), 13-37Markowitz, H. (1952), Portfolio Selection, The Journal of Finance, 7(1), 77-91Martin, G. P., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Wiseman R. M. (2013). Executive stock options as mixed gambles: revisiting the Behavioral Agency Model, Academy of Management Journal, 2, 451-472Meulbroek, L. K. (2001) The Efficiency of Equity-Linked compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options, Financial Management, 30(2), 5-44Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2002) Emperical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), 145-171Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983) The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55Ross, S. A. (2004) Compensation, Incentives, and Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness, The Journal of Finance, 59(1), 207-225Samuel J., Belda-Ruiz R., & Sanchez-Marian G. (2014) Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking, Journal of Business Research, 68(2), 451-463Sanders, W. G., & Hambrick D. C. (2007) Swinging for the Fences: The effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, The Academy of Management Journal, 50(5), 1055-1078Sawers, K., Wright, A., & Zamora, V. (2011), Does Greater Risk-Bearing in Stock Option Compensation Reduce the Influence of Problem Framing on Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior, Behavioral Research In Accounting, 23(1), 185-201Sharpe, W. F. (1964), Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, The Journal of Finance, 19(3), 425-442Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3)-1, 461-488Tian, Y. S. (2004). Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options, Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 1225-1245Wright, P., Ferris, S. P., & Awasthi V. (1996), Impact of Corporate Insider, Blockholder, and Institutional Ownership on Firm Risk Taking, The Academy of Management Journal, 2, 441-463Wiseman, R. W., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998), A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking, Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 133-153 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
108353110資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353110 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 翁嘉祥 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Weng, Chia-Hsiang en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 鐘元斌 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chung, Yuan-Bin en_US dc.creator (作者) 鐘元斌 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chung, Yuan-Bin en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2021 17:19:02 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2021 17:19:02 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2021 17:19:02 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108353110 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135924 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108353110 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究以2008年至2019年上市櫃員工認股權發行資料做為樣本，分析認股權憑證發行對企業風險之影響。過去文獻有風險偏好及趨避之衝突觀點，實證結果發現，認股權證有助於解決代理問題，發行權證數量越高，將鼓勵經理人選擇系統性風險(Beta值)較高之決策，但經理人具有風險規避的本質，應同時消除非系統性風險，在以PSM模型消除權證特性影響後，其結果仍維持一致。此外，亦加入經理人持股變數，以衡量整體財富對風險之影響，實證結果顯示，經理人持股越高之公司，在發行員工認股權後，總體風險呈現下降趨勢，顯示經理人對於公司之投資決策更保守，反映尾端風險可能對財富造成侵蝕，呈現經理人風險趨避狀態。本研究同時發現，產業創新條例19-1條提供租稅誘因，鼓勵企業採用股權獎酬工具，課稅時間點延緩至實際出售，且可採出售價格與取得價格孰低做為課稅依據，但緩課具有500萬額度上限，獎酬金額超過500萬額度仍需回歸正常課稅，使其實值效力降低，進而導致該租稅誘因無法對經理人的風險偏好及決策行為造成影響。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study is to investigate the effect of executive incentives on company risk by using employee stock options issued by Taiwan-listed companies from 2008 to 2019. As a result of our study, the stock option is a helpful tool to solve agency problems. If the company issued more options, company profit would be in line with the managers. These will encourage managers to choose strategies that have higher systematic risk (Beta). However, since managers are risk aversion in nature, managers tend to maintain or lower total risk, meanwhile, they tend to eliminate unsystematic risk. The result holds the same when we use PSM Model to eliminate the effect of stock option character. Besides, we also add the manager holding effect in our empirical model, in order to evaluate total wealth impact on enterprise risk. Mangers would be afraid of downside risk, which results in risk aversion behaviors.Innovation Act Art.19-1 provides tax incentives to encourage the company to adopt more employee compensation plans. We also take tax benefits provided by Industry Innovation Act Art.19-1 into consideration, in order to evaluate its impact on company risk. Based on the empirical results, tax incentives can’t change managers’ risk tendency and decision behavior. The main reason is it has 5,000 thousand limitations. The stock option which value exceeds the limit would be taxed in normal, which weakens its real impacts. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 表目錄 v壹、緒論 1貳、文獻及假說發展 4一、發行認股權因素 4二、員工認股權與風險 4三、假說發展 7參、研究方法 12一、應變數 12二、自變數 13三、控制變數 14四、實證模型建立 16五、樣本資料與選取 19肆、實證結果與分析 21一、發行權證樣本不同年度比較 21二、敘述性統計 22三、相關係數 23四、迴歸實證結果 25六、傾向分數配對方法之實證結果 31伍、穩健性測試 36陸、研究結論及、研究限制及未來研究建議 39參考文獻 41 zh_TW dc.format.extent 886260 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353110 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經理人股權獎酬 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 企業風險 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 系統性風險 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 產業創新條例 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Executive Stock Option en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Enterprise Risk en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Systematic Risk en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Innovation Act en_US dc.title (題名) 經理人股權獎酬對企業風險之影響 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Impact of Executive Stock Ownership on Enterprise Risk en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分陳雪如、黃邵彥、邱安安、劉俊麟等人(2011), 員工分紅費用化對薪酬制度影響之研究。