學術產出-Theses
Article View/Open
Publication Export
-
題名 我國監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權之實證分析
The Correction and Impeachment Power of Taiwan`s Control Yuan Members: An Empirical Analysis作者 東方翔
Tung, Fang-Hsiang貢獻者 俞振華
Yu, Chen-Hua
東方翔
Tung, Fang-Hsiang關鍵詞 監察委員
糾正權
彈劾權
黨派模型
專業模型日期 2021 上傳時間 4-Aug-2021 15:56:08 (UTC+8) 摘要 監察院為我國憲法機關之一，然長期以來政治學領域對其重視程度並不高。既有關於監察學的研究，多聚焦在制度層次，監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為研究可謂付之闕如，故本文欲填補相關文獻於此的討論。具體言之，本文的研究問題是：什麼因素會影響監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為？綜合過往學理，由於關於監察委員的行為研究實乃過於少數。故根據監察院在制度上從民意機關轉變為準司法機關的性質，從而，本文自司法政治和立法行為研究，爬梳出影響監察委員的行為因素。在司法政治研究中，文獻強調黨派因素會影響大法官的行為，不同黨派總統提名的大法官會有不同的意見表達行為。立法行為研究的資訊模型理論，則是強調國會議員的行為，不是受到政黨及選區的影響，而是其會展現出其專業性。本文建構出兩個理論模型—黨派模型和專業模型—解釋監察委員的行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為。在黨派模型方面，民進黨的監察委員傾向對國民黨的機關和人員提糾正或彈劾，國民黨的監察委員則傾向對民進黨的機關和人員提糾正或彈劾。在專業模型方面，監察委員會傾向提出與過去職業經歷相同議題領域的糾正或彈劾案。本文透過統計方法驗證理論和假設，依變數若為連續變數，則使用OLS模型；依變數若為計次變數，則使用Poisson模型。整體而言，本文的理論與假設大多獲得驗證。亦即，監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權時會有黨派考量，但也會有專業因素的考量。 參考文獻 Aldrich, John, and David Rohde. 2001. “The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection.” In Congress Reconsidered, 7th ed, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, D. C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc. chaps. pp. 269-292.Bartels, Brandon. 2011. “Choices in Context: How Case-Level Factors Influence the Magnitude of Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Politics Research 39(1): 142-175.Bowler, Shaun. 2002. “Parties in Legislature: Two Competing Explanations.” In Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-179.Cameron, Charles, and Jee-Kwang Park. 2009. “How Will They Vote? Predicting the Future Behavior of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2006.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6(3): 485-511.Carey, John. 2007. “Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 92-107.Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Dahl, Robert. 1957. “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker.” Journal of Public Law 6: 279-95.Dahlvik, Julia, Axel Pohn-Weidinger, and Martina Kollegger. 2021. “Independence despite Political Appointment? The Curious Case of the Austrian Ombudsman Board.” The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 13(2): 181-210.Dodd, Richard. 1977. “congress and the Quest of Power.” in Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer. Congress Consider. New York: Praeger Publishers. Pp 269-307Duval, Dominic, Steve Jocob, Eric Montigny, and Mathieu Ouimet. 2019. “Media coverage of reports published by the Que´bec Ombudsman: an automated content analysis.” International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0): 1-17.Epstein, Lee, and Jeffrey Segal. 2000. “Measuring Issue Salience.” Amerian Journal of Poltical Science 44(1): 66-83.Eulau, Heinz, and Paul D. Karps. 1978. “The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness.” In The Politics of Representation: Continuities in Theory and Research, eds. Heinz Eulau and John C. Wahlke. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.Fenno, Richard. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.Fenno, Richard. 