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題名 外部總經理與財務危機之關聯:論會計師產業專精度、審計經驗及任期之影響
The relationship between external CEO and financial distress: The impact of accountants` industry expertise, audit experience, and tenure
作者 吳沛穎
Wu, Pei-Ying
貢獻者 李佳玲
Lee, Chia-Ling
吳沛穎
Wu, Pei-Ying
關鍵詞 外部總經理
財務危機
會計師產業專精度
會計師審計經驗
會計師任期
External CEO
Financial distress
CPA industry specialist
CPA audit experience
CPA tenure
日期 2022
上傳時間 1-Jul-2022 16:03:36 (UTC+8)
摘要 過去研究多以財務會計層面的比率惡化作為財務危機的預警指標,然而有鑑於財務指標屬於事後指標,近年來更加入公司治理層面的指標,以使財務危機預警模型能達到更好的預測效果。CEO是公司的重要決策者,對公司營運風險有直接的影響,本研究探討若因擔任CEO前於樣本公司任職經理人年資資歷較淺,對公司發生財務危機的影響。本文以2006年至2020年台灣上市(櫃)公司作為研究樣本,實證結果表明,台灣市場證據顯示外部CEO與公司財務危機呈顯著正相關,反映聘僱外部CEO會導致營運風險增加,對公司發生財務危機的可能性有正向的影響,本研究為財務危機預警模型提供公司治理層面之預警指標。進一步分析發現,若公司的簽證會計師審計經驗愈豐富或簽證會計師任期愈長時,能負向調節外部CEO與財務危機間的正相關;非家族企業中公司簽證會計師產業專精度愈高時,能負向調節外部CEO與財務危機間的正相關,反映公司能借助外部審計的力量有效減少代理問題的發生。本研究亦透過敏感性分析及樣本選擇性偏誤測試,顯示本研究之實證結果具有穩健性。
In previous studies, the deterioration of financial accounting ratios has been used as an early warning indicator for financial distress. However, in view of the fact that financial indicators are lagging indicators, corporate governance indicators have been added in recent years to improve the early warning model for financial distress. As the top decision maker of a company, the CEO has a direct impact on the operational risk of the company. This study uses the characteristics of the CEO as the research target to investigate the impact of financial distress on the company if the manager has less years of experience in the sample company before becoming the CEO. The empirical results show that the market evidence in Taiwan shows a significant positive correlation between external CEOs and corporate financial distress, reflecting that the employment of external CEOs leads to an increase in operational risk and has a positive impact on the likelihood of financial distress. This study provides an early warning indicator at the corporate governance level for the financial distress early warning model. Further analysis revealed that the more experience the company`s CPA has in auditing or the longer the tenure of CPA, the more it can negatively adjust the positive correlation between external CEO and financial distress; the higher the industry expertise of CPA in non-family companies, the more it can negatively adjust the positive correlation between external CEO and financial distress, reflecting that the company can effectively reduce the occurrence of agency problems with the power of external audit. The sensitivity analysis and sample selectivity bias test also showed that the empirical results of this study were robust.
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Altman, E. I. 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. The journal of finance 23 (4):589-609.
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial economics 68 (2):263-285.
Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, and J. S. Yang. 2003. Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2):71-97.
Bell, T. B., M. Causholli, and W. R. Knechel. 2015. Audit firm tenure, non‐audit services, and internal assessments of audit quality. Journal of accounting research 53 (3):461-509.
Bliss, M. A. 2011. Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing. Accounting & Finance 51 (2):361-380.
Bonner, S. E. 1990. Experience effects in auditing: The role of task-specific knowledge. Accounting review:72-92.
Cahan, S. F., and J. Sun. 2015. The effect of audit experience on audit fees and audit quality. Journal of Accounting, auditing & finance 30 (1):78-100.
Carcello, J. V., and A. L. Nagy. 2002. Auditor industry specialization and fraudulent financial reporting. Paper read at Symposium on Auditing Problems.
———. 2004. Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (2):55-69.
Chatterjee, A., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. It`s all about me: Narcissistic chief executive officers and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 52 (3):351-386.
Chin, C. L., and H. Y. Chi. 2009. Reducing restatements with increased industry expertise. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (3):729-765.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial economics 58 (1-2):81-112.
Craswell, A. T., J. R. Francis, and S. L. Taylor. 1995. Auditor brand name reputations and industry specializations. Journal of accounting and economics 20 (3):297-322.
Dalton, D. R., M. A. Hitt, S. T. Certo, and C. M. Dalton. 2007. The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation. Academy of Management annals 1 (1):1-64.
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of accounting and economics 3 (3):183-199.
Donker, H., B. Santen, and S. Zahir. 2009. Ownership structure and the likelihood of financial distress in the Netherlands. Applied Financial Economics 19 (21):1687-1696.
