| dc.contributor.advisor | 徐則謙 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Hsu,Tse-Chien | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 郭品君 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Guo, Pin-Jun | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 郭品君 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Guo, Pin-Jun | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2022 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 1-Jul-2022 15:59:24 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 1-Jul-2022 15:59:24 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 1-Jul-2022 15:59:24 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0109351016 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140550 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國際經營與貿易學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 109351016 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本文以 Jiao and Wei (2020) 所提出的自然障礙 (Natural Barriers) 模型為基礎，在內生化權重之政府目標函數下，加入利益團體的角色，探討在不同利益方向的利益團體的競爭之下，透過機構品質傳導政府決策的選擇，進而分析對進口競爭利益團體與出口競爭利益團體分別帶來怎樣的影響，以及觀察政府機構品質對保護待售模型 (Protection For Sale) 的影響。研究顯示出口補貼的存在將導致進口產業需要追求更低的均衡機構品質來極大化福利，出口利益團體方面針對市場規模 (Market Size)、地理區隔 (Geography)，外國貿易政策 (Foreign Trade Policy) 探對機構品質傳導的影響。研究顯示本國市場規模越大、冰山成本越高、外國關稅障礙越大都將導致更低的最適機構品質，由於出口商重視國外市場，因此不同於進口競爭產業聚焦於本國貿易干預水準，出口商更需要權衡不同天然障礙下對自身利益的影響。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Based on the Natural Barriers model proposed by Jiao and Wei (2020) , this paper adds the role of interest groups under the government objective function of endogenous weights, and discusses the competition between interest groups. The choice of government decision-making is transmitted through institutional quality, then analysis the impact on import competition interest groups and export competition interest groups, and investigates the impact of government institution quality on the protection for sale model. We show that the existence of export subsidies will lead the importing industry to pursue a lower equilibrium institutional quality to maximize welfare。We also explore the impact on institutional quality transmission under the issue of market size, geographic segmentation, and foreign trade policy. We show that larger domestic market size, higher iceberg costs, and greater foreign tariff barriers will lead to lower optimal institutional quality. Since exporters focus on foreign markets, unlike import-competing industries that focus on domestic trade intervention levels, exporters need to pay more attention to weigh the impact on self-interest under different natural barriers. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言 1第二章 文獻回顧 2第三章 基本模型 6第一節 模型建立 6第二節 產業1最適機構品質 9第三節 產業2最適機構品質 11第四節 遊說下的均衡政策 14第四章 結論 18參考資料 19 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 1118287 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109351016 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 利益團體 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 自然障礙 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 政府機構品質 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Interest groups | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Natural barriers | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Quality | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 利益團體與關稅政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Interest Groups and Tariff Policy | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
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| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6814/NCCU202200646 | en_US |
