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題名 高階經理人薪酬與債務資金成本之關聯：以臺灣上市櫃公司為例
Relationship between Executive Compensation and Cost of Debt: Evidence from Listed Companies in Taiwan作者 謝旻軒
Hsieh, Min-Hsuan貢獻者 徐愛恩
Tsui, Ai-An
謝旻軒
Hsieh, Min-Hsuan關鍵詞 債務資金成本
高階經理人薪酬
經理人持股比例
公司治理機制
Cost of debt
Executive compensation
Managerial ownership
Corporate governance mechanisms日期 2021 上傳時間 4-Aug-2021 14:33:23 (UTC+8) 摘要 近年來，經理人薪酬成為熱門討論議題，許多肥貓企業也紛紛浮上檯面。本研究之目的在於探討企業高階經理人薪酬之結構與其債務資金成本之關聯性，並檢視不同的經理人持股比例是否對於其債務資金成本之高低亦有影響。本文以代理理論為基礎，利用2016年至2019年期間台灣的上市櫃公司為樣本。實證結果顯示，在其他條件不變下，薪資結構中有較高現金基礎誘因薪酬的公司有較低的債務資金成本。有較高經理人持股比例之企業亦傾向有較低之債務資金成本。
This study examines how executive compensation affects the cost of debt financing. Using management pay data from Taiwan, companies with higher cash-like incentive compensation in the salary structure have lower costs of debt, ceteris paribus. Moreover, this study provides evidence that companies with higher managerial ownership tend to have lower debt costs. The result suggests that executive compensation and managerial stock ownership can be used when determining credit terms.參考文獻 中文部分：李怡璇，(2013)。董監事酬勞與董監事責任險對於負債資金成本之影響，國立彰化師範大學會計學系碩士論文。陳瑞斌、翁慈青、朱全斌，（2009）。揭露水準對於信用評等與負債資金成本之影響，財務金融學刊，第17卷第2期，71-110。楊東曉、蘇秋竹，（2012）。經理人股權相關薪酬對違約風險的影響。會計評論，54，77-115。葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，（2002）。公司治理與平等系統，臺北：商周文化。 英文部分：Banker, R. D., Lee, S. Y., Potter, G., Srinivasan, D. (2000). An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based compensation plan. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3),315-350.Bebchuk, L. A., Fried, J. M., & Walker, D. I. (2002). Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation. University of Chicago Law Review, 69, 751-846.Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932).” The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” Macmillan, New York, N.Y.Callahan, C. M., Vendrzyk, V. P., & Butler, M. G. (2012). The impact of implied facilities cost of money subsidies on capital expenditures and the cost of debt in the defense industry. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(3), 301-319.Coles, J., Daniel, N. & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking, Journal of Financial Economics,79, 431-468.Duru, A., Mansi, S. & Reeb, D. (2005). Earnings-based bonus plans and the agency cost of debt, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24, 431-447.Fama, E. (1978). The Effects of a Firm`s Investment and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of Its Security Holders. The American Economic Review, 68(3), 272-284.Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson, & K. Schipper. (2004). Costs of equity and earnings attributes. The Accounting Review, 79(4), 967-1010.Haugen, R., & Senbet, L. (1988). Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 23(1), 27-38. doi:10.2307/2331022Holmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability, The Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), 74-91.Hoskisson, R. E, M.A. Hitt, & C. W. L. Hill. (1993). Managerial Incentitives And Investment In R&D in Large Multi-Product Firms, Organization Science, 4(2), 325-329.Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 1, 5-50.John, T. & John, W., (1993). Top-management compensation and capital structure, Journal of Finance, 48, 949-974.John, K., Lynch, A., & Puri, M. (2003). Credit Ratings, Collateral, and Loan Characteristics: Implications for Yield. The Journal of Business, 76(3), 371-409. doi:10.1086/375252Kelly, K., & J. L. Seow. (2016). Investor Reactions to Company Disclosure of High CEO Pay and High CEO-to-Employee Pay Ratio: An Experimental Investigation. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 28 (January), 107-125.Pittman, J., & S. Fortin. (2004). Auditor choice and the cost of debt capital for newly public firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37 (1), 113-136.Lim, Y. (2011). Tax avoidance, cost of debt and shareholder activism: Evidence from Korea. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(2), 456-470.Miller, E. (1977). Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion. The Journal of Finance, 32(4), 1151-1168. doi:10.2307/2326520Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.Myers, S.C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(June), 187-221Sanders, W., & Hambrick, D. (2007). Swinging for the Fences: The Effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance. The Academy of Management Journal, 50(5), 1055-1078. doi:10.2307/20159913Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. The Accounting Review, 73(4), 459-474.Shuto, A., & Kitagawa, N. (2011). The Effect of Managerial Ownership on the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 26(3), 590–620. doi:10.1177/0148558X11401553Vallascas, F., & Hagendorff, J. (2013). CEO bonus remuneration and bank default risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 22(2), 47-89. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
108353111資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353111 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 徐愛恩 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Tsui, Ai-An en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 謝旻軒 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Hsieh, Min-Hsuan en_US dc.creator (作者) 謝旻軒 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Hsieh, Min-Hsuan en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-Aug-2021 14:33:23 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-Aug-2021 14:33:23 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Aug-2021 14:33:23 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108353111 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136311 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108353111 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近年來，經理人薪酬成為熱門討論議題，許多肥貓企業也紛紛浮上檯面。