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題名 論死亡剝奪說與對稱問題
On Deprivation Account of Death and The Symmetry Problem
作者 謝欣儒
Hsieh, Hsin-Ju
貢獻者 鄭會穎
Cheng, Huei-Ying
謝欣儒
Hsieh, Hsin-Ju
關鍵詞 Thomas Nagel
死亡剝奪說
對稱問題
可能經驗
Derek Parfit
未來偏見
重要之事
Thomas Nagel
Deprivation account of death
Symmetry problem
possible experience
Derek Parfit
Future bias
What matter
日期 2022
上傳時間 1-Jul-2022 16:18:56 (UTC+8)
摘要 Thomas Nagel曾指出至少有三種問題與死亡哲學有關：第一類問題是關於某人實際並未感受到不愉快的事情是否可能對他是一件壞事。具體來說，針對死亡這件事，它的壞處並不建立在死亡會帶來任何痛苦的感覺，而是死亡者某種可能的好處會受到剝奪。第二類問題是如何把上述死亡的壞處歸屬於一個已經不存在的主體。換言之，當死亡者不復存在，我們如何將死亡的不幸加諸在某個已經不存在的主體上，以及這個主體是在何時經歷這個不幸？第三類問題涉及到人們看待死亡和出生前期間的態度。如果死亡的壞處是因為死亡者不存在所帶來的損失，同樣的，出生以前的不存在也應該具有同等的損失。然而，大多數人實際上不會為自己出生前的不存在而感到懊惱，因此似乎也沒有理由為死亡感到擔憂。

本文以上述三個問題為主軸展開研究。在第一類問題中，筆者將探討死亡剝奪說及其相關爭論，接著說明第二類及第三類問題，以及它們如何對死亡剝奪說的理論構成威脅。第三類問題又稱為「對稱問題」。過去在學術界主要有兩種回應該問題的方式，一種是來自Nagel的觀點，他認為人不可能提早出生，這說明出生前的可能經驗與死亡所剝奪的可能經驗不同。另一種觀點來自Derek Parfit對未來偏見的研究。這個觀點訴諸於人們擁有對未來和過去的不同時間偏好，藉此回應對稱問題。本文將依次分析這兩種觀點，並指出這兩種觀點各自遭受到的批評。經過上述研究，筆者進一步修正這兩種回應方式，並提出以重要之事來理解主體的方式，試圖解決與死亡哲學有關的三種問題。
Thomas Nagel suggests that at least three questions are related to the philosophy of death (Nagel, 1970). The first one is about whether it is a bad that someone does not feel any unpleasantness. To be more specific to death, its badness does not lie in any pain the death brings, but the deceased are deprived of some kind of possible experiences. The second question is how to make the badness in question possessed by a non-existing subject, and when this subject underwent this misfortune. And the last question involves the attitude toward how people treat the death and the time before the birth. If the badness of death is because of the loss which the nonexistence of the deceased brings, then likewise, the pre-vital nonexistence should involve the loss. However, most people do not concern with the pre-vital nonexistence. Therefore, it seems that there is no reason to feel worried about death.

This thesis takes these three questions as the main axis. For the first question, I review and explore the deprivation account of death and its arguments, and subsequently elaborate on the second and third questions, about how they threat to the deprivation account of death. The third question is also known as the symmetry problem. In the past, there were two ways in response to this problem. One was from Nagel’s perspectives: he holds that people could not exist earlier than it was actually born. This reveals the differences between the prenatal possible experiences and the posthumous possible experiences. The other point of view was from Derek Parfit’s research on future bias. This perspective resorts to the fact that people have different time preferences for the future and the past in response to the symmetry problem. This thesis analyzes the two perspective respectively and discusses their criticism. Through studies mentioned above, I further modify these two ways of responding, and proposes the way to use what matters to understand the subject, attempting to resolve the three questions about the philosophy of death.
參考文獻 Belk, R. W. (1988). “Possession and the Extended Self”,
Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 15, pp. 139-168.

