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題名 Nvidia 併購ARM的動態競爭研究
Dynamic Competition Analysis in M&A – A Case Study of Nvidia & ARM Merger作者 鄭家修
Cheng, Chia-Hsiu貢獻者 許牧彥
Hsu, Mu-Yen
鄭家修
Cheng, Chia-Hsiu關鍵詞 動態競爭
市場共同性
資源相似性
察覺- 動機 - 能力觀點
併購
Dynamic Competition
Market commonality
Resource similarity
AMC Theory
Mergers and Acquisitions日期 2022 上傳時間 1-八月-2022 18:52:46 (UTC+8) 摘要 2021年全球半導體市場全年總銷售值達5559億美元，全球受新冠疫情影響，供應鏈短缺與在家工作需求量大增。此外受惠於全球5G快速發展與建置、車用市場復甦，相應的晶片需求也大量增加。全球半導體品牌大廠，包括英特爾(Intel)、美光(Micron)、超微(AMD)、輝達(Nvidia)等等皆是美系大廠，影響力超越50%，相關的一舉一動也被全球關注。2020年9月IC 設計大廠Nvidia在市場投下了震撼彈，宣布將併購軟銀集團旗下的安謀控股公司(ARM Holdings plc.)。過去論文主要討論垂直併購績效與實質影響，但鮮少討論雙方在併購中動態競爭與互動的關係，因此本研究以動態競爭觀點，並納入各國政府對併購判決與調查，最終分析此次併購案。本研究發現Nvidia與ARM在合併前具有不同終端市場，一方為圖形運算與AI計算產品，一方為手機與伺服器架構商品。隨著科技進步，Nvidia將事業版圖伸向CPU市場，希望能透過併購快速補足公司在CPU專利與技術上的不足，根據模型，合併後與競爭對手Intel資源相似性將大幅提高，能大幅追上。然而，隨著政府針對違反公平交易法的調查，美國、歐盟、英國與中國等等國家相繼出手阻止與調查，最終併購案並未通過。因此本研究最後以AMC分析法探討後續Nvidia是否會加入商業聯盟來入股ARM。本研究參考ASML的例子來探討上游供應商的持股問題，認為極有可能以此方式進行下步動作。
In 2021, the total annual sales value of the global semiconductor market reach 555.9 billion US dollars. Due to the COVID-19 virus infection, the global supply chain fell into chaos and the demand for working from home has greatly increased. In addition, the 5G infrastructure globally and the recovery of the automotive market, the corresponding demand for chips, has also increased significantly. Global semiconductor brand manufacturers, including Intel, Micron, AMD, Nvidia, etc. are all major US-based manufacturers, with an influence exceeding 50%, and related actions are also recognized by the world.In September 2020, Nvidia, a major IC design company, announced that it would acquire ARM Holdings., a subsidiary of SoftBank Group. In the past, papers mainly discussed the performance and substantive impact of vertical mergers and acquisitions, but rarely discussed the dynamic competition and interaction between the two parties in mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, this study takes the perspective of dynamic competition and incorporates the judgments and investigations of various governments on mergers and acquisitions, and finally analyzes this merger case.This study found that Nvidia and ARM had different end markets before the merger, one for graphics computing and AI computing products, and the other for mobile phones and server architecture products. With the advancement of technology, Nvidia has extended its business to the CPU market, hoping to quickly make up for the company`s shortcomings in CPU patents and technologies through mergers and acquisitions. According to the model, after the merger, the resources similarity with its competitor Intel will be greatly improved, and it will be able to catch up significantly. However, following the government`s investigation into violations of the Fair Trade Law, countries such as the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and China have stepped in to block and investigate, and the merger case has not been approved in the end. Therefore, this study finally uses the AMC analysis method to explore whether Nvidia will join the business alliance to invest in ARM in the future.參考文獻 英文文獻Amit, R., & Shoemaker, P. (1993). Specialized assets and organizational rent. Strategic management journal, 14(1), 33-47.Arrow, K. J. (1975). Vertical integration and communication. The Bell Journal of Economics, 173-183.Chen, M.-J. (1996). Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration. Academy of management review, 21(1), 100-134.Chen, M.