1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. College of Social Science
  4. Theses
  5. Item

學術產出-Theses

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

題名 承租人條件限制對於房屋出租成交時間之影響
The effect of requirements for potential tenants on time to rent
作者 白承叡
Pai, Cheng-Jui
貢獻者 林子欽<br>江穎慧
Lin, Tzu-Chin<br>Chaing, Ying-Hui
白承叡
Pai, Cheng-Jui
關鍵詞 租屋廣告
承租人條件限制
委託房仲
出租成交時間
參數存活模型
Rental Advertisment
Requirements of potential tenants
Real estate brokerage industry
Transaction time
Parametric survival model
日期 2021
上傳時間 2-Sep-2021 17:28:11 (UTC+8)
摘要 網路使交易資訊流通更加快速，然而房東仍無法完全掌握承租人的素質，承租人亦無法完全掌握房屋資訊，雙方存有人與物資訊不對稱問題。本文利用591租屋網臺北市已出租成交資料，並選擇存活分析中模型配適度最佳之韋伯加速失敗模型混合逆高斯脆弱性模型，分別建立兩個模型，針對「雅房、獨立套房及分租套房」與「整層住家」進行實證分析，用以衡量資訊不對稱的情況下，房東篩選承租人及委託房仲，是否能降低雙方搜尋成本並縮短房屋成交所需時間，亦即達到提升交易效率的效果。
實證結果顯示，委託房仲能夠縮短雅房、獨立套房及分租套房出租成交所需時間1.88天（45.1小時），縮短整層住家0.52天（13小時）；租屋廣告中限制承租人性別條件將延長房屋出租成交所需時間0.65天（15.6小時）；租屋廣告中限制承租人身分條件將縮短雅房、獨立套房及分租套房出租成交所需時間0.6天（14.4小時），縮短整層住家0.86天（20.6小時）。
Despite the increasing speed of flowing transaction information on the Internet, landlords still cannot fully grasp the qualities of their tenants, whereas the tenants cannot fully acquire the housing information as well. For both sides, a problem of information asymmetry lies between tenant quality and housing information. This study utilizes the data of Taipei city obtained from 591 website, applies Weibull accelerated failure time model, which is the most suitable model regarding survival analysis, combined with Inverse-Gaussian frailty model, and establishes two models respectively. Empirical analysis of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio”, and “apartment” is performed, so as to observe whether the act of both tenant selection and real estate agent commission can solve the information asymmetry and improve transaction efficiency in the rental housing market. Also, to observe whether or not these acts could reduce the searching cost and shorten the transaction time.
The empirical results show that real estate brokers can shorten the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 1.88 days (45.1 hours), whereas “apartment” by 0.52 days (13 hours). Restriction on the gender of the tenant showed in the rental advertisement will extend the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 0.65 days (15.6 hours). Restriction on the identity of the tenant showed in the rental advertisement will shorten the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 0.6 days (14.4 hours), whereas “apartment” by 0.86 days (20.6 hours).
參考文獻 中文部分
1. 李馨蘋、劉代洋，1999，租賃住宅市場租金之影響因素，中華管理評論，2(1)。
2. 李春長，2002，《不動產仲介市場分析》臺北：文笙書局。
3. 李春長，2008，資訊揭露、信任、搜尋成本對委託房屋仲介業售屋意願之實證研究－以高雄市為例。住宅學報，17(1)，71-104。
4. 周美伶、張金鶚，2005，購屋搜尋期間影響因素之研究，管理評論，24，133-150。
5. 周美伶，2005，先前租買經驗對自住者購屋搜尋行為之影響–存活分析之應用，住宅學報，14(1)，21-39。
6. 周美伶，2005，購屋者外部資訊搜尋管道選擇行為與搜尋期間之探討，住宅學報，14(2)，1-25。
7. 花敬群，2000，發展出租住宅市場機制之研究，內政部建築研究所委託之專題研究專案成果。
8. 林祖嘉、陳建良，2005，租買選擇、貸款選擇、與世代組成：巢式LOGIT模型之應用，住宅學報，14(1)，1-20。
9. 林舒芃，2019，租屋市場房東篩選房客行為之探索性研究，國立臺北教育大學社會與區域發展學系學位論文。
10. 陳彥仲，1997，台灣地區期望住宅需求彈性之分析，都市與計劃，24(2)：223-238。
11. 許佑全、陳彥仲，2003，台南市租賃住宅市場之探討，「中華民國住宅學會第十二屆年會論文集」，新竹，528-554。
12. 張紹勳，2017，生物醫學統計：使用Stata分析（1版），臺北：五南。
13. 華昌宜、賴碧瑩，2001，我國租賃住宅市場之發展與推動，住宅學報，10(1)：67-76。
14. 彭建文，2004，台灣出租住宅市場與自有住宅市場價格調整關係之研究，都市與計劃，31(4)：391-412。
15. 楊文芳，2019，需求與知行的落差？初探招募資訊揭露對應徵者及新進員工組織工作認知之影響。管理學報，36(4)，391-419。
16. 楊澤泉、陳勇順，仲介服務、銀行服務與房地產市場，中華管理評論，4(2)，97-107。
17. 蘇偉強、劉庭如、黃斐、陳奉瑤，2013，特徵價格法應用的差異分析，土地問題研究季刊，12(3)，55-68。

