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題名 黨內同質性與黨際異質性對立法時間的影響：事件史分析
Intra-Party Homogeneity , Inter-Party Heterogeneity and the Duration of Legislation: An Event History Analysis作者 黃子峰
Huang, Tzu-Feng貢獻者 盛杏湲
Sheng, Shing-Yuan
黃子峰
Huang, Tzu-Feng關鍵詞 立法時間
條件式政黨政府理論
委託代理理論
事件史分析模型
Legislative duration
Principal-agent theory
Event history analysis
Conditional Party Government日期 2022 上傳時間 1-Jun-2022 16:35:22 (UTC+8) 摘要 國會作為民主國家中進行決策、立法的重要機構，無論在何種選制之下，各個國會中的行動者皆希冀透過明文的議事程序，使自身偏好的立法方案經由立法進程成功通過成為法律，發揮作用。但就實際結果，因有限的開會時間，並非所有的提案都能成為法律，因議程設定的不同，成功成為法律的提案也並非都歷經了相同的時間。不同的議程設定象徵不同立法時間的安排，也間接說明時間對於法案的通過是非常寶貴的資源。政黨作為國會中議程設定權的壟斷者，政黨內部成員立場歧異程度以及政黨之間對於議題的共識強弱，將影響政黨思考如何安排立法時間投注的差異，進而產生不同的議程設定結果。因此本研究主要研究問題為：不同黨內同質性、黨際異質性的立法時間差異為何？本研究以提案與修正動議作為分析單位，針對第二屆到第九屆立法院中左右、環保、兩岸三種議題，透過事件史分析模型進行分析，試圖說明黨內與黨際立場離散程度對立法時間的影響。黨內互動方面，議員與政黨之間委託代理關係的特性，延伸條件式政黨政府所提出議員與所屬政黨的互動關係，當同黨立委立場愈集中時，政黨不需要花費太多資源平衡黨內意見，因此可以愈短的時間通過法案。黨際互動方面，國會內政黨間的互動如同相異族群間互動關係，具有無限次重複賽局與社會配對賽局的特性，即便立場存在差異也並非絕對的對立衝突，且受到法案通過後政治利益的考量，黨際異質性對立法時間的影響並非線性關係。有別於過往對於國會多數決決策核心的想像，議員與政黨、政黨與政黨之間存在著立場的差異，即便存在國會多數黨壟斷議程設定權，但法案的通過皆須仰賴所有立法行動者間達成共識後相互合作方能更加快速且順利的通過，完成立法。立法成果的生成，必然是「裡子」與「面子」多面向考量後的結果。
Every legislative actor in the parliament, the crucial institution that makes decision and legislates in democratic nations, expects to pass their preferred bills successfully with expressly provided parliamentary procedure so as to make them laws and take effect through legislative agenda. However, in terms of actual results, due to limited conference time, not all proposals become laws; because of different agenda setting, not all the bills that become laws have undergone identical duration. Different agenda setting represents different arrangement, and it also demonstrates indirectly that duration is a significantly valuable resource for passage of bills.Since parties dominate the authority of agenda setting, the heterogeneity of internal members within a party and the strength of the consensus on certain issues will influence the parties’ consideration on how to arrange different legislation time spent so as to result in different agenda setting. Thus, the main concern of this study is: what’s the difference in legislative duration under different inter-party homogeneity and intra-party heterogeneity?This article takes proposals and amends as units of analysis, focusing on three kinds of issues including environmental protection, cross-strait relations, and left-right policies, among the 2th to 9th Legislative Yuan, analyzing through Event History Analysis, attempting to figure out how the dispersion on political positions within and between parties impacts the duration of legislation.With regard to intra-party interaction, owing to the feature of principal-agent relationships between legislators and parties, this article extends the interaction mode between a legislator and his party suggested in the Conditional Party Government Theory, pointing out that a party doesn’t have to spend much time resource balancing intra-party positions when stances of legislators within it get more consistent, which enables it to pass bills in a shorter duration. As for inter-party interaction, like interaction relations between interracial groups, inter-party interaction within the parliament possesses features of “Indefinitely Repeated Games” and “Social Matching Games.” Even though there are differences on ideology and positions, they are not absolute opposition and conflicts; also, in consideration of political benefits brought in by passage of bills, the influence of inter-party heterogeneity on the legislative duration presents a nonlinear relationship.Unlike past supposition that the parliament is majority-party-dominant, there is divergence in positions between parties and legislators, or between parties and parties. Though the majority party monopolizes the authority of agenda setting, the passage of bills depends on consensus reached by all the legislative actors and cooperation afterwards so as to make it smoother and quicker and complete the legislation. 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國立政治大學
