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題名 基於夏普利值的公平性量化模型 —以二階段製程系統為例
Quantitative models for fairness issues based on Shapley value – Taking a two-process manufacturing system as an example作者 蔡德脩
Tsai, Te-Hsiu貢獻者 洪叔民
Horng, Shwu-Min
蔡德脩
Tsai, Te-Hsiu關鍵詞 夏普利值
激勵合約
供應鏈
外包
量化
公平性
Shapley value
Incentive contract
Supply chain
Outsourcing
Quantitative
Fairness日期 2022 上傳時間 1-Aug-2022 18:57:07 (UTC+8) 摘要 利益分配一直都是供應鏈通路協作中的重要議題，這篇文獻裡我們將探討(1)如何合理的分配合作利益以及(2)哪種情形的利益分配會導致合作破裂。我們透過夏普利值來計算供應鏈中參與者的邊際貢獻，然後計算出每個人合理的應得利潤，此外我們也利用夏普利值針對Schmidt (1999)文獻中的不公平厭惡(Inequality Aversion)的量化公式進行修改，得出能夠合理反映一個供應鏈中，具有不平等條件的各個合作參與者的合作效用(Utility)的模型，並用此模型來判斷一次合作是否會成立或破滅。同時我們也以一個二階段製程系統為例進行數值分析來使我們的分析更具體。因此本研究參考了Tarakci, Tang (2006)研究中的供應鏈模型，透過假定不同參數來模擬不同的供應鏈合作情境，並用我們的模型來計算合理的利益分配以及判斷合作的可行性。例如在該系統中當一個製造商面對一個掌管核心高階技術的維修承包商，以及另一個可替代性較高的維修承包商時，利潤應該如何分配才能促成有效率的通路合作;抑或是當一個製造商面對兩個具有相似技術的承包商時應該如何合理的分配利益。最後，我們也會探討在該論文中傳統的利潤分配方法在加入的公平性的考量後的可行性，以此證明這些方法如激勵合約(Incentive Contract)的優點與缺陷。
Resource allocation is always an important issue in channel coordination of supply chain. In this thesis, we will discuss (i) how to fairly distribute profit and (ii) based on fairness, in what situations the coordination will break. We will use Shapley value to calculate the deserved profit of each participant in a supply chain. Besides, we will modify the formula of inequality aversion in the Fehr und Schmidt (1999) thesis as a model which can reasonably reflect the participants’ utility with different conditions in a supply chain, and use it to judge if a coordination will break or not.At the same time, we take two-process manufacturing system as example and analyze the numerical results in different situations of system through our model. We refer the supply chain models in Tarakci and Tang (2006), and simulate different coordination scenarios by adjusting different parameters of our models. By using our quantitative model, we can fairly distribute profit in these scenarios and judge the possibility of coordination in systems with different conditions. For example, when a manufacturer faces a maintenance contractor who is in charge of core high-level technology and a maintenance contractor which is more replaceable, how should profits be distributed to attain efficient channel cooperation and in what situations the coordination will be broken? How about a manufacturer with two contractors will similar techniques? At the end of our thesis, we will also discuss the traditional methods (like incentive contract) of profit allocation which don’t consider fairness factor to show the pros and cons of these methods.參考文獻 Alzoubia, H., Alshuridehb, M., Kurdic, B. A., & Inairata, M. (2020). Do Perceived Service Value, Quality, Price Fairness and Service Recovery Shape Customer Satisfaction and Delight? A Practical Study in the Service Telecommunication Context. Uncertain Supply Chain Management, 8(3), 579–588.Campbell, C. M., & Kamlani, K. S. (1997). The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence From a Survey of Firms. The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence From a Survey of Firms, 112(3), 759–789.Cruijssen, F. (2010). Supplier-Initiated Outsourcing: A Methodology to Exploit Synergy in Transportation. European Journal of Operational Research, 207(2), 763–774.Cui, T. H. (2007). Fairness and Channel Coordination. Management Science, 53(8), 1303–1314Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868.Fehr, E., Klein, A., & Schmidt, K. M. (2007). Fairness and Contract Design. Econometrica, 75(1), 121–154.Flisberg, P., Frisk, M., Guajardo, M., & Rönnqvist, M. (2015). Reallocation of Logistics Costs in a Cooperative Network of Sawmills. Computational Methods in Applied Sciences, 45, 171–183.Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367–388.Herreiner, D. K., & Puppe , C. (2010). Inequality Aversion and Efficiency with Ordinal and Cardinal Social Preferences—An Experimental Study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 76(2), 238–253.Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. l., & Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market. The American Economic Review, 76(4), 728– 741.Katok, E. (2013). Fairness in Supply Chain Contracts: A Laboratory Study. Journal of Operations Management, 31(3), 129–137.Layarda, R., Mayrazb, G. & Nickellc, S. (2008) The Marginal Utility of Income. Journal of Public Economics, 92(8), 1846-1857Ôzyurt, S. (2015). Searching for a Bargain: Power of Strategic Commitment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(1), 320–353.Petróczy, D. G., & Csató, L. (2021). Revenue Allocation in Formula One: A Pairwise Comparison Approach. International Journal of General Systems, 50(3), 243–261.Prasnikar, V., & Rotht, A. E. (1992). Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 865–888.Rey-biel, P. (2008). Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2), 297–320.Robinson, L. W. (1993). A Comment on Gerchak and Gupta’s“On Apportioning Costs to Customers in Centralized Continuous Review Inventory Systems.” Journal of Operations Management, 11(1), 99–102.Roth, A. E. (1991). Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study. The American Economic Review, 81(5), 1068– 1095.Sošić , G. (2006). Transshipment Od Inventories Among Retailers: Myopics vs Farsighted Stability. Management Science, 52(10), 1493–1508.Tarakci, H., & Tang, K. (2006). Maintenance Outsourcing of a Multi-Process Manufacturing System with Multiple Contractors. IIE Transactions, 38(8), 77–78.Tarakci, H., & Tang, K. (2006). Incentive Maintenance Outsourcing Contracts for Channel Coordination and Improvement. IIE Transactions, 38(8), 671–684.Zhenga, X. X., Lib, D. F., Liuc, Z., Jiad, F., & Sheue, J. B. (2019). Coordinating a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns through Variable-Weighted Shapley Values. Transportation Research Part E, 126, 227–253.Ziano, I., lembregts, C., & Pandelaere, M. (2022). People Weigh Salaries More than Ratios in Judgments of Income Inequality, Fairness, and Demands for Redistribution. Journal of Economic Psychology, 89. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
企業管理研究所(MBA學位學程)
108363071資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108363071 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 洪叔民 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Horng, Shwu-Min en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蔡德脩 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Tsai, Te-Hsiu en_US dc.creator (作者) 蔡德脩 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Tsai, Te-Hsiu en_US dc.date (日期) 2022 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Aug-2022 18:57:07 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Aug-2022 18:57:07 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Aug-2022 18:57:07 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108363071 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/141381 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 企業管理研究所(MBA學位學程) zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108363071 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 利益分配一直都是供應鏈通路協作中的重要議題，這篇文獻裡我們將探討(1)如何合理的分配合作利益以及(2)哪種情形的利益分配會導致合作破裂。我們透過夏普利值來計算供應鏈中參與者的邊際貢獻，然後計算出每個人合理的應得利潤，此外我們也利用夏普利值針對Schmidt (1999)文獻中的不公平厭惡(Inequality Aversion)的量化公式進行修改，得出能夠合理反映一個供應鏈中，具有不平等條件的各個合作參與者的合作效用(Utility)的模型，並用此模型來判斷一次合作是否會成立或破滅。同時我們也以一個二階段製程系統為例進行數值分析來使我們的分析更具體。因此本研究參考了Tarakci, Tang (2006)研究中的供應鏈模型，透過假定不同參數來模擬不同的供應鏈合作情境，並用我們的模型來計算合理的利益分配以及判斷合作的可行性。例如在該系統中當一個製造商面對一個掌管核心高階技術的維修承包商，以及另一個可替代性較高的維修承包商時，利潤應該如何分配才能促成有效率的通路合作;抑或是當一個製造商面對兩個具有相似技術的承包商時應該如何合理的分配利益。最後，我們也會探討在該論文中傳統的利潤分配方法在加入的公平性的考量後的可行性，以此證明這些方法如激勵合約(Incentive Contract)的優點與缺陷。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Resource allocation is always an important issue in channel coordination of supply chain. In this thesis, we will discuss (i) how to fairly distribute profit and (ii) based on fairness, in what situations the coordination will break. We will use Shapley value to calculate the deserved profit of each participant in a supply chain. Besides, we will modify the formula of inequality aversion in the Fehr und Schmidt (1999) thesis as a model which can reasonably reflect the participants’ utility with different conditions in a supply chain, and use it to judge if a coordination will break or not.At the same time, we take two-process manufacturing system as example and analyze the numerical results in different situations of system through our model. We refer the supply chain models in Tarakci and Tang (2006), and simulate different coordination scenarios by adjusting different parameters of our models. By using our quantitative model, we can fairly distribute profit in these scenarios and judge the possibility of coordination in systems with different conditions. For example, when a manufacturer faces a maintenance contractor who is in charge of core high-level technology and a maintenance contractor which is more replaceable, how should profits be distributed to attain efficient channel cooperation and in what situations the coordination will be broken? How about a manufacturer with two contractors will similar techniques? At the end of our thesis, we will also discuss the traditional methods (like incentive contract) of profit allocation which don’t consider fairness factor to show the pros and cons of these methods. