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題名 生物自然主義對排除問題的回應
How Biological Naturalism survives in face of Kim`s notion of exclusion problem?作者 布嘉俊
Pou, Ka-Chon貢獻者 鄭會穎
Cheng, Huei-Ying
布嘉俊
Pou, Ka-Chon關鍵詞 約翰·希爾勒
生物自然主義
排除論證
心理因果問題
John Searle
Biological Naturalism
Exclusion problem
Ontological irreducibility
Mental causation
Edwards` dictum日期 2022 上傳時間 1-Apr-2022 15:03:08 (UTC+8) 摘要 John Searle認為傳統心物問題有一個簡單解決方案，他稱此方案為「生物自然主義」(biological naturalism)。本文關懷Searle的生物自然主義是否能融貫地回答心物問題的兩個重要面向：心腦關係與心理因果。前者聚焦在存有學面向，給定我們對世界的理解—或許是物理主義(physicalism)—大腦如何作為心靈、意識等出現的解釋根源，它們的關係又是甚麼。後者則聚焦在因果面向，心靈、意識等是否參與世界的因果進程。在當時的脈絡下，生物自然主義因主張意識具「不可化約性」(ontological irreducibility)故大多被理解為非化約論。同時，專注於心理因果問題的Jaegwon Kim卻以他版本的排除問題(exclusion problem)論證，主張「不可化約性」與心理因果有效存在張力。似乎Kim版本的排除問題正好能充當生物自然主義的試金石。本文將先後交待Kim版本的排除問題及對生物自然主義的攻擊，並進一步剖析Kim版本的排除問題。我也將先停留在Kim的脈絡內試圖以內部方式作出回應。我視此為一種溫和的回應(mild response)。接着我將進入Searle提出生物自然主義的背景並呈現Searle如何從根本地提出一種消解「心理因果有效」與「心之不可化約性」間不融貫的框架。我視之為一種根本的回應(radical response)。
John Searle believes that there is a simple solution to mind-body problem, which he called biological naturalism. The feature of Searle’s theory is how he face mind-body problem by fulfilling the two most essential instincts in thinking of mind: ontologically irreducibility of mind and mental causal efficacious. In the context of modern philosophy of mind, especially considering physicalism, Searle’s theory are inconsistent because of the tension between these two. Exclusion problem is infamously proposing that, within physicalism, ontoligcally irreduciblity of mind and the mental causal efficacious are inconsistent. To me, this makes exclusion problem a tool to examine the validity of biological naturalism.Kim’s notion of exclusion problem will be revealed in Chapter 1, also I will show how exclusion problem attacks biological naturalism. In Chapter 2, I will further explain what the fundamental idea is behind it. Besides, I will provide a response which remains in its framework- the ‘mild’ response. The radical one, which I think what biological naturalism is, abandons the whole framework behind exclusion problem will be revealed in Chapter 3 and 4.參考文獻 Baker, L. (1993). ‘Metaphysics and Mental Causation’, In J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 75–96.Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1990). Metaphysics of Causation. Erkenntnis (1975-), 33(1), 89-119.Block, 2003. Do Causal powers drain away? Philosophy and phenomenological research, 67(1): 133-150.Dennett, Daniel C. (1993). Review of Searle, the rediscovery of mind. Journal of philosophy 60 (4):93-205.Donaldson. (2021). Vertical versus horizontal: What is really at issue in the exclusion problem? Synthese 198 (2): 1381-1396.Feigl, H. (1967). The Mental and the Physical: The Essay and a Postscript. University of Minnesota Press.Fodor, J. A. and M. CogNet (1990). A theory of content and other essays, MIT press Cambridge, MA.Fodor, J. A.. ‘Making Mind Matter More,’ in Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, MIT press. P. 156.Heil, J., & Mele, A. (eds) (1993)(Reprinted 2003). Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Kim, J., & Sosa, E. (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophyical Essays.Kim, J. (1995). Mental Causation in Searle`s "Biological Naturalism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(1): pp. 189-194.—— (1998) Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind–Body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge,Mass: MIT Press.—— (2001). ‘Mental causation and consciousness: The two mind-body problems for the76physicalist.’ In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.—— (2002). ‘Responses.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 671-680.—— (2003). ‘The nonreductivist`s troubles with mental causation,’ in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 189–210.—— (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.—— (2006). Philosophy of Mind (Second Edition). Boulder: Westview Press.—— (2007). Causation and mental causation. In B. P. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind (pp. 227-242). Blackwell publishing.—— (2010). Philosophy of Mind (Third Edition). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.LePore, E., & Loewer, B. (1989). More on Making Mind Matter. Philosophical Topics, 17(1), P. 175-191.Nida-Rümelin, Martine & Grewendorf, Günther & Meggle, Georg. (2002). ‘Causal Reduction, Ontological Reduction, and First-Person Ontology.’In Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality: Discussions with John R. Searle, P. 205-221.Papineau, David (2000). The rise of physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.). Cambridge University Press.