Dunn, K. A., and B. W. Mayhew. 2004. Audit firm industry specialization and client disclosure quality. Review of Accounting Studies 9 (1):35-58.
Elsaid, E., X. Wang, and W. N. Davidson. 2011. Does experience matter? CEO successions by former CEOs. Managerial Finance 37 (10): 915-939.
Giannetti, M. 2011. Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts. Journal of Financial Intermediation 20 (4):633-662.
Greene, W. H. 2003. Econometric analysis: Pearson Education India.
Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of management review 9 (2):193-206.
Harris, D., and C. Helfat. 1997. Specificity of CEO human capital and compensation. Strategic Management Journal 18 (11):895-920.
Heckman, J. J. 1976. The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models. In Annals of economic and social measurement 5 (4): 475-492.
Hung, J.-H., W.-S. Wang, I.-C. Li, H.-J. Chen, and W.-S. Chang. 2013. 經理人過度自信對企業發生財務危機之影響: 以家族企業特性為調節效果. 臺大管理論叢 23 (2):65-96.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial economics 3 (4):305-360.
Kallunki, J.-P., and E. Pyykkö. 2013. Do defaulting CEOs and directors increase the likelihood of financial distress of the firm? Review of Accounting Studies 18 (1):228-260.
Kim, K.-H., and R. Buchanan. 2008. CEO duality leadership and firm risk-taking propensity. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 24 (1).
Krishnan, G. V. 2003a. Audit quality and the pricing of discretionary accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (1):109-126.
———. 2003b. Does Big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management? Accounting horizons 17:1-16.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez‐de‐Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance 54 (2):471-517.
Liao, L.-K., Y.-C. Chang, and Y.-C. Wang. 2018. 管理特質與財務危機關係之研究. 中華會計學刊 14 (1):97-128.
Libby, R., and D. M. Frederick. 1990. Experience and the ability to explain audit findings. Journal of accounting research 28 (2):348-367.
Lo, A. W., K. Z. Lin, and R. M. Wong. 2022. Does availability of audit partners affect audit quality? Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting, auditing & finance 37 (2):407-439.
Ma, Z., R. Wang, and K. Zhou. 2021. Generalist CEOs and Audit Pricing. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 40 (4):123-147.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
109353009
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109353009
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 李佳玲zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Lee, Chia-Lingen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 吳沛穎zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Wu, Pei-Yingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 吳沛穎zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Pei-Yingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2022en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2022 16:03:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2022 16:03:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2022 16:03:36 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0109353009en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140571-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 109353009zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 過去研究多以財務會計層面的比率惡化作為財務危機的預警指標,然而有鑑於財務指標屬於事後指標,近年來更加入公司治理層面的指標,以使財務危機預警模型能達到更好的預測效果。CEO是公司的重要決策者,對公司營運風險有直接的影響,本研究探討若因擔任CEO前於樣本公司任職經理人年資資歷較淺,對公司發生財務危機的影響。本文以2006年至2020年台灣上市(櫃)公司作為研究樣本,實證結果表明,台灣市場證據顯示外部CEO與公司財務危機呈顯著正相關,反映聘僱外部CEO會導致營運風險增加,對公司發生財務危機的可能性有正向的影響,本研究為財務危機預警模型提供公司治理層面之預警指標。進一步分析發現,若公司的簽證會計師審計經驗愈豐富或簽證會計師任期愈長時,能負向調節外部CEO與財務危機間的正相關;非家族企業中公司簽證會計師產業專精度愈高時,能負向調節外部CEO與財務危機間的正相關,反映公司能借助外部審計的力量有效減少代理問題的發生。本研究亦透過敏感性分析及樣本選擇性偏誤測試,顯示本研究之實證結果具有穩健性。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In previous studies, the deterioration of financial accounting ratios has been used as an early warning indicator for financial distress. However, in view of the fact that financial indicators are lagging indicators, corporate governance indicators have been added in recent years to improve the early warning model for financial distress. As the top decision maker of a company, the CEO has a direct impact on the operational risk of the company. This study uses the characteristics of the CEO as the research target to investigate the impact of financial distress on the company if the manager has less years of experience in the sample company before becoming the CEO. The empirical results show that the market evidence in Taiwan shows a significant positive correlation between external CEOs and corporate financial distress, reflecting that the employment of external CEOs leads to an increase in operational risk and has a positive impact on the likelihood of financial distress. This study provides an early warning indicator at the corporate governance level for the financial distress early warning model. Further analysis revealed that the more experience the company`s CPA has in auditing or the longer the tenure of CPA, the more it can negatively adjust the positive correlation between external CEO and financial distress; the higher the industry expertise of CPA in non-family companies, the more it can negatively adjust the positive correlation between external CEO and financial distress, reflecting that the company can effectively reduce the occurrence of agency problems with the power of external audit. The sensitivity analysis and sample selectivity bias test also showed that the empirical results of this study were robust.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、緒論 1
貳、文獻回顧與假說發展 5
一、 外部CEO與財務危機之關聯 5
二、 會計師特質對外部CEO與公司財務危機關聯性的調節效果 6
參、研究方法 11
一、 資料來源與樣本期間 11
二、 變數衡量 13
三、 實證迴歸模型 17
肆、實證結果與分析 19
一、 敘述性統計 19
二、 相關係數分析 21
三、 主要模型之實證結果 23
四、 額外測試 26
伍、研究結論與建議 38
參考文獻 41
zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1127371 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109353009en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 外部總經理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財務危機zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 會計師產業專精度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 會計師審計經驗zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 會計師任期zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) External CEOen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financial distressen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CPA industry specialisten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CPA audit experienceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CPA tenureen_US
dc.title (題名) 外部總經理與財務危機之關聯:論會計師產業專精度、審計經驗及任期之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The relationship between external CEO and financial distress: The impact of accountants` industry expertise, audit experience, and tenureen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aktas, N., E. De Bodt, H. Bollaert, and R. Roll. 2016. CEO narcissism and the takeover process: From private initiation to deal completion. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51 (1):113-137.