Belshaw, C. (1993). “Asymmetry and Non-Existence”,
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 70, pp. 103-116.

Belshaw, C. (2000). “Later Death/Earlier Birth”, Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, pp. 69-83.

Bradley, B. (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.003.0002.

Brink, D. O. (2010). “Prospects for Temporal Neutrality”,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research, University
of San Diego School of Law, No. 10-011, pp. 1-26.

Brueckner, A. L, and Fischer, J. M. (1986). “Why Is Death
Bad”, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic. Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 213-221.

Brueckner, A. L, and Fischer, J. M. (1998). “Being born
earlier”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 76, No.
1, pp. 110-114.
Feinberg, J. (2003). The Moral Limits of the criminal Law.
Vol. 1: Harm to Others. Oxford Scholarship online. DOI:
10.1093/0195046641.001.0001.

Feldman, F. (1991). “Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death”,
The Philosophical Review, Vo. 100, No.2, pp. 205-227.

Feldman, F. (1992). Confrontations with the reaper: A
Philosophical Study of the Nature and the Value of Death.
New York: Oxford University Press.

Feldman, F. (2013). “Brueckner and Fischer on the evil of
death”, Philosophical Studies, 162(2), pp. 309-317. DOI:
10.1007/s11098-011-9766-6.

Fischer, J. M. (1997). “Death, Badness, and The
Impossibility of Experience”, The Journal of Ethics, Vol.
1, pp. 341-353.

Fischer, J. M, and Speak, D. (2000). “Death and the
Philosophical Conception of Personal Identity”, Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 24, No.1, pp.84-93.

Furley, D. J. (1986) “Nothing to Us?”, The Norms of Nature,
(eds.) M. Schofield and G. Striker, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Glannon, W. (1994). “Temporal Asymmetry, Life, and Death”,
American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 235-
244.

Gigerenzer, D, and Selten, R. (2002). “Rethinking
Rationality”, Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.
The MIT Press. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1654.001.0001.

Greene, P, and Sullivan, M. (2015). “Against Time Bias”,
Ethics, Vol. 125, No. 4, pp. 947-970.

Heathwood, C. (2008). “Fitting Attitudes and Welfare”,
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3, pp. 47-73.

Johansson, J. (2008). “Kaufman’s Response To Lucretius”,
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 89, pp. 470-485.

Johansson, J. (2013). “Past and Future Non-existence”, The
Journal of Ethics, Vol. 17, No 1/2, Special Issue: The
Benefits and Harms of Existence and Non-existence, pp. 51-
64.

Kagan, S. (2010). Death. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press.

Kahneman, D, and Tversky, A. (1979). “Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision under Risk”, Econometrica, Vol. 47,
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Kahneman, D, Knetsch, J. L, and Thaler R. H. (1991).
“Anomalies The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
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193-206.

Kaufman, F. (1996). “Death and Deprivation: or Why
Lucretius’s Symmetry argument fails.” Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, Vol. 74, No.2, pp. 305-312.

Kaufman, F. (1999). “Pre-Vital and Post- Mortem Non-
Existence”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No,
1, pp. 1-19.
Kaufman, F. (2000). “Thick and Thin Selves: Reply to Fischer
and Speak”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIV, pp. 94-
97.

Kaufman, F. (2011). “Late Birth, Early Death, and the
Problem of Lucretian Symmetry”, Social Theory and
Practice, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 113-127.

Kleing, J. (1978). “Crime and the Concept of Harm”, American
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 27-36.

Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Oxford: Basil.
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Philosophy and Medicine 73. DOI:
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May, R. (1969). Love and Will. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, Inc.

Meier, L. J. (2019). “What Matters in the Mirror of Time:
Why Lucretius’s Symmetry Argument Fails”, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 651-660.

Nagel, T. (1970). “Death”, Noûs, Vol. 4, No. 1. pp. 73-80.

Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal Questions. London: Cambridge
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Inc.