—— (2009). The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism. In Brain McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.Shoemakers, Sydney. (1979). Identity, Properties, and Causality. Midwest Studies inPhilosophy 4 (1):321-342.Searle, John. R., Dennett, D. C., & Chalmers, D. J. (1997). The mystery of consciousness. New York: New York Review of Books.Searle, John R. (1992). The rediscovery of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT.—— (2002). Why I am Not A Property Dualist. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 12:77pp. 57–64.—— (2004). Mind: A brief introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.—— (2008). Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.—— (2017). Biological Naturalism. In S. Schneider and M. Velmans (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. (pp. 327-336). New York: Wiley-Blackwell.Tse, Peter Ulric (2013). The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation. MIT Press.William Hasker. (1999). The Emergent Self. New York: Cornell University Press. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學系
106154013資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106154013 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 鄭會穎 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Cheng, Huei-Ying en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 布嘉俊 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Pou, Ka-Chon en_US dc.creator (作者) 布嘉俊 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Pou, Ka-Chon en_US dc.date (日期) 2022 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Apr-2022 15:03:08 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Apr-2022 15:03:08 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Apr-2022 15:03:08 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106154013 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/139552 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 哲學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106154013 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) John Searle認為傳統心物問題有一個簡單解決方案，他稱此方案為「生物自然主義」(biological naturalism)。本文關懷Searle的生物自然主義是否能融貫地回答心物問題的兩個重要面向：心腦關係與心理因果。前者聚焦在存有學面向，給定我們對世界的理解—或許是物理主義(physicalism)—大腦如何作為心靈、意識等出現的解釋根源，它們的關係又是甚麼。後者則聚焦在因果面向，心靈、意識等是否參與世界的因果進程。在當時的脈絡下，生物自然主義因主張意識具「不可化約性」(ontological irreducibility)故大多被理解為非化約論。同時，專注於心理因果問題的Jaegwon Kim卻以他版本的排除問題(exclusion problem)論證，主張「不可化約性」與心理因果有效存在張力。似乎Kim版本的排除問題正好能充當生物自然主義的試金石。本文將先後交待Kim版本的排除問題及對生物自然主義的攻擊，並進一步剖析Kim版本的排除問題。我也將先停留在Kim的脈絡內試圖以內部方式作出回應。我視此為一種溫和的回應(mild response)。接着我將進入Searle提出生物自然主義的背景並呈現Searle如何從根本地提出一種消解「心理因果有效」與「心之不可化約性」間不融貫的框架。我視之為一種根本的回應(radical response)。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) John Searle believes that there is a simple solution to mind-body problem, which he called biological naturalism. The feature of Searle’s theory is how he face mind-body problem by fulfilling the two most essential instincts in thinking of mind: ontologically irreducibility of mind and mental causal efficacious. In the context of modern philosophy of mind, especially considering physicalism, Searle’s theory are inconsistent because of the tension between these two. Exclusion problem is infamously proposing that, within physicalism, ontoligcally irreduciblity of mind and the mental causal efficacious are inconsistent. To me, this makes exclusion problem a tool to examine the validity of biological naturalism.Kim’s notion of exclusion problem will be revealed in Chapter 1, also I will show how exclusion problem attacks biological naturalism. In Chapter 2, I will further explain what the fundamental idea is behind it. Besides, I will provide a response which remains in its framework- the ‘mild’ response. The radical one, which I think what biological naturalism is, abandons the whole framework behind exclusion problem will be revealed in Chapter 3 and 4. