學術產出-Theses
Article View/Open
Publication Export
-
題名 資源詛咒？自然資源與內戰
The curse of resources? Natural resources and civil war作者 李嘉璇
Li, Jia-Syuan貢獻者 蘇昱璇
Su, Yu-Hsuan
李嘉璇
Li, Jia-Syuan關鍵詞 自然資源詛咒
內戰
自然資源租金
The curse of natural resources
Civil war
Rent of natural resources日期 2021 上傳時間 1-Oct-2021 10:10:51 (UTC+8) 摘要 自然資源詛咒，探討為何國家擁有某種大量不可再生的自然資源，理應可以促進國內的經濟成長，帶動國家的發展，卻反而造成經濟增長遲緩、工業化低落、貧富差距、過度依賴單一經濟結構、產業難以轉型、非民主的窘境。本研究假設仰賴自然資源的國家，有較高的機率發生內戰，以自然資源詛咒為理論基礎，研究自然資源租金的多寡和一國的內戰有無關聯，以及如果有關聯，何種自然資源對於內戰的影響最大；並以較長的資料年限，檢視在 Auty 提出理論的二十多年後詛咒是否仍然存在。本研究結合世界銀行、政體四計畫以及 UCDP/PRIO 之武裝衝突資料庫數據，建立資料區間 1970-2017 年 193 個國家的追蹤資料，以「國家－年」的數據結構，進行「時間序列與橫斷面資料」與「廣義估計方程式」的分析。為了更精確的將自然資源對於內戰的影響進行詮釋，本研究亦加入三個面向的討論：只考慮有生產自然資源的國家、進行地理分區、排除高收入國家。研究結果發現：整體而言自然資源和內戰爆發呈現高度相關，驗證自然資源詛咒理論的存在。在各種自然資源類型中，石油和天然氣對於內戰爆發機率的提高是有顯著影響的，而煤炭與金屬礦產對於內戰爆發機率的影響不大，森林資源與內戰的聯繫甚至有歧異性。此外，不同種類的自然資源對於不同地區均會產生不同的效果。自然資源在各地理區和內戰爆發呈現顯著正相關的分別是：南亞的石油、煤炭、天然氣，歐洲和中亞的石油、天然氣，撒哈拉以南非洲的天然氣，拉丁美洲和加勒比海的石油。東亞和太平洋以及中東和北非各類自然資源對於內戰爆發的影響均不顯著。
The curse of natural resources is a theory discussing why a country has a large amount of non-renewable natural resources, which should promote domestic economic growth and drive the country’s development, but have caused slow economic growth, income inequality, undemocracy, low industrialization, unsuccessful industrial transformation, and the dilemma of over-reliance on a single economic structure. This study assumes that countries that rely on natural resources have a higher probability of civil wars. Based on the curse of natural resources, I explore whether the natural resource rents are related to civil wars onset in a country, and if so, what kind of natural resources will have the largest impact on the civil war. I also use a longer period of data to examine whether the curse still exists more than 20 years after Auty put forward the theory.This study combines data from the World Bank, the Polity IV Project and UCDP/PRIO’s armed conflict database to establish a panel dataset for 193 countries from 1970 to 2017. The data structure of “country-year”" is used to conduct analysis of time series and cross-sectional data using generalized estimation equations. In order to more accurately interpret the impact of natural resources on the civil war, this study adds three aspects of discussion: only consider countries that produce natural resources, carry out geographic divisions, and exclude high-income countries.The results of the study found that natural resources are highly correlated with civil war onset, verifying the existence of the natural resources curse. Oil and natural gas have significant impact on the increase in probability of civil wars, while coal and metal minerals have little effect, and the relationship between forest resources and civil wars are even different in different specifications. In addition, different types of natural resources have different effects in different regions. The following natural resources have significantly positive impact on civil war onset: oil, coal, and natural gas in South Asia; oil and natural gas in Europe and Central Asia; natural gas in sub-Saharan Africa; oil in Latin America and the Caribbean. In East Asia and Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa, the impact of natural resources is not significant.參考文獻 A. 中文部分皮特龍，2020。《稀有金屬戰爭》。台灣：天下文化。平思寧，2014。〈中東北非地區的國內衝突起因之探析：政治與經濟的革命？〉，《問題與研究》，第五十三期，第三卷，61-86。平思寧，2015。〈自然資源與國內衝突：權力轉移理論的應用〉，《人文及社會科學集刊》，第二十七期，第三十卷。張文揚，2019a。〈不識字又兼無衛生？論自然資源在公共衛生與教育中對女性的影響〉，《人文及社會科學集刊》，第三十一期，第三卷。張文揚，2019b。〈中國大陸在非洲大陸投資的政治風險：從內戰的角度評析，1980-2014年〉，《全球政治評論》，第六十九期。張文揚、平思寧，2017。〈自然資源也詛咒了環境表現嗎? 一個跨國實證的分析〉，《台灣政治學刊》，第二十一期，第二卷 ，181-234。薛健吾，2016。〈自然資源，政體類型與國際軍事衝突－跨時間與空間的分析〉，《臺灣民主季刊》，第十三期，第二卷，43-92。戴萬平，2017。《印尼產業的政治經濟學：資源詛咒》。香港：香港城市大學。B. 英文部分Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2003). Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule: A model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2–3), 162–192. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10136Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents , Competition , and Corruption. American Economic Review, 89(4), 982–993.Aizenman, J., & Marion, N. (1999). Volatility and investment: Interpreting evidence from developing countries. Economica, 66(262), 157–1179. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00163Andersen, J. J., & Aslaksen, S. (2008). Constitutions and the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics, 87(2), 227–246. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.12.005Asanuma, S. (2008). Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Development : A Curse ? Or A Blessing ? – Lessons from Indonesia ’ s Experience. 1–15.Aslaksen, S., & Torvik, R. (2006). A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4), 571–585. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00471.xAuty, R. M. (1993). Sastaining Development in Mineral Economies: Resource Curse. London and New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203422595Barbier, E. B., & Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1999). Resource scarcity and innovation: Can poor countries attain endogenous growth? Ambio, 28(2), 144–147. https://doi.org/10.2307/4314865Bellemare, M. F., Masaki, T., & Pepinsky, T. B. (2015). Lagged Explanatory Variables and the Estimation of Causal Effects. The Journal of Politics, 79(3), 949–963.Blimes, R. J. (2006). The indirect effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the likelihood of civil war onset. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(4), 536–547. https://doi.org/10.1177/00222706289402Bourguignon, F., & Verdier, T. (2000). Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth. Journal of Development Economics, 62(2), 285–313. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00086-9Brunnschweiler, C. N., & Bulte, E. H. (2008). The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55(3), 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.004Cabrales, A., & Hauk, E. (2011). The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources. Economic Journal, 121(551), 58–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02390.xCaselli, F., & Coleman, W. J. (2013). On the theory of ethnic conflict. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 161–192. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.011Christenson, M. (2001). Civil War, Macro-Social Contexts, and Intervening Mechanisms: Identify- ing Structural Linkages. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Columbus, OH: Department of Sociology, Ohio State University.Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law & Economics, 3, 1–44.Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2005). Resource rents, governance, and conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 625–633. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277551de Soysa, I., & Fjelde, H. (2010). Is the hidden hand an iron fist? Capitalism and civil peace, 1970-2005. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), 287–298. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310362167Dixon, J. (2009). What causes civil wars? Integrating quantitative research findings. International Studies Review, 11(4), 707–735. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00892.xDube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013). Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia. Review of Economic Studies, 80(4), 1384–1421. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt009Fearon, J. D. (2005). Primary commodity exports and civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 483–507. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277544Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity , Insurgency , and Civil War. The American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75–90.Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2004). Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states. International Security, 28(4), 5–43. https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288041588296Flug, K., Spilimbergo, A., & Wachtenheim, E. W. (1999). Investment in education: do economic volatility and credit constraints matter? Journal of Development Economics, 55(2), 465–481.Gleditsch, K. S., & Ruggeri, A. (2010). Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), 299–310. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310362293Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education, and economic development. European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 847–859. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00127-1Gylfason, T., Herbertsson, T. T., & Zoega, G. (1999). A mixed blessing: Natural resources and economic growth. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3(2), 204–225. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100599011049Henderson, E. A. (2000). When States Implode : The Correlates of Africa ’ s Civil Wars , 1950-92. Studies in Comparative International Development, 35(2), 28–47.Hirschleifer, D. (1995). Mergers and acquisitions: strategic and informational issues.Hodler, R. (2006). The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries. European Economic Review, 50(6), 1367–1386. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.05.004Igoe, J. (2005). The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World. Journal of Ecological Anthropology, 9(1), 84–86. https://doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.9.1.8Inglehart, R. (1995). Public Support for Environmental Protection: Objective Problems and Subjective Values in 43 Societies. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28(1), 57–72.Kronenberg, T. (2004). The curse of natural resources in the transition economies. Economics of Transition, 12(3), 399–426. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00187.xLiang, K. Y., & Zeger, S. L. (1986). Longitudinal data analysis using generalized linear models. Biometrika, 73(1), 13–22. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/73.1.13Lujala, P. (2010). The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources. Journal of Peace Research, 47(1), 15–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309350015Lujala, P., Gleditsch, N. P., & Gilmore, E. (2005). A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 538–562. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277548Mansoorian, A. (1991). Resource Discoveries and " Excessive ’ External Borrowing. The Economic Journal, 101(409), 1497–1509.Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. The Quaterly Journal of Econmics, 110(3), 681–712.Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006). Cursed by resources or institutions? World Economy, 29(8), 1117–1131. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00808.xMontalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005). American Economic Association Ethnic Polarization , Potential Conflict , and Civil Wars. The American Economic Review, 95(3), 796–816.Ross, M. L. (1999). The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics, 51(2), 297–322. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100008200Ross, M. L. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325–361. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0011Ross, M. L. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 337–356. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043773Ross, M. L. (2006). Is democracy good for the poor? American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 860–874. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00220.xRosser, A. (2006). The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey. IDS Working Paper, April, 1–36. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.167.1124&rep=rep1&type=pdfRustad, S. C. A., Rød, J. K., Larsen, W., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2008). Foliage and fighting: Forest resources and the onset, duration, and location of civil war. Political Geography, 27(7), 761–782. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.09.004Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1995). Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth. National Bureau of Economic Research, 3. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5398Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 827–838. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8Sambanis, N. (2004). What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6), 814–858. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704269355Skaperdas, S. (2002). Warlord competition. Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), 435–446. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039004004Skocpol, T. (1982). Rentier state and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution. Theory and Society, 11(3), 265–283. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00211656Slaibi, A. (2007). Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage . Kenneth S. Deffeyes . Marine Resource Economics, 22(1), 115–117. https://doi.org/10.1086/mre.22.1.42629545Stijns, J. P. (2006). Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation. World Development, 34(6), 1060–1083. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.005Van Der Ploeg, F. (2011). Natural resources: Curse or blessing? Journal of Economic Literature, 49(2), 366–420. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.2.366C. 網路資料Polity IV Project, https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htmUppsala Conflict Data Program: UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國家發展研究所
108261003資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108261003 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 蘇昱璇 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Su, Yu-Hsuan en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 李嘉璇 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Li, Jia-Syuan en_US dc.creator (作者) 李嘉璇 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Li, Jia-Syuan en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Oct-2021 10:10:51 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Oct-2021 10:10:51 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Oct-2021 10:10:51 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108261003 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/137315 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國家發展研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108261003 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 自然資源詛咒，探討為何國家擁有某種大量不可再生的自然資源，理應可以促進國內的經濟成長，帶動國家的發展，卻反而造成經濟增長遲緩、工業化低落、貧富差距、過度依賴單一經濟結構、產業難以轉型、非民主的窘境。本研究假設仰賴自然資源的國家，有較高的機率發生內戰，以自然資源詛咒為理論基礎，研究自然資源租金的多寡和一國的內戰有無關聯，以及如果有關聯，何種自然資源對於內戰的影響最大；並以較長的資料年限，檢視在 Auty 提出理論的二十多年後詛咒是否仍然存在。本研究結合世界銀行、政體四計畫以及 UCDP/PRIO 之武裝衝突資料庫數據，建立資料區間 1970-2017 年 193 個國家的追蹤資料，以「國家－年」的數據結構，進行「時間序列與橫斷面資料」與「廣義估計方程式」的分析。為了更精確的將自然資源對於內戰的影響進行詮釋，本研究亦加入三個面向的討論：只考慮有生產自然資源的國家、進行地理分區、排除高收入國家。研究結果發現：整體而言自然資源和內戰爆發呈現高度相關，驗證自然資源詛咒理論的存在。在各種自然資源類型中，石油和天然氣對於內戰爆發機率的提高是有顯著影響的，而煤炭與金屬礦產對於內戰爆發機率的影響不大，森林資源與內戰的聯繫甚至有歧異性。此外，不同種類的自然資源對於不同地區均會產生不同的效果。自然資源在各地理區和內戰爆發呈現顯著正相關的分別是：南亞的石油、煤炭、天然氣，歐洲和中亞的石油、天然氣，撒哈拉以南非洲的天然氣，拉丁美洲和加勒比海的石油。