1977. “U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration.” American Political Science Review 71(3): 883-917.Finkel, Jodi. 2012. “Explaining the Failure of Mexico`s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman`s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate.” Hum Rights Rev 13: 473-495.Hall, Richard. 1987. “Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making.” Americαn Political Science Review 81: 105-127.Hitt, Matthew. 2013. “Presidential Success in Supreme Court Appointments: Informational Effects and Institutional Constraints.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 43(4): 792-813.Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Krehbiel, Keith. 2007. “Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game.” American Journal of Political Science 51(2): 231-240.Mayhew, David. 1987. “Congress: The Electoral Connection.” In The American Congress Reader, eds. Steven S. Smith, Jason M. Robert and Ryan J Vander Wielen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Mcillion, Barry. 2018. “Supreme Court Appointment Process: President’s Selection of a Nominee.” Congressional Research ServiceMiller, Warren, and Donald Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” American Political Science Review 56(1): 43-56.Moraski, Bryon, and Charles Shipan. 1999. “The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices.” American Journal of Political Science 43(4): 1069-1095.Rohde, David, and Kenneth Shepsle. 2007. “Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate: Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court.” The Journal of Politics 69(3): 664-677.Rohde, David. 1972. “Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in the Supreme Court.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 16: 208-224.Segal, Jeffrey, and Albert Cover. 1989. “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.” American Political Science Review 83(2): 557-565.Segal, Jeffrey, Lee Epstein, Charles Cameron, and Harold Spaeth. 1995. “Ideological Values the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited.” The Journal of Politics 57(3): 812-823.Segal, Jeffrey, Richard Timpone, and Robert Howard. 2000. “Buyer Beware? Presidential Success through Supreme Court Appointments.” Political Research Quarterly 53 (September): 557-595.Sheng, Shing Yuan, and Liao Hsiao Chuan. 2017. “Issues, Political Cleavages, and Party Competition in Taiwan.” In The Taiwan Voter, eds Christopher H. Achen and T. Y. Wang. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Smith, Steven. 2007. Party Influence in Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Snyder, Susan, and Barry Weingast. 2000. “The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB.” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 16(2): 269-305.Swedish Riksdagens Ombudsman. 2021. “About JO.” https://www.jo.se/en/ (accessed July 6, 2021).The Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman. 2021. “About the Ombudsman.” https://en.ombudsmanden.dk/ (accessed July 6, 2021).Unah, Issac, and Ange-Marie Hancock. 2006. “U.S. Supreme Court decision making, case salience, and the attitudinal model.” Law & Policy 28: 295-320.《立法院公報》，2014，〈委員會紀錄〉，103(49): 153-265。《立法院公報》，2018，〈委員會紀錄〉，107(18): 79-214。行政院研考會，1998，《日本行政監察制度之研究：給我國的借鏡》，臺北市：行政院研考會。李文郎，2006，〈第三屆與第四屆監察委員被提名人之比較—兼論監察委員之提名原則〉，載於《我國考試權與監察權之發展與變革》，高永光主編，台北市：時英。李伸一，2005，《監察權之理論與實務》（二版），臺北市：監察院。沈有忠，2017，〈政府類型〉，載於《政治學與臺灣政治》，王業立主編，台北：雙葉書廊。周陽山，2006，《監察與民主》，台北市：監察院。林紀東，1993，《中華民國憲法逐條釋義》（修訂七版），臺北市：三民。法治斌、董保城，2014，《憲法新論》（六版），臺北市：董保城。