中華管理評論國際學報，14(4)，1-25經濟部工業局(2019)。「產業創新條例」第19條之1實施檢討報告，未出版。資誠會計事務所(2009)。股份基礎給付議題 產學面對面。資誠通訊, 226, 40-43英文部分Agrawl, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996), Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, The Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377-397Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 605-617Armstrong C. S., & Vashishtha R. (2012), Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value, Journal of Financial Economics, 104, 70-88Babenko, I., & Tserlukevich, Y. (2009) Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options, The Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1791-1825Baker, T., Collins, D., & Reitenga, A. (2003), Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 18(4), 557-582Black, B. S., Kim, W., & Jang, H. (2006), Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value? Evidence From Korea, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 22(2), 366-413Bryan, S., Lee-Seok, H., & Steven B. L. (1999), CEO Stock Option Awards: An Empirical Analysis and Synthesis of the Economic Determinants, SSRN Electronic JournalChen., Y. R., & Ma, Y. (2011), Revisiting the risk-taking effect of executive stock options on firm performance. Journal of Business Research, 64, 650-648Core, J., & Guay, W. (2002), Estimating the value of stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 40, 613-630Defusco, R. A., Johnson, R. R., & Zorn, T. (1990), The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, The Journal of Finance, 45(2), 617-627Devers, C. E., Mcnamara, G., & Wiseman M. R. (2008), Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk, Organization Science, 19(4), 548-566Destuch, Y., Keil, T., & Laamanen,T. (2010) A Dual Agency View of Board Compensation: The Joint Effects of Outside Director and CEO Stock Options on Firm Risk, Strategic Management Journal, 32, 212-227Dong, Z., Wang, C., & Xie F. (2010), Do executive options induce excessive risk taking, Journal of Banking & Finance, 34, 2518-2529Firth, M., Peter, M.Y.F., & Oliver, M. R. (2007). How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China’s listed firms, Journal of Business Research, 60, 776-785Garvey, G. (1997) Marketable Incentive Contracts and Capital Structure Relevance, The Journal of Finance, 52(1), 353-378Gaver, J., & Gaver, K. M. (1993) Additional evidence of the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 125-160Harvey H., & John, J. (2003), The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: The Data, SSRN Electronic JournalHenderson, V. (2005). The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation, incentive and opportunity of executive stock options, Quantitative Finance, 5(1), 35-47Huddart, S. (1998), Tax Planning and the Exercise of Employee Stock Options, Contemporary Accounting Research, 15(2), 203-216James, S. A., Rebel, A. C., & James. W. L. (2000), Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, The Journal of Finance, 56(1), 81-106Jenson, M., & Mecking W. H. (1976), Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360Khan, R., Dharwadkar, R., & Brandes, P. (2005). Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination, Journal of Business Research, 58, 1078-1088Litner, J. (1965), The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 47(1), 13-37Markowitz, H. (1952), Portfolio Selection, The Journal of Finance, 7(1), 77-91Martin, G. P., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Wiseman R. M. (2013). Executive stock options as mixed gambles: revisiting the Behavioral Agency Model, Academy of Management Journal, 2, 451-472Meulbroek, L. K. (2001) The Efficiency of Equity-Linked compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options, Financial Management, 30(2), 5-44Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2002) Emperical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), 145-171Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983) The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55Ross, S. A. (2004) Compensation, Incentives, and Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness, The Journal of Finance, 59(1), 207-225Samuel J., Belda-Ruiz R., & Sanchez-Marian G. (2014) Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking, Journal of Business Research, 68(2), 451-463Sanders, W. G., & Hambrick D. C. (2007) Swinging for the Fences: The effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, The Academy of Management Journal, 50(5), 1055-1078Sawers, K., Wright, A., & Zamora, V. (2011), Does Greater Risk-Bearing in Stock Option Compensation Reduce the Influence of Problem Framing on Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior, Behavioral Research In Accounting, 23(1), 185-201Sharpe, W. F. (1964), Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, The Journal of Finance, 19(3), 425-442Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3)-1, 461-488Tian, Y. S. (2004). Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options, Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 1225-1245Wright, P., Ferris, S. P., & Awasthi V. (1996), Impact of Corporate Insider, Blockholder, and Institutional Ownership on Firm Risk Taking, The Academy of Management Journal, 2, 441-463Wiseman, R. W., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998), A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking, Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 133-153 zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100593 en_US