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Practice in Hellenisitic Ethics, Princeton: Princeton
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The Complete Extant Writing of Epicurus, Epictetus,
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University Press.

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Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press.

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of Epicurus”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 23,
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Against The Fear of Death”, Philosophy and the
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Toward the Future”, Principles and Persons: The Legacy of
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學系
105154007
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105154007
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 鄭會穎zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Cheng, Huei-Yingen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 謝欣儒zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Hsieh, Hsin-Juen_US
dc.creator (作者) 謝欣儒zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hsieh, Hsin-Juen_US
dc.date (日期) 2022en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2022 16:18:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2022 16:18:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2022 16:18:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0105154007en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140652-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 哲學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 105154007zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Thomas Nagel曾指出至少有三種問題與死亡哲學有關：第一類問題是關於某人實際並未感受到不愉快的事情是否可能對他是一件壞事。具體來說，針對死亡這件事，它的壞處並不建立在死亡會帶來任何痛苦的感覺，而是死亡者某種可能的好處會受到剝奪。第二類問題是如何把上述死亡的壞處歸屬於一個已經不存在的主體。換言之，當死亡者不復存在，我們如何將死亡的不幸加諸在某個已經不存在的主體上，以及這個主體是在何時經歷這個不幸？第三類問題涉及到人們看待死亡和出生前期間的態度。如果死亡的壞處是因為死亡者不存在所帶來的損失，同樣的，出生以前的不存在也應該具有同等的損失。然而，大多數人實際上不會為自己出生前的不存在而感到懊惱，因此似乎也沒有理由為死亡感到擔憂。

本文以上述三個問題為主軸展開研究。在第一類問題中，筆者將探討死亡剝奪說及其相關爭論，接著說明第二類及第三類問題，以及它們如何對死亡剝奪說的理論構成威脅。第三類問題又稱為「對稱問題」。過去在學術界主要有兩種回應該問題的方式，一種是來自Nagel的觀點，他認為人不可能提早出生，這說明出生前的可能經驗與死亡所剝奪的可能經驗不同。另一種觀點來自Derek Parfit對未來偏見的研究。這個觀點訴諸於人們擁有對未來和過去的不同時間偏好，藉此回應對稱問題。本文將依次分析這兩種觀點，並指出這兩種觀點各自遭受到的批評。經過上述研究，筆者進一步修正這兩種回應方式，並提出以重要之事來理解主體的方式，試圖解決與死亡哲學有關的三種問題。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Thomas Nagel suggests that at least three questions are related to the philosophy of death (Nagel, 1970). The first one is about whether it is a bad that someone does not feel any unpleasantness. To be more specific to death, its badness does not lie in any pain the death brings, but the deceased are deprived of some kind of possible experiences. The second question is how to make the badness in question possessed by a non-existing subject, and when this subject underwent this misfortune. And the last question involves the attitude toward how people treat the death and the time before the birth. If the badness of death is because of the loss which the nonexistence of the deceased brings, then likewise, the pre-vital nonexistence should involve the loss. However, most people do not concern with the pre-vital nonexistence. Therefore, it seems that there is no reason to feel worried about death.