孫文，2016，《三民主義》，臺北市：三民。翁曉玲，2018，〈孫中山先生之監察權思想與在台灣的實踐－兼論監察糾正權對行政權的審查及界限〉，《宗教哲學》，84: 35-52。盛杏湲，1999，〈立法問政與選區服務：第三屆立法委員代表行為的探討〉，《選舉研究》，6(2): 89-120。盛杏湲，2000，〈政黨或選區？立法委員的代表取向與行為〉，《選舉研究》，7(2): 37-73。盛杏湲，2008，〈政黨的國會領導與凝聚力：2000年政黨輪替前後的觀察〉，《台灣民主季刊》，5(4): 1-46.許德民，2009，《監察院糾正權之定位與可否及於地方政府之研究》，臺灣大學國家發展研究所碩士學位論文。陳春生，2003，〈從權力分立原則論我國監察權之行使與定位—以糾正權之行使為中心〉，載於《憲政危機與憲政轉機》，周育仁主編，國家政策研究基金會。陳運星，2001，〈論監察院的糾正權：法理學的觀點〉，《朝陽學報》，6: 275-294。陶百川，1978，《比較監察制度》，台北市：三民。陶百川、陳少廷，1982，《中外監察制度之比較》，臺北縣：中華文化復興運動推行委員會。傅啟學、賀凌虛、陳文仁、徐文珍、張劍寒、胡佛，1967，《中華民國監察院之研究》，國立臺灣大學法學院政治學系。彭錦珍，2005，〈從北歐監察使制度發展論我國監察權之獨立行使－以瑞典、芬蘭、丹麥三國為例之探討〉，《華岡社科學報》，19: 61-92。黃茗芬、廖茂發、莊智雅，2005，《腳步：黃煌雄監委工作紀實1999～2005》，台北市：遠流。楊智傑，2012，〈歐洲監察使的職權行使方式與具體貢獻〉，《東海大學法學研究》，37: 39-96。監察院國際事務小組，2012，《世界監察制度手冊》（二版），台北：監察院。劉惠仁，1990，《五權憲法中的監察院》，臺北市：正中。鄭琹尹，2017，〈從政黨輪替探討大法官意見表達行為之變化〉，政治大學政治學系碩士學位論文。蕭欽，2010，《監察權新論》，臺北市：文史哲。 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
政治學系
107252008資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107252008 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 俞振華 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Yu, Chen-Hua en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 東方翔 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Tung, Fang-Hsiang en_US dc.creator (作者) 東方翔 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Tung, Fang-Hsiang en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-Aug-2021 15:56:08 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-Aug-2021 15:56:08 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Aug-2021 15:56:08 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107252008 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136546 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 政治學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 107252008 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 監察院為我國憲法機關之一，然長期以來政治學領域對其重視程度並不高。既有關於監察學的研究，多聚焦在制度層次，監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為研究可謂付之闕如，故本文欲填補相關文獻於此的討論。具體言之，本文的研究問題是：什麼因素會影響監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為？綜合過往學理，由於關於監察委員的行為研究實乃過於少數。故根據監察院在制度上從民意機關轉變為準司法機關的性質，從而，本文自司法政治和立法行為研究，爬梳出影響監察委員的行為因素。在司法政治研究中，文獻強調黨派因素會影響大法官的行為，不同黨派總統提名的大法官會有不同的意見表達行為。立法行為研究的資訊模型理論，則是強調國會議員的行為，不是受到政黨及選區的影響，而是其會展現出其專業性。本文建構出兩個理論模型—黨派模型和專業模型—解釋監察委員的行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為。在黨派模型方面，民進黨的監察委員傾向對國民黨的機關和人員提糾正或彈劾，國民黨的監察委員則傾向對民進黨的機關和人員提糾正或彈劾。在專業模型方面，監察委員會傾向提出與過去職業經歷相同議題領域的糾正或彈劾案。本文透過統計方法驗證理論和假設，依變數若為連續變數，則使用OLS模型；依變數若為計次變數，則使用Poisson模型。整體而言，本文的理論與假設大多獲得驗證。亦即，監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權時會有黨派考量，但也會有專業因素的考量。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 前言 1第一節 研究動機及目的 1第二節 章節安排 4第貳章 文獻回顧 5第一節 監察權的制度研究 5第二節 糾正和彈劾的行為研究 17第三節 司法政治研究 20第四節 立法行為研究 23第參章 理論與假設 27第一節 黨派模型 27第二節 專業模型 31第肆章 研究設計 36第一節 資料來源 36第二節 變數與測量 39第三節 資料分析方法 49第伍章 實證分析 52第一節 黨派模型 52第二節 專業模型 72第三節 小結 92第陸章 結論 95第一節 影響監委糾正和彈劾的因素 95第二節 研究限制與對未來研究之建議 97參考文獻 98附錄 104 zh_TW dc.format.extent 3059684 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107252008 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 監察委員 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 糾正權 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 彈劾權 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 黨派模型 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 專業模型 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 我國監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權之實證分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Correction and Impeachment Power of Taiwan`s Control Yuan Members: An Empirical Analysis en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aldrich, John, and David Rohde. 