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題名 多階段製程下綜合產量及維護策略之最佳化研究及主顧協調之分析
Channel Coordination with Optimal Joint Determination of Productions and Maintenance Policies for Multi-staged Manufacturing System作者 吳孟峻
Wu, Meng-Chun貢獻者 楊素芬<br>唐正
Yang, Su-Fen<br>Tang, Jen
吳孟峻
Wu, Meng-Chun關鍵詞 主顧協調
維護策略
多階段製程
最佳化研究
供應鏈合約
Channel coordination
Maintenance policy
Multi-staged manufacturing system
Optimization study
Supply chain contract日期 2021 上傳時間 4-Aug-2021 14:42:33 (UTC+8) 摘要 在一個二階段的製程供應鏈中，我們假設預防維修可以透過整體修復使得設備恢復可靠度；修正維修在沒有改善設備的損耗程度下僅僅使得製程恢復到可運轉的狀態，並且將兩階段獨立的維修業務分別外包給兩間不同的合約商。我們首先分析同時考慮產量以及維修策略的一階段固定報酬給付模型，再利用一階段模型的最佳解延伸至二階段整合模型的研究，其中每個階段皆負責一部分產品的必要組成物件。因此，製造商的預期獲利會與這兩階段生產物件的最小值成正比；而外包維修商的預期利潤則是與維修花費有關，在雙方的利潤分配中，我們會透過誘因合約來協調雇主與客戶並促成合作。這份誘因合約能透過分攤成本損失達成雙贏的結果，且有利於主顧協調後額外的利潤分配。此外，受惠於合約的外包維修商也會因此提高效率，改善製程的維修時間、成本以及設備的故障次數。
Consider a supply chain, where a manufacturer is operating a production line with two processes (stages) in a series configuration. Each of the two stages (or processes) manufactures an intermediate product, which is a required component of the final assembled product. In order to improve the reliability of the processes, preventive maintenance (PM), which overhauls and improves the processes to their original states periodically, and corrective maintenance (CM, i.e., minimal repair), which merely restores the process to operation without improving its reliability, are employed. The processes are assumed to be independent, and their respective maintenance functions are outsourced to two different maintenance contractors. Absent the time for maintenance, we assume that both stages operate continuously, and we call this “two-staged integrated manufacturing system” in this thesis for convenience.We first study the optimal solutions of the production rates and maintenance policies under the single-staged fixed payment model, where the manufacturer’s expected profit is directly proportional to the effective uptimes (or, production quantities) of these two processes, while the two contractors’ expected profits are negatively proportional to the expected maintenance costs. We then study the optimal solution for the two-staged integrated model based on the results of the two single-staged models.Finally, in order to achieve channel (or supply chain) coordination, an incentive contract is offered to each contractor. By sharing the cost between the manufacturer and the suppliers, the incentive contract always leads to a win-win coordination, with the benefit of allocating the extra profits from channel coordination between the manufacturer and the contractors. In addition, the contractors have incentives to become more cost effective and be willing to improve maintenance times, costs and the breakdowns during the process.參考文獻 Barlow, R.E. and Proschan, F. (1965) Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Wiley, New York, NY.Lal, R. (1990). Improving channel coordination through franchising. Marketing Science, 9(4), 299-318.Jeuland, A. P., & Shugan, S. M. (1983). Managing channel profits. Marketing Science, 2(3), 239-272.McGuire, T. W., & Staelin, R. (1983). An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration. Marketing Science, 2(2), 161-191.Murthy, D. N. P., & Asgharizadeh, E. (1999). Optimal decision making in a maintenance service operation. European Journal of Operational Research, 116(2), 259-273.Milgate, M. (2001). Supply chain complexity and delivery performance: an international exploratory study. Supply Chain Management, 6(3), 106-118.Plambeck, E. L., & Zenios, S. A. (2000). Performance-based incentives in a dynamic principal-agent model. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2(3), 240-263.Sherif, Y. S., & Smith, M. L. (1981). Optimal maintenance models for systems subject to failure–A review. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 28(1), 47-74.Tarakci, H., Tang, K., Moskowitz, H. & Plante, R. (2003) Incentive maintenance contracts for optimizing channel profit. Working Paper, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.Tarakci, H. (2004). Coordination in maintenance outsourcing (Doctoral dissertation, Purdue University).Tarakci, H., Tang, K., Moskowitz, H., & Plante, R. (2006). Maintenance outsourcing of a multi-process manufacturing system with multiple contractors. IIE Transactions, 38(1), 67-78.Tarakci, H., Tang, K., Moskowitz, H., & Plante, R. (2006). Incentive maintenance outsourcing contracts for channel coordination and improvement. IIE Transactions, 38(8), 671-684.Valdez‐Flores, C., & Feldman, R. M. (1989). A survey of preventive maintenance models for stochastically deteriorating single‐unit systems. Naval Research Logistics, 36(4), 419-446.Wang, H. (2002). A survey of maintenance policies of deteriorating systems. European Journal of Operational Research, 139(3), 469-489.Yan, R. (2011). Managing channel coordination in a multi-channel manufacturer–retailer supply chain. Industrial Marketing Management, 40(4), 636-642. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
統計學系
108354017資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108354017 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 楊素芬<br>唐正 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Yang, Su-Fen<br>Tang, Jen en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 吳孟峻 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Wu, Meng-Chun en_US dc.creator (作者) 吳孟峻 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Wu, Meng-Chun en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-Aug-2021 14:42:33 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-Aug-2021 14:42:33 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Aug-2021 14:42:33 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108354017 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136321 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 統計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108354017 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在一個二階段的製程供應鏈中，我們假設預防維修可以透過整體修復使得設備恢復可靠度；修正維修在沒有改善設備的損耗程度下僅僅使得製程恢復到可運轉的狀態，並且將兩階段獨立的維修業務分別外包給兩間不同的合約商。我們首先分析同時考慮產量以及維修策略的一階段固定報酬給付模型，再利用一階段模型的最佳解延伸至二階段整合模型的研究，其中每個階段皆負責一部分產品的必要組成物件。因此，製造商的預期獲利會與這兩階段生產物件的最小值成正比；而外包維修商的預期利潤則是與維修花費有關，在雙方的利潤分配中，我們會透過誘因合約來協調雇主與客戶並促成合作。