-J., Smith, K. G., & Grimm, C. M. (1992). Action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses. Management science, 38(3), 439-455.Chen, M. J., & Miller, D. (1994). Competitive attack, retaliation and performance: an expectancy‐valence framework. Strategic management journal, 15(2), 85-102.Conner, K. R. (1994). THE RESOURCE-BASED CHALLENGE TO THE INDUSTRY-STRUCTURE PERSPECTIVE. Academy of Management Proceedings,Fan, Joseph P. H., & Goyal, Vidhan K. (2006). On the Patterns and Wealth Effects of Vertical Mergers. The Journal of Business, 79(2), 877-902. https://doi.org/10.1086/499141Green, J. R. (1986). Vertical integration and assurance of markets. In New developments in the analysis of market structure (pp. 177-210). Springer.Harrigan, K. R. (1985). Vertical integration and corporate strategy. Academy of Management journal, 28(2), 397-425.Hsu, M.-Y., &, & Chen, M.-J. (2006). Competitor Analysis and Inter-Firm Rivalry: by integrating market commonality and resource similarity. Darden Graduate School of Business, University of Virginia.Mankiw, N. G. (2020). Principles of economics. Cengage Learning.Ndlela, L. T., & du Toit, A. S. A. (2001). Establishing a knowledge management programme for competitive advantage in an enterprise. International Journal of Information Management, 21(2), 151-165. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S0268-4012(01)00007-XPisano, G. P., & Teece, D. J. (2007). How to capture value from innovation: Shaping intellectual property and industry architecture. California management review, 50(1), 278-296.Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive advantage of nations: creating and sustaining superior performance. simon and schuster.Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage : creating and sustaining superior performance / Michael E. Porter. Free Press.Schumpeter, J. (1942). Creative destruction. Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 825, 82-85.Softbank. (2021). 2021 Annual Financial Report (Annual Financial Report, Issue.Trautwein, F. (1990). Merger motives and merger prescriptions. Strategic management journal, 11(4), 283-295.中文文獻吳安妮. (1992). 台灣企業併購動機之實證研究. 管理評論, 11, 1-27.吳柏毅. (2021). 反托拉斯法與監管對併購案的影響: 以AT&T併購時代華納為例 (Publication Number 2021年) 國立政治大學]. AiritiLibrary.汪渡村. (2007). 公平交易法. 五南圖書出版股份有限公司.周蓓雯, & 劉尚志. (2007). 高科技企業併購專利實地查核之法律分析與風險管理-以美國專利法為中心 國立交通大學].品狄斯克, Pindyck, R. S., 魯賓費爾德, Rubinfeld, D. L., 劉純之, 游慧光, & 林恭正. (2014). 個體經濟學 / Robert S. Pindyck,Daniel L. Rubinfeld著 ; 劉純之,游慧光,林恭正譯 (八版 ed.). 華泰.許牧彥. (2016, 2016-11). 加己減異、加異減己 ─ 專利佈署的全方位競爭策略 科技管理學會年會暨論文研討會（CSMOT）, http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129286陳韻珊. (2015). 垂直整合的封鎖效果. 公平交易委員會電子報.黃美瑛. (1991). 美國反托拉斯執行組織與運作之研究. 經濟研究(31), 73-123. https://doi.org/10.29765/tei.199112.0003楊政學. (2005). 個體經濟學 : 學理與應用 = Microeconomics Theories and Applications / 楊政學著 (初版 ed.). 新文京開發.溫偉任, 李文傑, & 歐宜芬. (2016). 垂直整合廠商是否促成下游競爭廠商的聯合行為? 經濟論文, 44(4), 487-535.廖元豪. (2000). 美國聯邦交易委員會法第五條與其他反托拉斯法之關係--兼論我國公平交易法第二十四條之適用範圍. 公平交易季刊, 1-30.賴品中. (2018). 企業併購的動態競爭分析 : 以台灣半導體封測廠商日月光與矽品合併為例 = Dynamic competition analysis in M&A : a case study of ASE-SPIL merger / 賴品中撰 賴品中]. 台北市.韓嘯宇. (2020). 英偉達（NVDA） 更新報告 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
科技管理與智慧財產研究所
109364117資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109364117 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 許牧彥 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Hsu, Mu-Yen en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 鄭家修 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Cheng, Chia-Hsiu en_US dc.creator (作者) 鄭家修 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Cheng, Chia-Hsiu en_US dc.date (日期) 2022 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-八月-2022 18:52:46 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-八月-2022 18:52:46 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-八月-2022 18:52:46 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0109364117 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/141362 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 科技管理與智慧財產研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 109364117 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 2021年全球半導體市場全年總銷售值達5559億美元，全球受新冠疫情影響，供應鏈短缺與在家工作需求量大增。