This thesis takes these three questions as the main axis. For the first question, I review and explore the deprivation account of death and its arguments, and subsequently elaborate on the second and third questions, about how they threat to the deprivation account of death. The third question is also known as the symmetry problem. In the past, there were two ways in response to this problem. One was from Nagel’s perspectives: he holds that people could not exist earlier than it was actually born. This reveals the differences between the prenatal possible experiences and the posthumous possible experiences. The other point of view was from Derek Parfit’s research on future bias. This perspective resorts to the fact that people have different time preferences for the future and the past in response to the symmetry problem. This thesis analyzes the two perspective respectively and discusses their criticism. Through studies mentioned above, I further modify these two ways of responding, and proposes the way to use what matters to understand the subject, attempting to resolve the three questions about the philosophy of death.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 摘要 ⅰ
目錄 ⅳ
第一章 前 言 1
第一節 問題意識 1
第二節 兩項預設 3
一、物理主義 4
二、快樂主義 6
第三節 論述結構 8
第二章 死亡剝奪說 10
第一節 Epicurus論死亡 10
第二節 死亡剝奪說 19
第三節 死亡如何構成傷害 28
第四節 英年早逝 37
第三章 對稱問題及同一性路線 42
第一節 對稱論點 42
第二節 Nagel的同一性主張 48
第三節 Kaufman的同一性主張 53
一、批評 (A) 57
二、批評 (B) 61
第四節 同一性路線的困難 63
第四章 時間偏見 67
第一節 Parfit對時間偏見的看法 67
第二節 Brueckner與Fischer的偏好觀點 71
第三節 反對時間偏見 77
一、近期偏見 77
二、未來偏見 82
第四節 對偏好的解釋及其困境 87
一、演化:時間偏見何以普遍存在 87
二、偏好觀點的困境 91
第五章 對稱難題的解答 93
第一節 心理連續性 93
第二節 自我關心論證 101
第三節 得到快樂是否重要 104
結論 109
參考文獻 110		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 4117297 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105154007en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Thomas Nagelzh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 死亡剝奪說zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 對稱問題zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 可能經驗zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Derek Parfitzh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 未來偏見zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 重要之事zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Thomas Nagelen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Deprivation account of deathen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Symmetry problemen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) possible experienceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Derek Parfiten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Future biasen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) What matteren_US
dc.title (題名) 論死亡剝奪說與對稱問題zh_TW
dc.title (題名) On Deprivation Account of Death and The Symmetry Problemen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Belk, R. W. (1988). “Possession and the Extended Self”,
Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 15, pp. 139-168.

Belshaw, C. (1993). “Asymmetry and Non-Existence”,
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 70, pp. 103-116.

Belshaw, C. (2000). “Later Death/Earlier Birth”, Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, pp. 69-83.

Bradley, B. (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.003.0002.

Brink, D. O. (2010). “Prospects for Temporal Neutrality”,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research, University
of San Diego School of Law, No. 10-011, pp. 1-26.

Brueckner, A. L, and Fischer, J. M. (1986). “Why Is Death
Bad”, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic. Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 213-221.

Brueckner, A. L, and Fischer, J. M. (1998). “Being born
earlier”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 76, No.
1, pp. 110-114.
Feinberg, J. (2003). The Moral Limits of the criminal Law.
Vol. 1: Harm to Others. Oxford Scholarship online. DOI:
10.1093/0195046641.001.0001.

Feldman, F. (1991). “Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death”,
The Philosophical Review, Vo. 100, No.2, pp. 205-227.

Feldman, F. (1992). Confrontations with the reaper: A
Philosophical Study of the Nature and the Value of Death.
New York: Oxford University Press.

Feldman, F. (2013). “Brueckner and Fischer on the evil of
death”, Philosophical Studies, 162(2), pp. 309-317. DOI:
10.1007/s11098-011-9766-6.

Fischer, J. M. (1997). “Death, Badness, and The
Impossibility of Experience”, The Journal of Ethics, Vol.
1, pp. 341-353.

Fischer, J. M, and Speak, D. (2000). “Death and the
Philosophical Conception of Personal Identity”, Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 24, No.1, pp.84-93.

Furley, D. J. (1986) “Nothing to Us?”, The Norms of Nature,
(eds.) M. Schofield and G. Striker, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Glannon, W. (1994). “Temporal Asymmetry, Life, and Death”,
American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 235-
244.

Gigerenzer, D, and Selten, R. (2002). “Rethinking
Rationality”, Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.
The MIT Press. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1654.001.0001.

Greene, P, and Sullivan, M. (2015). “Against Time Bias”,
Ethics, Vol. 125, No. 4, pp. 947-970.

Heathwood, C. (2008). “Fitting Attitudes and Welfare”,
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3, pp. 47-73.

Johansson, J. (2008). “Kaufman’s Response To Lucretius”,
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 89, pp. 470-485.

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dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202200628en_US