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題名 Understanding Corporate Governance in Business Groups: Lobbying by Subsidiary CEO for R&D Investment
作者 黃政仁
Huang, Cheng Jen
Shao, Jun;Wu, Anne;Boh, Wai Fong
貢獻者 會計系
日期 2022-01
上傳時間 29-Jul-2022 15:41:50 (UTC+8)
摘要 This study sheds light on control and corporate governance issues between parent firms and subsidiaries in business groups by examining the extent to which subsidiary CEOs’ network power influence their ability to lobby for greater subsidiary R&D investment. Our results highlight that subsidiary CEOs of business groups exert their network power to lobby for approval from parent firms for greater subsidiary R&D investment. Further, our findings suggest that effective subsidiary corporate governance can mitigate the positive influence of subsidiary CEOs’ network power on their ability to lobby for more subsidiary R&D investment. Finally, we find that excessive R&D investment secured by subsidiary CEOs result in lower subsidiary’s firm performance.
關聯 2022 American Accounting Association Management Accounting Section Midyear Meeting, American Accounting Association Management Accounting Section
資料類型 conference
dc.contributor 會計系
dc.creator (作者) 黃政仁
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Cheng Jen
dc.creator (作者) Shao, Jun;Wu, Anne;Boh, Wai Fong
dc.date (日期) 2022-01
dc.date.accessioned 29-Jul-2022 15:41:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 29-Jul-2022 15:41:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 29-Jul-2022 15:41:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140946-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study sheds light on control and corporate governance issues between parent firms and subsidiaries in business groups by examining the extent to which subsidiary CEOs’ network power influence their ability to lobby for greater subsidiary R&D investment. Our results highlight that subsidiary CEOs of business groups exert their network power to lobby for approval from parent firms for greater subsidiary R&D investment. Further, our findings suggest that effective subsidiary corporate governance can mitigate the positive influence of subsidiary CEOs’ network power on their ability to lobby for more subsidiary R&D investment. Finally, we find that excessive R&D investment secured by subsidiary CEOs result in lower subsidiary’s firm performance.
dc.format.extent 431283 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) 2022 American Accounting Association Management Accounting Section Midyear Meeting, American Accounting Association Management Accounting Section
dc.title (題名) Understanding Corporate Governance in Business Groups: Lobbying by Subsidiary CEO for R&D Investment
dc.type (資料類型) conference