外文部分
1. Akerlof, G. (1970) The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500.
2. Arrow, K. (1973) The theory of discrimination, Discrimination in Labor Markets 3(10), 3–33.
3. Ahmed, A.M., Hammarstedt, M., (2008). Discrimination in the rental housing market: a field experiment on the Internet. J. Urban Econ. 64 (2), 362–372.
4. Ahmed, A.M., Andersson, L., Hammarstedt, M., (2010). Can discrimination in the housing market be reduced by increasing the information about the applicants? Land Econ. 86(1), 79–90.
5. Auspurg, K., Hinz, T., Schmid, L., (2017). Contexts and conditions of ethnic discrimination: evidence from a field experiment in a German housing market. J. Hous. Econ. 35, 26–36.
6. Beatty, S. E. & S. M. Smith (1987). "External Search Effort: An Investigation Across Several Product Categories, Journal of Consumer Research. 14, 83-95.
7. Bakos, J. Y. & B. R. Nault (1997). Ownership and Investment in Electronic Networks, Information Systems Research. 8(4): 321-342.
8. Bartoš, V., Bauer, M., Chytilová, J., Matějka, F., (2016). Attention discrimination: theory and field experiments with monitoring information acquisition. Am. Econ. Rev. 106(6), 1437–1475.
9. Becker, G. S. (2010) The Economics of Discrimination. The Univesity of Chicagio Press.
10. Bosch, M., Carnero, M.A., Farré, L., (2015). Rental housing discrimination and the persistence of ethnic enclaves. Series 6(2), 129–152.
11. Bills, D. B., Di Stasio, V., & Gërxhani, K. (2017). The demand side of hiring: Employers in the labor market. Annual Review of Sociology, 43: 291-310.
12. Bonnet, F., & Pollard, J. (2020). Tenant selection in the private rental sector of Paris and Geneva. Housing Studies, 1-19.
13 Clark, W. A. V. & R. Flowerdew, (1982). A Review of Search Models and Their Application to Search in The Housing Market, in Modelling Housing Market Search. 4-29. ed. William A. V. Clark, London: Croom Helm.
14. Cronin, F. J. (1982). The Efficiency of Housing Search, Southern Economic Journal. 48(4): 1016-1030.
15. Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1): 39-67.
16. Chang, E., & Chin, H. (2018). Signaling or experiencing: Commitment HRM effects on recruitment and employees` online ratings. Journal of Business Research, 84: 175-185.
17. Francois Bonnet & Julie Pollard (2020): Tenant selection in the private rental sector of Paris and Geneva, Housing Studies. 1-19.
18. Flage, A. (2018). Ethnic and gender discrimination in the rental housing market: Evidence from a meta-analysis of correspondence tests, 2006–2017. Journal of Housing Economics, 41, 251-273.
19. Harvey, J. (2000). Urban Land Economics. 5th ed. Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd.
20. Hanson, A., Hawley, Z., (2011). Do landlords discriminate in the rental housing market? Evidence from an internet field experiment in US cities. J. Urban Econ. 70 (2), 99–114.
21. Jovanovic, B. (1979). Job matching and the theory of turnover, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 972–990.
22. Kolter, Philip, (2003), Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning, Implementation, and Control. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall.
23. Lincoln, P. C. (1989). Investor Relations: The User’s Perspective, in the Handbook of Investor Relations. ed. D. R. Nichols, Illinois: Dow Jones and Company, Inc.
24. Lynch, J. G. & D. Ariely (2000) Wine Online: Search Costs Affect Competition on Price, Quality, And Distribution, Marketing Science, 19(1): 83-103.
25. Le Gallo, J., L`Horty, Y., du Parquet, L., & Petit, P. (2017). Les discriminations dans l`accès au logement en France: un testing de couverture nationale. No. 2017-11. TEPP.
