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題名 移轉訂價下跨國企業的租稅逃漏行為
A study on Tax Evasion and Transfer Pricing of the Multinational Enterprises作者 林彥汝
Lin, Yan-Ru貢獻者 翁堃嵐
林彥汝
Lin, Yan-Ru關鍵詞 移轉訂價
租稅逃漏
Transfer Pricing
Tax Evasion日期 2021 上傳時間 4-Aug-2021 16:02:01 (UTC+8) 摘要 傳統探討移轉訂價的文獻忽略了廠商可以進行租稅逃漏的事實。有鑒於此，本文設立擁有一個外國子公司的跨國企業母公司，母公司在追求預期稅後利潤極大之目標下，不僅會進行移轉訂價，同時也會從事租稅逃漏的活動。在此設定之下，本文重新探討並比較公式計價與分離會計兩種移轉訂價的課稅制度。依據本文的研究顯示：在引入跨國企業母公司可從事租稅逃漏行為之情況下，公式計價制度雖具有避免企業利用移轉訂價轉移跨國間利潤之優點，卻會誘發企業進行租稅逃漏行為。且當兩國稅率具有差異時，FA制度下存在誘發MNE逃漏高於SA制度下更多租稅之可能性。因此從稅基流失的觀點來看，公式計價制度不必然會優於分離會計制度。換言之，此一結果可對傳統移轉訂價文獻認為公式計價課稅基礎相對分離會計課稅基礎能完全抑制跨國企業從事移轉訂價活動避免稅基流失的觀點提出不同的看法。
The traditional literature discussing transfer pricing ignores the fact that multinational enterprises (MNEs) can evade taxation. In view of this, this paper establishes a multinational parent company with a foreign subsidiary. The parent company will not only transfer prices but also engage in tax evasion activities in pursuit of maximizing the goal after-tax profits. Under this setting, this paper reexamines and compares two transfer pricing systems of formula apportionment (FA) and separate accounting (SA). According to the research in this paper, when the introduction of multinational parent companies can engage in tax evasion activities, although formula apportionment still has the advantage of preventing companies from using transfer pricing to transfer profits between countries, it will induce MNEs to evade taxation. And when there are differences in tax rates between the two countries, there is a possibility that FA will induce more tax evasion from MNE than under SA. Therefore, from the perspective of tax base loss, formula apportionment is not necessarily better than the separate accounting. In other words, this result can put forward different views on whether FA is a superior method of taxing multinationals.參考文獻 Allingham, M. G., and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.Chen, K. P. and C. Y. C. Chu (2005), “Internal Control versus External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion,” Rand Journal of Economics, 36, 151-164.Crocker, K. J. and J. Slemrod (2005), “Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs,” Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1593-1610.Desai, M. A. and D. Dharmapala (2009), “Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91, 537-546Gordon, R. and JD Wilson (1986), “An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation Under Formula Apportionment," Econometrica,54(6), 1357–1373.Horst, T. (1971) “The Theory of the Multinational Firm: Optimal Behavior under Different Tariff and Tax Rates,” Journal of Political Economy, 79(5),1059–1072Horst, T. (1993), “The Comparable Profits Method,” Tax Notes International, 14, 1443-1458.Kreutzer, D. and D.R. Lee (1986), “On Taxation and Understated Monopoly Profits,” National Tax Journal, 39, 241-243.Kreutzer, D. and D.R. Lee (1988), “Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: A Reply,” National Tax Journal, 41, 583-584.Lee, K. (1998), “Tax Evasion, Monopoly, and Nonneutral Profit Taxes,” National Tax Journal, 51, 333-338.Liu, L., Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T., and D. Guo (2019), “International transfer pricing and tax avoidance: Evidence from linked trade-tax statistics in the UK,” Review of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming).Musgrace, P. (1973) International tax base division and the multinational corporation, Public Finance 27, 394–411.Nielsen, SB, Raimondos-Moller, P., and Schjelderup (2001), Tax spillovers under separate accounting and formula apportionment, EPRU Working Paper no. 01-07, University of CopenhagenNielsen, SB, Raimondos-Moller, P., and Schjelderup. (2003), “Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5, 419–437Rossing, C. P., Cools, M., and C. Rohde (2017), “International transfer pricing in multinational enterprises,” Journal of Accounting Education, 39, 55-67.Samuelson, L. (1982), “The Multinational Firm with Arm`s Length Transfer Pricing Limits," Journal of International Economics, 13, 365–374.Schjelderup, G. and Sorgard, L. (1997), "Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, 4,277–290.Wang, L.F.S. and J.L. Conant (1988), “Corporate Tax and Output Decisions of Uncertain Monopolist,” National Tax Journal, 41, 579-581.Yaniv, G.. (1995), “A note on the Tax-Evading Firm,” National Tax Journal, 48, 113-120.Yaniv, G.. (1996), “Tax Evasion and Output Decisions,” Public Finance Quarterly, 24,501-505.Yitzhaki, S. (1974), “A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 3, 201-2.Yitzhaki, S. (1987), “On the excess burden of tax evasion,” Public Finance Quarterly, 15,123-37. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
