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題名 獨立董事與經理人能力之關聯
The Association Between Independent Directors and Managerial Ability作者 廖若晴 貢獻者 潘健民
廖若晴關鍵詞 獨立董事
經理人能力
Independent director
Managerial ability日期 2021 上傳時間 4-Aug-2021 14:29:43 (UTC+8) 摘要 為了提高公司透明度及公司效率，主管機關在公司治理的範疇中，額外發展出了獨立董事的監管機制，獨立董事除了對公司經營面能達到監督效果，對於公司的經理人人選也會有所影響。本研究以2005至2019年之東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，旨在探討獨立董事的設置與公司經理人的能力之關聯。本研究透過獨立董事的有無及獨立董事的比例，此兩項作為指標去衡量其對經理人能力之影響。實證結果發現，當公司有獨立董事時，經理人能力是會較高的。同時也發現，獨立董事的比例與經理人能力之間是呈現正相關的。在後續的追加測試中也發現，若獨立董事有證券業及保險業相關背景時，經理人能力也是較高的。
In an effort to improve corporate efficiency and financial transparency , government authorities have developed a mechanism, independent directors, to improve corporate governance. The role of independent directors is designed to monitor the operations of the firms to enhance corporate governance. . Using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2019, this paper investigates and aims to explore the association between independent directors and managerial ability.This paper uses two measures to examine the association between independent directors and managerial ability: (1) the exisitence of independent directors; and (2) the ratio of independent directors in board. The results show that when managerial ability is likely to be higher when the firm has independent directors in the board. The results also identify a positive association between the ratio of independent directors and managerial ability.參考文獻 Agrawal, A., and C. Knoeber. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31 (3): 377-397.Aguilera, R. 2005. Corporate governance and director accountability: An institutional comparative perspective. British Journal of Management 16: S39–S53.Bamber, L., J. Jiang, and I. Wang. 2010. What’s my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. Accounting Review 85 (4): 1131-1162.Beasley, M. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71 (4): 443-465.Beasley, M., J. Carcello, D. Hermanson, and P. Lapides. 2000. Fraudulent financial reporting: Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms. Accounting Horizons 14 (4): 441-454.Berle, A., and G. Means. 1932. Modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208.Bhagat, S., and B. Black. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law 27 (2): 231-274.Bhagat, S., and B. Bolton. 2013. Director ownership, governance, and performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48 (1):105-135.Brickley, J., J. Coles, and R. Terry. 1994. Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of Financial Economics 35: 371-390.Byrd, J., and K. Hickman. 1992. Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics 35: 195-221.Carter, D., B. Simkins, and W. Simpson. 2003. Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. Financial Review 38: 33-53.Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87: 157-176.Coles, J., and W. Hesterly. 2000. Independence of the chairman and board composition: Firm choices and shareholder value. Journal of Management 26 (2): 195-214.Cotter, J., A. Shivdasani, and M. Zenner. 1997. Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics. 43: 195-218.Dalton, D., C. Daily, J. Johnson, and A. Ellstrand. 1999. Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Review 28 (3): 383-396.Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229-1248.Demerjian, P., B. Lev, M. Lewis, and S. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. Accounting Review 88 (2): 463-498Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. Maydew. 2010. The effects of executives on corporate tax avoidance. Accounting Review 85 (4): 1163-1189Ferris, S., and X. Yan. 2007.Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance. Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (2): 392-420Francis, J., A. Huang, S. Rajgopal, and A. Zang. 2008. CEO reputation and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 109-147.Ge, W., D. Matsumoto, and J. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the effect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (4): 1141-1179.Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick. 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1):107-155Hambrick, D., and P. Mason.1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review (9): 193-206.Hillman, A., and T. Dalziel. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. The Academy of Management Review 28 (3): 383-396.Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4):305-360.Johl, S., S. Kaur, and B. Cooper. 2013.Board characteristics and firm performance: Evidence from Malaysian public listed firms. Journal of Economics, Business and Management 3 (2): 239-243Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 375-400.Milbourn, T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68: 233-262.Nakano, M. and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further. evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387.Shivdasani, A. 1993. Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 167-198.Wiersema, M., and K. Bantel. 1992. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35 (1): 91-121.Wiersema, M., and A. Bird. 1993. Organizational demography in Japanese firms: Group heterogeneity, individual dissimilarity, and top management team turnover. Academy of Management Journal 36 (5): 996-1025. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