26. Moore, G. A., (1995), In Side the Tornado: Marketing Strategies from Silicon Valley’s Cutting Edge. New York: Harper Business.
27. Nelson, P. (1970). Information and consumer behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311–329.
28. Olawande, O. A. (2011). Harnessing real estate investment through proper tenant selection in Nigeria. Property Management.
29. Phelps, E. (1972). The statistical theory of racism and sexism, American Economic Review, 62, 659–661.
30. Preece, J. & Bimpson, E. (2019). Forms and Mechanisms of Exclusion in Contemporary Housingn Systems: An Evidence Review. UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence, Glasgow.
31. Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355–374.
32. Stiglitz, J. E. (1975). The theory of screening, education, and the distribution of income, The American Economic Review, 65(3), 283–300.
33. Salant, S. W. (1991). “For Sale by Owner: When to Use a Broker and How to Price the House,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. 14: 157-173.
34. Stern, L. W. & A. I. EI-Ansary (1996). Marketing Channels. 5th ed. NJ: Prentice Hall.
35. Spulber, D. F. (1999). Market Microstructure: Intermediaries and the Theory of the Firm. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
36. Taylor, James, W. (1974) The Role of Risk in Consumer Behavior, Journal of Marketing. 38. April: 54-60.
37. Thomas, W. F. (2003). The meaning of race to employers: A dynamic qualitative perspective, The Sociological Quarterly, 44, 227–242.
38. Uggerslev, K. L., Fassina, N. E., & Kraichy, D. (2012). Recruiting through the stages: A meta‐analytic test of predictors of applicant attraction at different stages of the recruiting process. Personnel Psychology, 65(3): 597-660.
39. Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
40. Yavas, A. (1992). A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets. Journal of American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, 20, 533-548.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
地政學系
107257017
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107257017
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林子欽<br>江穎慧zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Lin, Tzu-Chin<br>Chaing, Ying-Huien_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 白承叡zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Pai, Cheng-Juien_US
dc.creator (作者) 白承叡zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Pai, Cheng-Juien_US
dc.date (日期) 2021en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-Sep-2021 17:28:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Sep-2021 17:28:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Sep-2021 17:28:11 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107257017en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/137029-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 地政學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 107257017zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 網路使交易資訊流通更加快速，然而房東仍無法完全掌握承租人的素質，承租人亦無法完全掌握房屋資訊，雙方存有人與物資訊不對稱問題。本文利用591租屋網臺北市已出租成交資料，並選擇存活分析中模型配適度最佳之韋伯加速失敗模型混合逆高斯脆弱性模型，分別建立兩個模型，針對「雅房、獨立套房及分租套房」與「整層住家」進行實證分析，用以衡量資訊不對稱的情況下，房東篩選承租人及委託房仲，是否能降低雙方搜尋成本並縮短房屋成交所需時間，亦即達到提升交易效率的效果。
實證結果顯示，委託房仲能夠縮短雅房、獨立套房及分租套房出租成交所需時間1.88天（45.1小時），縮短整層住家0.52天（13小時）；租屋廣告中限制承租人性別條件將延長房屋出租成交所需時間0.65天（15.6小時）；租屋廣告中限制承租人身分條件將縮短雅房、獨立套房及分租套房出租成交所需時間0.6天（14.4小時），縮短整層住家0.86天（20.6小時）。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Despite the increasing speed of flowing transaction information on the Internet, landlords still cannot fully grasp the qualities of their tenants, whereas the tenants cannot fully acquire the housing information as well. For both sides, a problem of information asymmetry lies between tenant quality and housing information. This study utilizes the data of Taipei city obtained from 591 website, applies Weibull accelerated failure time model, which is the most suitable model regarding survival analysis, combined with Inverse-Gaussian frailty model, and establishes two models respectively. Empirical analysis of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio”, and “apartment” is performed, so as to observe whether the act of both tenant selection and real estate agent commission can solve the information asymmetry and improve transaction efficiency in the rental housing market. Also, to observe whether or not these acts could reduce the searching cost and shorten the transaction time.