107255018資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255018 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 翁堃嵐 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林彥汝 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Yan-Ru en_US dc.creator (作者) 林彥汝 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lin, Yan-Ru en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-Aug-2021 16:02:01 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-Aug-2021 16:02:01 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Aug-2021 16:02:01 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107255018 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136574 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 107255018 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 傳統探討移轉訂價的文獻忽略了廠商可以進行租稅逃漏的事實。有鑒於此，本文設立擁有一個外國子公司的跨國企業母公司，母公司在追求預期稅後利潤極大之目標下，不僅會進行移轉訂價，同時也會從事租稅逃漏的活動。在此設定之下，本文重新探討並比較公式計價與分離會計兩種移轉訂價的課稅制度。依據本文的研究顯示：在引入跨國企業母公司可從事租稅逃漏行為之情況下，公式計價制度雖具有避免企業利用移轉訂價轉移跨國間利潤之優點，卻會誘發企業進行租稅逃漏行為。且當兩國稅率具有差異時，FA制度下存在誘發MNE逃漏高於SA制度下更多租稅之可能性。因此從稅基流失的觀點來看，公式計價制度不必然會優於分離會計制度。換言之，此一結果可對傳統移轉訂價文獻認為公式計價課稅基礎相對分離會計課稅基礎能完全抑制跨國企業從事移轉訂價活動避免稅基流失的觀點提出不同的看法。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The traditional literature discussing transfer pricing ignores the fact that multinational enterprises (MNEs) can evade taxation. In view of this, this paper establishes a multinational parent company with a foreign subsidiary. The parent company will not only transfer prices but also engage in tax evasion activities in pursuit of maximizing the goal after-tax profits. Under this setting, this paper reexamines and compares two transfer pricing systems of formula apportionment (FA) and separate accounting (SA). According to the research in this paper, when the introduction of multinational parent companies can engage in tax evasion activities, although formula apportionment still has the advantage of preventing companies from using transfer pricing to transfer profits between countries, it will induce MNEs to evade taxation. And when there are differences in tax rates between the two countries, there is a possibility that FA will induce more tax evasion from MNE than under SA. Therefore, from the perspective of tax base loss, formula apportionment is not necessarily better than the separate accounting. In other words, this result can put forward different views on whether FA is a superior method of taxing multinationals. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究架構 3第二章 文獻回顧 4第一節 租稅逃漏文獻 4第二節 移轉訂價 6第三章 傳統租稅逃漏模型 (不考慮移轉訂價活動) 9第四章 基本模型 10第一節 集權管理 12一、 Formula Apportionment (FA) 12二、 Separate Accounting (SA) 15第二節 分權管理 18一、 Formula Apportionment (FA) 19二、 Separate Accounting (SA) 21第五章 結論 24參考文獻 26 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1223490 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255018 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 移轉訂價 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅逃漏 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Transfer Pricing en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax Evasion en_US dc.title (題名) 移轉訂價下跨國企業的租稅逃漏行為 zh_TW dc.title (題名) A study on Tax Evasion and Transfer Pricing of the Multinational Enterprises en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Allingham, M. G., and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.Chen, K. P. and C. Y. C. Chu (2005), “Internal Control versus External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion,” Rand Journal of Economics, 36, 151-164.Crocker, K. J. and J. Slemrod (2005), “Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs,” Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1593-1610.Desai, M. A. and D. Dharmapala (2009), “Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91, 537-546Gordon, R. and JD Wilson (1986), “An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation Under Formula Apportionment," Econometrica,54(6), 1357–1373.Horst, T. (1971) “The Theory of the Multinational Firm: Optimal Behavior under Different Tariff and Tax Rates,” Journal of Political Economy, 79(5),1059–1072Horst, T. (1993), “The Comparable Profits Method,” Tax Notes International, 14, 1443-1458.Kreutzer, D. and D.R. Lee (1986), “On Taxation and Understated Monopoly Profits,” National Tax Journal, 39, 241-243.Kreutzer, D. and D.R. Lee (1988), “Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: A Reply,” National Tax Journal, 41, 583-584.Lee, K. (1998), “Tax Evasion, Monopoly, and Nonneutral Profit Taxes,” National Tax Journal, 51, 333-338.Liu, L., Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T., and D. Guo (2019), “International transfer pricing and tax avoidance: Evidence from linked trade-tax statistics in the UK,” Review of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming).Musgrace, P. (1973) International tax base division and the multinational corporation, Public Finance 27, 394–411.Nielsen, SB, Raimondos-Moller, P., and Schjelderup (2001), Tax spillovers under separate accounting and formula apportionment, EPRU Working Paper no. 01-07, University of CopenhagenNielsen, SB, Raimondos-Moller, P., and Schjelderup. (2003), “Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5, 419–437Rossing, C. P., Cools, M., and C. Rohde (2017), “International transfer pricing in multinational enterprises,” Journal of Accounting Education, 39, 55-67.Samuelson, L. (1982), “The Multinational Firm with Arm`s Length Transfer Pricing Limits," Journal of International Economics, 13, 365–374.Schjelderup, G. and Sorgard, L. (1997), "Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, 4,277–290.Wang, L.F.S. and J.L. Conant (1988), “Corporate Tax and Output Decisions of Uncertain Monopolist,” National Tax Journal, 41, 579-581.Yaniv, G.. (1995), “A note on the Tax-Evading Firm,” National Tax Journal, 48, 113-120.Yaniv, G.. (1996), “Tax Evasion and Output Decisions,” Public Finance Quarterly, 24,501-505.Yitzhaki, S. (1974), “A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 3, 201-2.Yitzhaki, S. (1987), “On the excess burden of tax evasion,” Public Finance Quarterly, 15,123-37. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202100698 en_US