東亞和太平洋以及中東和北非各類自然資源對於內戰爆發的影響均不顯著。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The curse of natural resources is a theory discussing why a country has a large amount of non-renewable natural resources, which should promote domestic economic growth and drive the country’s development, but have caused slow economic growth, income inequality, undemocracy, low industrialization, unsuccessful industrial transformation, and the dilemma of over-reliance on a single economic structure. This study assumes that countries that rely on natural resources have a higher probability of civil wars. Based on the curse of natural resources, I explore whether the natural resource rents are related to civil wars onset in a country, and if so, what kind of natural resources will have the largest impact on the civil war. I also use a longer period of data to examine whether the curse still exists more than 20 years after Auty put forward the theory.This study combines data from the World Bank, the Polity IV Project and UCDP/PRIO’s armed conflict database to establish a panel dataset for 193 countries from 1970 to 2017. The data structure of “country-year”" is used to conduct analysis of time series and cross-sectional data using generalized estimation equations. In order to more accurately interpret the impact of natural resources on the civil war, this study adds three aspects of discussion: only consider countries that produce natural resources, carry out geographic divisions, and exclude high-income countries.The results of the study found that natural resources are highly correlated with civil war onset, verifying the existence of the natural resources curse. Oil and natural gas have significant impact on the increase in probability of civil wars, while coal and metal minerals have little effect, and the relationship between forest resources and civil wars are even different in different specifications. In addition, different types of natural resources have different effects in different regions. The following natural resources have significantly positive impact on civil war onset: oil, coal, and natural gas in South Asia; oil and natural gas in Europe and Central Asia; natural gas in sub-Saharan Africa; oil in Latin America and the Caribbean. In East Asia and Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa, the impact of natural resources is not significant. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景與動機 1第二節 研究問題與目的 4第三節 研究流程 5第貳章 文獻回顧 6第一節 自然資源的產業概況 6一、 石油業 6二、 金屬礦業 7三、 森林業 8四、 稀有金屬 9第二節 自然資源詛咒理論 10一、 自然資源詛咒對經濟面向的影響 11二、 自然資源詛咒對制度面向的影響 14第三節 文獻中關於內戰爆發原因之探討 16一、 人口 17二、 地理環境 17三、 自然資源 17四、 經濟 18五、 衝突歷史 18六、 政府類型與政權 18第四節 文獻中自然資源與內戰關聯影響之研究 19一、 種族同質／分化程度 20二、 收入的類型 21三、 自然資源占出口比例 21四、 資本密集型商品的價格下跌 22五、 領導者的選擇 22第五節 自然資源與內戰爆發之聯繫 22第參章 研究方法與資料來源 27第一節 實證研究方法 27第二節 實證模型 28第三節 穩健性檢驗 29第四節 研究資料來源 31一、 依變數：內戰的爆發 31二、 主要自變數：自然資源租金 32三、 控制變數 33四、 敘述統計 36第肆章 實證結果 42第一節 自然資源和內戰爆發之間的關係 42一、 自然資源和內戰爆發之間的關係 42二、 加入控制變數 45第二節 進行地理分區 48一、 東亞和太平洋 48二、 南亞 50三、 歐洲和中亞 52四、 中東和北非 54五、 撒哈拉以南非洲 56六、 拉丁美洲和加勒比海 58第伍章 結論 60第一節 研究總結 60第二節 研究貢獻 62第三節 研究限制與未來研究方向 63參考文獻 66第壹章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景與動機 1第二節 研究問題與目的 4第三節 研究流程 5第貳章 文獻回顧 6第一節 自然資源的產業概況 6一、 石油業 6二、 金屬礦業 7三、 森林業 8四、 稀有金屬 9第二節 自然資源詛咒理論 10一、 自然資源詛咒對經濟面向的影響 11二、 自然資源詛咒對制度面向的影響 14第三節 文獻中關於內戰爆發原因之探討 16一、 人口 17二、 地理環境 17三、 自然資源 17四、 經濟 18五、 衝突歷史 18六、 政府類型與政權 18第四節 文獻中自然資源與內戰關聯影響之研究 19一、 種族同質／分化程度 20二、 收入的類型 21三、 自然資源占出口比例 21四、 資本密集型商品的價格下跌 22五、 領導者的選擇 22第五節 自然資源與內戰爆發之聯繫 22第參章 研究方法與資料來源 27第一節 實證研究方法 27第二節 實證模型 28第三節 穩健性檢驗 29第四節 研究資料來源 31一、 依變數：內戰的爆發 31二、 主要自變數：自然資源租金 32三、 控制變數 33四、 敘述統計 36第肆章 實證結果 42第一節 自然資源和內戰爆發之間的關係 42一、 自然資源和內戰爆發之間的關係 42二、 加入控制變數 45第二節 進行地理分區 48一、 東亞和太平洋 48二、 南亞 50三、 歐洲和中亞 52四、 中東和北非 54五、 撒哈拉以南非洲 56六、 拉丁美洲和加勒比海 58第伍章 結論 60第一節 研究總結 60第二節 研究貢獻 62第三節 研究限制與未來研究方向 63參考文獻 66 表次表1 敘述統計表 37表2 自然資源租金所得占GDP比例最高的前10次，1970-2016年 38表3 內戰爆發頻率最高的前11國，1971-2017年 41表4 自然資源和內戰爆發之間的關係 44表5 加入控制變數後的自然資源和內戰爆發之間的關係，1971-2017年 47表6 東亞和太平洋 49表7 南亞 51表8 歐洲和中亞 53表9 中東和北非 55表10 撒哈拉以南非洲 57表11 拉丁美洲和加勒比海 59圖次圖1 各類自然資源租金所得占GDP比例，1970-2016年 40 zh_TW dc.format.extent 3897196 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108261003 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自然資源詛咒 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 內戰 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自然資源租金 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) The curse of natural resources en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Civil war en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Rent of natural resources en_US dc.title (題名) 資源詛咒？自然資源與內戰 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The curse of resources? Natural resources and civil war en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) A. 中文部分皮特龍，2020。《稀有金屬戰爭》。台灣：天下文化。平思寧，2014。〈中東北非地區的國內衝突起因之探析：政治與經濟的革命？〉，《問題與研究》，第五十三期，第三卷，61-86。平思寧，2015。〈自然資源與國內衝突：權力轉移理論的應用〉，《人文及社會科學集刊》，第二十七期，第三十卷。張文揚，2019a。〈不識字又兼無衛生？論自然資源在公共衛生與教育中對女性的影響〉，《人文及社會科學集刊》，第三十一期，第三卷。張文揚，2019b。〈中國大陸在非洲大陸投資的政治風險：從內戰的角度評析，1980-2014年〉，《全球政治評論》，第六十九期。