Altman, E. I. 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. The journal of finance 23 (4):589-609.
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial economics 68 (2):263-285.
Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, and J. S. Yang. 2003. Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2):71-97.
Bell, T. B., M. Causholli, and W. R. Knechel. 2015. Audit firm tenure, non‐audit services, and internal assessments of audit quality. Journal of accounting research 53 (3):461-509.
Bliss, M. A. 2011. Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing. Accounting & Finance 51 (2):361-380.
Bonner, S. E. 1990. Experience effects in auditing: The role of task-specific knowledge. Accounting review:72-92.
Cahan, S. F., and J. Sun. 2015. The effect of audit experience on audit fees and audit quality. Journal of Accounting, auditing & finance 30 (1):78-100.
Carcello, J. V., and A. L. Nagy. 2002. Auditor industry specialization and fraudulent financial reporting. Paper read at Symposium on Auditing Problems.
———. 2004. Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (2):55-69.
Chatterjee, A., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. It`s all about me: Narcissistic chief executive officers and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 52 (3):351-386.
Chin, C. L., and H. Y. Chi. 2009. Reducing restatements with increased industry expertise. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (3):729-765.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial economics 58 (1-2):81-112.
Craswell, A. T., J. R. Francis, and S. L. Taylor. 1995. Auditor brand name reputations and industry specializations. Journal of accounting and economics 20 (3):297-322.
Dalton, D. R., M. A. Hitt, S. T. Certo, and C. M. Dalton. 2007. The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation. Academy of Management annals 1 (1):1-64.
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of accounting and economics 3 (3):183-199.
Donker, H., B. Santen, and S. Zahir. 2009. Ownership structure and the likelihood of financial distress in the Netherlands. Applied Financial Economics 19 (21):1687-1696.
Dunn, K. A., and B. W. Mayhew. 2004. Audit firm industry specialization and client disclosure quality. Review of Accounting Studies 9 (1):35-58.
Elsaid, E., X. Wang, and W. N. Davidson. 2011. Does experience matter? CEO successions by former CEOs. Managerial Finance 37 (10): 915-939.
Giannetti, M. 2011. Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts. Journal of Financial Intermediation 20 (4):633-662.
Greene, W. H. 2003. Econometric analysis: Pearson Education India.
Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of management review 9 (2):193-206.
Harris, D., and C. Helfat. 1997. Specificity of CEO human capital and compensation. Strategic Management Journal 18 (11):895-920.
Heckman, J. J. 1976. The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models. In Annals of economic and social measurement 5 (4): 475-492.
Hung, J.-H., W.-S. Wang, I.-C. Li, H.-J. Chen, and W.-S. Chang. 2013. 經理人過度自信對企業發生財務危機之影響: 以家族企業特性為調節效果. 臺大管理論叢 23 (2):65-96.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial economics 3 (4):305-360.
Kallunki, J.-P., and E. Pyykkö. 2013. Do defaulting CEOs and directors increase the likelihood of financial distress of the firm? Review of Accounting Studies 18 (1):228-260.
Kim, K.-H., and R. Buchanan. 2008. CEO duality leadership and firm risk-taking propensity. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 24 (1).
Krishnan, G. V. 2003a. Audit quality and the pricing of discretionary accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (1):109-126.
———. 2003b. Does Big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management? Accounting horizons 17:1-16.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez‐de‐Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance 54 (2):471-517.
Liao, L.-K., Y.-C. Chang, and Y.-C. Wang. 2018. 管理特質與財務危機關係之研究. 中華會計學刊 14 (1):97-128.
Libby, R., and D. M. Frederick. 1990. Experience and the ability to explain audit findings. Journal of accounting research 28 (2):348-367.
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dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202200662en_US