2001. “The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection.” In Congress Reconsidered, 7th ed, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, D. C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc. chaps. pp. 269-292.Bartels, Brandon. 2011. “Choices in Context: How Case-Level Factors Influence the Magnitude of Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Politics Research 39(1): 142-175.Bowler, Shaun. 2002. “Parties in Legislature: Two Competing Explanations.” In Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-179.Cameron, Charles, and Jee-Kwang Park. 2009. “How Will They Vote? Predicting the Future Behavior of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2006.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6(3): 485-511.Carey, John. 2007. “Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 92-107.Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Dahl, Robert. 1957. “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker.” Journal of Public Law 6: 279-95.Dahlvik, Julia, Axel Pohn-Weidinger, and Martina Kollegger. 2021. “Independence despite Political Appointment? The Curious Case of the Austrian Ombudsman Board.” The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 13(2): 181-210.Dodd, Richard. 1977. “congress and the Quest of Power.” in Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer. Congress Consider. New York: Praeger Publishers. Pp 269-307Duval, Dominic, Steve Jocob, Eric Montigny, and Mathieu Ouimet. 2019. “Media coverage of reports published by the Que´bec Ombudsman: an automated content analysis.” International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0): 1-17.Epstein, Lee, and Jeffrey Segal. 2000. “Measuring Issue Salience.” Amerian Journal of Poltical Science 44(1): 66-83.Eulau, Heinz, and Paul D. Karps. 1978. “The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness.” In The Politics of Representation: Continuities in Theory and Research, eds. Heinz Eulau and John C. Wahlke. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.Fenno, Richard. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.Fenno, Richard. 1977. “U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration.” American Political Science Review 71(3): 883-917.Finkel, Jodi. 2012. “Explaining the Failure of Mexico`s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman`s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate.” Hum Rights Rev 13: 473-495.Hall, Richard. 1987. “Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making.” Americαn Political Science Review 81: 105-127.Hitt, Matthew. 2013. “Presidential Success in Supreme Court Appointments: Informational Effects and Institutional Constraints.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 43(4): 792-813.Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Krehbiel, Keith. 2007. “Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game.” American Journal of Political Science 51(2): 231-240.Mayhew, David. 1987. “Congress: The Electoral Connection.” In The American Congress Reader, eds. Steven S. Smith, Jason M. Robert and Ryan J Vander Wielen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Mcillion, Barry. 