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents Chapter 1 Introduction 1Chapter 2 Literature review 4Section 1 Two process integrated model 4Section 2 System optimization 6Section 3 Incentive Contract 8Chapter 3 Fairness and channel coordination 12Section 1 Shapley value 12Section 2 Assumption and design of the game 13Section 3 Shapley values in different cases 15Section 4 Shapley value in case I 16Section 5 Shapley value in case II and case III 19Chapter 4 The model of inequality aversion 22Section 1 A simple model of inequality aversion from Fehr und Schmidt (1999) 22Section 2 Modefied model 23Chapter 5 Numerical analysis 26Section 1 Predictions in different cases 26Section 2 The effect of a variation in the maintenance time 33Section 3 Resource allocation of situations with different maintenance costs 35Chapter 6 Conclusions 38Reference 40 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1684229 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108363071 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 夏普利值 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 激勵合約 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 供應鏈 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 外包 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 量化 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公平性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Shapley value en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Incentive contract en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Supply chain en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Outsourcing en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Quantitative en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Fairness en_US dc.title (題名) 基於夏普利值的公平性量化模型 —以二階段製程系統為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Quantitative models for fairness issues based on Shapley value – Taking a two-process manufacturing system as an example en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Alzoubia, H., Alshuridehb, M., Kurdic, B. A., & Inairata, M. (2020). Do Perceived Service Value, Quality, Price Fairness and Service Recovery Shape Customer Satisfaction and Delight? A Practical Study in the Service Telecommunication Context. Uncertain Supply Chain Management, 8(3), 579–588.Campbell, C. M., & Kamlani, K. S. (1997). The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence From a Survey of Firms. The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence From a Survey of Firms, 112(3), 759–789.Cruijssen, F. (2010). Supplier-Initiated Outsourcing: A Methodology to Exploit Synergy in Transportation. European Journal of Operational Research, 207(2), 763–774.Cui, T. H. (2007). Fairness and Channel Coordination. Management Science, 53(8), 1303–1314Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868.Fehr, E., Klein, A., & Schmidt, K. M. (2007). Fairness and Contract Design. Econometrica, 75(1), 121–154.Flisberg, P., Frisk, M., Guajardo, M., & Rönnqvist, M. (2015). Reallocation of Logistics Costs in a Cooperative Network of Sawmills. Computational Methods in Applied Sciences, 45, 171–183.Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367–388.Herreiner, D. K., & Puppe , C. (2010). Inequality Aversion and Efficiency with Ordinal and Cardinal Social Preferences—An Experimental Study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 76(2), 238–253.Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. l., & Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market. The American Economic Review, 76(4), 728– 741.Katok, E. (2013). Fairness in Supply Chain Contracts: A Laboratory Study. Journal of Operations Management, 31(3), 129–137.Layarda, R., Mayrazb, G. & Nickellc, S. (2008) The Marginal Utility of Income. Journal of Public Economics, 92(8), 1846-1857Ôzyurt, S. (2015). Searching for a Bargain: Power of Strategic Commitment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(1), 320–353.Petróczy, D. G., & Csató, L. (2021). Revenue Allocation in Formula One: A Pairwise Comparison Approach. International Journal of General Systems, 50(3), 243–261.Prasnikar, V., & Rotht, A. E. (1992). Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 865–888.Rey-biel, P. (2008). Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2), 297–320.Robinson, L. W. (1993). A Comment on Gerchak and Gupta’s“On Apportioning Costs to Customers in Centralized Continuous Review Inventory Systems.” Journal of Operations Management, 11(1), 99–102.Roth, A. E. (1991). Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study. The American Economic Review, 81(5), 1068– 1095.Sošić , G. (2006). Transshipment Od Inventories Among Retailers: Myopics vs Farsighted Stability. Management Science, 52(10), 1493–1508.Tarakci, H., & Tang, K. (2006). Maintenance Outsourcing of a Multi-Process Manufacturing System with Multiple Contractors. IIE Transactions, 38(8), 77–78.Tarakci, H., & Tang, K. (2006). Incentive Maintenance Outsourcing Contracts for Channel Coordination and Improvement. IIE Transactions, 38(8), 671–684.Zhenga, X. X., Lib, D. F., Liuc, Z., Jiad, F., & Sheue, J. B. (2019). Coordinating a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns through Variable-Weighted Shapley Values. Transportation Research Part E, 126, 227–253.Ziano, I., lembregts, C., & Pandelaere, M. (2022). People Weigh Salaries More than Ratios in Judgments of Income Inequality, Fairness, and Demands for Redistribution. Journal of Economic Psychology, 89. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202200660 en_US
