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題名 伊朗革命衛隊在伊朗經濟之角色,2005-2017年
The Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran’s Economy, 2005-2017作者 賴義中
Lai, Yi-Chung貢獻者 魏百谷
Wei, Bai-Ku
賴義中
Lai, Yi-Chung關鍵詞 伊朗
革命衛隊
內賈德
魯哈尼
哈梅尼
伊朗核協議
Iran
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Hassan Rouhani
Ali Khamenei
JCPOA日期 2021 上傳時間 1-十月-2021 10:16:31 (UTC+8) 摘要 伊朗革命衛隊(IRGC)普遍被認為在伊朗國內政治及區域地緣政治中均扮演重要角色。經過多年發展,革命衛隊已從一支高度意識形態化的軍隊演變為一個龐大的複合體,其影響力遍及伊朗社會的各個層面。革命衛隊不僅在伊朗干涉區域國家的各項行動中參與甚多,近年來更擴大其經濟實力,也讓國際學術圈相繼投入研究其發展。為特別探究革命衛隊在伊朗經濟中之角色,本文首先爬梳了革命衛隊發展沿革,包含其成立、轉變及鞏固之過程,並著重於其自伊朗立國以來各時期的發展如何有助形塑其現階段的地位。其次,透過比較革命衛隊在Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013)及Hassan Rouhani (2013-2017,第1任)兩位總統任內之發展,本文發現革命衛隊雖應國家早期建制需要執行任務,經過多年時間,其已發展出一定自主性及內部動能,且在面對多次民選政府及總統變更時,逐漸能夠主導自身議程。另一方面,革命衛隊的快速成長也引起伊朗國內及國際之關注,伊朗最高領導人Ali Khamenei作為憲法中革命衛隊之監管者,亦會擇時間接干涉調解,使革命衛隊不至於脫離政權掌控。此外,隨著國際政治情勢快速變化,革命衛隊與伊朗民選政府間的關係也愈趨複雜。結論中,本文認為革命衛隊與伊朗民選政府間的關係將持續由合作與衝突並存,而革命衛隊亦將持續追求自身利益、捍衛固有權力及維持現狀。
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is widely considered one of the most influential actors both within the domestic and regional geopolitics. Over the years, the IRGC has evolved from an ideological force to conglomerate whose tracks influence becomes visible in many aspects of the Iranian society. Besides heavily involving in Iran’s regional intervention, the IRGC has expanded its economic power in more recent years, which also draws increasing attention from the global academic sphere.To expound the IRGC’s economic role per se, this thesis first reviews the formation, transition, and consolidation process of the IRGC, particularly how its development in different time phases had helped shape its current status. Secondly, by comparing the development respectively under two previous presidents, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) and Hassan Rouhani (2013-2017, first term), this thesis finds out that the IRGC, despite being responsive to the government’s need in early state-building, has cultivated its autonomy and internal dynamics overtime and has gradually adopts its own agenda when facing presidency changes. On the other hand, while the IRGC’s fast growth aroused concerns inside and outside Iran, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who constitutionally oversees the IRGC, also mediated indirectly to bring the IRGC under the regime’s control. On top of that, fast-changing international political issues have further complicated the relations between the IRGC and the elected presidents. 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國立政治大學
中東與中亞研究碩士學位學程
104560001資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104560001 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 魏百谷 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Wei, Bai-Ku en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 賴義中 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Lai, Yi-Chung en_US dc.creator (作者) 賴義中 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lai, Yi-Chung en_US dc.date (日期) 2021 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-十月-2021 10:16:31 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-十月-2021 10:16:31 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-十月-2021 10:16:31 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0104560001 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/137332 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 中東與中亞研究碩士學位學程 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 104560001 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 伊朗革命衛隊(IRGC)普遍被認為在伊朗國內政治及區域地緣政治中均扮演重要角色。經過多年發展,革命衛隊已從一支高度意識形態化的軍隊演變為一個龐大的複合體,其影響力遍及伊朗社會的各個層面。革命衛隊不僅在伊朗干涉區域國家的各項行動中參與甚多,近年來更擴大其經濟實力,也讓國際學術圈相繼投入研究其發展。為特別探究革命衛隊在伊朗經濟中之角色,本文首先爬梳了革命衛隊發展沿革,包含其成立、轉變及鞏固之過程,並著重於其自伊朗立國以來各時期的發展如何有助形塑其現階段的地位。其次,透過比較革命衛隊在Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013)及Hassan Rouhani (2013-2017,第1任)兩位總統任內之發展,本文發現革命衛隊雖應國家早期建制需要執行任務,經過多年時間,其已發展出一定自主性及內部動能,且在面對多次民選政府及總統變更時,逐漸能夠主導自身議程。另一方面,革命衛隊的快速成長也引起伊朗國內及國際之關注,伊朗最高領導人Ali Khamenei作為憲法中革命衛隊之監管者,亦會擇時間接干涉調解,使革命衛隊不至於脫離政權掌控。此外,隨著國際政治情勢快速變化,革命衛隊與伊朗民選政府間的關係也愈趨複雜。結論中,本文認為革命衛隊與伊朗民選政府間的關係將持續由合作與衝突並存,而革命衛隊亦將持續追求自身利益、捍衛固有權力及維持現狀。