此外受惠於全球5G快速發展與建置、車用市場復甦，相應的晶片需求也大量增加。全球半導體品牌大廠，包括英特爾(Intel)、美光(Micron)、超微(AMD)、輝達(Nvidia)等等皆是美系大廠，影響力超越50%，相關的一舉一動也被全球關注。2020年9月IC 設計大廠Nvidia在市場投下了震撼彈，宣布將併購軟銀集團旗下的安謀控股公司(ARM Holdings plc.)。過去論文主要討論垂直併購績效與實質影響，但鮮少討論雙方在併購中動態競爭與互動的關係，因此本研究以動態競爭觀點，並納入各國政府對併購判決與調查，最終分析此次併購案。本研究發現Nvidia與ARM在合併前具有不同終端市場，一方為圖形運算與AI計算產品，一方為手機與伺服器架構商品。隨著科技進步，Nvidia將事業版圖伸向CPU市場，希望能透過併購快速補足公司在CPU專利與技術上的不足，根據模型，合併後與競爭對手Intel資源相似性將大幅提高，能大幅追上。然而，隨著政府針對違反公平交易法的調查，美國、歐盟、英國與中國等等國家相繼出手阻止與調查，最終併購案並未通過。因此本研究最後以AMC分析法探討後續Nvidia是否會加入商業聯盟來入股ARM。本研究參考ASML的例子來探討上游供應商的持股問題，認為極有可能以此方式進行下步動作。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) In 2021, the total annual sales value of the global semiconductor market reach 555.9 billion US dollars. Due to the COVID-19 virus infection, the global supply chain fell into chaos and the demand for working from home has greatly increased. In addition, the 5G infrastructure globally and the recovery of the automotive market, the corresponding demand for chips, has also increased significantly. Global semiconductor brand manufacturers, including Intel, Micron, AMD, Nvidia, etc. are all major US-based manufacturers, with an influence exceeding 50%, and related actions are also recognized by the world.In September 2020, Nvidia, a major IC design company, announced that it would acquire ARM Holdings., a subsidiary of SoftBank Group. In the past, papers mainly discussed the performance and substantive impact of vertical mergers and acquisitions, but rarely discussed the dynamic competition and interaction between the two parties in mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, this study takes the perspective of dynamic competition and incorporates the judgments and investigations of various governments on mergers and acquisitions, and finally analyzes this merger case.This study found that Nvidia and ARM had different end markets before the merger, one for graphics computing and AI computing products, and the other for mobile phones and server architecture products. With the advancement of technology, Nvidia has extended its business to the CPU market, hoping to quickly make up for the company`s shortcomings in CPU patents and technologies through mergers and acquisitions. According to the model, after the merger, the resources similarity with its competitor Intel will be greatly improved, and it will be able to catch up significantly. However, following the government`s investigation into violations of the Fair Trade Law, countries such as the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and China have stepped in to block and investigate, and the merger case has not been approved in the end. Therefore, this study finally uses the AMC analysis method to explore whether Nvidia will join the business alliance to invest in ARM in the future. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景與動機 1第二節 研究目的與問題 1第三節 研究定位與內容 2第二章 文獻回顧 5第一節 動態競爭 5第二節 企業併購 7第三節 公平交易法 9第三章 研究方法 12第一節 研究架構 12第二節 資料蒐集方法 13第三節 變數定義與分析方式 14第四章 產業分析 17第一節 半導體晶片生產商生態 17第二節 複雜指令與簡單指令 18第三節 簡單指令集競爭 19第四節 Nvidia 與ARM 公司分析 20第五章 企業併購與政府回應 26第一節 Nvidia 申請併購ARM 26第二節 併購對於ARM架構生態的影響 27第三節 各國政府對併購的回應 29第四節 Nvidia終止併購ARM 37第六章 個案分析 39第一節 競爭者分析 39第二節 競爭決策者的驅動因子 48第三節 併購失敗競爭結果 50第七章 研究結論與建議 55第一節 研究結論 55第二節 研究限制與後續建議 57參考文獻 58 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1804371 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109364117 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 動態競爭 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 市場共同性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資源相似性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 察覺- 動機 - 能力觀點 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dynamic Competition en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Market commonality en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Resource similarity en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) AMC Theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Mergers and Acquisitions en_US dc.title (題名) Nvidia 併購ARM的動態競爭研究 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Dynamic Competition Analysis in M&A – A Case Study of Nvidia & ARM Merger en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 英文文獻Amit, R., & Shoemaker, P. (1993). Specialized assets and organizational rent. Strategic management journal, 14(1), 33-47.Arrow, K. J. (1975). Vertical integration and communication. The Bell Journal of Economics, 173-183.Chen, M.