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題名 認識與後設認識—賈央塔《正理之花．非二元識論章》譯註與研究
Cognition and Meta-cognition: A Study and Annotated Translation of the Vijñānādvaitavāda Section of Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī作者 李承恩
Lee, Cheng-En貢獻者 林鎮國<br>何建興
Lin, Chen-Kuo<br>Ho, Chien-Hsing
李承恩
Lee, Cheng-En關鍵詞 賈央塔
正理之花
正理派
識論
認識
後設認識
自證
反思認識日期 2022 上傳時間 1-Aug-2022 17:43:29 (UTC+8) 摘要 《正理之花》（Nyāyamañjarī）是印度正理派（Nyāya）哲學家賈央塔（Bhaṭṭa Jayanta，約840-900 CE）的重要著作，其中的〈非二元識論章〉（Vijñānādvaitavādaḥ，下稱識論章）涉及他對佛教中以陳那（Dignāga，約480-540 CE）、法稱（Dharmakīrti，約600-660 CE）為首的「識論（Vijñānavāda）」立場的批評，本文特別聚焦於認識與後設認識的討論，對〈識論章〉進行哲學研究與梵本中文譯註，主要的問題意識為：對賈央塔而言，認識經驗是什麼？因此，本文藉由探討以下議題：形相（ākāra）、量論（pramāṇavāda）、自證（svasaṁvitti）、反思認識（anuvyavasāya），分析賈央塔和識論的爭論，特別是釐清陳那的回憶論證和法稱的共同知覺限定（sahopalambhaniyama）論證，說明識論如何宣稱僅有認識為唯一存在，並且在認識當下必然具有對認識的反身性意識；相對的，賈央塔如何基於認識的因果關係而反駁識論，指出必然有外在對象的存在，且認識僅能在後續被反思認識所經驗。最終本文試圖證成如下核心主張：「站在正理派的立場，所謂的認識就是透過因果關係認識到與認識相異的對象，因此不可能有自證」。 參考文獻 1. 工具書中華電子佛典協會編，2016，CBETA電子佛典，台北：中華電子佛典協會。平川彰主編，1978，《俱舍論索引》，第一部至第三部，東京：大藏。荻原雲來主編，1979，《漢譯對照梵和大辭典》，台北：新文豐出版公司。2. 原始文獻五百大阿羅漢等造，玄奘譯，《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》，CBETA, T27, no. 1545。世親造，玄奘譯，《阿毘達磨俱舍論》，CBETA, T29, no. 1558。世親造，玄奘譯，《唯識二十論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1590。安慧造，玄奘譯，《大乘阿毘達磨雜集論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1606。呂澂輯，《集量論釋略抄》，CBETA, B09, no. 37。迦旃延子造，五百羅漢釋，《阿毘曇毘婆沙論》，CBETA, T28, no. 1546。陳那造，真諦譯，《無相思塵論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1619。陳那造，玄奘譯，《觀所緣緣論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1624。陳那造，玄奘譯，《因明正理門論》，CBETA, T32, no. 1628。商羯羅主造，玄奘譯，《因明入正理論》，CBETA, T32, no. 1630。提婆設摩阿羅漢造，玄奘譯，《阿毘達磨識身足論》，CBETA, T26, no. 1539。訶梨跋摩造，鳩摩羅什譯，《成實論》，CBETA, T32, no. 1646。慧月造，玄奘譯，《勝宗十句義論》，CBETA, T54, no. 2138。窺基造，《成唯識論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1830。窺基造，《唯識二十論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1834。護法造，玄奘譯，《大乘廣百論釋論》，CBETA, T30, no. 1571。護法造，義淨譯，《觀所緣論釋》，CBETA, T31, no. 1625。護法等造，玄奘譯，《成唯識論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1585。Āgamaḍambara: Dezsõ, C. 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國立政治大學
哲學系
109154001資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109154001 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 林鎮國<br>何建興 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lin, Chen-Kuo<br>Ho, Chien-Hsing en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 李承恩 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lee, Cheng-En en_US dc.creator (作者) 李承恩 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lee, Cheng-En en_US dc.date (日期) 2022 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Aug-2022 17:43:29 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Aug-2022 17:43:29 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Aug-2022 17:43:29 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0109154001 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/141141 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 哲學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 109154001 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 《正理之花》（Nyāyamañjarī）是印度正理派（Nyāya）哲學家賈央塔（Bhaṭṭa Jayanta，約840-900 CE）的重要著作，其中的〈非二元識論章〉（Vijñānādvaitavādaḥ，下稱識論章）涉及他對佛教中以陳那（Dignāga，約480-540 CE）、法稱（Dharmakīrti，約600-660 CE）為首的「識論（Vijñānavāda）」立場的批評，本文特別聚焦於認識與後設認識的討論，對〈識論章〉進行哲學研究與梵本中文譯註，主要的問題意識為：對賈央塔而言，認識經驗是什麼？