108353018資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353018 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 潘健民 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 廖若晴 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 廖若晴 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-Aug-2021 14:29:43 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-Aug-2021 14:29:43 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Aug-2021 14:29:43 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108353018 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136292 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108353018 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 為了提高公司透明度及公司效率，主管機關在公司治理的範疇中，額外發展出了獨立董事的監管機制，獨立董事除了對公司經營面能達到監督效果，對於公司的經理人人選也會有所影響。本研究以2005至2019年之東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，旨在探討獨立董事的設置與公司經理人的能力之關聯。本研究透過獨立董事的有無及獨立董事的比例，此兩項作為指標去衡量其對經理人能力之影響。實證結果發現，當公司有獨立董事時，經理人能力是會較高的。同時也發現，獨立董事的比例與經理人能力之間是呈現正相關的。在後續的追加測試中也發現，若獨立董事有證券業及保險業相關背景時，經理人能力也是較高的。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) In an effort to improve corporate efficiency and financial transparency , government authorities have developed a mechanism, independent directors, to improve corporate governance. The role of independent directors is designed to monitor the operations of the firms to enhance corporate governance. . Using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2019, this paper investigates and aims to explore the association between independent directors and managerial ability.This paper uses two measures to examine the association between independent directors and managerial ability: (1) the exisitence of independent directors; and (2) the ratio of independent directors in board. The results show that when managerial ability is likely to be higher when the firm has independent directors in the board. The results also identify a positive association between the ratio of independent directors and managerial ability. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、緒論 1第一節 研究動機及目的 1第二節 研究架構 4貳、文獻探討與研究假說 5第一節 獨立董事 5第二節 經理人能力 8第三節 研究假說 10參、研究方法 11第ㄧ節 資料來源與樣本篩選 11第二節 模型與變數定義 15肆、實證結果與分析 20第一節 敘述性統計 20第二節 相關係數檢定 22第三節 主模型實證結果 25第四節 追加測試 28伍、結論 40參考文獻 42附錄 46 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1388553 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353018 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獨立董事 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經理人能力 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independent director en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Managerial ability en_US dc.title (題名) 獨立董事與經理人能力之關聯 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Association Between Independent Directors and Managerial Ability en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Agrawal, A., and C. Knoeber. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31 (3): 377-397.Aguilera, R. 2005. Corporate governance and director accountability: An institutional comparative perspective. British Journal of Management 16: S39–S53.Bamber, L., J. Jiang, and I. Wang. 2010. What’s my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. Accounting Review 85 (4): 1131-1162.Beasley, M. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71 (4): 443-465.Beasley, M., J. Carcello, D. Hermanson, and P. Lapides. 2000. Fraudulent financial reporting: Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms. Accounting Horizons 14 (4): 441-454.Berle, A., and G. Means. 1932. Modern corporation and private property. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208.Bhagat, S., and B. Black. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law 27 (2): 231-274.Bhagat, S., and B. Bolton. 2013. Director ownership, governance, and performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48 (1):105-135.Brickley, J., J. Coles, and R. Terry. 1994. Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of Financial Economics 35: 371-390.Byrd, J., and K. Hickman. 1992. Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics 35: 195-221.Carter, D., B. Simkins, and W. Simpson. 2003. Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. Financial Review 38: 33-53.Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87: 157-176.Coles, J., and W. Hesterly. 2000. Independence of the chairman and board composition: Firm choices and shareholder value. Journal of Management 26 (2): 195-214.Cotter, J., A. Shivdasani, and M. Zenner. 1997. Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics. 43: 195-218.Dalton, D., C. Daily, J. Johnson, and A. Ellstrand. 1999. Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Review 28 (3): 383-396.Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229-1248.Demerjian, P., B. Lev, M. Lewis, and S. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. Accounting Review 88 (2): 463-498Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. Maydew. 2010. The effects of executives on corporate tax avoidance. Accounting Review 85 (4): 1163-1189Ferris, S., and X. Yan. 2007.Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance. Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (2): 392-420Francis, J., A. Huang, S. Rajgopal, and A. Zang. 2008. CEO reputation and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 109-147.Ge, W., D. Matsumoto, and J. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the effect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (4): 1141-1179.Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick. 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1):107-155Hambrick, D., and P. Mason.1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review (9): 193-206.Hillman, A., and T. Dalziel. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. The Academy of Management Review 28 (3): 383-396.Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4):305-360.Johl, S., S. Kaur, and B. Cooper. 2013.Board characteristics and firm performance: Evidence from Malaysian public listed firms. Journal of Economics, Business and Management 3 (2): 239-243Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 375-400.Milbourn, T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68: 233-262.Nakano, M. and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further. evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387.Shivdasani, A. 1993. Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 167-198.Wiersema, M., and K. Bantel. 1992. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35 (1): 91-121.Wiersema, M., and A. Bird. 1993. Organizational demography in Japanese firms: Group heterogeneity, individual dissimilarity, and top management team turnover. Academy of Management Journal 36 (5): 996-1025. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100697 en_US