-J. (1996). Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration. Academy of management review, 21(1), 100-134.Chen, M.-J., Smith, K. G., & Grimm, C. M. (1992). Action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses. Management science, 38(3), 439-455.Chen, M. J., & Miller, D. (1994). Competitive attack, retaliation and performance: an expectancy‐valence framework. Strategic management journal, 15(2), 85-102.Conner, K. R. (1994). THE RESOURCE-BASED CHALLENGE TO THE INDUSTRY-STRUCTURE PERSPECTIVE. Academy of Management Proceedings,Fan, Joseph P. H., & Goyal, Vidhan K. (2006). On the Patterns and Wealth Effects of Vertical Mergers. The Journal of Business, 79(2), 877-902. https://doi.org/10.1086/499141Green, J. R. (1986). Vertical integration and assurance of markets. In New developments in the analysis of market structure (pp. 177-210). Springer.Harrigan, K. R. (1985). Vertical integration and corporate strategy. Academy of Management journal, 28(2), 397-425.Hsu, M.-Y., &, & Chen, M.-J. (2006). Competitor Analysis and Inter-Firm Rivalry: by integrating market commonality and resource similarity. Darden Graduate School of Business, University of Virginia.Mankiw, N. G. (2020). Principles of economics. Cengage Learning.Ndlela, L. T., & du Toit, A. S. A. (2001). Establishing a knowledge management programme for competitive advantage in an enterprise. International Journal of Information Management, 21(2), 151-165. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S0268-4012(01)00007-XPisano, G. P., & Teece, D. J. (2007). How to capture value from innovation: Shaping intellectual property and industry architecture. California management review, 50(1), 278-296.Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive advantage of nations: creating and sustaining superior performance. simon and schuster.Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage : creating and sustaining superior performance / Michael E. Porter. Free Press.Schumpeter, J. (1942). Creative destruction. Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 825, 82-85.Softbank. (2021). 2021 Annual Financial Report (Annual Financial Report, Issue.Trautwein, F. (1990). Merger motives and merger prescriptions. Strategic management journal, 11(4), 283-295.中文文獻吳安妮. (1992). 台灣企業併購動機之實證研究. 管理評論, 11, 1-27.吳柏毅. (2021). 反托拉斯法與監管對併購案的影響: 以AT&T併購時代華納為例 (Publication Number 2021年) 國立政治大學]. AiritiLibrary.汪渡村. (2007). 公平交易法. 五南圖書出版股份有限公司.周蓓雯, & 劉尚志. (2007). 高科技企業併購專利實地查核之法律分析與風險管理-以美國專利法為中心 國立交通大學].品狄斯克, Pindyck, R. S., 魯賓費爾德, Rubinfeld, D. L., 劉純之, 游慧光, & 林恭正. (2014). 個體經濟學 / Robert S. Pindyck,Daniel L. Rubinfeld著 ; 劉純之,游慧光,林恭正譯 (八版 ed.). 華泰.許牧彥. (2016, 2016-11). 加己減異、加異減己 ─ 專利佈署的全方位競爭策略 科技管理學會年會暨論文研討會（CSMOT）, http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/129286陳韻珊. (2015). 垂直整合的封鎖效果. 公平交易委員會電子報.黃美瑛. (1991). 美國反托拉斯執行組織與運作之研究. 經濟研究(31), 73-123. https://doi.org/10.29765/tei.199112.0003楊政學. (2005). 個體經濟學 : 學理與應用 = Microeconomics Theories and Applications / 楊政學著 (初版 ed.). 新文京開發.溫偉任, 李文傑, & 歐宜芬. (2016). 垂直整合廠商是否促成下游競爭廠商的聯合行為? 經濟論文, 44(4), 487-535.廖元豪. (2000). 美國聯邦交易委員會法第五條與其他反托拉斯法之關係--兼論我國公平交易法第二十四條之適用範圍. 公平交易季刊, 1-30.賴品中. (2018). 企業併購的動態競爭分析 : 以台灣半導體封測廠商日月光與矽品合併為例 = Dynamic competition analysis in M&A : a case study of ASE-SPIL merger / 賴品中撰 賴品中]. 台北市.韓嘯宇. (2020). 英偉達（NVDA） 更新報告 zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202200965 en_US