本研究之目的在於探討企業高階經理人薪酬之結構與其債務資金成本之關聯性，並檢視不同的經理人持股比例是否對於其債務資金成本之高低亦有影響。本文以代理理論為基礎，利用2016年至2019年期間台灣的上市櫃公司為樣本。實證結果顯示，在其他條件不變下，薪資結構中有較高現金基礎誘因薪酬的公司有較低的債務資金成本。有較高經理人持股比例之企業亦傾向有較低之債務資金成本。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study examines how executive compensation affects the cost of debt financing. Using management pay data from Taiwan, companies with higher cash-like incentive compensation in the salary structure have lower costs of debt, ceteris paribus. Moreover, this study provides evidence that companies with higher managerial ownership tend to have lower debt costs. The result suggests that executive compensation and managerial stock ownership can be used when determining credit terms. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究架構 3第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 5第一節 代理理論 5第二節 高階經理人薪酬 8第三節 高階經理人持股 9第四節 債務資金成本 9第五節 高階經理人薪酬與債務資金成本 11第六節 高階經理人持股與債務資金成本 12第三章 研究方法 13第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 13第二節 變數定義與實證模型 16第四章 實證結果 21第一節 敘述性統計分析 21第二節 相關係數分析 23第三節 迴歸結果分析 27第四節 敏感性分析 33第五章 結論與建議 37第一節 研究結論 37第二節 研究限制與建議 38附錄一 研究變數彙總表 39參考文獻 41 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1626901 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353111 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 債務資金成本 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 高階經理人薪酬 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經理人持股比例 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理機制 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cost of debt en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Executive compensation en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Managerial ownership en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate governance mechanisms en_US dc.title (題名) 高階經理人薪酬與債務資金成本之關聯：以臺灣上市櫃公司為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Relationship between Executive Compensation and Cost of Debt: Evidence from Listed Companies in Taiwan en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分：李怡璇，(2013)。董監事酬勞與董監事責任險對於負債資金成本之影響，國立彰化師範大學會計學系碩士論文。陳瑞斌、翁慈青、朱全斌，（2009）。揭露水準對於信用評等與負債資金成本之影響，財務金融學刊，第17卷第2期，71-110。楊東曉、蘇秋竹，（2012）。經理人股權相關薪酬對違約風險的影響。會計評論，54，77-115。葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，（2002）。公司治理與平等系統，臺北：商周文化。 英文部分：Banker, R. D., Lee, S. Y., Potter, G., Srinivasan, D. (2000). An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based compensation plan. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3),315-350.Bebchuk, L. A., Fried, J. M., & Walker, D. I. (2002). Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation. University of Chicago Law Review, 69, 751-846.Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932).” The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” Macmillan, New York, N.Y.Callahan, C. M., Vendrzyk, V. P., & Butler, M. G. (2012). The impact of implied facilities cost of money subsidies on capital expenditures and the cost of debt in the defense industry. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(3), 301-319.Coles, J., Daniel, N. & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking, Journal of Financial Economics,79, 431-468.Duru, A., Mansi, S. & Reeb, D. (2005). Earnings-based bonus plans and the agency cost of debt, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24, 431-447.Fama, E. (1978). The Effects of a Firm`s Investment and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of Its Security Holders. The American Economic Review, 68(3), 272-284.Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson, & K. Schipper. (2004). Costs of equity and earnings attributes. The Accounting Review, 79(4), 967-1010.Haugen, R., & Senbet, L. (1988). Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 23(1), 27-38. doi:10.2307/2331022Holmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability, The Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), 74-91.Hoskisson, R. E, M.A. Hitt, & C. W. L. Hill. (1993). Managerial Incentitives And Investment In R&D in Large Multi-Product Firms, Organization Science, 4(2), 325-329.Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 1, 5-50.John, T. & John, W., (1993). Top-management compensation and capital structure, Journal of Finance, 48, 949-974.John, K., Lynch, A., & Puri, M. (2003). Credit Ratings, Collateral, and Loan Characteristics: Implications for Yield. The Journal of Business, 76(3), 371-409. doi:10.1086/375252Kelly, K., & J. L. Seow. (2016). Investor Reactions to Company Disclosure of High CEO Pay and High CEO-to-Employee Pay Ratio: An Experimental Investigation. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 28 (January), 107-125.Pittman, J., & S. Fortin. (2004). Auditor choice and the cost of debt capital for newly public firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37 (1), 113-136.Lim, Y. (2011). Tax avoidance, cost of debt and shareholder activism: Evidence from Korea. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(2), 456-470.Miller, E. (1977). Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion. The Journal of Finance, 32(4), 1151-1168. doi:10.2307/2326520Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.Myers, S.C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(June), 187-221Sanders, W., & Hambrick, D. (2007). Swinging for the Fences: The Effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance. The Academy of Management Journal, 50(5), 1055-1078. doi:10.2307/20159913Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. The Accounting Review, 73(4), 459-474.Shuto, A., & Kitagawa, N. (2011). The Effect of Managerial Ownership on the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 26(3), 590–620. doi:10.1177/0148558X11401553Vallascas, F., & Hagendorff, J. (2013). CEO bonus remuneration and bank default risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 22(2), 47-89. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100746 en_US