The empirical results show that real estate brokers can shorten the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 1.88 days (45.1 hours), whereas “apartment” by 0.52 days (13 hours). Restriction on the gender of the tenant showed in the rental advertisement will extend the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 0.65 days (15.6 hours). Restriction on the identity of the tenant showed in the rental advertisement will shorten the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 0.6 days (14.4 hours), whereas “apartment” by 0.86 days (20.6 hours).		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與問題 1
第二節 研究內容與方法 4
第三節 研究架構與流程 8
第二章 相關理論與文獻回顧 11
第一節 市場資訊不完全及其影響 11
第二節 承租人篩選原則 16
第三節 文獻回顧總結 22
第三章 研究設計及資料說明 25
第一節 研究設計 25
第二節 實證模型建立 37
第三節 資料處理與說明 39
第四章 實證結果與分析 59
第一節 租屋廣告資料實際樣態 59
第二節 影響三種類型房屋出租成交時間因素分析 68
第三節 影響整層住家房屋出租成交時間因素分析 83
第五章 結論與建議 95
第一節 結論 95
第二節 後續研究建議 100
參考文獻 101
中文部分 101
外文部分 103
附錄一 三種類型—韋伯加速失敗混合逆高斯脆弱性模型 107
附錄二 整層住家—韋伯加速失敗混合逆高斯脆弱性模型 108		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 5216080 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107257017en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租屋廣告zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 承租人條件限制zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 委託房仲zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 出租成交時間zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 參數存活模型zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Rental Advertismenten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Requirements of potential tenantsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Real estate brokerage industryen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Transaction timeen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Parametric survival modelen_US
dc.title (題名) 承租人條件限制對於房屋出租成交時間之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The effect of requirements for potential tenants on time to renten_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分
1. 李馨蘋、劉代洋，1999，租賃住宅市場租金之影響因素，中華管理評論，2(1)。
2. 李春長，2002，《不動產仲介市場分析》臺北：文笙書局。
3. 李春長，2008，資訊揭露、信任、搜尋成本對委託房屋仲介業售屋意願之實證研究－以高雄市為例。住宅學報，17(1)，71-104。
4. 周美伶、張金鶚，2005，購屋搜尋期間影響因素之研究，管理評論，24，133-150。
5. 周美伶，2005，先前租買經驗對自住者購屋搜尋行為之影響–存活分析之應用，住宅學報，14(1)，21-39。
6. 周美伶，2005，購屋者外部資訊搜尋管道選擇行為與搜尋期間之探討，住宅學報，14(2)，1-25。
7. 花敬群，2000，發展出租住宅市場機制之研究，內政部建築研究所委託之專題研究專案成果。
8. 林祖嘉、陳建良，2005，租買選擇、貸款選擇、與世代組成：巢式LOGIT模型之應用，住宅學報，14(1)，1-20。
9. 林舒芃，2019，租屋市場房東篩選房客行為之探索性研究，國立臺北教育大學社會與區域發展學系學位論文。
10. 陳彥仲，1997，台灣地區期望住宅需求彈性之分析，都市與計劃，24(2)：223-238。
11. 許佑全、陳彥仲，2003，台南市租賃住宅市場之探討，「中華民國住宅學會第十二屆年會論文集」，新竹，528-554。
12. 張紹勳，2017，生物醫學統計：使用Stata分析（1版），臺北：五南。
13. 華昌宜、賴碧瑩，2001，我國租賃住宅市場之發展與推動，住宅學報，10(1)：67-76。
14. 彭建文，2004，台灣出租住宅市場與自有住宅市場價格調整關係之研究，都市與計劃，31(4)：391-412。
15. 楊文芳，2019，需求與知行的落差？初探招募資訊揭露對應徵者及新進員工組織工作認知之影響。管理學報，36(4)，391-419。
16. 楊澤泉、陳勇順，仲介服務、銀行服務與房地產市場，中華管理評論，4(2)，97-107。
17. 蘇偉強、劉庭如、黃斐、陳奉瑤，2013，特徵價格法應用的差異分析，土地問題研究季刊，12(3)，55-68。

外文部分
1. Akerlof, G. (1970) The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500.
2. Arrow, K. (1973) The theory of discrimination, Discrimination in Labor Markets 3(10), 3–33.
3. Ahmed, A.M., Hammarstedt, M., (2008). Discrimination in the rental housing market: a field experiment on the Internet. J. Urban Econ. 64 (2), 362–372.
4. Ahmed, A.M., Andersson, L., Hammarstedt, M., (2010). Can discrimination in the housing market be reduced by increasing the information about the applicants? Land Econ. 86(1), 79–90.
5. Auspurg, K., Hinz, T., Schmid, L., (2017). Contexts and conditions of ethnic discrimination: evidence from a field experiment in a German housing market. J. Hous. Econ. 35, 26–36.
6. Beatty, S. E. & S. M. Smith (1987). "External Search Effort: An Investigation Across Several Product Categories, Journal of Consumer Research. 14, 83-95.
7. Bakos, J. Y. & B. R. Nault (1997). Ownership and Investment in Electronic Networks, Information Systems Research. 8(4): 321-342.
