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題名 規範性權力與中國在歐盟之投資：以匈牙利和德國為例
Master’s Program in Diplomacy National Chengchi University Master’s Thesis作者 柯文龍
Keough, Austin Miles貢獻者 陳秉逵
Dr. Chen, Ping-Kuei
柯文龍
Austin Miles Keough關鍵詞 規範性權力
中國
歐盟
中國對外投資
中國歐盟關系
Normative power
Normative foreign policy
China
European Union
China-EU relations
Chinese investment日期 2022 上傳時間 5-Oct-2022 09:16:56 (UTC+8) 摘要 歐盟的規範性權力對人權的普遍化越來越重要。不少國家包含中國批評過歐盟的人權外交。同時許多學者把歐盟成為一個規範的權力。有些學者會批評歐盟的規範性權力，他們認為歐盟的規範性權力是無效的。但是，很少有人研究各個成員國的規範性權力的對外宣傳。本論文面對這個題目與確保歐盟的分裂是否與規範性權力有影響力。
The European Union (EU) has become an international player in the promotion of values and ideas to other nations. It has been criticized by China for its human rights diplomacy, yet it has been commended for setting standards among many nations. Scholars have called the EU a normative power, saying value promotion has become the cornerstone of EU foreign policy, but also argued about the effectiveness of the EU’s normative foreign policy. However, little has been said about what states are doing on the individual level to promote or to avoid promoting, EU norms with non-member states. A unilateral approach to normative power promotion avoids the trap of assumptions associated with the argument of the effectiveness of normative power, with concrete examples and empirical data. This thesis has been organized to build an argument that the choices that EU member states make to either promote, or not promote, EU norms, are related to member states’ relationships with China, by finding what states are doing to promote, or to avoid promoting, EU norms on a state level. As it is accepted that China’s economic power is its commonly used tool, this thesis uses Chinese investment as an independent variable to observe how the actions states take can change due to their relationship with China. By analyzing the causal chain of Chinese investment and close political relations, it discusses how Chinese investment is clearly linked to close political relations with China. Therefore, Chinese investment leads to close political relations and in turn influences member states’ stances on issues related to China, which can lead to fragmentation between EU member states. While many assume fragmentation influences the EU’s ability to promote normative values through its member states, this thesis proves that states can, and do, promote EU normative foreign policy unilaterally, while disproving the argument that fragmentation prevents the EU from promoting normative foreign policy. Chinese investment can, and does, influence EU normative power promotion, but it influences it on the state level. Some states are actively promoting EU normative foreign policy, while others are actively ignoring it. Through a comparative case study to examine Germany and Hungary, this thesis views how member states interact with China, observes how Chinese investment is occurring in the member states, and explores how member states act in relation to China and the promotion of normative values.參考文獻 李明. 2019. “一帶一路與全球治理”《全球政治評論》68:31-50.蘇卓馨. 2018. “歐盟規範性權力與中國關係性權力在中東歐國家實踐”《政治科學論叢》81:69-104.張利華. 2013.“歐盟人權外交與中國應對之策”《學術前沿》2013(1):42-50.Ana Curic A. and Kálmán A. 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國立政治大學
外交學系
109253027資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109253027 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 陳秉逵 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Dr. Chen, Ping-Kuei en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 柯文龍 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Austin Miles Keough en_US dc.creator (作者) 柯文龍 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Keough, Austin Miles en_US dc.date (日期) 2022 en_US dc.date.accessioned 5-Oct-2022 09:16:56 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 5-Oct-2022 09:16:56 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Oct-2022 09:16:56 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0109253027 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/142132 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 外交學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 109253027 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 歐盟的規範性權力對人權的普遍化越來越重要。不少國家包含中國批評過歐盟的人權外交。同時許多學者把歐盟成為一個規範的權力。有些學者會批評歐盟的規範性權力，他們認為歐盟的規範性權力是無效的。但是，很少有人研究各個成員國的規範性權力的對外宣傳。本論文面對這個題目與確保歐盟的分裂是否與規範性權力有影響力。