張文揚、平思寧，2017。〈自然資源也詛咒了環境表現嗎? 一個跨國實證的分析〉，《台灣政治學刊》，第二十一期，第二卷 ，181-234。薛健吾，2016。〈自然資源，政體類型與國際軍事衝突－跨時間與空間的分析〉，《臺灣民主季刊》，第十三期，第二卷，43-92。戴萬平，2017。《印尼產業的政治經濟學：資源詛咒》。香港：香港城市大學。B. 英文部分Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2003). Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule: A model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2–3), 162–192. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10136Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents , Competition , and Corruption. American Economic Review, 89(4), 982–993.Aizenman, J., & Marion, N. (1999). Volatility and investment: Interpreting evidence from developing countries. Economica, 66(262), 157–1179. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00163Andersen, J. J., & Aslaksen, S. (2008). Constitutions and the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics, 87(2), 227–246. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.12.005Asanuma, S. (2008). Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Development : A Curse ? Or A Blessing ? – Lessons from Indonesia ’ s Experience. 1–15.Aslaksen, S., & Torvik, R. (2006). A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4), 571–585. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00471.xAuty, R. M. (1993). Sastaining Development in Mineral Economies: Resource Curse. London and New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203422595Barbier, E. B., & Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1999). Resource scarcity and innovation: Can poor countries attain endogenous growth? Ambio, 28(2), 144–147. https://doi.org/10.2307/4314865Bellemare, M. F., Masaki, T., & Pepinsky, T. B. (2015). Lagged Explanatory Variables and the Estimation of Causal Effects. The Journal of Politics, 79(3), 949–963.Blimes, R. J. (2006). The indirect effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the likelihood of civil war onset. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(4), 536–547. https://doi.org/10.1177/00222706289402Bourguignon, F., & Verdier, T. (2000). Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth. Journal of Development Economics, 62(2), 285–313. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00086-9Brunnschweiler, C. N., & Bulte, E. H. (2008). The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55(3), 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.004Cabrales, A., & Hauk, E. (2011). The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources. Economic Journal, 121(551), 58–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02390.xCaselli, F., & Coleman, W. J. (2013). On the theory of ethnic conflict. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 161–192. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.011Christenson, M. (2001). Civil War, Macro-Social Contexts, and Intervening Mechanisms: Identify- ing Structural Linkages. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Columbus, OH: Department of Sociology, Ohio State University.Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law & Economics, 3, 1–44.Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2005). Resource rents, governance, and conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 625–633. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277551de Soysa, I., & Fjelde, H. (2010). Is the hidden hand an iron fist? Capitalism and civil peace, 1970-2005. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), 287–298. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310362167Dixon, J. (2009). What causes civil wars? Integrating quantitative research findings. International Studies Review, 11(4), 707–735. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00892.xDube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013). Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia. Review of Economic Studies, 80(4), 1384–1421. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt009Fearon, J. D. (2005). Primary commodity exports and civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 483–507. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277544Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity , Insurgency , and Civil War. The American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75–90.Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2004). Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states. International Security, 28(4), 5–43. https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288041588296Flug, K., Spilimbergo, A., & Wachtenheim, E. W. (1999). Investment in education: do economic volatility and credit constraints matter? Journal of Development Economics, 55(2), 465–481.Gleditsch, K. S., & Ruggeri, A. (2010). Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), 299–310. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310362293Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education, and economic development. European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 847–859. