dc.contributor | 會計評論 | - |
dc.creator (作者) | 鍾宇軒 | - |
dc.creator (作者) | Chung, Yu-Hsuan | - |
dc.creator (作者) | 鍾慧芬 | - |
dc.creator (作者) | Chung, Hui-Fen | - |
dc.date (日期) | 2021-01 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 17-Nov-2021 16:43:07 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.available | 17-Nov-2021 16:43:07 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 17-Nov-2021 16:43:07 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/137863 | - |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 政治和監管環境通常容易對公股銀行帶來較大影響,本文透過2007年至2016年間臺灣上市櫃公司個別公股銀行貸款合約,探討立法委員的企業持股是否有助於公司獲取公股銀行之貸款。實證結果發現當立法委員擁有企業的股權越多時,對於公司得到公股銀行的貸款金額水準不一定有所裨益。再者,當立法委員對於企業的持股人數(持有股權)增加時,與公股銀行貸款亦呈負向關係。故本研究結果顯示企業擁有政治人物持股並不一定能夠反映出有所助益的訊號,反而是企業從事融資活動時,較難以預期的影響因素。 | - |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The political and regulatory environment would usually enormously influence government-controlled banks. This study investigates whether the stock ownership by members of the legislature benefits firms to get government-controlled bank loans by examining bank loan contracts in Taiwan listed firms from 2007 to 2016. The empirical results show that firms with a higher proportion of legislators` stock ownership do not benefit firms to get higher amounts from government-controlled bank loans. Moreover, this study finds a negative relationship between firms with increasing legislative stockholders (with increasing legislators` stock ownership) and government-controlled bank loans. Thus, this study suggests that politician ownership might send potential disadvantaged signals and could be an unpredictable element in corporate financing activities. | - |
dc.format.extent | 581858 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation (關聯) | 會計評論, 72, 119-177 | - |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 立法委員股權 ; 公股銀行 ; 公股銀行貸款 ; Legislators` stock ownership ; Government-controlled banks ; Bank loans | - |
dc.title (題名) | 立法委員持股對企業獲取公股銀行貸款有助益嗎? | - |
dc.title (題名) | Do Stock Ownership by Members of the Legislature Benefit Firms to Get Government-controlled Banks` Loans? | - |
dc.type (資料類型) | article | - |
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6552/JOAR.202101_(72).0004 | - |
dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.202101_(72).0004 | - |