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The European Union (EU) has become an international player in the promotion of values and ideas to other nations. It has been criticized by China for its human rights diplomacy, yet it has been commended for setting standards among many nations. Scholars have called the EU a normative power, saying value promotion has become the cornerstone of EU foreign policy, but also argued about the effectiveness of the EU’s normative foreign policy. However, little has been said about what states are doing on the individual level to promote or to avoid promoting, EU norms with non-member states. A unilateral approach to normative power promotion avoids the trap of assumptions associated with the argument of the effectiveness of normative power, with concrete examples and empirical data. This thesis has been organized to build an argument that the choices that EU member states make to either promote, or not promote, EU norms, are related to member states’ relationships with China, by finding what states are doing to promote, or to avoid promoting, EU norms on a state level. As it is accepted that China’s economic power is its commonly used tool, this thesis uses Chinese investment as an independent variable to observe how the actions states take can change due to their relationship with China. By analyzing the causal chain of Chinese investment and close political relations, it discusses how Chinese investment is clearly linked to close political relations with China. Therefore, Chinese investment leads to close political relations and in turn influences member states’ stances on issues related to China, which can lead to fragmentation between EU member states. While many assume fragmentation influences the EU’s ability to promote normative values through its member states, this thesis proves that states can, and do, promote EU normative foreign policy unilaterally, while disproving the argument that fragmentation prevents the EU from promoting normative foreign policy. Chinese investment can, and does, influence EU normative power promotion, but it influences it on the state level. Some states are actively promoting EU normative foreign policy, while others are actively ignoring it. Through a comparative case study to examine Germany and Hungary, this thesis views how member states interact with China, observes how Chinese investment is occurring in the member states, and explores how member states act in relation to China and the promotion of normative values. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents Abstract 1Chapter 1: Introduction 61.1 Background 61.2 Motivation 81.3 Research Question 91.4 Literature Review 101.4.1 Chinese investment and close political relations 121.4.2 Chinese Investment in Germany and Hungary 141.4.3 Literature Review Conclusion 151.5 Research Design 161.6 Research Method 181.7 Data Collection 221.8 Research Limitations 231.9 Chapter Conclusion 24Chapter 2: Chinese Investment in Germany and Hungary 262.1 Foreign relations between Germany and China 262.1.1 Chinese Initiatives and Germany 272.1.2 Chinese Investment in Germany 302.1.3 Investment Issues Between Germany and China 342.1.4 Technological sovereignty and SOE Activity 372.1.5 Conclusion 392.2 Foreign relations between Hungary and China 402.2.1 Chinese Initiatives and Hungary 432.2.2 Investment in Hungary and Close Political Relations 452.2.3 Comprehensive List of Cooperation Between Hungary and China 472.2.4 Hungary the Accommodating Mercantilist 512.2.5 Conclusion 53Chapter 3: EU Member States and the Promotion of Normative Foreign Policy 553.1 Background 553.2 The Actions of Germany 583.2.1 Technological Sovereignty 593.2.2 Germany Counters Anti-Dumping Measures 603.2.3 Germany Votes to Grant China Market Economy Status 623.2.4 German Cabinet Blocks the Sale of IMST to Addisino 633.2.5 German Government Votes for Xinjiang Sanctions 653.3 The Actions of Hungary 663.3.1 Orban’s Protest of the World Uyghur Congress 673.3.2 Hungary Supports Anti-Dumping Measures 693.3.3 Hungary Votes to Grant China Market Economy Status 703.3.4 Orban Supports the Sale of BrosodChem to SEO Wanhua 723.3.5 Hungarian Government Votes for Xinjiang Sanctions 743.4 Chapter Conclusion 75Chapter 4: Conclusion 764.1 Introduction 764.2 Empirical Findings 774.3 Scope for Future Study 78References 81 zh_TW dc.format.extent 898463 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109253027 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 規範性權力 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中國 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 歐盟 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中國對外投資 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中國歐盟關系 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Normative power en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Normative foreign policy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) China en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) European Union en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) China-EU relations en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Chinese investment en_US dc.title (題名) 規範性權力與中國在歐盟之投資：以匈牙利和德國為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Master’s Program in Diplomacy National Chengchi University Master’s Thesis en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 李明. 2019. “一帶一路與全球治理”《全球政治評論》68:31-50.蘇卓馨. 2018. “歐盟規範性權力與中國關係性權力在中東歐國家實踐”《政治科學論叢》81:69-104.張利華. 2013.“歐盟人權外交與中國應對之策”《學術前沿》2013(1):42-50.Ana Curic A. and Kálmán A. 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