2018. “Supreme Court Appointment Process: President’s Selection of a Nominee.” Congressional Research ServiceMiller, Warren, and Donald Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” American Political Science Review 56(1): 43-56.Moraski, Bryon, and Charles Shipan. 1999. “The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices.” American Journal of Political Science 43(4): 1069-1095.Rohde, David, and Kenneth Shepsle. 2007. “Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate: Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court.” The Journal of Politics 69(3): 664-677.Rohde, David. 1972. “Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in the Supreme Court.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 16: 208-224.Segal, Jeffrey, and Albert Cover. 1989. “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.” American Political Science Review 83(2): 557-565.Segal, Jeffrey, Lee Epstein, Charles Cameron, and Harold Spaeth. 1995. “Ideological Values the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited.” The Journal of Politics 57(3): 812-823.Segal, Jeffrey, Richard Timpone, and Robert Howard. 2000. “Buyer Beware? Presidential Success through Supreme Court Appointments.” Political Research Quarterly 53 (September): 557-595.Sheng, Shing Yuan, and Liao Hsiao Chuan. 2017. “Issues, Political Cleavages, and Party Competition in Taiwan.” In The Taiwan Voter, eds Christopher H. Achen and T. Y. Wang. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Smith, Steven. 2007. Party Influence in Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Snyder, Susan, and Barry Weingast. 2000. “The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB.” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 16(2): 269-305.Swedish Riksdagens Ombudsman. 2021. “About JO.” https://www.jo.se/en/ (accessed July 6, 2021).The Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman. 2021. “About the Ombudsman.” https://en.ombudsmanden.dk/ (accessed July 6, 2021).Unah, Issac, and Ange-Marie Hancock. 2006. “U.S. Supreme Court decision making, case salience, and the attitudinal model.” Law & Policy 28: 295-320.《立法院公報》，2014，〈委員會紀錄〉，103(49): 153-265。《立法院公報》，2018，〈委員會紀錄〉，107(18): 79-214。行政院研考會，1998，《日本行政監察制度之研究：給我國的借鏡》，臺北市：行政院研考會。李文郎，2006，〈第三屆與第四屆監察委員被提名人之比較—兼論監察委員之提名原則〉，載於《我國考試權與監察權之發展與變革》，高永光主編，台北市：時英。李伸一，2005，《監察權之理論與實務》（二版），臺北市：監察院。沈有忠，2017，〈政府類型〉，載於《政治學與臺灣政治》，王業立主編，台北：雙葉書廊。周陽山，2006，《監察與民主》，台北市：監察院。林紀東，1993，《中華民國憲法逐條釋義》（修訂七版），臺北市：三民。法治斌、董保城，2014，《憲法新論》（六版），臺北市：董保城。孫文，2016，《三民主義》，臺北市：三民。翁曉玲，2018，〈孫中山先生之監察權思想與在台灣的實踐－兼論監察糾正權對行政權的審查及界限〉，《宗教哲學》，84: 35-52。盛杏湲，1999，〈立法問政與選區服務：第三屆立法委員代表行為的探討〉，《選舉研究》，6(2): 89-120。盛杏湲，2000，〈政黨或選區？立法委員的代表取向與行為〉，《選舉研究》，7(2): 37-73。盛杏湲，2008，〈政黨的國會領導與凝聚力：2000年政黨輪替前後的觀察〉，《台灣民主季刊》，5(4): 1-46.許德民，2009，《監察院糾正權之定位與可否及於地方政府之研究》，臺灣大學國家發展研究所碩士學位論文。陳春生，2003，〈從權力分立原則論我國監察權之行使與定位—以糾正權之行使為中心〉，載於《憲政危機與憲政轉機》，周育仁主編，國家政策研究基金會。陳運星，2001，〈論監察院的糾正權：法理學的觀點〉，《朝陽學報》，6: 275-294。陶百川，1978，《比較監察制度》，台北市：三民。陶百川、陳少廷，1982，《中外監察制度之比較》，臺北縣：中華文化復興運動推行委員會。傅啟學、賀凌虛、陳文仁、徐文珍、張劍寒、胡佛，1967，《中華民國監察院之研究》，國立臺灣大學法學院政治學系。彭錦珍，2005，〈從北歐監察使制度發展論我國監察權之獨立行使－以瑞典、芬蘭、丹麥三國為例之探討〉，《華岡社科學報》，19: 61-92。黃茗芬、廖茂發、莊智雅，2005，《腳步：黃煌雄監委工作紀實1999～2005》，台北市：遠流。楊智傑，2012，〈歐洲監察使的職權行使方式與具體貢獻〉，《東海大學法學研究》，37: 39-96。監察院國際事務小組，2012，《世界監察制度手冊》（二版），台北：監察院。劉惠仁，1990，《五權憲法中的監察院》，臺北市：正中。鄭琹尹，2017，〈從政黨輪替探討大法官意見表達行為之變化〉，政治大學政治學系碩士學位論文。蕭欽，2010，《監察權新論》，臺北市：文史哲。 zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100875 en_US
