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題名 The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Reporting on the Syndicated Loan Structure
強制採用國際會計準則對債務契約結構之影響
作者 金成隆;姚維仁;曾家璿
Chin, Chen-lung;Yao, Wei-ren;Tseng, Chia-hsuan
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 International financial reporting standards; IFRS; Syndicated loans; Lead arranger
國際會計準則; 聯貸契約; 主辦銀行
日期 2020-12
上傳時間 7-Jul-2022 14:50:32 (UTC+8)
摘要 This research examines whether and how the globally mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter, IFRS) affects the ownership structure of syndicated loans. We find that the lead arrangers retain a larger proportion of a syndicated loan, fewer lenders are involved in a syndicated loan, and lead arrangers, in turn, form a more concentrated syndicate after borrowers adopt IFRS. Specifically, the adoption of a principles-based accounting system such as IFRS, characterized by limited interpretation and implementation guidance, increases the difference in professional judgment among debt contracting parties, which in turn reduces lenders’ and borrowers’ demand for accounting information in signing debt contracts. Further analyses indicate that the negative effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on the ownership structure of a syndicated loan is weaker in common-law countries (in countries with a stricter enforcement regime) than in civil-law countries (in countries with a weaker enforcement regime).
本研究以聯貸市場探討強制採用國際會計準則對債務契約結構的影響。實證研究結果發現在強制採用國際會計準則之後,主辦銀行的債權持有比例增加,參與聯貸的銀行家數減少,表示強制採用國際會計準則使債務契約結構趨向集中。國際會計準則屬於原則式準則,提供較少詳細解釋以及指引規範,因此財務報表編製者對會計政策選擇與裁量權具有較高彈性,協辦銀行對於採用國際會計準則所伴隨的較高資訊風險存有疑慮,因此要求主辦銀行提高債權持有比例,降低聯貸市場以會計資訊訂定債務契約之需求。進一步分析發現強制採用國際會計準則對於債務契約結構的負面影響,成文法系國家之負面影響大於普通法系國家、法令執行強度較弱國家之負面影響大於法令執行強度較強國家。
關聯 Corporate Management Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp.107-152
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.3966/102873102020124002004
dc.contributor 會計系
dc.creator (作者) 金成隆;姚維仁;曾家璿
dc.creator (作者) Chin, Chen-lung;Yao, Wei-ren;Tseng, Chia-hsuan
dc.date (日期) 2020-12
dc.date.accessioned 7-Jul-2022 14:50:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 7-Jul-2022 14:50:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Jul-2022 14:50:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140840-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This research examines whether and how the globally mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter, IFRS) affects the ownership structure of syndicated loans. We find that the lead arrangers retain a larger proportion of a syndicated loan, fewer lenders are involved in a syndicated loan, and lead arrangers, in turn, form a more concentrated syndicate after borrowers adopt IFRS. Specifically, the adoption of a principles-based accounting system such as IFRS, characterized by limited interpretation and implementation guidance, increases the difference in professional judgment among debt contracting parties, which in turn reduces lenders’ and borrowers’ demand for accounting information in signing debt contracts. Further analyses indicate that the negative effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on the ownership structure of a syndicated loan is weaker in common-law countries (in countries with a stricter enforcement regime) than in civil-law countries (in countries with a weaker enforcement regime).
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究以聯貸市場探討強制採用國際會計準則對債務契約結構的影響。實證研究結果發現在強制採用國際會計準則之後,主辦銀行的債權持有比例增加,參與聯貸的銀行家數減少,表示強制採用國際會計準則使債務契約結構趨向集中。國際會計準則屬於原則式準則,提供較少詳細解釋以及指引規範,因此財務報表編製者對會計政策選擇與裁量權具有較高彈性,協辦銀行對於採用國際會計準則所伴隨的較高資訊風險存有疑慮,因此要求主辦銀行提高債權持有比例,降低聯貸市場以會計資訊訂定債務契約之需求。進一步分析發現強制採用國際會計準則對於債務契約結構的負面影響,成文法系國家之負面影響大於普通法系國家、法令執行強度較弱國家之負面影響大於法令執行強度較強國家。
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dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Corporate Management Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp.107-152
dc.subject (關鍵詞) International financial reporting standards; IFRS; Syndicated loans; Lead arranger
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 國際會計準則; 聯貸契約; 主辦銀行
dc.title (題名) The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Reporting on the Syndicated Loan Structure
dc.title (題名) 強制採用國際會計準則對債務契約結構之影響
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.3966/102873102020124002004
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.3966/102873102020124002004