8. Bartoš, V., Bauer, M., Chytilová, J., Matějka, F., (2016). Attention discrimination: theory and field experiments with monitoring information acquisition. Am. Econ. Rev. 106(6), 1437–1475.
9. Becker, G. S. (2010) The Economics of Discrimination. The Univesity of Chicagio Press.
10. Bosch, M., Carnero, M.A., Farré, L., (2015). Rental housing discrimination and the persistence of ethnic enclaves. Series 6(2), 129–152.
11. Bills, D. B., Di Stasio, V., & Gërxhani, K. (2017). The demand side of hiring: Employers in the labor market. Annual Review of Sociology, 43: 291-310.
12. Bonnet, F., & Pollard, J. (2020). Tenant selection in the private rental sector of Paris and Geneva. Housing Studies, 1-19.
13 Clark, W. A. V. & R. Flowerdew, (1982). A Review of Search Models and Their Application to Search in The Housing Market, in Modelling Housing Market Search. 4-29. ed. William A. V. Clark, London: Croom Helm.
14. Cronin, F. J. (1982). The Efficiency of Housing Search, Southern Economic Journal. 48(4): 1016-1030.
15. Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1): 39-67.
16. Chang, E., & Chin, H. (2018). Signaling or experiencing: Commitment HRM effects on recruitment and employees` online ratings. Journal of Business Research, 84: 175-185.
17. Francois Bonnet & Julie Pollard (2020): Tenant selection in the private rental sector of Paris and Geneva, Housing Studies. 1-19.
18. Flage, A. (2018). Ethnic and gender discrimination in the rental housing market: Evidence from a meta-analysis of correspondence tests, 2006–2017. Journal of Housing Economics, 41, 251-273.
19. Harvey, J. (2000). Urban Land Economics. 5th ed. Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd.
20. Hanson, A., Hawley, Z., (2011). Do landlords discriminate in the rental housing market? Evidence from an internet field experiment in US cities. J. Urban Econ. 70 (2), 99–114.
21. Jovanovic, B. (1979). Job matching and the theory of turnover, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 972–990.
22. Kolter, Philip, (2003), Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning, Implementation, and Control. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall.
23. Lincoln, P. C. (1989). Investor Relations: The User’s Perspective, in the Handbook of Investor Relations. ed. D. R. Nichols, Illinois: Dow Jones and Company, Inc.
24. Lynch, J. G. & D. Ariely (2000) Wine Online: Search Costs Affect Competition on Price, Quality, And Distribution, Marketing Science, 19(1): 83-103.
25. Le Gallo, J., L`Horty, Y., du Parquet, L., & Petit, P. (2017). Les discriminations dans l`accès au logement en France: un testing de couverture nationale. No. 2017-11. TEPP.
26. Moore, G. A., (1995), In Side the Tornado: Marketing Strategies from Silicon Valley’s Cutting Edge. New York: Harper Business.
27. Nelson, P. (1970). Information and consumer behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311–329.
28. Olawande, O. A. (2011). Harnessing real estate investment through proper tenant selection in Nigeria. Property Management.
29. Phelps, E. (1972). The statistical theory of racism and sexism, American Economic Review, 62, 659–661.
30. Preece, J. & Bimpson, E. (2019). Forms and Mechanisms of Exclusion in Contemporary Housingn Systems: An Evidence Review. UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence, Glasgow.
31. Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355–374.
32. Stiglitz, J. E. (1975). The theory of screening, education, and the distribution of income, The American Economic Review, 65(3), 283–300.
33. Salant, S. W. (1991). “For Sale by Owner: When to Use a Broker and How to Price the House,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. 14: 157-173.
34. Stern, L. W. & A. I. EI-Ansary (1996). Marketing Channels. 5th ed. NJ: Prentice Hall.
35. Spulber, D. F. (1999). Market Microstructure: Intermediaries and the Theory of the Firm. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
36. Taylor, James, W. (1974) The Role of Risk in Consumer Behavior, Journal of Marketing. 38. April: 54-60.
37. Thomas, W. F. (2003). The meaning of race to employers: A dynamic qualitative perspective, The Sociological Quarterly, 44, 227–242.
38. Uggerslev, K. L., Fassina, N. E., & Kraichy, D. (2012). Recruiting through the stages: A meta‐analytic test of predictors of applicant attraction at different stages of the recruiting process. Personnel Psychology, 65(3): 597-660.
39. Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
40. Yavas, A. (1992). A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets. Journal of American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, 20, 533-548.		zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202101238en_US