政治學系
108252016資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108252016 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 盛杏湲 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Sheng, Shing-Yuan en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃子峰 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang, Tzu-Feng en_US dc.creator (作者) 黃子峰 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Huang, Tzu-Feng en_US dc.date (日期) 2022 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jun-2022 16:35:22 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jun-2022 16:35:22 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jun-2022 16:35:22 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108252016 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140224 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 政治學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108252016 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 國會作為民主國家中進行決策、立法的重要機構，無論在何種選制之下，各個國會中的行動者皆希冀透過明文的議事程序，使自身偏好的立法方案經由立法進程成功通過成為法律，發揮作用。但就實際結果，因有限的開會時間，並非所有的提案都能成為法律，因議程設定的不同，成功成為法律的提案也並非都歷經了相同的時間。不同的議程設定象徵不同立法時間的安排，也間接說明時間對於法案的通過是非常寶貴的資源。政黨作為國會中議程設定權的壟斷者，政黨內部成員立場歧異程度以及政黨之間對於議題的共識強弱，將影響政黨思考如何安排立法時間投注的差異，進而產生不同的議程設定結果。因此本研究主要研究問題為：不同黨內同質性、黨際異質性的立法時間差異為何？本研究以提案與修正動議作為分析單位，針對第二屆到第九屆立法院中左右、環保、兩岸三種議題，透過事件史分析模型進行分析，試圖說明黨內與黨際立場離散程度對立法時間的影響。黨內互動方面，議員與政黨之間委託代理關係的特性，延伸條件式政黨政府所提出議員與所屬政黨的互動關係，當同黨立委立場愈集中時，政黨不需要花費太多資源平衡黨內意見，因此可以愈短的時間通過法案。黨際互動方面，國會內政黨間的互動如同相異族群間互動關係，具有無限次重複賽局與社會配對賽局的特性，即便立場存在差異也並非絕對的對立衝突，且受到法案通過後政治利益的考量，黨際異質性對立法時間的影響並非線性關係。有別於過往對於國會多數決決策核心的想像，議員與政黨、政黨與政黨之間存在著立場的差異，即便存在國會多數黨壟斷議程設定權，但法案的通過皆須仰賴所有立法行動者間達成共識後相互合作方能更加快速且順利的通過，完成立法。立法成果的生成，必然是「裡子」與「面子」多面向考量後的結果。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Every legislative actor in the parliament, the crucial institution that makes decision and legislates in democratic nations, expects to pass their preferred bills successfully with expressly provided parliamentary procedure so as to make them laws and take effect through legislative agenda. However, in terms of actual results, due to limited conference time, not all proposals become laws; because of different agenda setting, not all the bills that become laws have undergone identical duration. Different agenda setting represents different arrangement, and it also demonstrates indirectly that duration is a significantly valuable resource for passage of bills.Since parties dominate the authority of agenda setting, the heterogeneity of internal members within a party and the strength of the consensus on certain issues will influence the parties’ consideration on how to arrange different legislation time spent so as to result in different agenda setting. Thus, the main concern of this study is: what’s the difference in legislative duration under different inter-party homogeneity and intra-party heterogeneity?This article takes proposals and amends as units of analysis, focusing on three kinds of issues including environmental protection, cross-strait relations, and left-right policies, among the 2th to 9th Legislative Yuan, analyzing through Event History Analysis, attempting to figure out how the dispersion on political positions within and between parties impacts the duration of legislation.With regard to intra-party interaction, owing to the feature