因此，本文藉由探討以下議題：形相（ākāra）、量論（pramāṇavāda）、自證（svasaṁvitti）、反思認識（anuvyavasāya），分析賈央塔和識論的爭論，特別是釐清陳那的回憶論證和法稱的共同知覺限定（sahopalambhaniyama）論證，說明識論如何宣稱僅有認識為唯一存在，並且在認識當下必然具有對認識的反身性意識；相對的，賈央塔如何基於認識的因果關係而反駁識論，指出必然有外在對象的存在，且認識僅能在後續被反思認識所經驗。最終本文試圖證成如下核心主張：「站在正理派的立場，所謂的認識就是透過因果關係認識到與認識相異的對象，因此不可能有自證」。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 導論 1研究動機與目的 1文獻探討 4研究方法與步驟 8章節劃分 8預期成果與貢獻 13第一章 認識 161.1 形相 161.2 識論之量論 221.3 識論對經量部的反駁 371.4 正理派量論及其對識論的批評 43第二章 後設認識 592.1 照顯：自照、他照 592.2 自證與回憶論證 642.3 自證作為認識成立之條件 752.4 正理派的反思認識 872.5 賈央塔批評自證 95結論 105《正理之花．非二元識論章》中文譯註 110詞彙對照表 169參考文獻 177 zh_TW dc.format.extent 3035871 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109154001 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 賈央塔 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 正理之花 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 正理派 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 識論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 認識 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 後設認識 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自證 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 反思認識 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 認識與後設認識—賈央塔《正理之花．非二元識論章》譯註與研究 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Cognition and Meta-cognition: A Study and Annotated Translation of the Vijñānādvaitavāda Section of Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. 工具書中華電子佛典協會編，2016，CBETA電子佛典，台北：中華電子佛典協會。平川彰主編，1978，《俱舍論索引》，第一部至第三部，東京：大藏。荻原雲來主編，1979，《漢譯對照梵和大辭典》，台北：新文豐出版公司。2. 原始文獻五百大阿羅漢等造，玄奘譯，《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》，CBETA, T27, no. 1545。世親造，玄奘譯，《阿毘達磨俱舍論》，CBETA, T29, no. 1558。世親造，玄奘譯，《唯識二十論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1590。安慧造，玄奘譯，《大乘阿毘達磨雜集論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1606。呂澂輯，《集量論釋略抄》，CBETA, B09, no. 37。迦旃延子造，五百羅漢釋，《阿毘曇毘婆沙論》，CBETA, T28, no. 1546。陳那造，真諦譯，《無相思塵論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1619。陳那造，玄奘譯，《觀所緣緣論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1624。陳那造，玄奘譯，《因明正理門論》，CBETA, T32, no. 1628。商羯羅主造，玄奘譯，《因明入正理論》，CBETA, T32, no. 1630。提婆設摩阿羅漢造，玄奘譯，《阿毘達磨識身足論》，CBETA, T26, no. 1539。訶梨跋摩造，鳩摩羅什譯，《成實論》，CBETA, T32, no. 1646。慧月造，玄奘譯，《勝宗十句義論》，CBETA, T54, no. 2138。窺基造，《成唯識論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1830。窺基造，《唯識二十論述記》，CBETA, T43, no. 1834。護法造，玄奘譯，《大乘廣百論釋論》，CBETA, T30, no. 1571。護法造，義淨譯，《觀所緣論釋》，CBETA, T31, no. 1625。護法等造，玄奘譯，《成唯識論》，CBETA, T31, no. 1585。Āgamaḍambara: Dezsõ, C. 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