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 緒論 1第一節—前言 1第二節—簡單解決方案的基本內涵 5緒論小結及章節安排 7第一章—Kim 版本的排除問題 9第一節—不可拒絕的原則 10第二節—排除問題 16第壹部份-附隨論證 16第貳部份-排除論證 17小結—排除問題的結果及對生物自然主義之應用 18第二章—排除問題的根源 20第一節—競爭關係及 Kim 的因果觀 20第二節-水平因果關係的不存在 27第二節-Edwards 圖像的條件 30第三節-必要條件以至因果效力 34小結 38第三章—生物自然主義要旨及理論擔當 39第一節—生物自然主義第一要旨—拒絕概念二元論 39第二節—第一人稱存有與不可化約性 47第壹部份-第一人稱存有 48第貳部份-不可化約性 53小結 58第四章—Searle 對排除問題的回應 59第一節—因果化約的未證成 59第二節—不同層次描述和單一因果系統 62第三節—因果化約作為存有化約的形上學結果 68第四節—根本性的回應 70小結 72結論 74參考文獻 75 zh_TW dc.format.extent 3554809 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106154013 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 約翰·希爾勒 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 生物自然主義 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 排除論證 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 心理因果問題 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) John Searle en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Biological Naturalism en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Exclusion problem en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ontological irreducibility en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Mental causation en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Edwards` dictum en_US dc.title (題名) 生物自然主義對排除問題的回應 zh_TW dc.title (題名) How Biological Naturalism survives in face of Kim`s notion of exclusion problem? en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Baker, L. (1993). ‘Metaphysics and Mental Causation’, In J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 75–96.Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1990). Metaphysics of Causation. Erkenntnis (1975-), 33(1), 89-119.Block, 2003. Do Causal powers drain away? Philosophy and phenomenological research, 67(1): 133-150.Dennett, Daniel C. (1993). Review of Searle, the rediscovery of mind. Journal of philosophy 60 (4):93-205.Donaldson. (2021). Vertical versus horizontal: What is really at issue in the exclusion problem? Synthese 198 (2): 1381-1396.Feigl, H. (1967). The Mental and the Physical: The Essay and a Postscript. University of Minnesota Press.Fodor, J. A. and M. CogNet (1990). A theory of content and other essays, MIT press Cambridge, MA.Fodor, J. A.. ‘Making Mind Matter More,’ in Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, MIT press. P. 156.Heil, J., & Mele, A. (eds) (1993)(Reprinted 2003). Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Kim, J., & Sosa, E. (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophyical Essays.Kim, J. (1995). Mental Causation in Searle`s "Biological Naturalism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(1): pp. 189-194.—— (1998) Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind–Body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge,Mass: MIT Press.—— (2001). ‘Mental causation and consciousness: The two mind-body problems for the76physicalist.’ In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.—— (2002). ‘Responses.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 671-680.—— (2003). ‘The nonreductivist`s troubles with mental causation,’ in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 189–210.—— (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.—— (2006). Philosophy of Mind (Second Edition). Boulder: Westview Press.—— (2007). Causation and mental causation. In B. P. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind (pp. 227-242). Blackwell publishing.—— (2010). Philosophy of Mind (Third Edition). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.LePore, E., & Loewer, B. (1989). More on Making Mind Matter. Philosophical Topics, 17(1), P. 175-191.Nida-Rümelin, Martine & Grewendorf, Günther & Meggle, Georg. (2002). ‘Causal Reduction, Ontological Reduction, and First-Person Ontology.’In Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality: Discussions with John R. Searle, P. 205-221.Papineau, David (2000). The rise of physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.). Cambridge University Press.—— (2009). The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism. In Brain McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.Shoemakers, Sydney. (1979). Identity, Properties, and Causality. Midwest Studies inPhilosophy 4 (1):321-342.Searle, John. R., Dennett, D. C., & Chalmers, D. J. (1997). The mystery of consciousness. New York: New York Review of Books.Searle, John R. (1992). The rediscovery of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT.—— (2002). Why I am Not A Property Dualist. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 12:77pp. 57–64.—— (2004). Mind: A brief introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.—— (2008). Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.—— (2017). Biological Naturalism. In S. Schneider and M. Velmans (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. (pp. 327-336). New York: Wiley-Blackwell.Tse, Peter Ulric (2013). The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation. MIT Press.William Hasker. (1999). The Emergent Self. New York: Cornell University Press. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202200356 en_US