of principal-agent relationships between legislators and parties, this article extends the interaction mode between a legislator and his party suggested in the Conditional Party Government Theory, pointing out that a party doesn’t have to spend much time resource balancing intra-party positions when stances of legislators within it get more consistent, which enables it to pass bills in a shorter duration. As for inter-party interaction, like interaction relations between interracial groups, inter-party interaction within the parliament possesses features of “Indefinitely Repeated Games” and “Social Matching Games.” Even though there are differences on ideology and positions, they are not absolute opposition and conflicts; also, in consideration of political benefits brought in by passage of bills, the influence of inter-party heterogeneity on the legislative duration presents a nonlinear relationship.Unlike past supposition that the parliament is majority-party-dominant, there is divergence in positions between parties and legislators, or between parties and parties. Though the majority party monopolizes the authority of agenda setting, the passage of bills depends on consensus reached by all the legislative actors and cooperation afterwards so as to make it smoother and quicker and complete the legislation. The generation of legislative results is certainly the consequence of multi-aspect consideration for vanity and actuality. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 目次第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與研究問題 1第二章 文獻回顧 4第一節 時間之於國會 4第二節 議程設定權的掌握者—政黨 12第三章 理論建構與假設 21第一節 國會中的寶貴資源：時間 21第二節 國會議員間、政黨間的互動 23第三節 修正條件式政黨政府理論 31第四章 研究設計與事件史分析 35第一節 資料來源與變數測量 35第二節 事件史分析模型 38第五章 經驗分析結果 44第一節 各類型法案立法時間 44第二節 提案黨內同質性、黨際異質性 48第三節 模型估計 54第四節 穩健性檢驗 76第六章 結論 78第一節 研究結論與討論 78第二節 研究限制 83參考文獻 86附錄 93 zh_TW dc.format.extent 3001209 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108252016 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 立法時間 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 條件式政黨政府理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 委託代理理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 事件史分析模型 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Legislative duration en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Principal-agent theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Event history analysis en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Conditional Party Government en_US dc.title (題名) 黨內同質性與黨際異質性對立法時間的影響：事件史分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Intra-Party Homogeneity , Inter-Party Heterogeneity and the Duration of Legislation: An Event History Analysis en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文李佳怡、黃旻華，2007，〈後冷戰時期影響國際恐怖主義發生之結構因素：應用事件史分析法之探討〉。《東吳政治學報》，25（3）：1-49。盛杏湲，2003，〈立法機關與行政機關在立法過程中的影響力：一致政府與分立政府的比較〉。《台灣政治學》，7（2）：51-105。盛杏湲、周應龍，2008，〈選樣偏誤模型在調查研究中項目無反應問題的應用〉。《台灣政治學刊》12（1）: 147-183。盛杏湲，2012，〈媒體報導對企業型政治立法成敗的影響〉。《東吳政治學報》，30（1）：1-42。盛杏湲，2020，〈立法院的議題政治：政黨極化或趨同〉。第十二屆國會學術研討會：國會、新趨勢、新方法，東吳大學政治學系、國會研究中心。盛杏湲，2014，〈選制變革前後立委提案的持續與變遷：一個探索性的研究〉《臺灣政治學刊》，18（1）：73-127。盛杏湲，2017，〈立法院的議題政治。科技部計畫〉。科技部計畫編號：MOST106-2410-H-004-120-MY3。盛杏湲、黃士豪，2017，〈黨團協商機制：從制度化觀點分析〉。《東吳政治學報》，35（1）：39-93。黃秀端，1998，〈金權政治和立院的財政、經濟與交通委員會〉。國科會研究計劃。國科會計畫編號：NSC:85-2417-H-黃秀端，2000，〈立法院內不同類型委員會運作方式〉。《東吳政治學報》，11:35-70。黃紀、林佳旻，2007，〈影響區域立委連任成敗之因素：事件史分析〉。《政治學報》，43：1-41。楊婉瑩，2003，〈一致性到分立性政府的政黨合作與衝突：以第四屆立法院為例〉。《東吳政治學報》，16：49-95。蔡韻竹，2019，〈同中求異？政黨在記名表決中形式與實質對立〉。載於黃秀端編之《國會立法與國會監督》。台北：五南出版有限公司。薛承泰，1993，〈「事件時序分析法」(Event History Analysis)簡介〉。《人口研究通訊》，14：18-24。羅清俊、張皖萍，2008，〈立法委員分配政治行為分析：選區企業與立法委員企業背景的影響〉。《政治科學論叢》，18：47-94。二、英文Aldrich, John H. 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