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題名 管理層更換條款存在於聯合貸款合約的探討
Determinants of Change of Management Restrictions Clauses in Syndicate Loan Contracts作者 陳吳子昭
Chen Wu, Zih-Jhao貢獻者 張元晨
Chang, Yuan-Chen
陳吳子昭
Chen Wu, Zih-Jhao關鍵詞 聯合貸款
管理層更換限制
syndicate loan
change of management restrictions日期 2021 上傳時間 2-Sep-2021 15:46:48 (UTC+8) 摘要 管理層更換限制(CMRs)是存在於聯合貸款合約中的一種限制條款，其內容主要是規範公司在借款期間內對管理層更換上的限制。本文使用美國上市公司與銀行之間的聯合貸款合約作為研究對象，在 1995年至2020年期間蒐集了16,396份聯合貸款合約，並探討影響管理層更換限制條款存在合約裡的因素。本研究發現，在公司規模越小、到期日越短、貸方數量越少的聯貸合約中，CMRs越有可能被引入，而當公司CEO為創辦人、CEO面臨退休或是公司沒有其他CEO繼承人時對於CMRs的存在皆有正向顯著的影響，顯示銀行使用 CMRs的動機可能來自於對人力風險的擔憂。透過樣本資料的觀察，在受到 CMRs約束的期間，公司發生CEO變動的頻率減少，然而，即使銀行透過 CMRs來避免失去重要的人才，本文並沒有找到 CMRs的存在對於公司未來表現有顯著影響的證據。
Change of management restrictions(CMRs) is a covenant in syndicated loan contracts which restricts change in management during the term of loan. The study used 16,396 syndicated loan contracts between US listed companies and banks from 1995 to 2020 to investigate what are determinants of CMRs inclusion.The results show that CMRs tend to be included with small firm, and loan with shorter maturity or fewer lenders also increases the use of CMRs. When CEO is founder, close to retirement or there is no other CEO successor have significantly positive impact on including CMRs, showing that banks may use CMRs by reason of human risks. The study also found that CEO turnover decreases when the company with CMRs. However, even banks use CMRs to retain talents, there is no evidence that CMRs has significant impact on the future firm performance.參考文獻 Akins, B., DeAngelis, D., and Gaulin, M., 2020, Debt Contracting on Management, Journal of Finance 75, 2095–2137.Becker, G., 1964, Human Capital Theory (Columbia University Press, New York, NY).Chava, S., and Roberts, M. R., 2008, How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants, Journal of Finance 63, 2085–2121.Denis, D. J., and Wang, J., 2014, Debt Covenant Renegotiations and Creditor Control Rights, Journal of Financial Economics 113, 348–367.Fahlenbrach R., 2009, Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market Performance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 439-466.Grinstein, Y., 2006, The Disciplinary Role of Debt and Equity Contracts: Theory and Tests, Journal of Financial Intermediation 15, 419–443.Ivashina, V., 2009, Asymmetric Information Effects on Loan Spreads, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 300-319.Jenter, D., Kanaan, F., 2015, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation Journal of Finance 70, 2155–2184.Murphy, K. J., 1999, Executive Compensation, Handbook of Labor Economics 3, 2485-2563.Nini, G., Smith, D. C., and Sufi, A., 2009, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 400–420.Nini, G., Smith, D. C., and Sufi, A., 2012, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, Review of Financial Studies 25, 1713–1761.Roberts, M. R. and Sufi, A., 2009, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Finance 64, 1657-1695. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
108357032資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108357032 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 張元晨 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Chang, Yuan-Chen en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳吳子昭 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen Wu, Zih-Jhao en_US dc.creator (作者) 陳吳子昭 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chen Wu, Zih-Jhao en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2-Sep-2021 15:46:48 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-Sep-2021 15:46:48 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Sep-2021 15:46:48 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108357032 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136836 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財務管理學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108357032 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 管理層更換限制(CMRs)是存在於聯合貸款合約中的一種限制條款，其內容主要是規範公司在借款期間內對管理層更換上的限制。本文使用美國上市公司與銀行之間的聯合貸款合約作為研究對象，在 1995年至2020年期間蒐集了16,396份聯合貸款合約，並探討影響管理層更換限制條款存在合約裡的因素。本研究發現，在公司規模越小、到期日越短、貸方數量越少的聯貸合約中，CMRs越有可能被引入，而當公司CEO為創辦人、CEO面臨退休或是公司沒有其他CEO繼承人時對於CMRs的存在皆有正向顯著的影響，顯示銀行使用 CMRs的動機可能來自於對人力風險的擔憂。透過樣本資料的觀察，在受到 CMRs約束的期間，公司發生CEO變動的頻率減少，然而，即使銀行透過 CMRs來避免失去重要的人才，本文並沒有找到 CMRs的存在對於公司未來表現有顯著影響的證據。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Change of management restrictions(CMRs) is a covenant in syndicated loan contracts which restricts change in management during the term of loan. The study used 16,396 syndicated loan contracts between US listed companies and banks from 1995 to 2020 to investigate what are determinants of CMRs inclusion.The results show that CMRs tend to be included with small firm, and loan with shorter maturity or fewer lenders also increases the use of CMRs. When CEO is founder, close to retirement or there is no other CEO successor have significantly positive impact on including CMRs, showing that banks may use CMRs by reason of human risks. The study also found that CEO turnover decreases when the company with CMRs. However, even banks use CMRs to retain talents, there is no evidence that CMRs has significant impact on the future firm performance. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 7第一節 研究背景與動機 7第二節 研究架構 8第二章 文獻回顧與假設建立 9第一節 文獻回顧 9第二節 假設建立 11第三章 研究方法 12第一節 樣本及資料來源 12第二節 模型設計 19第四章 實證結果 23第一節 敘述統計與母體平均差異t檢定 23第二節 影響管理層更換限制條款存在因素探討 27第三節 管理層更換限制條款對於公司影響探討 36第五章 研究結論與後續研究建議 40第一節 研究結論 40第二節 後續研究建議 41參考文獻 42附錄 43 zh_TW dc.format.extent 2588240 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108357032 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯合貸款 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 管理層更換限制 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) syndicate loan en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) change of management restrictions en_US dc.title (題名) 管理層更換條款存在於聯合貸款合約的探討 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Determinants of Change of Management Restrictions Clauses in Syndicate Loan Contracts en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Akins, B., DeAngelis, D., and Gaulin, M., 2020, Debt Contracting on Management, Journal of Finance 75, 2095–2137.Becker, G., 1964, Human Capital Theory (Columbia University Press, New York, NY).Chava, S., and Roberts, M. R., 2008, How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants, Journal of Finance 63, 2085–2121.Denis, D. J., and Wang, J., 2014, Debt Covenant Renegotiations and Creditor Control Rights, Journal of Financial Economics 113, 348–367.Fahlenbrach R., 2009, Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market Performance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 439-466.Grinstein, Y., 2006, The Disciplinary Role of Debt and Equity Contracts: Theory and Tests, Journal of Financial Intermediation 15, 419–443.Ivashina, V., 2009, Asymmetric Information Effects on Loan Spreads, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 300-319.Jenter, D., Kanaan, F., 2015, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation Journal of Finance 70, 2155–2184.Murphy, K. J., 1999, Executive Compensation, Handbook of Labor Economics 3, 2485-2563.Nini, G., Smith, D. C., and Sufi, A., 2009, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 400–420.Nini, G., Smith, D. C., and Sufi, A., 2012, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, Review of Financial Studies 25, 1713–1761.Roberts, M. R. and Sufi, A., 2009, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Finance 64, 1657-1695. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202101485 en_US
