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題名 Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles
作者 潘振宇
Pan, Chen-Yu
Konishi, Hideo;Simeonov, Dimitar
貢獻者 國貿系
關鍵詞 Group contest; Pairwise battles; Invariance result; Order choice game; Battle-by-battle player choice game
日期 2022.03
上傳時間 6-Jul-2022 15:40:09 (UTC+8)
摘要 We consider games in which team leaders strategically choose the order of players sent to the battlefield in majoritarian team contests with multiple pairwise battles as in Fu et al. (2015). We consider one-shot order-choice games and battle-by-battle sequential player choice games. We show that as long as the number of players on each team is the same as the number of battles, the equilibrium winning probability of a team and the ex ante expected effort of each player in a multi-battle contest are independent of whether players` assignments are one-shot or battle-by-battle sequential. This equilibrium winning probability and ex ante expected total effort coincide with those where the player matching is chosen totally randomly with an equal probability lottery by the contest organizer. Finally, we show how player choices add subtleties to the equivalence result by examples.
關聯 Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.132, pp.274-287
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.006
dc.contributor 國貿系
dc.creator (作者) 潘振宇
dc.creator (作者) Pan, Chen-Yu
dc.creator (作者) Konishi, Hideo;Simeonov, Dimitar
dc.date (日期) 2022.03
dc.date.accessioned 6-Jul-2022 15:40:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 6-Jul-2022 15:40:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-Jul-2022 15:40:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140815-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) We consider games in which team leaders strategically choose the order of players sent to the battlefield in majoritarian team contests with multiple pairwise battles as in Fu et al. (2015). We consider one-shot order-choice games and battle-by-battle sequential player choice games. We show that as long as the number of players on each team is the same as the number of battles, the equilibrium winning probability of a team and the ex ante expected effort of each player in a multi-battle contest are independent of whether players` assignments are one-shot or battle-by-battle sequential. This equilibrium winning probability and ex ante expected total effort coincide with those where the player matching is chosen totally randomly with an equal probability lottery by the contest organizer. Finally, we show how player choices add subtleties to the equivalence result by examples.
dc.format.extent 105 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.132, pp.274-287
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Group contest; Pairwise battles; Invariance result; Order choice game; Battle-by-battle player choice game
dc.title (題名) Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.006
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.006