這份誘因合約能透過分攤成本損失達成雙贏的結果，且有利於主顧協調後額外的利潤分配。此外，受惠於合約的外包維修商也會因此提高效率，改善製程的維修時間、成本以及設備的故障次數。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Consider a supply chain, where a manufacturer is operating a production line with two processes (stages) in a series configuration. Each of the two stages (or processes) manufactures an intermediate product, which is a required component of the final assembled product. In order to improve the reliability of the processes, preventive maintenance (PM), which overhauls and improves the processes to their original states periodically, and corrective maintenance (CM, i.e., minimal repair), which merely restores the process to operation without improving its reliability, are employed. The processes are assumed to be independent, and their respective maintenance functions are outsourced to two different maintenance contractors. Absent the time for maintenance, we assume that both stages operate continuously, and we call this “two-staged integrated manufacturing system” in this thesis for convenience.We first study the optimal solutions of the production rates and maintenance policies under the single-staged fixed payment model, where the manufacturer’s expected profit is directly proportional to the effective uptimes (or, production quantities) of these two processes, while the two contractors’ expected profits are negatively proportional to the expected maintenance costs. We then study the optimal solution for the two-staged integrated model based on the results of the two single-staged models.Finally, in order to achieve channel (or supply chain) coordination, an incentive contract is offered to each contractor. By sharing the cost between the manufacturer and the suppliers, the incentive contract always leads to a win-win coordination, with the benefit of allocating the extra profits from channel coordination between the manufacturer and the contractors. In addition, the contractors have incentives to become more cost effective and be willing to improve maintenance times, costs and the breakdowns during the process. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents Chapter 1. Introduction 1Chapter 2. Fixed-payment Model in a Single-staged Problem 42.1. Optimal Solutions in a Single-staged Process 82.2. Optimal Solutions for the Manufacturer 82.3. Optimal Solutions for the Contractor 132.4. Optimal Solutions for the Entire System 132.5. Relations of the Solutions in Sections 2.2-2.4 152.6. Examples 16Chapter 3. Two-staged Integrated Fixed-payment Model 193.1. Profit and Cost Improvement Strategies 203.2. Optimal Solutions for the Two-staged Model 223.3. Examples 25Chapter 4. Coordination Mechanisms 364.1. Requirements for Coordination 364.2. The Cost Subsidization (CS) Contract 364.3. Examples 45Chapter 5. Conclusions 47References 48 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1519033 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108354017 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 主顧協調 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 維護策略 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 多階段製程 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 最佳化研究 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 供應鏈合約 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Channel coordination en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Maintenance policy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Multi-staged manufacturing system en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Optimization study en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Supply chain contract en_US dc.title (題名) 多階段製程下綜合產量及維護策略之最佳化研究及主顧協調之分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Channel Coordination with Optimal Joint Determination of Productions and Maintenance Policies for Multi-staged Manufacturing System en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Barlow, R.E. and Proschan, F. (1965) Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Wiley, New York, NY.Lal, R. (1990). Improving channel coordination through franchising. Marketing Science, 9(4), 299-318.Jeuland, A. P., & Shugan, S. M. (1983). Managing channel profits. Marketing Science, 2(3), 239-272.McGuire, T. W., & Staelin, R. (1983). An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration. Marketing Science, 2(2), 161-191.Murthy, D. N. P., & Asgharizadeh, E. (1999). Optimal decision making in a maintenance service operation. European Journal of Operational Research, 116(2), 259-273.Milgate, M. (2001). Supply chain complexity and delivery performance: an international exploratory study. Supply Chain Management, 6(3), 106-118.Plambeck, E. L., & Zenios, S. A. (2000). Performance-based incentives in a dynamic principal-agent model. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2(3), 240-263.Sherif, Y. S., & Smith, M. L. (1981). Optimal maintenance models for systems subject to failure–A review. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 28(1), 47-74.Tarakci, H., Tang, K., Moskowitz, H. & Plante, R. (2003) Incentive maintenance contracts for optimizing channel profit. Working Paper, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.Tarakci, H. (2004). Coordination in maintenance outsourcing (Doctoral dissertation, Purdue University).Tarakci, H., Tang, K., Moskowitz, H., & Plante, R. (2006). Maintenance outsourcing of a multi-process manufacturing system with multiple contractors. IIE Transactions, 38(1), 67-78.Tarakci, H., Tang, K., Moskowitz, H., & Plante, R. (2006). Incentive maintenance outsourcing contracts for channel coordination and improvement. IIE Transactions, 38(8), 671-684.Valdez‐Flores, C., & Feldman, R. M. (1989). A survey of preventive maintenance models for stochastically deteriorating single‐unit systems. Naval Research Logistics, 36(4), 419-446.Wang, H. (2002). A survey of maintenance policies of deteriorating systems. European Journal of Operational Research, 139(3), 469-489.Yan, R. (2011). Managing channel coordination in a multi-channel manufacturer–retailer supply chain. Industrial Marketing Management, 40(4), 636-642. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100903 en_US