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00127-1Gylfason, T., Herbertsson, T. T., & Zoega, G. (1999). A mixed blessing: Natural resources and economic growth. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3(2), 204–225. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100599011049Henderson, E. A. (2000). When States Implode : The Correlates of Africa ’ s Civil Wars , 1950-92. Studies in Comparative International Development, 35(2), 28–47.Hirschleifer, D. (1995). Mergers and acquisitions: strategic and informational issues.Hodler, R. (2006). The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries. European Economic Review, 50(6), 1367–1386. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.05.004Igoe, J. (2005). The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World. Journal of Ecological Anthropology, 9(1), 84–86. https://doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.9.1.8Inglehart, R. (1995). Public Support for Environmental Protection: Objective Problems and Subjective Values in 43 Societies. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28(1), 57–72.Kronenberg, T. (2004). The curse of natural resources in the transition economies. Economics of Transition, 12(3), 399–426. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00187.xLiang, K. Y., & Zeger, S. L. (1986). Longitudinal data analysis using generalized linear models. Biometrika, 73(1), 13–22. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/73.1.13Lujala, P. (2010). The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources. Journal of Peace Research, 47(1), 15–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309350015Lujala, P., Gleditsch, N. P., & Gilmore, E. (2005). A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 538–562. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277548Mansoorian, A. (1991). Resource Discoveries and " Excessive ’ External Borrowing. The Economic Journal, 101(409), 1497–1509.Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. The Quaterly Journal of Econmics, 110(3), 681–712.Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006). Cursed by resources or institutions? World Economy, 29(8), 1117–1131. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00808.xMontalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005). American Economic Association Ethnic Polarization , Potential Conflict , and Civil Wars. The American Economic Review, 95(3), 796–816.Ross, M. L. (1999). The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics, 51(2), 297–322. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100008200Ross, M. L. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325–361. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0011Ross, M. L. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 337–356. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043773Ross, M. L. (2006). Is democracy good for the poor? American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 860–874. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00220.xRosser, A. (2006). The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey. IDS Working Paper, April, 1–36. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.167.1124&rep=rep1&type=pdfRustad, S. C. A., Rød, J. K., Larsen, W., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2008). Foliage and fighting: Forest resources and the onset, duration, and location of civil war. Political Geography, 27(7), 761–782. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.09.004Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1995). Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth. National Bureau of Economic Research, 3. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5398Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 827–838. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8Sambanis, N. (2004). What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6), 814–858. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704269355Skaperdas, S. (2002). Warlord competition. Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), 435–446. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039004004Skocpol, T. (1982). Rentier state and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution. Theory and Society, 11(3), 265–283. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00211656Slaibi, A. (2007). Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage . Kenneth S. Deffeyes . Marine Resource Economics, 22(1), 115–117. https://doi.org/10.1086/mre.22.1.42629545Stijns, J. P. (2006). Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation. World Development, 34(6), 1060–1083. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.005Van Der Ploeg, F. (2011). Natural resources: Curse or blessing? Journal of Economic Literature, 49(2), 366–420. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.2.366C. 網路資料Polity IV Project, https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htmUppsala Conflict Data Program: UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202101560 en_US