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is widely considered one of the most influential actors both within the domestic and regional geopolitics. Over the years, the IRGC has evolved from an ideological force to conglomerate whose tracks influence becomes visible in many aspects of the Iranian society. Besides heavily involving in Iran’s regional intervention, the IRGC has expanded its economic power in more recent years, which also draws increasing attention from the global academic sphere.To expound the IRGC’s economic role per se, this thesis first reviews the formation, transition, and consolidation process of the IRGC, particularly how its development in different time phases had helped shape its current status. Secondly, by comparing the development respectively under two previous presidents, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) and Hassan Rouhani (2013-2017, first term), this thesis finds out that the IRGC, despite being responsive to the government’s need in early state-building, has cultivated its autonomy and internal dynamics overtime and has gradually adopts its own agenda when facing presidency changes. On the other hand, while the IRGC’s fast growth aroused concerns inside and outside Iran, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who constitutionally oversees the IRGC, also mediated indirectly to bring the IRGC under the regime’s control. On top of that, fast-changing international political issues have further complicated the relations between the IRGC and the elected presidents. In conclusion, this thesis suggests that cooperation and confrontation should continue to co-exist in the relations of the IRGC and the Iranian government, while the IRGC will seek to pursue its own interests, defend its power, and remain the status quo. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents Chapter 1: Introduction...1Sec. 1.1 Research Background and Motives...1Sec. 1.2 Research Questions and Aims...5Sec. 1.3 Literature Review...6Sec. 1.4 Research Design...14Sec. 1.5 Chapter Outline...16Chapter 2: Formation, Transition, and Consolidation of the IRGC (1979-2005)...18Sec. 2.1 Gendarmerie: Creation and Institutionalization of the IRGC...19Sec. 2.2 Martyrs: the IRGC in the Iran-Iraq War...24Sec. 2.3 Rafsanjani: The Implication of Privatization...27Sec. 2.4 Khatami: Tension and Confrontation...31Sec. 2.5 Summary...35Chapter 3: Aligning with Ahmadinejad: How IRGC Expands its Economic Influence (2005-2013)...37Sec. 3.1 IRGC’s Economic Role in the Constitution...38Sec. 3.2 Strategic Alliance of IRGC and Ahmadinejad...40Sec. 3.3 IRGC Reaches Out for Oil and Gas...44Sec. 3.4 Impact of the Sanctions...49Sec. 3.5 Summary...55Chapter 4: Diminishing Economic Influence: Rouhani’s Attempt to Contain the IRGC (2013-2017)...57Sec. 4.1 Rouhani and Khamenei’s Approach to the IRGC...58Sec. 4.2 Rouhani’s Reform and How the IRGC Responds...61Sec. 4.3 JCPOA and its Implication for the IRGC...67Sec. 4.4 Post-JCPOA Political-economic Landscape and the IRGC...69Sec. 4.5 Summary...73Chapter 5: Conclusion...75Sec. 5.1 Research Findings...75Sec. 5.2 Future Prospects...77Bibliography...80 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1241891 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104560001 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 伊朗 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 革命衛隊 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 內賈德 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 魯哈尼 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 哈梅尼 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 伊朗核協議 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Iran en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Hassan Rouhani en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ali Khamenei en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) JCPOA en_US dc.title (題名) 伊朗革命衛隊在伊朗經濟之角色,2005-2017年 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran’s Economy, 2005-2017 en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) BibliographyBooks or MonographsAlfoneh, Ali. 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